Evon Hudson v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY On Appeal from the United States District Court for…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-3591
EVON HUDSON,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(Dist. Ct. No. 01-cv-00685)
District Judge: Honorable William L. Standish
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 25, 2004
Before: ROTH, AMBRO and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges.
(Filed : April 2, 2004)
OPINION

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1 Hudson contends she is challenging steps four and five of the evaluation
process. See Appellant Br. at 4-5. However, her challenge seems to focus on the
residual functional capacity analysis (step 4), rather than the conclusion that given that
capacity there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Hudson is
capable of performing (including custodial worker, hand packager, or fastfood worker)
(step 5). Hudson’s brief also includes a broad claim that the “ALJ failed to properly
consider whether the Appellant’s impairments equals or exceeds [sic] in severity the
impairments listed in Appendix 1” (step 3), see Appellant Br. at 6, but this argument is
never developed.
2
CHERTOFF, Circuit Judge.
Evon Hudson appeals from the District Court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for supplemental security
income benefits (SSI). Hudson’s appeal essentially challenges the Administrative Law
Judge’s (ALJ) determination at step four of the five-step evaluation process promulgated
by the Social Security Administration to determine whether an individual is disabled. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.1 At step four, the ALJ concluded that Hudson retained the residual
functional capacity to perform “light work,” with the additional restrictions that she
should not work around heights or hazardous machinery. For the reasons stated below,
we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
Hudson was born on February 17, 1945. She has a tenth grade education and no
past relevant work experience. Hudson filed for disability benefits on or about

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2 There appears to be some inconsistency in the record with respect to the filing
date. The date of initial filing is listed as September 9, 1996, in the ALJ’s decision, see
Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”) at 16, and in the Initial Disability Determination by
State Agency, see Tr. at 35. However, the date used by the District Court and the date
that appears to be on the Application for Supplemental Security Income is November 13,
1996. See Tr. at 52. For the purposes of this appeal, this date discrepancy is not
material.
3 On July 25, 2001, the Appeals Council extended the time within which to
commence a civil action through April 16, 2001, the date the civil action was filed. Tr. at
4.
3
November 13, 1996,2 alleging disability due to osteoarthritis, hypertension, anxiety and
depression. See Tr. at 56. Hudson’s application for SSI was denied both initially and
upon reconsideration. After conducting a hearing, on February 26, 1999, the ALJ
rendered a decision concluding that Hudson was not entitled to benefits. On October 21,
2000, the Appeals Council denied Hudson’s request to review the ALJ’s decision.
Subsequently, Hudson sought judicial review of the adverse decision, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania.3 On July 16, 2002, the Honorable William L. Standish, adopting the
Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Francis X. Caiazza, granted the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment and denied Hudson’s cross-motion for
summary judgment. This appeal followed.
II.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and

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4
appellate jurisdiction is vested in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The role of this
Court is identical to that of the District Court; we must determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision. Plummer v. Apfel, 186
F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence means “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Jesurum v. Sec’y of
the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “It is less than a preponderance of the
evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Id. Overall, the substantial evidence standard
is a deferential standard of review. Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d
429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).
The Social Security Administration has promulgated a five-step evaluation process
to determine whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see generally
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. In step one, the Commissioner decides whether the claimant
is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not eligible for
disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). In step two, the Commissioner determines
whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment. If the impairment is not
“severe,” the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). In
step three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the evidence establishes that the claimant
suffers from a listed impairment. If so, the claimant is automatically eligible for benefits.
If the claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, however, the

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4 The ALJ’s opinion erroneously refers to him as “Dr. Mueller.” This
typographical error is immaterial to the outcome of the case.
5
Commissioner proceeds to the next step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). In step four, the
Commissioner examines the claimant’s “residual functional capacity,” and whether such
capacity enables her to perform her past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not eligible
for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Finally, in step five the Commissioner
considers whether work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the
claimant can perform given her medical impairments, age, education, past work
experience, and residual functional capacity. If so, the claimant is not eligible for
benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). In this final step, “the burden of production shifts to
the Commissioner, who must demonstrate the claimant is capable of performing other
available work in order to deny a claim of disability.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428.
The issues on appeal arise from the ALJ’s determination at step four that Hudson
had the residual functional capacity to perform light work.
III.
Hudson essentially re-asserts the same two arguments on appeal that she advanced
before the District Court: (1) the ALJ’s conclusion that she could perform the full range
of light work is not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the ALJ erred in relying on
the reports of non-examining physicians instead of a subsequent report by Dr. Moeller,4

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6
an examining physician, in assessing her residual functional capacity.
We do not dwell on Hudson’s first argument as this broad assertion fails to even
identify a specific error by the ALJ. Rather, like the District Court, we are satisfied that
the written decision provides sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Hudson
could perform light work, with the additional restrictions of not working around heights
or hazardous machinery.
We similarly reject Hudson’s second contention that the ALJ erred in relying on
the reports of non-examining physicians for substantially the same reasons as outlined by
the District Court. While this Court has acknowledged that “greater weight should be
given to the findings of a treating physician than to a physician who has examined the
claimant as a consultant . . . [,] a statement by a plaintiff’s treating physician that she is
‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ is not dispositive.” Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 47-48
(3d Cir. 1994). Rather, “the ALJ must weigh the relative worth of a treating physician’s
report against the reports submitted by other physicians who have examined the
claimant.” Id. at 48; see also Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991)
(concluding ALJ correctly determined opinions of treating physicians were not
controlling). “Where . . . the opinion of a treating physician conflicts with that of a non-
treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but cannot reject
evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317
(3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).

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5 The ALJ explained: “The undersigned assigns limited weight to these
conclusions. In light of the relatively normal findings that the claimant had and the fact
that she did not have a meniscal tear in her right knee, the undersigned finds that the
restrictions in her ability to stand and walk are excessive in light of the objective medical
findings.”
7
In this case, the ALJ considered Dr. Moeller’s report but gave limited weight to its
conclusions in light of the objective medical evidence, including MRI and x-ray results.
Tr. at 19-20.5 Moreover, the ALJ properly assigned limited weight to the opinions from
Dr. Frezzell and Dr. Bazron that Hudson was “permanently disabled,” explaining that
“[t]hese reports are conclusory statements only and are not supported.” Tr. at 20. This
Court has explained that “[f]orm reports in which the physician’s obligation is only to
check a box or fill in a blank are weak evidence at best.” Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d
1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993).
Thus, the ALJ did not err in assigning limited weight to opinions of Hudson’s
treating physicians in light of the objective medical evidence. Rather, there is substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Hudson is not disabled.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court entered on July 17,
2002, will be affirmed.

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