United States of America v. James B. Brown

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-1193
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee
v.
JAMES B. BROWN
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 01-cr-00636-1)
District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 12, 2003
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, GARTH Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed December 22, 2003)
OPINION
AM BRO, Circuit Judge
James M. Brown (“Brown”) appeals the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s denial of a request, under the Criminal Justice Act

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1Brown’s evaluating clinician was Melissa Peters, Ph.D, a forensic psychologist at
the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky.
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(“CJA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1), for funds to engage a psychologist for sentencing
purposes.
Facts and Procedural History
In October 2001, Brown was indicted on charges of: 1) possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon; 2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine base; and 3) possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The District Court declared
Brown indigent and appointed counsel. Thereafter, he entered a plea of not guilty to all
charges. While awaiting trial, Brown was held at a federal detention center.
In January 2002 detention center officials observed that Brown exhibited various
mental health problems. Thereafter, the District Court granted Brown’s motion to be
evaluated for competency to stand trial. He was then transferred to a federal medical
center for evaluation. In April 2002 a forensic psychologist concluded that Brown was
competent to stand trial.1
Brown’s trial began in September 2002. A jury convicted him of trafficking in
cocaine base and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Prior to sentencing,
Brown filed a motion, under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1), to obtain funds so that he could be
evaluated by a clinical and forensic psychologist in order for findings and expert
testimony to be used at the time of sentencing. Based upon the pre-trial forensic

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2We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742.
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evaluation, the District Court denied his motion. Brown petitioned the District Court for
reconsideration of the denial, but it determined that there was no need for a further
psychological evaluation.
At the sentencing hearing, the District Court determined that under the guidelines
Brown’s proper range was 78 to 97 months. Despite continued claims of psychological,
mental and psychiatric infirmity, Brown did not file a motion for downward departure.
The District Court sentenced Brown to a prison term of 90 months. He thereafter
appealed.2
Standard of Review
We review the District Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. “The decision to
grant or deny a motion under [18 U.S.C. §] 3006A(e)(1) is one committed to the
discretion of the district court and [such a] decision will be disturbed on appeal only if it
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir.
1997) (internal citation omitted). To show an abuse of discretion, “appellants must show
the district court’s action was arbitrary[,] fanciful or clearly unreasonable.” Stich v.
United States, 730 F.2d 115, 118 (3d Cir. 1984). We will not disturb a trial court’s
exercise of discretion unless “no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.”
Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000).

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Discussion
CJA funds to assist an indigent defendant in preparing for sentencing are
warranted in the right case. United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d at 143. “Upon finding,
after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and
that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court . . . shall authorize counsel
to obtain them.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1)).
Brown asserts that the District Court’s denial of CJA funds to help him prepare for
sentencing deprived him of his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the United State Constitution. To support this assertion, Brown cites Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), which held that “where mental condition is a significant
factor at sentencing, the denial of psychiatric assistance to a capital defendant results in a
deprivation of due process.” Id. at 87. However, Ake also noted that “defendant’s mental
condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding . . . and it is unlikely that
psychiatric assistance . . . would be of probable value in cases where it is not.” Id. at 82.
“The variable on which [a court] must focus is, therefore, the probable value the
assistance of a psychiatrist will have . . . and the risk attendant on its absence.” Id. at 84.
Based upon the existence of the pre-trial psychological evaluation and the
evaluation’s finding that Brown was competent to stand trial, it was reasonable for the
District Court to find that further psychiatric assistance would not be of value at

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3Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has interpreted Ake such that “the constitution only
requires the government to furnish an indigent criminal defendant psychiatric or
psychological assistance during the sentencing phase of a trial if 1) the defendant’s sanity
was a significant issue during the trial, or 2) defendant is on trial for his life and the state
first presents psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness.” U.S. v. Osaba, 213 F.3d
913, 917 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Kordenbrok v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1120 (6th Cir.
1990). Brown was not on trial for his life and, because the District Court determined that
he was competent to stand trial, his sanity was not an issue.
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sentencing.3 Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to deny CJA
funds to assist Brown in preparing for sentencing.
Conclusion
In this context, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
/s/ Thomas L. Ambro, Circuit Judge
Circuit Judge

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