KAREN L. DeCARLO v. JOANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY Appeal from the United States…

* Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 04-1388
KAREN L. DeCARLO,
Appellant
v.
JOANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Civil Action No. 03-cv-0563)
District Judge: Hon. Donetta W. Ambrose
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 16, 2004
Before: McKEE and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges,
and BUCKWALTER, District Judge.*
(Filed December 2, 2004)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Karen DeCarlo asks us to review the district court’s affirmance of the Social
Security Administration’s denial of her claim for disability insurance benefits. We
conclude that the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and

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that the Administrative Law Judge posed a properly phrased hypothetical question to the
vocational expert. Accordingly, we will affirm.
I.
Since we write only for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts of this case
except insofar as may be helpful to our brief discussion. Karen DeCarlo stopped working
in July 1997 after she injured herself while working as a delivery room nurse. (A.R.
451). An MRI of her cervical spine in August 1997, revealed a small right parcentral
herniated nucleus pulposus at C6-7 with minimal underlying cord deformity; small
paracentral disc osteophyte complex at C5-6 with minimal cord deformity; and minimal
neural foraminal stenosis at left C3-4. (A.R. 194). An MRI of her brain taken at that
same time was unremarkable. (A.R. 193).
DeCarlo’s claim for disability benefits was denied at the initial level of
administrative review. DeCarlo and a vocational expert testified on appeal before the
ALJ. The ALJ issued a decision denying DeCarlo’s claim, and DeCarlo appealed to the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The district court
affirmed and granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal
followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C.§ 1291. We
conduct a de novo review of the district court’s order for summary judgment, and will

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only reverse if the ALJ’s findings were not supported by “substantial evidence.”
Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 1984). “Substantial evidence” is
defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.”
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)).
To establish an entitlement to social security disability benefits, a claimant must
demonstrate the existence of a “medically determinable basis for an impairment that
prevents him from engaging in any ‘substantial gainful activity.’” Plummer, 186 F.3d at
427-428. A claimant is considered unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity” if
the claimant suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a
continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is only
considered unable to engage in any substantial activity “if his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427-428.
The ALJ utilizes a five-step analysis to evaluate eligibility for disability benefits.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The ALJ must determine: (1) whether the claimant is currently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity;” (2) if not, whether the claimant suffers from a

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“severe impairment;” (3) if the claimant has a severe impairment, whether the
impairment falls on the list of impairments presumed to be severe enough to preclude
gainful work, as listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P., appx. 1; (4) whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent the claimant from performing her past relevant work; (5) if the
claimant is incapable of resuming her former occupation, whether the claimant is capable
of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, in light
of her age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520. The claimant carries the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence
that he/she is unable to return to previous employment (steps 1-4). Dobrowolsky v.
Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). Once the claimant meets this burden, the
burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can engage in
alternative substantial gainful activity (step 5). Id.
Here, the ALJ followed the five-step analysis in determining that DeCarlo suffers
from “severe impairments,” including cervical disc disease, status post C5, 6 and 7 facet
rhizotomy, and depression. However, the ALJ concluded that these impairments
nonetheless permit DeCarlo to perform jobs that involve “light work.” Accordingly, the
ALJ found that DeCarlo is not entitled to receive disability benefits.
DeCarlo presents two issues for appeal. She asserts that: (1) the ALJ erred in step
two of the five-step analysis by not finding that her headaches constitute a severe
impairment; and (2) the ALJ erred in step five by not posing a hypothetical question that

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included headaches as a limitation. We will address each assignment of error in turn.
A. Step Two- Severe Impairment
DeCarlo argues that the district court erred in finding that her headaches did not
constitute a severe impairment. According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a), an impairment
(or combination of impairments) is not severe if it does not significantly limit a
claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. Basic work
activities are defined as the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs, including
walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b)(1).
The ALJ determined that DeCarlo’s headaches did not constitute a severe
impairment because her MRI was negative and because neither her treating nor
examining physicians placed any restrictions on her as a result of her headaches.
In challenging the ALJ’s treatment of her negative MRI, DeCarlo argues:
“[s]urely, the ALJ does not believe that disabling headaches cannot be present in the
absence of a positive MRI scan of the brain.” She claims that the negative brain scan
merely confirms that the ventricles and cortical sulci have a normal appearance and that
there is no evidence of intracerebral hemorrhage. (A.R. 57). DeCarlo may be correct in
stating that a negative MRI, standing alone, cannot conclusively rule out the presence of
disabling headaches. However, as we discuss below, the negative MRI was not the only
reason for the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ also relied upon the fact that neither her treating

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physician nor her examining physician placed specific restrictions upon DeCarlo despite
her complaints about headaches. The ALJ thus found no indication that the headaches
would limit DeCarlo’s ability to work.
DeCarlo has been examined by at least four different physicians and various
occupational and physical therapists since she was first injured in 1997. They noted that
DeCarlo complained of headaches. (A.R. 274-75, 452-53, 483, 557, 559). However,
none of them indicated the headaches affected DeCarlo’s ability to work. It was certainly
not improper for the ALJ to note this omission because it strongly suggests that
DeCarlo’s headaches did not limit employment.
B. Step Five- Hypothetical Question
DeCarlo’s second argument is that the ALJ failed to consider all of the limitations
resulting from her headaches when posing hypothetical questions to the vocational
expert. At step four of the five-step analysis, the ALJ determined that DeCarlo no longer
had the capacity to engage in her past relevant work as a delivery nurse because of severe
impairments other than her headaches and insomnia. Once the evidence established that
DeCarlo cannot perform her past relevant work, the burden shifted to the Commissioner
to establish other jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant
can perform given her medically determinable limitations, age, education and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f).
A hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert must specify all of a

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claimant’s impairments that are supported by the record. Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829
F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). Since DeCarlo’s subjective
complaints of disabling headaches are not supported by objective medical evidence in the
record, the ALJ was not required to include them in the hypothetical question he posed to
the vocational expert. See Craigie v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 56, 57-58 (3d Cir. 1987)
(explaining that an ALJ does not have to accept a claimant’s personal description of
symptoms as objective medical evidence); see also Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 123
(3d Cir. 2002) (finding that the question posed to the vocational expert must include
impairments supported by “medically undisputed evidence in the record.”)
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the record contains substantial
evidence supporting the ALJ’s findings. Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the
District Court.

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