James O. Lindquist, Jr.; Donald S. Lindquist; Judith A. Lindquist; Sksm Associates v. Buckingham Township

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________________________
NO. 02-2469
_______________________________
JAMES O. LINDQUIST, JR.;
DONALD S. LINDQUIST;
JUDITH A. LINDQUIST;
SKSM ASSOCIATES,
Appellants
v.
BUCKINGHAM TOWNSHIP;
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF BUCKINGHAM TOWNSHIP;
ERNEST KNIGHT, II, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
RESPECTIVE OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS AGENTS OF
BUCKINGHAM TOWNSHIP AND THE BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS OF BUCKINGHAM TOWNSHIP;
*LYNN BUSH, AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
GEORGE M. BUSH, ESQ.
* (Dismissed as per the Court's 11/13/02 Order)
_______________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. No. 01-cv-02036
(District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III)
________________________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)(1993)
February 25, 2003

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*Judge Becker completed his term as Chief Judge on May 4, 2003. 1
**Judge Scirica became Chief Judge on May 4, 2003. 1
***The Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Judge for the Northern 1
District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 2
3
2
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge,* SCIRICA, Circuit Judge,** and SHADUR, *** District
Judge
(Filed: May 16, 2003)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This action was brought by James O. Lindquist, Jr., Donald Lindquist, Judith
Lindquist and SKSM Associates (collectively, the “Landowners” or “plaintiffs”) against
Buckingham Township, its Board of Supervisors, Ernest Knight, II, the Township’s
consulting engineer and George M. Bush, Esquire, the Township’s former solicitor
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act, for alleged violation of plaintiffs’
substantive due process rights and for an alleged regulatory taking of their property by the
Township. (App. 40). Plaintiffs alleged that a violation of their constitutional rights
occurred as a result of arbitrary and irrational actions by defendants which are said to
have delayed and prevented the development of their real property located in Buckingham
Township, Bucks County, Pennsylvania.
The plaintiffs’ arguments, drawn from their briefs, may be summarized as follows:

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1In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years, and 1
thus the statute of limitations for a civil rights cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 2
also two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524 (1981 & Supp. 1996); Knoll v. Springfield 3
Township School District, 763 F.2d 584, 585 (3d Cir. 1985). 4
3
1. The District Court erred in dismissing the Landowners’ due
process takings claim as not ripe for review since the landowners failed to
avail themselves of the appropriate state law procedures. Even though the
Landowners assert a due process takings claim, the District Court
improperly applied the ripeness requirements promulgated in Williamson
County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172 (1985), for a “just compensation” takings claim. Williamson’s
“exhaustion of state law remedies” requirement is not applicable to due
process takings claims. M oreover, Pennsylvania’s condemnation process is
not an adequate process for obtaining compensation for a due process
taking, and therefore, the Landowners were not required to pursue their
claim in state court. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 699 (1999).
2. The District Court erred in ruling that the Landowners’ claims
were barred by the statute of limitations since the Landowners failed to
identify one substantive due process violation during the statutory period.
The District Court improperly disregarded numerous affirmative acts by the
Township which not only constitute substantive due process violations but
establish a frequent pattern of unlawful conduct sufficient to invoke the
continuing violation doctrine to incorporate the Township’s long standing
history of intentionally delaying and frustrating the landowners’
development of the Property.
We find these arguments without merit, hence we affirm. Although the facts and
procedural history of this and a prior related case are complicated, we need not rescribe
them here; rather, we confine ourselves to a statement of our ratio decidendi.
First, plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims were properly dismissed because
plaintiffs failed to file suit before the applicable Pennsylvania two-year statute of
limitations expired.1 They were aware of their constitutional injuries on September 3,

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4
1998 when their attorneys filed lawsuits in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
on the same facts which they allege in the present federal action violated their civil rights.
The “continuing violation” theory is not applicable to toll the statute of limitations. We
have held that “a plaintiff may not rely on the continuing violation theory to advance
claims about isolated instances of discrimination concluded in the past, even though the
effects persist into the present.” Courtney v. LaSalle University, 124 F.3d 499, 505 (3d
Cir. 1997). Additionally, in our recent decision in UA Theatre Circuit v. Warrington, 316
F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003), we held that in light of County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833 (1998), a plaintiff asserting that a municipal land-use decision violated substantive
due process must show that the defendants’ conduct “shocked the conscience,” and not
just evinced “improper motive.” The plaintiffs do not even come close to establishing
conduct on the part of defendants that shocks the conscience.
The District Court also was correct in dismissing plaintiffs’ regulatory taking claim
because it is not ripe. Plaintiffs had available the inverse condemnation procedures under
the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code but failed to avail themselves of those
procedures. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 172, and Cowell v. Palmer Township, 263 F.3d
286 (3d Cir. 2001).
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Edward R. Becker
Circuit Judge

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