Nos: 02-2695/3762 WYATT, VIRGIN ISLANDS, INC. HOVENSA, LLC v. Government of the Virgin Islands by

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
Nos: 02-2695/3762
_____________
WYATT, VIRGIN ISLANDS, INC.
HOVENSA, LLC,
Intervenor-Plaintiff in District Court
v.
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN
ISLANDS BY AND THROUGH THE
VIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR; CECIL BENJAMIN,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMM ISSIONER OF THE VIRGIN
ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
VIRGINIE GEORGE; MALCOLM
MACCOW; EDGAR BARRIOS;
CLAUDE GAINE
Intervenors-Defendants in District Court
Government of the Virgin Islands,
Appellant in 02-2695
Virginie George, Malcolm M accows,
Edgar Barrios and Claude Gaines,
Appellants in 02-3762
Appeal from the District Court of the
Virgin Islands
(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-00029)
District Judge: Honorable Raymond L.
Finch
Argued on April 30, 2003
Before: ROTH, MCKEE and COWEN
Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 12, 2004)
Iver A. Stridiron
Attorney General
Elliott M. Davis
Solicitor General
Douglas J. Juergens (Argued)
Maureen Phelan
Richard S. Davis
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
48B-50C Kronprindsens Gade
GERS Building, 2nd Floor
St. Thomas, VI 00802
K. Glenda Cameron (Argued)
Lee J. Rohn
Law Office Lee J. Rohn
1101 King Street, Suite 2
Christiansted
St. Croix, USVI, 00820
Counsel for Appellants

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Charles E. Engeman (Argued)
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart
1336 Beltjen Road
Suite 202
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, VI 00802
W. Carl Jordan
Tara Porterfield (Argued)
Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.
2300 First City Tower
1001 Fannin Street
Houston, TX 77002-6760
George H. T. Dudley
Micol L. Morgan
Dudley, Topper and Feuerzeig, LLP
Law House, 1A Frederiksberg Gade
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
U.S. Virgin Islands 00802
Counsel for Appellees
O P I N I O N
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Plaintiffs, Wyatt V.I., Inc., and
HOVENSA, L.L.C., brought an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief in the
District Court of the Virgin Islands. The
dispute arose from the requirement Wyatt
imposed on prospective employees that
they sign a Dispute Resolution Agreement
(DRA) as a condition of employment.
Plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the
DRA is enforceable and (2) an injunction
to prohibit the Commissioner of the
Department of Labor from interfering with
their use of the DRA. The District Court
granted declaratory relief in plaintiffs’
favor. Although the defendants raise many
grounds on appeal, the only issue we need
address is whether the plaintiffs’ action for
declaratory and injunctive relief is ripe for
judicial review. For the reasons we state
below, we conclude that, under Public
Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., Inc.,
344 U.S. 237 (1952), there is no “case of
actual controversy” here as is required by
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Thus, plaintiffs’
cause of action is not ripe for review.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2001, HOVENSA awarded
Wyatt a contract to provide maintenance
and other services at HOVENSA’s oil
refinery in St. Croix, Virgin Islands. In
November 2001, Wyatt began accepting
employment applications in the Virgin
Islands. As a condition of employment,
Wyatt required all applicants to sign the
DRA. Under the DRA, each applicant
agreed to submit to binding arbitration all
claims arising from the applicant’s
candidacy for employment or the terms
and co nd itio ns of an y offer of
e m p l o y m e n t . 1 W y a t t ’ s p a r e n t
1 The Dispute Resolution Agreement
provides in relevant part:
NOTICE TO ALL APPLICANTS
If you wish to be considered
for employment with Wyatt V.I.,

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corporation, Wyatt Field Services Co.,
does not requ ire app licants for
employment on the mainland United States
to sign a DRA.
Prospective employees complained
to the Virgin Islands Department of Labor
about the DRA. As a result of these
complaints, the Commissioner of the
Department of Labor sent two letters to
Wyatt requesting that Wyatt “cease and
desist” its use of the DRA. In the first
letter, dated December 20, 2001, the
Commissioner wrote to Todd Reidlinger,
a manager at Wyatt in the Virgin Islands,
“[t]he agreement is improper and illegal; it
does not serve as a portrayal of reasonable
and fair labor/management relations.” The
C o m m i s s i o n e r a l s o asserted th e
Department of Labor’s belief that the DRA
violated the Virgin Islands Wrongful
Discharge Act (WDA), 24 V.I.C. § 76.
Then in a February 1, 2002, letter, sent to
Carmelo Rivera, a human resources
Inc. (“Wyatt”), you must read and
sign the fo llowing Dispute
Resolution Agreement. Your
application will not be considered
until you h ave s igned the
Agreement. If you desire to do so,
you may take this document with
you to review. You must, however,
return a signed copy of the
Agreement with your application if
you wish to continue the
application process.
Dispute Resolution Agreement
I recognize that differences
may arise between Wyatt and me in
relation to my application for
employment. Both Wyatt and I
agree to resolve any and all claims,
disputes or controversies arising
out of or relating to my application
or candidacy for employment or the
terms and conditions of any offer of
employment exclusively by final
and binding arbitration before a
neutral arbitrator pursuant to the
American Arbitration Association’s
National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment Disputes, a copy of
which is available at www.adr.org
or from Wyatt. By way of example
only, some of the types of claims
subject to final and binding
arbitration include claims for an
alleged wrongful decision not to
hire me; claims for discrimination
or harassment on the basis of age,
race, religion, disability, national
origin or other basis prohibited by
state, federal, or territorial law; or
c la im s for breach of any
e m p l o ym e n t a g r e e m e n t o r
promises; and any claims for
personal injury or property damage.
This agreement extends to disputes
with or claims against Wyatt V.I.,
Inc., HOVENSA, L.L.C., and any
of their related or affiliated
companies, entities, employees or
individuals (as intended third party
beneficiaries to this agreement).

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consultant for Wyatt, the Commissioner
stated:
We will do whatever is
necessary to ensure that the
Virgin Islands’ workforce
receive every ‘employment
protection’ guaranteed to
them under our labor laws.
You are hereby advised that
a willful violation of 24
V.I.C. § 76 will be reported
to Office of the Attorney
General for prosecution.
Please cease and desist from
this p r a c tice. Y o u r
cooperation is expected.
Wyatt nevertheless continued to use
the DRA as a condition of employment.2
The Department of Labor then requested
an opinion from the Office of the Attorney
General of the Virgin Islands regarding
Wyatt’s use of the DRA. On March 1,
2002, the Attorney General issued an
opinion letter, stating:
We find that this case is ripe
f o r in j u n c t iv e a n d / o r
declaratory relief, and we
shall proceed to seek such
relief on behalf of the
Department of Labor and
the prospective employees
of Wyatt. We expect to
gather affidavits to support
such an ac tion fro m
prospective employees who
were told they had to sign
these agreements if they
wanted to be considered for
employment with Wyatt,
and felt coerced into signing
the agreements.
* * *
The pre-employment dispute
r e s o l u t i o n a g r e e m e n t
required by Wyatt, Inc. for
prospective employees is in
violation of 24 V.I.C. 76,
and is unco nscionable ,
coercive, an adhesio n
contract, and is contrary to
an important public policy
in the Virgin Islands which
recognizes the employment
r e a l i t y o f a n i s la n d
economy.
After the Attorney General issued the
opinion, the Commissioner notified Wyatt
of his intent to bring charges if Wyatt
continued to use the DRA.
The Government, however, never
filed suit against Wyatt. Instead, on March
20, 2002, Wyatt instituted an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Government. In Count I, Wyatt sought
2 In an apparent effort to reconcile
the dispute over the use of the DRA, the
Commissioner and Wyatt’s attorney
conferred by telephone before the
Commissioner sent the first letter. Wyatt
agreed to remove objectionable language
from the DRA concerning employment at
will but continued to use essentially the
same DRA. The two also met after the
Commissioner sent the first letter but did
not resolve the dispute.

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a declaration under the Federa l
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2201(a ), and the Virgin Islands
Declaratory Judgment Act, 5 V.I.C. §1261,
that 1) by agreeing to arbitrate, an
applicant or employee does not forego
substantive rights, but instead agrees to
resolution of all disputes in an arbitral
forum; 2) the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 16, governs the
enforceability of arbitration agreements
covering employment disputes; 3) the
DRA is protected by and enforceable
under the FAA; 4) the DRA does not
violate the WDA; 5) the DRA is not
unconscionable; 6) the DRA is not
contrary to the public policy of the Virgin
Islands; 7) even if the DRA violates the
WDA, the WDA is preempted by the
FAA; and 8) the Commissioner’s “cease
and desist” letters are unenforceable to the
extent they purport to require Wyatt to
abandon its use of the DRA. In Count II,
Wyatt claimed a violation of the federal
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
alleged that the Commissioner was
attempting to deprive Wyatt of its liberty
interest in entering into lawful contracts. In
Count III, Wyatt sought injunctive relief
against the Commissioner. Wyatt named,
as defendants, the Government of the
Virgin Islands by and through the Virgin
Islands Department of Labor and Cecil
Benjamin, in his Official Capacity as
Commissioner of the Virgin Islands
Department of Labor.
HOVENSA moved to intervene as
a third party beneficiary to Wyatt’s DRA
because the DRA granted HOVENSA the
same right to demand arbitration as it
granted Wyatt. The motion was granted.
HOVENSA’s complaint in intervention
alleged the same counts as Wyatt’s,
excluding the request for injunctive relief.
After the suit had commenced
Virginie George, Malcolm Maccow, Edgar
Berrios, and Claud Gaines, prospective
employees whom Wyatt would not
consider for employment because of their
refusal to sign the DRA, moved to
intervene as defendants. That motion was
also granted.3
The District Court became
concerned about its jurisdiction to hear the
case and ordered the parties to address that
issue. In its Memorandum Opinion dated
June 5, 2002, the District Court concluded
that it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction based on the alleged violation
of 42 U.S.C. §1983. The District Court
held, however, that it did have federal
question jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1331, based on Wyatt’s claim that the
FAA provides a substantive right to enter
into an arbitration agreement and that any
local law in conflict with the FAA is
preempted by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.
Wyatt, V.I., Inc. v. Government of the
3 The prospective employees also
moved to reopen the evidence to allow
presentation of evidence of “coercion,
duress, lack of ability to apply for jobs
elsewhere, the illegality of the provision
and the public policy of the Virgin
Islands.” The District Court denied the
prospective employees’ motion to reopen
the evidence.

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Virgin Islands, 2002 WL 31599790, * 2
(D.V.I. June 5, 2002).
The District Court ruled that
declaratory relief was an appropriate
remedy in the case because Wyatt was
facing “a threat of liability if it continues
to use the Dispute Resolution Agreement
without a determination of its legality.” In
granting declaratory relief in Wyatt’s
favor, the court first noted that there was
no preemption issue because there is no
Virgin Islands law or policy directly in
conflict with enforcement of the DRA
under the FAA. The District Court next
concluded that the DRA is enforceable
under the FAA because it is not
unconscionable, coercive, or contrary to
public policy. Finally, the District Court
denied Wyatt’s request for injunctive
relief. The court reasoned that any further
Government action would be unlikely as a
result of the declaratory judgment entered
in Wyatt’s favor.
The Go vern men t and th e
prospective employees filed their appeals
on June 7, 2002, and September 27, 2002,
respectively.4 Wyatt does not appeal the
District Court’s denial of injunctive relief.
During the pendency of this appeal,
we have held in Lloyd v. HOVENSA,
L.L.C., 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004), that
Wyatt’s DRA was not unenforceable as
violative of public policy, 369 F.3d at 274,
and we affirmed an order compelling
arbitration pursuant to the DRA. 369 F.3d
at 275.
II. JURISDICTION AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court purported to
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the
general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.
We have jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
which gives the courts of appeals
jurisdiction over appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts. We
exercise plenary review over whether a
cause of action is ripe. See Doe v. County
of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d 437, 452 (3d Cir.
2001).
III. DISCUSSION
As one ground of appeal, the
prospective employee defendants have
challenged the District Court’s decision to
exercise judicial review of the case on the
ground that the case is not yet ripe.5 First,
they submit that the Commissioner’s cease
and desist letters were not orders within
the meaning of 24 V.I.C. § 68(c). They
further urge that, even if the cease and
desist letters are considered orders, the
Commissioner never petitioned the
Territorial Court for enforcement of the
orders. They argue that, because the
Territorial Court never entered a decree
4 The prospective employees filed a
motion to reconsider in the District Court
on June 19, 2002, but they withdrew that
motion on September 27, 2002 and filed
a notice of appeal the same day.
5 The prospective employees relied
on a ripeness argument in their brief and
at oral argument, but the Government did
not rely on this ground for appeal.

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enforcing the orders, there was no final
administrative or state action; therefore,
the case was not ripe for judicial
intervention.
Wyatt and HOVENSA contend that
the case is ripe for judicial review because
the Commissioner’s “cease and desist”
orders constitute concrete action in the
sense that the orders affect Wyatt’s
primary conduct, namely what contracts
Wyatt can utilize in its hiring process.
Additionally, Wyatt asserts that it had no
choice but to bring its action for
declaratory and injunctive relief because it
thought it would be subject to fines or
imprisonment under 24 V.I.C. § 75 if it
continued to ignore the orders of the
Commissioner.
We agree with the prospective
employee defendants that this case is not
ripe under the “case of actual controversy”
requirement of the Declaratory Judgment
Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201. Because
we decide the appeal on this basis, we will
not go on to discuss the other grounds for
appeal.
The Declaratory Judgment Act
creates a remedy by which federal courts
“may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking
such declaration” when there is a “case of
actual controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
The Supreme Court, in upholding the
constitutionality of the Act, has interpreted
the remedy as limited to cases and
controversies in the constitutional sense.
See Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford,
Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240
(1937). A “case of actual controversy”
means one of a justiciable nature.
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 325 (1936). The Act is
constitutional “so far as it authorizes relief
which is consonant with the exercise of the
judicial function in the determination of
controversies to which under the
Constitution the judicial power extends.”
Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240.
In order for there to be a “case of
actual controversy” in the constitutional
sense, the controversy must be
one that is appropriate for
judicial determination. A
justiciable controversy is
thus distinguished from a
difference or dispute of a
hypothetical or abstract
character; from one that is
academic or moot. The
controversy must be definite
and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties
h a v i n g a d v e r s e le g a l
interests. It must be a real
and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a
conclusive character, as
distinguished from an
opinion advising what the
law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240-41 (citations
omitted). The conflict between the parties
must be ripe for judicial intervention; it
cannot be “nebulous or contingent” but
“must have taken on fixed and final shape
so that a court can see what legal issues it
is deciding, what effect its decision will

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have on the adversaries, and some useful
purpose to be achieved in deciding them.”
Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 244.
Interrelated to our discussion of
what constitutes a “case of actual
controversy” in the constitutional sense is
the ripeness doctrine. The purpose of the
ripeness doctrine is to “prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves
i n a b s t ra c t d is a g r e e m e n t s o v er
administrative policies, and also to protect
the agencies from judicial interference
until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties.” Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
148-49 (1967), overruled on other
grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
105 (1977). In determining whether a
dispute has matured to a point to require
judicial adjudication, courts must consider
“the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration.” Id. at
149. A dispute is not ripe for judicial
determination “‘if it rests upon contingent
future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at
all.’” Doe v. County of Centre, PA, 242
F.3d 437, 453 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300
(1998)). “Claims based merely upon
‘assumed potential invasions’ of rights are
not enou gh to wa rrant jud icial
intervention.” Ashwander, 297 U.S. at
325 (quoting Arizona v. California, 283
U.S. 423, 462 (1931)).
In Wycoff, the Supreme Court
faced the issue whether there was a “case
of actual controversy” in an action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, under the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, to
establish that certain film products were
being transported in interstate commerce.
The Utah Public Service Commission had
denied the plaintiff’s application for
authorization to carry film commodities
within the state. The plaintiff commenced
an action in federal court, seeking both a
declaratory judgment that its carriage of
motion picture film and newsreels between
points in Utah constituted interstate
commerce and an injunction from
interfering with this transportation.
Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 239.
The Court decided that the case was
not ripe for judicial review. First, the
Court noted that the dispute had not
matured to a point where the Court could
see what controversy was going to
develop. Id. at 245. It was not enough
that the pl a i n ti f f feared future
administrative or judicial action by the
commission. Id.
Second, the Court noted that the
declaratory proceeding, as it was invoked
by the plaintiffs, not only “foreclos[ed] an
a d m i n i s tr a t i v e b o d y , ” b u t w a s
“incompatible with a proper federal-state
relationship.” Id. at 247. The Court
stated:
Declaratory proceedings in
the federal courts against
state officials must be
decided with regard for the
implications of our federal
system. State administrative
bodies have the initial right
to reduce the general

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policies of state regulatory
statutes into concrete orders
and the primary right to take
evidence and make findings
of fact. It is the state courts
which have the first and the
last word as to the meaning
of state statutes and whether
a particular order is within
the legislative terms of
reference so as to make it
the action of the State.
Id.; Cf. Topp-Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
314 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding
that, under Wycoff, District Court erred in
exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
action for declaratory relief because, just
as federal “interference” with state
administrative agencies and interpretation
of state law is “condemned,” plaintiff’s
federal action seeking relief from
territorial administration of Puerto Rican
trademark law is similarly condemned).
The dispute presented in the case
before us is Wyatt’s claim that it was
facing prosecution under 24 V.I.C. § 75
and the possibility of the imposition of
fines. Section 75 provides:
Whoever wilfully
resists, prev ents ,
impedes or interferes
w i t h t h e
Commissioner or his
d u l y a u t h o r iz e d
representative, in the
performance of his
duties pursuant to
this chapter, shall be
fined not more than
$500 or imprisoned
not more than 3
months, or both.
(emphasis added). We note first
that Wyatt does not mention
potential prosecution under § 75 in
its complaint requesting declaratory
relief. Nor is § 75 mentioned at the
District Court hearing on April 4,
2002, or in the District Court’s
Memorandum Opinion of June 5,
2002, granting declaratory relief to
Wyatt. In fact, at the April 5
hearing, the Assistant Attorney
G e n e r a l , r e p r e se n t i n g t h e
Government, stated:
With respect
to enforcement of a
cease and desist
order, I believe that
there is no single
way in which cease
and desist orders are
to be enforced.
T h e
government has at its
arsenal more than
o n e t e c h n i q u e ,
including the seeking
o f d e c l a r a t o r y
judgment, which was
the intention in this
matter and which, to
some extent, appears
to be the direction in
which it’s going.
We believe

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that by getting a
court to adjudicate
the dispute we would
be resolving the
issues raised by the
cease and d esist
order, and that’s it.
The government, however,
has never taken any steps to obtain
a declaratory judgment or to invoke
any other remedy as set out in
Chapter 3 of Title 24 of the Virgin
Islands Code. Such remedies
would include a petition for judicial
enforcement of an order, pursuant
to § 69, a petition for judicial
review of an order, pursuant to §
70, or an order for reinstatement of
a wrongfully discharged employee,
pursuant to § 77(c). Because the
penalties of § 75 are limited to
resisting, preventing, impeding or
interfering with the Commissioner
in the performance of his duties, as
set out in Chapter 3, it would
appear that the Commissioner
would have to seek further remedial
action under Chapter 3, than he has
done here, before he could invoke
the penalties of § 75. Wyatt’s fears
appear then to be premature.
The only action that Commissioner
did take was to write two letters in which
he requested that Wyatt “cease and desist”
its use of the DRA. Such a letter is not an
“order,” nor was there any evidentiary
hearing held prior to the transmittal of
either letter. The inconclusiveness of the
Commissioner’s decision on how he would
follow up the initial letters and the opinion
letter of the Attorney General is
demonstrated by the statement, which we
quote above, of the Assistant Attorney
General at the April 5 District Court
hearing.
As in Wycoff, the plaintiffs merely
feared potential future administrative or
judicial action and brought this action for
declaratory relief “to hold in readiness for
use should the Commission[er] at any
future time attempt to” use his powers to
issue an order and enforce that order
through the Territorial Court. See Wycoff,
344 U.S. at 245. In essence, the dispute
between the parties is contingent upon
events that may not occur at all or may
occur differently than anticipated. See
Doe v. County of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d at
453. Because Wyatt did not give the
Commissioner the chance to proceed on its
own grounds, the Department of Labor
never had the opportunity “to reduce the
general policies of [its] state [statute] into
[a] concrete order,” and the Virgin Islands
never had the opportunity to give the “last
word” as to the meaning of the WDA and
whether the Commissioner’s order was
“within the legislative terms of reference
so as to make it the action of” the Virgin
Islands. Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 247. Wyatt
has not yet felt the effects of final
administrative or state action in a concrete
way. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at
148-49. For the above reasons, we
conclude that this cause of action is not yet
ripe for review.
The Go vern men t and the
prospective employees also argue that the
District Court did not have federal

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question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. They contend that Wyatt’s request
for a declaration that “even if the
Agreement violates the WDA, the WDA is
preempted by the FAA” is in reality an
anticipated federal defense of preemption
which, under the well-pleaded complaint
rule, does not by itself give the District
Court subject matter jurisdiction over
Wyatt’s cause of action. In response,
Wyatt submits that the District Court did
have jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
well-pleaded complaint rule, under Shaw
v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 86 (1983).
Wyatt argues that they presented a federal
question over which the District Court had
jurisdiction because they sought to enjoin
the Commissioner from interfering with
their federal right to enter into arbitration
agreements on the ground that the WDA is
preempted by the FAA. See id. at 96, n.14
(“A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief
from state regulation, on the ground that
such regulation is pre-empted by a federal
statute, which by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution must prevail,
thus presents a federal question which the
federal courts have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.”).
Because we will dismiss this case
on ripeness grounds, we do not need to
decide the federal question jurisdiction
issue at this time. See Wycoff, 344 U.S. at
248-49 (“Since this case should be
dismissed in any event, it is not necessary
to determine whether, on this record, the
alleged controversy over an action that
may be begun in state court would be
maintainable under the head of federal-
question jurisdiction.”).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will
reverse the District Court’s grant of
declaratory relief and remand this case to
the District Court with directions to
dismiss it.

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