Camphill Soltane v. Us Department of Justice

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 03-1626
____________
CAMPHILL SOLTANE,
Appellant
v.
US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERVICE
___________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
District Court Judge: Honorable Herbert
J. Hutton
(Civil Action No. 02-0727)
________________
Argued: December 5, 2003
Before: SLOVITER and ALITO, Circuit
Judges, and OBERDORFER, District
Judge*
(Opinion Filed: August 26, 2004)
LAWRENCE H. RUDNICK (Argued)
1608 Walnut Street, Suite 1500
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellant
PATRICK L. MEEHAN
LAURIE MAGID
VIRGINIA A. GIBSON
SUSAN R. BECKER (Argued)
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
____________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________________
ALITO, Circuit Judge:
Camphill Soltane (“Camphill”)
appeals a final order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania affirming the denial of
Camphill’s visa petition on behalf of an
employee sought to be classified as a
“special immigrant religious worker.”
Because that denial was predicated on
legal error and improper findings of
evidentiary deficiency, we vacate the
judgment of the District Court and remand
this case for reconsideration by the agency.
I.
Camphill Soltane is a non-profit
organization, dedicated to providing
services to young adults with mental
disabilities. Rooted in “Anthroposophy”
and the teachings of Rudolph Steiner,
* The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer,
Senior District Judge for the District of
Columbia, sitting by designation.

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2
Camphill seeks to create a spiritual
community through cooperative life, social
interaction, and spiritual activity. “The
Camphill Movement is focused on
Christianizing the ordinary aspects of life
for the mentally handicapped as well as for
the fully able members of the community
. . . .” Appellant Br. at 6.
Since 1996, the Chester County
facility of Camphill has employed
Annagret Goetze, a citizen and native of
Germany. Goetze was originally admitted
into the United States in the R-1
classification as a nonimmigrant religious
worker. In 2000, Camphill filed an I-360
immigrant visa petition on behalf of
Goetze with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS).1 This
petition sought to have Goetze classified
as a special immigrant religious worker so
that she could serve in the proposed
position of houseparent, music instructor,
and religious instructor at the Camphill
facility.
The Vermont Servicing Center of
the INS made a request for further
evidence showing that Goetze had two
years of experience in a religious
occupation and that she had received
specific religious training. App. I at 32.
Camphill responded with explanations of
the training process and the religious
nature of the position, see App. II at 59-61,
as well as a set of literature (some
authored by Steiner) that discussed
Anthroposophy and the “C amphill
M ovem ent” and was presumably
submitted as representative training
material. See App. II at 62-146.2
No twiths tanding the su pplem enta l
submissions, the INS denied Camphill’s
petition in February 2001, finding that
Camphill had failed to establish that
Goetze was to be employed in a religious
occupation, as required under the
regulations. App. I at 31.
Camphill filed a timely appeal with
the Administrative Appeals Unit. In
December 2001, a final administrative
d e c i s io n w a s r e n d e r e d b y t h e
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) of
the INS. Reviewing the record de novo,
the AAO affirmed on four independent
grounds, any one of which alone could
have justified the denial: (1) Camphill did
not qualify as a religious organization as
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C); (2)
the proposed position of houseparent was
neither a religious occupation nor a
religious vocation; (3) there was
insufficient evidence to determine whether
Goetze had worked in a religious position
for two years preceding the petition; and
(4) Cam phill provided insufficient
evidence to prove that there was a
1The INS has ceased to exist as of
March 1, 2003, and has been replaced by
the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services. We nevertheless use the term
INS throughout this opinion (as do the
briefs) for the sake of consistency.
2For example, App. II at 86 is a sheet
labeled “Study Material” listing several
sources, some of which appear to be
included in the administrative record.

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3
qualifying tender of a job to Goetze.
Camphill appealed for review of the
AAO decision in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). In February 2003,
the District Court entered judgment against
Camphill, affirming the AAO decision on
all four grounds. This appeal followed.
II.
As a preliminary matter, we are
required to consider the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction, even though neither
party contends that it is lacking here. See
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,
475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“[E]very federal
appellate court has a special obligation to
satisfy itself not only of its own
jurisdiction, but also that of the lower
courts in a cause under review, even
though the parties are prepared to concede
it.”) (internal quotes omitted). The
jurisdictional question in this case centers
on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which
provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court
shall have jurisdiction to
review . . . any other
decision or action of the
Atto rney Ge neral th e
authority for which is
specified under this title [8
U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq.] to
be in the discretion of the
Attorney General, other than
the granting of relief under
[8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)]
[governing asylum].
Id. In this case, the statutory basis for
Camphill’s visa request was 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(b)(4), which governs the issuance
of preference visas to “certain special
immigrants,” including those engaged in a
“religious occupation or vocation,” see id.
§ 1101(a)(27)(C)(ii). If the AAO’s denial
of Camphill’s visa request constituted a
“decision or action of the Attorney General
the authority for which is specified under
this title to be in the discretion of the
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,” t h e n un d e r
§ 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii) the District Court
lacked jurisdiction to review the agency
action.
The key to § 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii) lies
in its requirement that the discretion giving
rise to the jurisdictional bar must be
“specified” by statute. In other words,
“the language of the statute in question
must provide the discretionary authority”
before the bar can have any effect.
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,
345 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2003). For
example, in Spencer Enterprises, the Ninth
Circuit found no discretion specified in a
statute that listed “clear[] . . . eligibility
requirements” with instructions that a visa
“shall” issue when those requirements are
met. By contrast, in Urena-Tavarez v.
Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2004), we
found that the statute at issue “explicitly
assign[ed]” discretion to the Attorney
General, focusing on the use of specific
language to that end (“discretion” and
“sole discre tion”), to geth er w ith
instructions that certain actions “may” (as
opposed to “shall”) be taken when any of
the enumerated conditions is satisfied.

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The statute at issue in this case
provides:
Visas shall be made
available, in a number not to
exceed 7.1 percent of such
w o r l d w i d e l e v e l , t o
qualified special immigrants
described in [8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)] (other than
t h o s e d e s c r i b e d i n
subparagraph (A) or (B)
thereof), of which not more
than 5,000 may be made
available in any fiscal year
to sp e ci al im migrants
described in subclause (II)
or (III) of [8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(C)(ii)(II) or
(III)], and not more than 100
may be made available in
any fiscal year to special
immigra n t s , e x c ludin g
spouses and children, who
are described in [8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(M)].
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4) (emphasis added).
A “special immigrant,” as that
classification pertains to ministers and
other religious workers, is defined as:
(C) an immigrant,
and the immigrant's spouse
a n d c h i l d r e n i f
accompanying or following
to join the immigrant, who–
(i) for at least 2
years immediately preceding
the time of application for
admission, has been a
member of a religious
denomination having a bona
fide nonprofit, religious
organization in the United
States;
(ii) seeks to enter the
United States–
(I) solly for the purpose
of carrying on the vocation
of a minister of that
religious denomination,
(II) before October 1,
2008, in order to work for
the organization at the
request of the organization
in a professional capacity in
a religious vocation or
occupation, or
(III) before October 1,
2008, in order to work for
the organization (or for a
bona fide o rganization
which is affiliated with the
religious denomination and
is exempt from taxation as
an organization described in
section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of
1986) at the request of the
organization in a religious
vocation or occupation; and
( i i i ) h a s b e e n
carrying on such vocation,
professional work, or other
work continuously for at
least the 2-year period

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5
described in clause (i);
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C).
The language of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(b)(4) makes clear that the Attorney
General is required to grant preference
visas to those who fall within certain
numerical limits and qualify as “special
immigrants” under § 1101(a)(27). These
relevant numerical limits are set by statute,
see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), and the
definition of “special immigrant” (as
relevant to religious workers) is fairly
detailed and specific, with no explicit
reference to “discretion” as in Urena-
Tavarez. In fact, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4)
bears some similarity to the neighboring
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5), which
was analyzed in Spencer Enterprises, in
that it sets forth specific eligibility
requirements, with instructions that the
visa “shall” issue if those requirements are
met. Accordingly, we do not read
§ 1153(b)(4) as having “specified” that the
granting of the visas in question “be in the
discretion of the Attorney General.”
We note that the dissent in Spencer
Enterprises criticized the majority in that
case for what it believed was an overly
“mechanical” approach, including reliance
on the semantic distinction between “may”
and “shall.” See Spencer Enterprises, 345
F.3d at 696-98. (Beezer, J., dissenting).
We agree that the question of whether
discretionary authority has been specified
by statute should be considered by
examining the statute as a whole. But we
do not think (as the Spencer Enterprises
dissent goes on to suggest) that the use of
marginally ambiguous statutory language,
without more, is adequate to “specific[y]”
that a particular action is within the
Attorney General’s discretion for the
purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Of
course, in a sense, an agency generally has
“discretion” under Chevron to interpret
ambiguous language used in a statute it
administers. But if that sort of ubiquitous
“discretion” were sufficient by itself to
satisfy § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the effects of
that jurisdictional bar would be sweeping
indeed. We do not believe that Congress
intended such a result.3
For these reasons, we hold that a
preference visa determination under
§ 1153(b)(4) is not a “decision or action of
the Attorney General the authority for
which is specified under this title to be in
the discretion of the Attorney General.”
T h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b a r o f
§ 1252(a )(2 ) ( B ) ( ii ) is t h e re f o re
inapplicable in this case.
3Furthermore, if “discretion” under
§ 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii) means nothing more
than the “application of facts to
principles,” see Spencer Enterprises, 345
F.3d at 699 (Beezer, J., dissenting), then it
is hard to imagine any action by the
Attorney General under the relevant title
that would not be deemed discretionary.
For example, the substantial evidence
standard under which we review many
immigration actions contemplates that in
some cases there will be a range of
acceptable outcomes among which an
adjudicator might reasonably choose. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

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6
III.
We now turn to the merits of the
appeal. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, we will reverse agency
action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an
abuse of discretion,” or “unsupported by
substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706;
Spencer Enterprises, 345 F.3d at 693. We
defer to both formal and informal agency
interpretations of an ambiguous regulation
unless those interpretations are “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Thomas
Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S.
504, 512 (1994); Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452 (1997).4
A.
We first consider the question
whether Camphill qualifies as a “religious
organization” under § 1101(a)(27)(C).
The associated regulation at 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.5(m)(3) mandates that petitioners
prove eligibility for tax-exempt status
under “section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 as it relates to
religious organizations.” Id. The AAO
held that “[o]nly organizations classified,
or classifiable, as ‘churches’ . . . are
qualifying religious organizations for the
purpose of special immigrant religious
worker classification.” App. I at 25.
The government later informed the
Court that “the agency [was] in the process
of issuing a memorandum that . . .
broadens its interpretation of when an
organization may qualify as a ‘bona fide
religious organization,’” and that it
therefore desired to withdraw its argument
that Camphill had not qualified for the
special immigration visa on the ground
that it was not a “church.” Appellee Letter
Br. at 1.5 We accept this concession, and
4We need not decide whether the AAO
adjudication in this case is best
characterized as “formal” or “informal,”
since the outcome in terms of deference is
the same. See Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony
Music Entertainment Ctr., 193 F.3d 730,
733 (3rd Cir. 1999); Scott H. Angstreich,
Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of
Seminole Rock Deference to Agency
Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 49, 56 (2000) (“[A]n interpretation
of a regulation in a format lacking the
force of law warrants Chevron-style
deference, but such an interpretation of a
statute does not.”); Note, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 359, 377-78 (2000) (“The Auer Court
. . . held that agencies can issue
authoritative interpretations of their own
ambiguous regulations outside [the
procedural] strictures [of the APA].”); cf.
U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-29
(2001) (agency’s informal interpretation of
a statutory ambiguity does not merit
Chevron deference).
5See William R. Yates, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Extension of
the Special Immigrant Religious Worker
Program and Clarification of Tax Exempt
Status Requirements for R eligious
Organizations (December 17, 2003),
availa ble a t h t t p :/ / w w w . i l w . co m /
lawyers/immigdaily/doj_news/2004,0113

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7
therefore proceed under the assumption
that Camphill qualifies as a “religious
organization.”
B.
We next consider whether the AAO
decision can be affirmed on the ground
that the proposed position of houseparent
is not a “religious occupation.”6 This term
is defined by regulation as follows:
Religious occupation means
an activity which relates to
a traditio nal re ligious
function. Exa mp les of
individuals in religious
occupations include, but are
not limited to, liturgical
w o r k e r s , r e l i g i o u s
i n s t r u c t o rs , r e l ig i o u s
c o u n s e l o r s , c a n t o r s ,
catechists, workers in
r e ligious hospitals o r
r e l i g i o u s h e a l th c a re
facilities, missionaries,
religious translators, or
religious broadcasters. This
group does not include
j a n i t o r s , m a i n t e n a n c e
w orkers, clerks, f u n d
raisers, or persons solely
involved in the solicitation
of donations.
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(2) (emphasis added).
The AAO found that the “duties of the
position [of houseparent] involve the care
of the mentally handicapped,” and that
“[s]uch duties are considered a wholly
secular function, even if the facility is
operated by a charitable organization
founded on religious principles.” App. I at
26. The AAO further explained that “[t]he
service interprets the pertinent regulations
to require that such positions are
traditionally full-time salaried positions
requiring specific religious or theological
training,” and that Camphill had failed to
show that the position of houseparent
satisfied this definition. Id. On appeal,
Camphill argues that the INS erred in
interpreting § 204.5(m)(2) in a manner that
excluded the position in which Goetze was
to serve.
We agree with Camphill that the
AAO improperly applied the regulation in
this case. The characterization of Goetze’s
position as not “relat[ing] to a traditional
religious function” suggests that the
conclusion was predetermined. The AAO
first described what Goetze did in terms
that excluded any mention of the religious
component of her duties—saying that her
job was to care for the mentally
-religiouswker.pdf.
6Camphill originally argued that
Goetze’s position also constituted a
“religious vocation,” as that term is
defined in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(2). The
AAO rejected that position, and Camphill
does not appear to challenge that
determination on appeal. Aside from a
passing reference to the “religious
vocation” term in its brief, Camphill’s
argument is centered entirely on the
meaning of the term “religious
occupation.” See Appellant Br. at 23-28;
Appellant Reply Br. at 8-15.

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8
handicapped—and then concluded that she
was performing a secular function because
its own characterization of what she was
doing was secular. The same approach
could be used as a basis for concluding
that most of the positions explicitly listed
in the regulation are secular. For example,
§ 204.5(m)(2) mentions “religious
translators,” who might be described as
performing the function of translation, a
“secular” activity. Similarly, “religious
counselors” perform the function of
counseling troubled individuals, which
could also be characterized as secular.
Accordingly, we believe the AAO’s
analytic approach is inconsistent with the
text of the regulation.
We note that the regulation
specifically excludes certain workers, such
as “janitors” and “maintenance workers,”
who perform wholly secular functions, but
this does not mean that a person cannot
qualify as having a “religious occupation”
if the worker’s job includes both secular
and religious aspects. In this vein, we note
that the commentary accompanying the
promulgation of § 204.5(m)(2) provides
that “[i]f [a] job has no religious
significance, then the fact that a person is
a member of a religious denomination
working in a facility run by the
denomination would not by itself make
that person a religious worker.” 56 Fed.
Reg. 66965 (Dec. 27, 1991) (emphasis
added). We take this language as
suggesting that a job may qualify under the
regulation if it has some religious
significance. To the extent that the AAO
read § 204.5(m)(2) as requiring that a
“religious occupation” involve only
religious functions, we believe that its
interpretation is inconsistent with the text
of the regulation and other indications of
the agency’s intent and is accordingly not
entitled to deference. Thomas Jefferson,
512 U.S. at 512.
Alternatively, if the AAO’s
decision is read as finding that the position
of houseparent involved only secular
functions, we do not find that conclusion
supported by substantial evidence of
record. Camphill consistently testified that
Goetze’s position involved a number of
clearly religious responsibilities, including
“imbuing residents with the religious
values and practices of Camphill[;]
conducting house-based ac tivities,
including practical chores, prayer, festival
celebrations and Bible readings[;]
instructing other staff in the practices and
Christian values of Camphill life[;] [and]
[t]eaching religious subjects and values to
mentally retarded young adults.” App. I at
35. Moreover, the religious texts included
in the administrative record, including
transcripts from a series of lectures entitled
“Curative Education,” App. II at 62-85,
appear to provide some support for
Camphill’s contention that even the
prescribed manner of care for its mentally
handicapped residents involved religious
aspects. The AAO did not analyze or
otherwise engage this evidence, but rather
stated perfunctorily that Goetze’s duties
are “wholly secular.” There is little or no
support in the record for that claim.
Finally, we consider the AAO’s
position that a “religious occupation” must

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9
be a “traditionally full-time salaried
position[] requiring specific religious or
theological training.” This interpretation
is similarly questionable. The requirement
that the position be “salaried” appears to
be inconsistent with the list of religious
occupations given in the regulation itself,
which includes positions—perhaps most
notably “missionaries”—who do not
always receive salaries. We further note
that in promulgating the final rules at
issue, the agency explicitly stated that they
had been “revised to account more clearly
for uncompensated volunteers, whose
services are engaged but who are not
technically employees.” 56 Fed. Reg.
66965 (Dec. 27, 1991) (emphasis added).
With respect to the “full-time” and
“religious or theological training”
requirements, assuming for the sake of
argument that such requirements are
consistent with the regulation, we see no
evidence that the position offered by
Camphill would not qualify. Camphill
indicated to the agency that Goetze’s
responsibilities required at least 80 hours
of labor per week, see App. I at 35, and
that she would be working “full-time,”
without “supplemental employment.” Id.
at 36. Camphill also submitted detailed
descriptions of its training process, see
App. II at 59-61, as well as extensive
excerpts from its religious texts in
response to the agency’s request for
training curriculum. See App. I at 32;
App. II at 62-146. Again, there is no
suggestion in the AAO’s opinion that this
evidence was ever considered—only the
bald assertion that Camphill had “not
shown that the position of houseparent is
traditionally a permanent salaried position
or that the duties of the position require
specific religious training.” App. I at 26.
This is insufficient to constitute substantial
evidence in support of the AAO’s
conclusion.
We need not set forth here a
definitive test regarding when a job may or
may not be characterized as a “religious
occupation.” However, we think it clear
that the AAO has failed to show why the
position offered by Camphill to Goetze in
this case does not qualify. Accordingly,
we cannot sustain the decision of the AAO
on this ground without further evidence or
explanation.
C.
The other two reasons underlying
the AAO’s denial of Camphill’s visa
application had to do with purported
evidentiary deficiencies. Specifically, the
AAO held that Camphill had not proven
that Goetze had two years of continuous
experience in the relevant occupation, see
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(1), nor had it proven
that a “qualifying job offer” had been
tendered to Goetze, see id. § 204.5(m)(4).
It is true that Camphill did no more
than submit a letter explaining (among
other things) that Goetze had been
employed by Camphill for four years, see
App. II at 35, and that she would continue
to receive room, board, medical insurance,
etc., as compensation for her work, see
App. II at 36. On the other hand, the AAO
decision does not explain in any
reasonable detail why this evidence was

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10
insufficient. The AAO simply states that
“supporting documentary evidence”
should have been submitted, and cites
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14
I. & N. Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972), for
the proposition that the petitioner in visa
proceedings bears the evidentiary burden
of proof.
Of course, there is no doubt that
Camphill bore the burden of proof in this
case; again, the critical question is why the
letter presented by Camphill was
insufficient to sustain that burden. In this
respe ct, Treasure Craft is easily
distinguished from this case. There, the
petitioner went on record as declaring that
competent training in the pottery industry
was not available in Mexico. The
Regional Commissioner deciding the case
took administrative notice of the fact that
Mexico had a thriving pottery trade, and
accordingly held that the assertions by the
petitioner were insufficient to sustain the
burden of proof. Here, by contrast, there
was no similar administrative notice
opposing Camphill’s documentation to the
effect that Goetze did indeed undergo
significant religiou s training, was
employed by Camphill for two years, and
had been extended a job offer.
“An agency's rejection of
uncontradicted testimony can support a
finding of substantial evidence.” Tieniber
v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir.
1983); see also NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co.,
369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). However, an
agency is generally under at least a
minimal obligation to provide adequate
reasons explaining why it has rejected
uncontradicted evidence. See Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., 2 Administrative Law Treatise
§ 11.2 at 791 (2002). For example, if the
AAO ruling was based on a determination
that Camphill’s assertions were not
credible, then there should have been some
sort of finding regarding credibility, either
explicit or implicit. See Tieniber v.
Heckler, 720 F.2d at 1254 (describing
“strict” and “lenient” approaches by
courts); see also Choratch v. Finch, 438
F.2d 342, 343 (3d Cir. 1971) (“We think it
is not too much to require that an
administrative decision that a claimant is
not eligible . . . be supported by explicit
findings of all facts that are essential to the
conclusion of ineligibility.”). The AAO
makes no effort to explain or suggest why
it rejected Camphill’s detailed letter
explaining the nature of Goetze’s position.
Furthermore, Camphill notes that
INS regulations place an obligation on the
part of the INS to request additional
evidence if that which was already
submitted is deemed insufficient. See 8
C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8) (“where there is no
evidence of ineligibility, and initial
evidence or eligibility information is
missing or the Service finds that the
evidence submitted either does not fully
establish eligibility for the requested
benefit or raises underlying questions
regarding eligibility, the Service shall
request the missing initial evidence”)
(emphasis added).7 The INS does not
7For example, although the AAO
mentions that Camphill might have
submitted Goetze’s tax documents to show

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11
provide any explanation, either in the
AAO ruling or in its brief on appeal, as to
why this regulation would be inapplicable
in this case.
Because the AAO’s rejection of the
evidence regarding Goetze’s work
experience and job offer does not appear
to be supported by substantial evidence,
we conclude that the AAO decision may
not be sustained on these grounds without
further evidence or explanation.
IV.
None of the arguments advanced by
the AAO in support of the visa denial
withstand scrutiny on appeal. The AAO
clearly did not “consider[] all relevant
[evidentiary] factors” in this case, Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.
729, 744 (1985), nor did it properly
interpret its regulation defining “religious
occupation.” The “proper course” is
therefore to “remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation.”
Id.
that she had been employed full-time by
C a m p h i l l w i t h o u t e n g ag i n g in
supplemental employment, see App. I at
27, it is clear that the initial request for
additional evidence issued by the INS,
while it demanded several items of
information from Camphill, did not make
any demand for tax documents. App. I at
32.

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