Sadie M. Hollis v. Commissioner of Social Security on Appeal From the United States District Court for…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 04-1868
___________
SADIE M. HOLLIS,
Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
District Court Judge: Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
(Civil No. 02-3073 (JAG))
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 3, 2004
BEFORE: ALITO, BARRY and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 3, 2004 )

-- 1 of 9 --

2
OPINION
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Sadie M. Hollis challenges the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security, affirmed by the District
Court, that she was not disabled during the period July 16, 1996
through June 30, 1998. Hollis contends that the administrative
law judge (ALJ) failed adequately to justify his findings that
Hollis’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of an
impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, App. 1 (a
“Listed Impairment”) and that Hollis was able to perform her
past work until July 1, 1998. Because the Commissioner’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm.
I.
As we write only for the parties, we recite only the
essential facts. Hollis filed for Social Security disability
benefits in March 1997, alleging that she had been disabled
since July 12, 1996 – also the date on which the data entry
facility at which she had been employed closed down. Hollis
alleges that her diabetes, diagnosed in 1994, caused problems
with her hands and feet since late 1995. She testified that her
arms, legs and vision bothered her and restricted her movement,
and that she could not lift more than ten pounds.
Several medical reports bear on Hollis’s capabilities

-- 2 of 9 --

3
prior to July 1998. First, a one page report submitted by
Hollis’s treating physician, Dr. Sylvia Pagulayan, in August
1999 states that Hollis was diagnosed with peptic ulcer disease
and Type II diabetes mellitus in 1994. The report also describes
symptoms of peripheral neuropathy and carpel tunnel syndrome
and concludes that Hollis cannot work, but it does not state
when her disabling condition began. Dr. Pagulayan’s report
was apparently prepared using medical notes from her regular
examinations of Hollis since 1984 or 1985. A second report
that refers to the period prior to July 1998 is that of Dr. Jean
Messihi of New Jersey’s Disability Determination Services. Dr.
Messihi performed a number of tests on Hollis on June 19, 1997
and reported no severe impairments. In particular, he found that
Hollis possessed “normal function of the hands.” Third,
radiologist Dr. Anthony F. Tramontana prepared a report based
on a roentgen examination of Hollis’s chest and lumbosacral
spine on June 26, 1997. Fourth, Dr. Raquel Eleuteri of New
Jersey’s Disability Determination Services submitted a report
based on her examination of Hollis on November 10, 1998. Dr.
Eleuteri found that Hollis’s hand and wrist were in severe pain
and restricted Hollis’s movements. The ALJ relied on Dr.
Eleuteri’s report and other evidence to conclude that Hollis was
disabled from July 1998 onward; he found there was no medical
evidence to support a finding of disability before that time.
Hollis argues that the ALJ did not offer any explanation
as to how he concluded that her impairments were not the
medical equivalent of a Listed Impairment. She further argues
that he erred in his assessment of her residual functional
capacity prior to July 1, 1998 because he (1) rejected her
treating physician’s medical report; (2) did not consult a

-- 3 of 9 --

4
medical expert about the onset date of her disabilities; (3)
rejected Hollis’s subjective reports of pain during this period as
incredible; and (4) failed to compare Hollis’s capacities with the
demands of her past work.
II.
The Commissioner determines whether a claimant is
disabled pursuant to a five-step test. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
Following that five-part test, the ALJ in this case found, first,
that Hollis had not engaged in substantial gainful activity, and
second, that her impairments were severe within the meaning of
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). At the third step, the ALJ was to
determine whether her impairments either met or were equal in
severity with a Listed Impairment; he found that they were not.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). At the fourth step, he was to
determine whether her residual functional capacity was
sufficient to perform her past work; he found that until July 1,
1998, it was. See 20 C.F. R. § 404.1520(e, f). As a result, the
ALJ did not reach step five of the disability test with respect to
the period prior to July 1998. Id.
A. Medical Equivalence
Hollis claims that the ALJ did not properly justify his
conclusion that her impairments did not automatically qualify
her as disabled at step three. In particular, she argues that the
ALJ failed to evaluate the medical evidence as required by 20
C.F.R. § 404.1526(a), failing even to identify which of her
impairments he compared to the Listed Impairments. So
unsatisfactory was the ALJ’s discussion, contends Hollis, that

-- 4 of 9 --

5
it is not amenable to review and reversable for that reason under
Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112
(3d Cir. 2000).
In Burnett, this Court vacated a decision whose analysis
at step three consisted only of a conclusory statement that the
claimant’s impairment did not qualify as a Listed Impairment,
without setting forth any reasons that would have allowed for
meaningful review. Id. at 120-21. But unlike in Burnett, the
ALJ in this case did explain his decision that Hollis’s
impairments did not equal a Listed Impairment. Specifically, he
found that though she suffered from diabetes and hypertension,
in the contested period there was no evidence of any of the
following conditions that could render her impairments
equivalent to a Listed Impairment: retinopathy or acidosis at
least on the average of once every two months, amputation, end
organ damage, cerebral vascular pathology, mycardial
infarction, blockage in the blood vessels, or substantial
adenocarcinoma.
Nor was the ALJ required to consult a medical expert on
the question of medical equivalency. Regulations allow but do
not require a medical expert to opine on the nature and severity
of a claimant’s impairment and whether it equals the
requirements of a Listed Impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(f)(2)(iii). The ALJ based his finding as to medical
equivalence on medical findings, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §
404.1526(b). The available medical evidence was adequate and
it supported the ALJ’s decision.
B. Capacity To Perform Prior Work

-- 5 of 9 --

6
Hollis also claims that the ALJ erred when he found in
step four that prior to July 1, 1998, her residual functional
capacity was sufficient to perform her past work.
First, she argues that he unjustifiably rejected the medical
opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Pagulayan. Because
treating physicians are “most able to provide a detailed
longitudinal picture of a claimant’s medical impairment(s)” and
accordingly bring a “unique perspective” to the medical
evidence, their opinions are controlling if well-supported and
uncontradicted. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). In this case, had
Dr. Pagulayan represented to the Commissioner that Hollis was
disabled since her alleged onset date, the ALJ might have
concluded that her opinion was contradicted by the report
submitted by Dr. Messihi and could potentially have rejected
Dr. Pagulayan’s report in favor of Dr. Messihi’s after due
consideration of the relevant factors and medical evidence. Id.
See also Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000).
But in fact Dr. Pagulayan never stated when the disabling
symptoms she described began. Even though the ALJ left the
record open after the hearing in order to give Hollis an
opportunity to obtain medical notes or other evidence from Dr.
Pagulayan, Hollis failed to produce any additional
documentation of her disability that might have indicated that
those symptoms began prior to July 1, 1998.
Second, Hollis argues that the ALJ was obliged to
consult a medical expert to determine the onset date of her
disability. But such consultation is only mandatory when the
medical evidence is ambiguous. See SSR 82-30, 1983 WL
31249, at *2-*3; Walton v. Halter, 243 F.3d 703, 709-10 (3d

-- 6 of 9 --

1Hollis claims that the Social Security Agency lost part of her file but it does not appear
that Hollis ever submitted reports from Dr. Pagulayan dated prior to July 1998.
7
Cir. 2001). There is no evidence on record that suggests Hollis
was disabled prior to July 1, 1998. Consultation with a medical
expert would nevertheless be required if the absence of
evidence suggesting Hollis was disabled was attributable to
gaps in her medical evidence.1 Id. But not only are two
medical reports from the period prior to July 1998 already on
the record, but also, the frequency of Hollis’s visits to Dr.
Pagulayan over fifteen years suggests that extensive records are
probably in existence, probably in Dr. Pagulayan’s possession.
Because it is claimant’s burden at all but the last stage of the
five-part test to produce evidence of disability, where there is
evidence that complete medical records for a given period are
already in existence, an ALJ is not required to engage a medical
expert to identify an onset date just because claimant contends
that those existing but unproduced records would contradict
other medical reports already on the record. See Doak v.
Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff
bears burden in fourth stage of disability test).
Third, Hollis claims that the ALJ inappropriately rejected
her subjective testimony regarding her pain. In particular, she
claims it is implausible that she became “credible” only after
July 1, 1998. Although subjective reports of pain cannot alone
sustain a disability claim, the ALJ was indeed obligated to give
appropriate consideration to Hollis’s testimony and explain the
reason for finding it incredible in part. See 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(5)(A), 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (providing that

-- 7 of 9 --

8
statements about pain or other symptoms will not alone
establish disability but agency will consider those symptoms
and the extent to which they can reasonably be accepted as
consistent with the objective medical evidence). That is what
the ALJ did in this case. Hollis’s reading of the ALJ’s decision
to imply that Hollis’s credibility as a person magically altered
on July 1, 1998 is disingenuous. It is clear that the ALJ found
that there was not sufficient evidence of the intensity, frequency
and duration of Hollis’s alleged symptoms prior to July 1998 to
support her subjective complaints, and that the medical
evidence suggests her condition would only have been
reasonably expected to produce the alleged symptoms to the
requisite degree from July 1998 forward. Contrary to Hollis’s
suggestion, there is nothing suspicious about the ALJ’s finding
that the objective evidence was consistent with her subjective
complaints in one period but not another.
Finally, Hollis claims the ALJ failed to compare her
residual functional capacities with the demands of her job, as
necessary to arrive at a conclusion regarding her ability to
perform her past work. See 20 C.F. R. § 404.1520(f). But the
ALJ performed precisely that analysis. He observed that
Hollis’s position as a data entry clerk did not require exertion in
excess of the sedentary level. He acknowledged that it did
require bilateral manual dexterity but found that there was no
evidence in the record to establish that Hollis was limited in the
use of her hands prior to July 1998. It was because she could
no longer use her hands for repetitive movements after that time
that the ALJ found Hollis was disabled starting July 1, 1998.
Because each of the findings made by the ALJ in

-- 8 of 9 --

arriving at his conclusion that Hollis was disabled since, but not
prior to, July 1, 1998 were supported by substantial evidence,
we will affirm.

-- 9 of 9 --