No: 02-4053 MARIA T. BUSS, Individually v. JOHN QUIGG, Corporal; CAPTAIN LNU; LIEUTENANT LNU; SERGEANT LNU, Corporal John Quigg

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No: 02-4053
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*MARIA T. BUSS, Individually and as Administratrix for the
Estate of Cyril F. Buss, Sr. Deceased; DANA BUSS
v.
JOHN QUIGG, Corporal; CAPTAIN LNU; LIEUTENANT LNU; SERGEANT LNU,
Corporal John Quigg,
Appellant
(*Amended per Clerk's Order on 12/5/02)
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-03908 )
District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on December 19, 2003
Before: ROTH and M cKEE, Circuit Judges
CUDAHY*, Circuit Judge
(Opinion filed: February 5, 2004)
* Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Circuit Court Judge for the Seventh Circuit,
sitting by designation.

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O P I N I O N
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Maria T. Buss, suing on behalf of herself, the estate of her late husband, and their
daughter, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Pennsylvania State Police Corporal John Quigg
and three unnamed supervising officers. Buss’s claims against Quigg included invasion
of privacy, assault and battery, use of excessive force, illegal detention, false arrest, arrest
without probable cause, arrest and detention without due process, unlawful entry, and
false imprisonment. As to the unnamed supervising officers, Buss claimed that they had
failed to adequately train, supervise and take remedial action against Quigg. The District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Quigg all claims except for unlawful entry
and excessive force. Buss subsequently abandoned her claims against the three unnamed
supervising officers. A jury found that Quigg had unlawfully entered the Buss home but
that he had not used excessive force. The jury did not award any damages to plaintiffs in
spite of its finding because of an error in the District Court’s instructions. The District
Court sought to rectify this error by granting plaintiffs nominal damages of one dollar
each. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the District Court also awarded Buss, as the

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1We note that Buss originally sought $35,560 in attorneys fees and $7,979 in costs.
The District Court reduced the attorneys fees to deduct 4.5 hours spent on non-legal
work; the District Court also allowed only $3,479 in costs, excluding $4,500 in non-
compensable expert fees.
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prevailing party, $34,660 in attorney’s fees and $3,479 in costs1. Quigg now appeals
arguing that Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), prevents civil rights plaintiffs, who
obtain only nominal damages on one of multiple claims, from receiving attorneys fees.
Alternatively, Quigg argues that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to
reduce the fee award for limited success.
We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review an
award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. General Instrument Corp. v. Nu-Tek
Elecs. & Mfg., 197 F.3d 83, 91 (3d Cir. 1999). The “question of what standards to apply
in calculating an award of attorney’s fees is a legal question, and therefore we exercise
plenary review over this issue.” Id. (quoting Washington v. Philadelphia County Ct. of
Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (3d Cir. 1996)).
When assessing whether a plaintiff who has won only nominal damages may
reasonably be awarded fees, courts look to the “degree of success obtained.” Farrar at
114. “[W]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove
an essential element of his claim for monetary damages, the only reasonable fee is usually
no fee at all.” Id. at 115. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Farrar also pointed to three
relevant indicia of success: the extent of relief, the significance of the legal issue on

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which the plaintiff prevailed, and the public purpose served by the litigation. Id. at 122.
When considering the reasonableness of an award of attorneys fees, the amount
awarded “should reflect the extent to which the litigant was successful.” Washington, 89
F.3d at 1043 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) (stating “[a] reduced
fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the
scope of the litigation as a whole.”)).
Turning to the merits of Quigg’s first argument, we agree with the District Court
that, although the plaintiffs won only a partial victory, they were the prevailing party.
The determination that Buss and her family acted rightly in defending their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights is significant relief under Farrar. This is especially so
when coupled with the legal significance of unreasonable search and seizure and the
public purpose of deterring such behavior. We conclude also that the illegal entry
component was a central element of Buss’s claim. For these reasons, we agree with the
District Court in finding that Buss did achieve a significant degree of success in
prosecuting her claim and that Buss could recover attorneys fees in spite of the nominal
damages she received.
As to Quigg’s alternative argument that the District Court abused its discretion in
refusing to adjust the fee award for limited success, we note that Buss’s successful and
unsuccessful claims arise out of a common core of facts – Quigg’s unlawful entry –
“making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.” Hensley,

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461 U.S. at 435. Quigg correctly points out, however, that reductions may be in order for
partial success “even where the plaintiffs’ claims were inter-related, nonfrivolous, and
raised in good faith.” Id. at 436. In this case, Buss succeeded only on the unlawful entry
claim. Comparing that success to the scope of the litigation as a whole, Quigg’s
argument is not entirely without merit. Yet “when the trial court applies the correct legal
standard, the court has discretion in determining the actual [attorneys] fees award.”
Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1222 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Hensley 461 U.S. at
437; Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 378 (3d Cir. 1987)). Based on our
review of the record, it is evident that the district judge carefully considered the claims on
which Buss did not succeed and made a reasoned judgment that the time spent on these
claims did not justify a reduction in the fees award. We therefore conclude that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of attorneys fees awarded .
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Jane R. Roth
Circuit Judge

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