United States of America v. Vincent Amadioha

NOT PRECEDENTI
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 00-2610
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
VINCENT AMADIOHA,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Crim. No. 99-cr-00107)
District Judge: Hon. William H. Walls
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 6, 2002
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 20, 2002)
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Vincent Amadioha, who was convicted of conspiracy to import narcotics in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 952(a), 963, and possession with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2, appeals from the judgment of
conviction and sentence. On August 25, 2000, Amadioha was sentenced to 121 months
for each count, to be served concurrently. Because we write only for the parties, we need
not recite the familiar factual background.
Amadioha raises two issues on appeal. In the first, he contends that the District
Court erred in admitting into evidence documents seized pursuant to a consent search of
his car, arguing that the seizure exceeded the scope of the consent. In the second,
Amadioha contends that the District Court erred in admitting evidence of four other
packages, arguing that the District Court’s determination violated Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 and 404(b). As this is an appeal from a final judgment of a district court,
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
I.
Amadioha was the general manager of a Kentucky Fried Chicken in North
Brunswick. U.S. Customs Agents had inspected a package addressed to Mr. Naheed at
the Kentucky Fried Chicken that contained three pots that were stamped on the bottoms:
"Siam Fujiware, Thailand." The pots contained 1070 grams of heroin. The agents
executed a controlled delivery and, after they concluded that Makar, the assistant
manager, was not the intended recipient, arranged for Makar to call Amadioha, who
arrived at the KFC to retrieve the UPS package. After a brief discussion with Makar
about the package, Amadioha returned to his car where he was arrested.

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Amadioha gave the officers consent to search his car, and signed a "consent to
search" form that states, "I further authorize [the named police officer] to remove any
letters, documents, papers, materials, or other property which is considered pertinent to
the investigation[.]" Supp. App. at 1. The record discloses no limitation, discussed or
agreed upon by Amadioha and the officers, on the search.
At the time Amadioha gave his consent, the briefcase at issue here was located on
the front passenger side seat of the car in plain view and was closed but not locked. The
evidence admitted at trial, seized from the briefcase, was documentation indicating
Amadioha’s involvement in drug trafficking, specifically a money gram from Thailand
that referenced Thailand, which is a known source country for heroin, and a Western
Union money transfer order, also referencing Bangkok, Thailand. The District Court
overruled defense counsel’s objection to the introduction of documents found in
Amadioha’s briefcase, stating, "I’m satisfied that I accept [the officer’s] recitation of the
events that upon being arrested, the arresting officers or agents checked the vehicle of the
defendant for the presence of weapons. There after obtaining [defendant’s] consent to
search that vehicle, [the officer] found a black briefcase on the . . . front passenger
seat[.]" Supp. App. at 50.
The District Court’s determination that Amadioha consented to the search of his
car, as well as the subsequent seizure of the briefcase within the car, including the
documents within the briefcase, was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the documents
taken from within the briefcase were properly admitted at trial. A district court’s
determination of consent to search luggage is a finding of fact, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), and is subject only to clearly erroneous review by
this court. United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 954-55 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
If an individual consents to a search, the government may undertake a search without a
warrant or probable cause, and any evidence discovered during such a search may be
seized and admitted at trial. Id. at 955; accord Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219. The scope
of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is limited by the "’objective’
reasonableness" standard "what would the typical reasonable person have understood
by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
251 (1991).
The District Court determined that the seizure of the briefcase and the
documentation within it was not outside the scope of the consent search. This
determination was not clearly erroneous. In United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171
(3d Cir. 1988), this court upheld the legality of the scope of a search in almost identical
circumstances. Like the search in this case, the search of Anderson’s car proceeded
pursuant to a signed consent to search form that gave consent to "remove any letters[,]
documents, papers, materials or other property" pertinent to the investigation. Id. at
1176. We affirmed the district court’s ruling, stating "[p]ermission to search an
automobile would be hollow indeed if it did not include permission to search its contents
and component parts." Id. (quoting United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518, 527 (3d
Cir. 1979)).
Similarly, in this case, Amadioha testified that he consented to the officer’s search
of his car, and he signed a consent form virtually identical to the one signed in Anderson.
Amadioha argues that the briefcase’s nexus with the car was broken because he took it
with him when he went into the KFC and carried it out with him to the car when he was
arrested. However, the District Court’s finding that the consent to search encompassed
the briefcase, which the officers first saw within the car, is not inconsistent with Jimeno.
We will affirm the court’s denial of the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from
the briefcase within Amadioha’s car.
II.
The government was permitted to introduce, over objection, evidence of four
other packages containing heroin shipped into the United States that provided
circumstantial evidence that Amadioha was part of a conspiracy to import heroin. The
District Court overruled Amadioha’s motion to exclude this evidence after it determined
that the evidence was relevant. We review the District Court’s decision to admit
evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 217 (3d Cir.
1999). If evidence of other crimes is offered as intrinsic proof of the offense charged,
and not as proof of bad character, then Rule 404(b) does not apply and the evidence is
admissible. Id. "In cases where the incident offered is a part of the conspiracy alleged in

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the indictment, the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) because it is not an ’other’
crime." Id. at 217-218 (quoting 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,
Federal Practice and Procedure 5239, at 450-51 (1978)).
In Gibbs, the defendant was charged with participation in a cocaine conspiracy
and the evidence admitted was that the defendant, on two separate occasions, sent a man
to kill someone. 190 F.3d at 217. We affirmed the admission of the evidence because it
tended to show the defendant’s use of violence to further the illegal objectives of the
cocaine conspiracy. Id. at 218.
In this case, the District Court explained that it admitted the evidence of the four
other packages because "the jury [could] circumstantially deduce that someone other than
[Amadioha] sent packages to [Amadioha] and to others which contain drugs." App. at
45. The evidence admitted against Amadioha tended to show that Amadioha smuggled
drugs into the country via packages sent by other persons as part of a conspiracy to
import heroin into this country. Like the evidence in Gibbs, this evidence was not
evidence of "other" crimes, and therefore not subject to Rule 404(b), because it was
intrinsic to the conspiracy charge alleged. The other packages, because of the addresses
used, the similarity in contents, the signatures of the persons receiving them, the overall
link to Amadioha, and the tendency to prove the conspiracy alleged, were intrinsic to the
conspiracy charge. They were therefore admissible.
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and
sentence.
_____________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
______________________________
Circuit Judge

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