Pravinbhai B. Patel v. JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States

*The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 03-3327
PRAVINBHAI B. PATEL,
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board No. A70-651-284)
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on May 24, 2004
BEFORE: ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and
SCHWARZER,* Senior District Judge
(Filed: February 3, 2005)

-- 1 of 6 --

2
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge.
In this immigration case, petitioner Pravinbhai Patel seeks affirmation of his
Petition for Review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ orders denying his application
for political asylum and withholding of removal. We will deny the petition for review.
I. Facts Pravinbhai Patel, a 43 year old male, was born in India and remains a
citizen of India. He entered the United States, without inspection, on November 11,
1992, at the U.S./ Mexican Boarder.
On or about March 8, 1993, Patel filed an asylum application with the INS. Patel
based his asylum claim on the mistreatment and threats he endured as a result of his
religious and political affiliation. Patel contended that he was a Muslim and was the
Secretary of the Muslim League in his village.
On October 2, 2001, Patel filed an amended asylum application containing a
completely different set of allegations. Patel contended that he was Hindu and that his
father was a local leader in the BJP, a major Hindu political party. He alleged that the
Muslims came to his home twice, physically assaulted him and his family, and threatened
to kill his family if they did not leave the village. Patel reported these incidents to the
local police but they allegedly refused to help. As a last resort, Patel claimed he burnt
down his home and relocated with his family to Surat, India. In Surat, Patel contended he

-- 2 of 6 --

3
was recognized and threatened by Muslims because of his father’s involvement with the
BJP and because he was a Hindu.
During his final evidentiary hearing, on February 7, 2002, Patel testified that his
amended asylum application contained an accurate account of his allegations. The
Immigration Judge (IJ) considered all the evidence and denied Patel’s application for
relief, finding his application and testimony not credible. The IJ noted the inconsistency
between Patel’s original and amended asylum applications warranted disbelief.
Additionally, the IJ found Patel’s claim that the police refused to assist him implausible in
light of the State Departments Report, which revealed police support of Hindus. The IJ
also found it unlikely that Muslims would recognize Patel in a village 300 miles from his
home. Finally, the IJ noted that Patel failed to corroborate his father’s alleged
involvement in the BJP.
Patel appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA affirmed the
IJ’s decision without a separate opinion. After his motion to reconsider was denied by the
BIA, Patel appealed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
When the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without opinion, we must review the IJ’s
decision. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Chen v. INS,
87 F.3d 5, 7 n.3 (1st Cir. 1996)). We review both the IJ’s denial of asylum eligibility and
adverse credibility determination under the substantial evidence standard. Goa v.

-- 3 of 6 --

4
Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). Under this standard, the IJ’s findings must be
“supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as
a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The IJ’s ruling must be upheld “unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Gao, 299F.3d at 272. We have
jurisdiction over the petition for review under section 242(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a).
III. Discussion
An adverse credibility ruling must be based on substantial evidence in the record.
Gao, 299 F.3d at 272. The fact finder must provide cogent reasons that relate to the
asylum claim as the basis for questioning the applicants credibility. See
Balasubarmanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998). An adverse credibility
determination based on “implausibility” is only proper if made against the background of
the country conditions. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003). Additionally, the IJ
can view the applicant’s testimony in light of the strength or weakness of additional
evidence presented. See, e.g., Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 548.
When seeking asylum, an alien has the burden of showing that he or she is a
refugee as defined by the INA. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13. Under the INA, a refugee is a person
that is unable to return to his or her home country “because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion ...or political opinion ... .” 8

-- 4 of 6 --

5
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The alien must establish his or her asylum claim through
credible testimony. Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d. 477, 484 (3d Cir. 2001).
We find the IJ based his adverse credibility ruling on sufficient grounds. The IJ
cites specific reasons, based in the record, to support his adverse credibility ruling: (1)
the discrepancy between the original and amended application and (2) the implausible
evidence and omissions in Patel’s testimony based on his amended application.
Patel asserts that case law cautions an IJ to place little emphasis on the veracity of
an immigrant’s statements given at the border. Due, however, to the direct impact on
Patel’s overall credibility, the IJ, in making his adverse credibility ruling, was justified in
relying on the conflicting asylum applications. We do not believe that a reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to find otherwise.
Furthermore, the IJ indicates that events alleged in Patel’s amended application
and testimony are implausible. Patel claims that after he was attacked by Muslims he
reported the violence to the local police, who did not act because they were “unable to
become involved in [the] matter.” In light of the U.S. State Department Country Report,
the IJ concludes that these events are implausible. The Country Report indicates that
Hindus are the majority in India and the police support Hindus in responding to M uslim
attacks. Against the background of the reported police support, the IJ was reasonable in
finding Patel’s testimony was implausible.
The IJ also found Patel’s claim that Muslims threatened him in Surat, a distant

-- 5 of 6 --

6
village, implausible. Patel asserts that the IJ failed to establish reasons why his testimony
was implausible. Evidence in the record, however, supports the IJ’s finding. Patel
testified, without further explanation, that his father was not a “big leader” in his home
village and that Surat is located 300 miles away from his home. The IJ was reasonable in
finding it implausible that Muslims recognized Patel in a village 300 miles away from his
home because of his father’s minor leadership role in the BJP. We conclude that a
reasonable fact finder would not be compelled to find otherwise.
The IJ also cites the lack of corroborative evidence as support for his adverse
credibility ruling. Patel alleges that the attacks and threats he experienced from Muslims
are partly attributable to his father’s involvement in the BJP. Although his father’s
political affiliation is integral to his claim, Patel failed to provide evidence corroborating
his father’s leadership role in the BJP. Patel argues that an alien is not required and
cannot fairly be expected to provide corroborative evidence in an immigration hearing.
The IJ reasoned that Patel could easily have established his father’s political involvement
through testimony by his mother or wife, who both currently reside with him. We agree
that this is not the type of evidentiary burden that will excuse an alien from supplying
corroborative evidence. The IJ was reasonable in finding the lack of corroborative
evidence weakened Patel’s credibility.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Patel’s petitions for review.

-- 6 of 6 --