Joseph Newton v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation

APS–327 UNREPORTED - NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 03-2135
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JOSEPH NEWTON,
Appellant
v.
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF
PROBATION AND PAROLE; DAVE WITHERS;
JOSEPH GOBER;
ARTHUR AMATO, Sued individually and
in their official capacity
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On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-00201)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
September 25, 2003
Before: SLOVITER, M CKEE AND SMITH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed November 12, 2003 )
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OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Joseph Newton, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his civil
rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 for failure to state a

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claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Upon consideration of the record on
appeal, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint.
In February 2003, Newton filed suit against the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole (Board), Hearing Examiner Dave Withers, Parole Supervisor Joseph Gober,
and Parole Agent Arthur Amato. In his complaint, Newton alleges that he has been
subjected to unlawful detention and wrongful imprisonment as a result of the defendants’
actions in improperly revoking his parole. Newton includes in his complaint several
claims based on Pennsylvania law, including allegations of abuse of process, malicious
use of process, false arrest, false imprisonment, conspiracy to commit official oppression
and the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Appellant sought monetary damages, as
well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
The M agistrate Judge to whom Newton’s complaint was referred issued a Report
recommending, inter alia, that Newton’s federal claims be dismissed for failure to state a
claim insofar as appellant’s challenge to his detention sounded in habeas and thus had to
be pursued through the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus once state remedies
had been exhausted, and because his claims for monetary and declaratory relief were not
cognizable under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). With respect to Newton’s
state law claims, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court decline to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction and, instead, dismiss them without prejudice to appellant’s right
to assert them in state court. Over Newton’s objections, the District Court adopted the

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recommendations set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report. This timely appeal
followed.
Having reviewed the record on appeal, we find no error in the District Court’s
disposition of the claims asserted in Newton’s complaint. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court explained that when a prisoner challenges “the fact
or duration of his confinement[ ] based ... upon the alleged unconstitutionality of state
administrative action[,] [s]uch a challenge is just as close to the core of habeas corpus as
an attack on the prisoner’s conviction.” Id. at 489. Thus, insofar as Newton challenged
the actions of the Board in revoking his parole and requested injunctive relief in the form
of release from confinement, the District Court was correct to conclude that habeas
corpus was his sole federal remedy. Id. at 500. Moreover, because the District Court
determined that Newton had yet to pursue state remedies with respect to the Parole
Board’s revocation decision (a determination with which we agree), we cannot fault the
District Court for failing to construe appellant’s complaint as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus since such a petition would have ultimately been subject to dismissal on
exhaustion grounds.
We likewise agree with the District Court’s determination that Newton’s claims
seeking declaratory and monetary relief for an allegedly unconstitutional term of
imprisonment are not cognizable under Heck unless and until appellant establishes that
the Parole Board’s revocation decision has been reversed on appeal, expunged, or called

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into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court. From a
reading of Newton’s complaint, it is clear that the nature of his allegations are such that,
if proven, they would necessarily imply the invalidity of the decision to revoke his parole.
See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997).
Accordingly, because we find that the appeal presents no arguable issues of fact or
law, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319 (1989).

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