United States of America v. Anthony Watson

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 01-2617
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY WATSON,
Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Dist. Court No. 00-CR-313-05)
District Court Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
Argued March 29, 2004
Before: ALITO, FISHER, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: April 7, 2004)
JEREMY H.G. IBRAHIM
14th Floor
121 South Broad Street
The North American Building
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Counsel for Appellant

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KATHY A. STARK (Argued)
Suite 1250
Office of the United States
Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a judgment in a criminal case. Because we find Watson’s
claims to be without merit, we affirm.
First, we hold that the District Court was not clearly erroneous when it found that
Watson had a managerial role in the conspiracy. Witnesses testified that Watson ran a
corner in the conspiracy, that he hired at least one worker to sell crack, and that he was
frequently seen with the leaders of the conspiracy. Furthermore, the District Court was
not clearly erroneous when it found that the use or possession of a firearm in the
conspiracy was clearly foreseeable. As a manager in a sizeable crack cocaine distribution
ring, in which two members had already been shot, the use of a firearm by a member of
the conspiracy was more than reasonably foreseeable. See United States v. Ramos, 147
F.3d 281, 286-287 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Dixon, 982 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1992).
Second, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it

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admitted the government’s charts and exhibits summarizing the electronic
communications between the conspirators. The government, through a witness and a
public record, was able to properly establish that the telephone and beeper numbers on the
charts and exhibits were properly attributed to Watson. See, e.g., Supp. App. at 133-135;
184-185. Furthermore, the charts and exhibits were accurately explained by a
government witness, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding them
more probative than prejudicial. See Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 1006; United
States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 fn. 14 (3d Cir. 2000).
Third, the District Court correctly denied Watson’s motion to suppress the money
and drugs found at the time of his arrest. The surveillance officer saw Watson engaging
in three transactions that, based on her experience as a narcotics officer, she knew to be
drug deals. Each time, Watson would talk to a customer, go into an abandoned lot
nearby, emerge with an object, and exchange the object for money. The police stopped
Watson for an investigatory stop, an action that he admits was valid. Upon stopping him,
one officer looked in the abandoned lot and saw a McDonalds’ plastic cup filled with
crack. The police officer found the cup almost immediately upon entering. Thus, the
seizure of the cup was legal because it was in plain view. See Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 133-134 (1990) (“If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation
nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy.”) Upon finding the crack, the
police arrested Watson, and the money was obtained through a valid search incident to

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Watson’s arrest. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 911 (1980).
Fourth, the District Court properly determined Watson’s relevant conduct. As
stated above, significant evidence supports the conclusion that Watson was a manager in
the drug conspiracy. Furthermore, several witnesses placed him in the conspiracy for its
entire two-year existence.
For the above reasons, we affirm.

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