Aaron Williams v. Superintendent James Price

*The Honorable William W Schwarzer, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 00-3117
AARON W ILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT JAMES PRICE; SERGEANT EILER;
OFFICER WILLIAM KOERBEL; DOCTOR STEPHEN STEVENS
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Dist. Court No. 98-cv-01811)
District Court Judge: Robert J. Cindrich
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 11, 2003
Before: ALITO and M cKEE, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER,* District Judge.
(Opinion Filed: June 24, 2003)
OPINION OF THE COURT

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PER CURIAM:
Because we write for the parties, the background of this case is not set out
in detail. This is an appeal from a final order in a case in which a state prisoner
asserted Eighth Amendment claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison
officials and a doctor. We affirm.
On appeal, the plaintiff raises three issues. Appellant’s Br. at 3-4. The
plaintiff first argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his claim against the
doctor pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). The plaintiff contends that the
complaint adequately asserted an Eighth Amendment claim based on deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs. However, we agree with the District Court
and the Magistrate Judge that deliberate indifference cannot be proven under the
relevant allegations of the complaint. See Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175 (7th Cir.
1996); Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427 (8th Cir.l 1993). Furthermore, any
attempt to replead would have been futile.
The plaintiff next argues that the District Court erred in holding that he
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The plaintiff advances an interpretation
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act under which a prisoner could deliberately
bypass all administrative remedies and then file in federal court once the time for
pursuing administrative remedies has run out. The language of the PLRA does not
compel this result; the plaintiff cites no precedent adopting this construction; and
we are convinced that the PLRA was intended to prevent just such tactics. We
therefore reject the plaintiff’s argument. We likewise conclude that the denial of

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the plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file a grievance was not arbitrary
or capricious.
Finally, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing
to appoint counsel for the plaintiff. We have considered all of the arguments set
out in the plaintiff’s complaint and find no ground for reversal.

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