David Angstadt v. MIDD-WEST SCHOOL DISTRICT On Appeal from the United States District Court for the…

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-3912
DAVID ANGSTADT
and BARBARA ANGSTADT,
Parents and Natural Guardians of
Megan Angstadt, A M inor,
Appellants
v.
MIDD-WEST SCHOOL DISTRICT
On Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-02170)
District Judge: Hon. James F. M cClure,
Jr.
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR
34.1(a) July 15, 2004
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and
WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 29, 2004 )
Jeffrey C. Dohrmann
Rieders, Travis, Humphrey, Harris,
Waters & Waffenschmidt
Williamsport, PA 17701
Attorney for Appellants
Michael I. Levin
Paul N. Lalley
Levin Legal Group, P.C.
Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006
Attorneys for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellants David and Barbara
Angstadt brought suit on behalf of their
daughter, Megan Angstadt, against the
Midd-West School District (the “School
District” or “Midd-West”) for civil rights
violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
and for violations of the Pennsylvania
Public School Code of 1949, 24 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. §§ 1-101, et seq. The District
Court granted the School District’s motion
to dismiss1 and the Angstadts appeal this
1 The District Court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state law claims both because it had
dismissed those claims over which it had
original jurisdiction and because the state
law claims were complex. The court
noted that it had dismissed all federal
claims and, quoting the statute that gives
it discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
that “raises a novel or complex issue of
State law,” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1),
concluded that “any question regarding
charter schools in Pennsylvania is a
novel and/or complex issue of State
law.” App. at 19. It also stated that the
charter school question predominates

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decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
The Angstadts sued the School
District based upon its refusal to permit
Megan to participate in interscholastic
basketball. Megan is currently seventeen
years old and has never been enrolled in
the School District, which is her “school
district of residence.” App. at 6. Instead,
she was home schooled from the third
grade to the eighth grade. During her
seventh and eighth grade years (1999-2000
and 2000-2001), Midd-West allowed
Megan to play interscholastic basketball,
granting her an exception to its provision
disallowing students not enrolled in the
School District from participating in its
extracurricular activities.
In 2001, she stopped home
schooling and began attending Western
Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School
(“WPCCS”) as a ninth-grade student.
WPCCS was and is a duly chartered and
certified cyber charter school pursuant to
the Pennsylvania School Code. The School
Code defines “cyber charter school” as “an
independent public school established and
operated under a charter from the
Department of Education and in which the
school uses technology in order to provide
a significant portion of its curriculum and
to deliver a significant portion of
instruction to its students through the
Internet or other electronic means.” 24 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17-1703-A.
Once enrolled at WPCCS, which
does not have a basketball team for female
students of Megan’s grade and age, Megan
continued to play interscholastic basketball
for Midd-West at the beginning of the
2001-2002 school year. However, the
School District “refused to allow [her] to
continue to practice, play and compete in
interscholastic basketball . . . for the
remainder of the 2001-2002 school year
and the 2002-2003 school year by claiming
that [she] has not met the . . .
requirements.” App. at 31 (Compl. ¶ 18).
The Angstadts contend these requirements
are “unreaso na bl e, a rb itra ry and
capricious.” App. at 31 (Compl. ¶ 18).
Pursuant to the Pennsylvania
School Code, made applicable to cyber
charter schools by 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 17-1747-A,
. . . . no school district of
residence shall prohibit a
student of a charter school
from participating in any
extracurricular activity of
that school district of
residence: Provided, That
the student is able to fulfill
all of the requirements of
participation in such activity
and the charter school does
not provide the same
extracurricular activity.
over the federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(2). It therefore dismissed Count
IV of the complaint without prejudice.

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24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17-1719-A(14)
(emphasis added). The Angstadts allege
that Megan “has met all charter school,
cyber charter school, Pennsylvania
Department of Education, and PIAA
[Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Association] requirements, and all
reasonable requirements placed upon her
by [the School District], to practice, play
and compete in interscholastic basketball
. . . .” App. at 31 (Compl. ¶ 19) (emphasis
added). The implication of this statement
is that there were requirements Megan did
not meet.
The Angstadts filed their initial
complaint, along with a request for a
temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction, on January 29,
2002, seeking to compel the School
District to permit Megan to participate in
interscholastic basketball. The District
Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
February 4, 2002 and denied the request
for a stay, after which the Angstadts
voluntarily dismissed their complaint on
the ground that the Pennsylvania
legislature amended the Charter School
Law to authorize cyber charter schools.
They filed their second complaint,
initiating the instant action, on November
27, 2002, again seeking a temporary
restraining order, a preliminary injunction
and other relief to compel the School
District to permit Megan’s participation in
interscholastic basketball competition.
This complaint alleged that the School
District violated Megan’s rights to First
Amendment freedom of association, Due
Process, and Equal Protection. The
District Court denied the requested
tempora ry restraining order a n d
preliminary injunction.
The School District referenced two
letters, entered into the record in the first
action, which set forth the requirements
imposed on Megan under 25 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 17-1719-A(14) in order to
qualify for extracurricular activities. In
their responsive pleadings, the Angstadts
contended that the District Court could
consider the letters as materials outside the
pleadings only after converting the motion
to dismiss to a summary judgment motion
to afford them an opportunity to submit
additional materials under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56.
The District Court granted the
motion to dismiss, holding that the
requirements for participation were not
disputed by the Angstadts and were
integral to the complaint, and that the
Angstadts had failed to state a claim on the
First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal
Protection grounds pleaded.
II.
DISCUSSION
We exercise plenary review of a
dismissal order pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
A. Motion to Dismiss and Summary
Judgment
The Angstadts argue that because
“[i]n determining whether a claim should
be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a court
looks only to the facts alleged in the

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complaint and its attachments without
reference to other parts of the record,”
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &
Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.
1994), the District Court erred in
considering information set forth outside
the complaint. However, we have
recognized that “[a]lthough a district court
may not consider matters extraneous to the
pleadings, a document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint may
be considered without converting the
motion to dismiss into one for summary
judgment.” U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v.
Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (emphasis deleted).
The gravamen of the Angstadts’
complaint is that the requirements for
participating in extracurricular activities
are unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious,
but the Angstadts neither enumerate the
requirements generally nor specify the
requirements to which they object. These
requirements were integral to the
complaint, as the Angstadts’ claim could
not be evaluated without some reference to
them. In light of the Angstadts’ failure to
enumerate them for the District Court, the
School District sensibly undertook to do
so. The Angstadts do not dispute the
factual accuracy of the twenty-nine
requirements set forth by the School
District in the two letters previously
referenced, dated October 23, 2001 and
November 30, 2001. Instead, the
An gstad ts contend that the lis t
summarizing these requirements into five
general categories, provided by the School
District, was improperly considered by the
District Court.
We do not agree that the District
Court accepted the School District’s
characterization of the requirements as
falling into five over-simplified and rather
benign catego ries, “ w ithout even
reviewing the documents on which that
representation was based.” Appellants’
Br. at 21 (emphasis in original). First,
there is no basis for the implication that
the District Judge, who presided over the
action in which the two letter documents
were of record, was unfamiliar with the
documents on which the summary was
based. In fact, many of the requirements
are set forth in the relevant statutes. Such
requirements include full-time attendance
with attendance meaning “a minimum of
180 days of instruction,” App. at 46
(quoting 22 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Code
11.1); a day of instruction meaning “time
in the school day devoted to instruction
provided as an integral part of the school
program under the direction of certificated
school employees,” App. at 46; a
curriculum appro ved by and in
conformance with the regulations of the
State Board of Education and the
Pennsylvania School Code, App. at 49
(quoting PIAA Bylaws, Art. IX, § 1); and
“passing at least four full-credit subjects or
the equivalent. Eligibility shall be
cumulative from the beginning of a
grading period, shall be reported on a
weekly basis, and shall be filed in the
principal’s office.” App. at 50 (quoting
PIAA Bylaws, Art. IX, § 1).
H a v i n g p u t t h e re l e v a nt

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requirements at issue, the Angstadts
cannot now claim that their own failure to
enumerate these requirements creates an
issue of fact precluding dismissal. The
District Court accepted the School
District’s summary of the five categories
of requirements as:
1. Megan must have achieved
at least the 9th grade level
academically;
2. Megan’s curriculum must be
similar to the curriculum,
i n c l u de t h e p h y s ic a l
education course, for the
students enrolled in Midd-
West;
3. M eg a n a n d W P C C S must
p r o v i d e v e r i f i a b l e
attendance documentation;
4. Mega n and WPC CS mus t
document on-going passing
grades;
5. Megan must mainta i n an
average or above citizenship
grade.
App. at 45-46 (footnotes omitted).
Because Megan did not receive any
internet instruction or attend any “real
time” courses, which meant that all of her
attendance and class time was self-verified
instead of verified by certified instructors,
and because she studied a curriculum
provided by the University of Missouri and
not approved by the State Board of
Education, the School District deemed her
ineligible to participate in interscholastic
sports. Furthermore, for the reasons that
follow, the Angstadts’ complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, and this failure could not have
been cured by additional factual evidence.
B. Freedom of Association
The Angstadts argue that
“educational choices of the type and nature
at issue in this matter are within the scope
of constitutionally protected associations
and that [the School District’s] actions
interfere with or chill those rights as
exercised by the [sic] Megan and her
family.” Appellants’ Br. at 24. The
School District responds that the
“Angstadts do not allege that Megan is
unable to attend WPCCS as a consequence
of the [School] District’s requirements . .
. ; they have not, in fact, been deprived of
the educational alternative of attending a
cyber charter school by reason of the
[School] District’s implementation of its
requirements for participation in its
extracurricular activities.” Appellee’s Br.
at 18-19. We agree.
To determine whether the School
District’s refusal to allow Megan to
participate in interscholastic basketball
violates her right to association, we must
identify the precise nature of the
associational right in question, the extent
to which the state action regulates that
right, and thus the appropriate level of
scrutiny under which to view that state
action.
As the right to education is not
constitutionally protected, San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,

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411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), we turn to whether
there is a protected intimate, as opposed to
expressive, association right at issue. The
right of intimate association extends to
“child rearing and education.” Bd. of Dirs.
of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). In Pierce v.
Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925), the Supreme Court struck down
a state statute that “unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.”
That statute, however, made public
education compulsory, subject to specific
exceptions, thereby directly impacting the
right of parents to educate their children in
the manner they desired. Here the
regulation in question – the requirements
placed upon students who wish to
participate in interscholastic basketball –
does not impact the Angstadts’ ability to
educate their daughter in the manner they
choose.2 At best, the regulation’s impact
on the Angstadts’ right to rear Megan is
attenuated.
Furthermore, state action that
incidentally affects the parent-child
relationship is subject to minimum
scrutiny, requiring only that the action
rationally advance a legitimate government
interest. See Phila. Police & Fire Ass’n
for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of
Phila., 874 F.2d 156, 162-63, 168 (3d Cir.
1989). Under the rational basis standard,
the Angstadts had the burden of
overcoming the presumption of rationality,
see Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581,
594 (3d Cir. 1985), and their bare legal
conclusion that the requirements that they
failed to enumerate are “unreasonable,
arbitrary and capricious,” App. at 31
(Compl. ¶ 18), is insufficient to rebut the
presumption of rationality. Because the
burden on the Angstadts’ right to educate
Megan, to the extent there is a burden, is at
best incidental, the District Court did not
err in dismissing the complaint as to the
right of association claim.
C. Due Process
The Angstadts’ due process claim
can be summarily dismissed. They
concede that “no property interest exists in
participation in extracurricular activities,
including sports, as a general principle,
under the United States Constitution.”
Appellants’ Br. at 29. Even if the state
statute were to be viewed as giving Megan
a property interest in participating in
extracurricular sports, the statute expressly
conditions that participation on the proviso
“that the student is able to fulfill all of the
requirements of participation in such
activity.” 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 17-
1719-A(14). The Angstadts’ assertion that
Megan has m et all “reasonable
requirements,” suggests that they concede
that she has not met all of the
“requirements of participation” for
interscholastic basketball. It follows that
Megan has no property interest for which
2 There is no constitutionally
protected right to play sports. Thus the
fact that the requirements regulate
Megan’s ability to play basketball is of
no legal consequence.

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due process must be afforded. Thus, we
agree with the District Court that the
Angstadts fail to state a due process claim
upon which relief may be granted.
D. Equal Protection
The Angstadts allege that the
“unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious
requirements to practice, play and compete
in interscholastic basketball” deprive
Megan “of equal protection of the law
based upon [her] status as a cyber charter
school student.” App. at 36 (Compl. ¶ 41).
We apply the highly deferential, rational-
basis standard of review because the
School District’s requirements do not
burden any fundamental constitutional
right, and the difference between cyber-
school students and physical-school
students is not a suspect classification,
such as those based on race, alienage, or
national origin. Moreover, there is no
differing or unequal treatment because the
requirements imposed upon cyber-school
students are no different than those
imposed upon physical-school students.
The additional difficulty that cyber-school
students may face is insufficient to plead
an equal protection violation absent
membership in a suspect classification.
In any event, the Angstadts’ claim
cannot pass the rational-basis threshold.
“Under rational-basis rev iew, th e
challenged classification must be upheld
‘if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.’” Donatelli v.
Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993)
(quoting FCC v. Beach Communications,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). The
School District put forth five interests
animating the list of requirements. As
stated by the District Court, they are:
(1) ensuring that its student
athletes have the academic
eligibility to play high
school sports; (2) ensuring
that its athletes meet its
p h y s i c a l e d u c a t i o n
r e q u i r e m e n t s ; ( 3 )
discouraging students from
cutting class or taking
unauthorized trips away
from school during the
school day; (4) encouraging
students to maintain passing
grades[;] and (5) promoting
good citizenship.
App. at 17 (citations omitted). These
reasons provide a rational basis for the
requirements for participation in extra-
scholastic events by cyber-students as well
as physical-school students.3
Because the Angstadts fail to
allege, as a preliminary matter, that the
state action differentially regulates cyber-
school students and physical-school
students, which is a non-suspect
classification, and because the complaint
could not defeat rational-basis review, we
affirm the decision of the District Court as
to the equal protection claim.
3 Whether they violate the
Pennsylvania Public School Code is a
matter for the state courts to resolve.

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III.
CONCLUSION
The District Court did not err when
it dismissed the Angstadts’ First
Amendment, Due Process, and Equal
Protection claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
We will therefore affirm its order
dismissing the action, without prejudice to
the Angstadts’ right to file their state
claims in state court.

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