William Boyd v. Department of Corrections

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 00-2390
__________
WILLIAM BOYD,
Appellant
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; MARTIN HORN, SECRETARY;
DONALD VAUGHN, SUPERINTENDANT; M. LORENZO, DEPUTY;
GREGORY ROSA, DEPUTY; RUSSEL SMITH; GUY SMITH, CAPTAIN;
CHARLIE JUDGE, LT.; BRIAN KLETCHES, SGT.; LORE
BAILEY; J. STRICKLAND; LOUIS MARIANI; RA KNAUER;
K. C. JONES, LT.
__________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
D.C. Civil No. 99-CV-04987
District Judge: The Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter
__________
Argued February 11, 2002
__________
Before: MANSMANN, McKEE, and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: February 26, 2002 )
____________
Scott Markow, Esq. (Argued)
Caroline M. Brown, Esq.
Covington & Burling
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
Attorneys for Appellant
Randall J. Henzes, Esq. (Argued)
Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania
21 South 12th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Attorney for Appellees
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge

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Appellant William Boyd has been held in the Restricted Housing Unit in
Administrative Custody at SCI-Graterford since his arrival at the prison in January 1999.
His complaint, which he brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and in which he named as
defendants the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and various of its employees,
alleged that his initial confinement and continuing placement at the highest level of
security at Graterford his Administrative Custody claims violated his First, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also raised a number of claims unrelated to his
custody status, including claims that he was assaulted by another inmate, he was denied
medical attention, he was threatened with double-celling in response to his grievances, he
was denied exercise opportunities, and he was denied the use of the main law library.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds, including
Eleventh Amendment immunity, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to
state a claim. The District Court granted defendants’ motion solely on the basis of failure
to exhaust and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Boyd timely appealed, and argues
that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint with respect to those claims
related to his Administrative Custody status because under the applicable procedures he
had, in fact, exhausted his administrative remedies. He argues, as well, that he should be
permitted to amend his complaint to plead exhaustion with respect to those claims related
to other prison conditions. We agree on both scores, and will reverse the order of the
District Court and remand for further proceedings.
I. Administrative Custody Claims
Boyd argues that the District Court erred when it applied the procedures of the
Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System (DC-ADM 804) rather than the
Administrative Custody Procedures (DC-ADM 802) when evaluating whether he had
exhausted his Administrative Custody claims. Under the Administrative Custody
Procedures, he argues, he exhausted all available administrative remedies, as required by
42 U.S.C. 1997(e)(a), as to both the initial determination of January 21, 1999 to hold
him in Administrative Custody and the May and September 1999 determinations to
continue him in Administrative Custody. This is so, he continues, for three reasons: first,
his administrative remedies ceased to be "available" within the meaning of 1997(e)(a)
after the Superintendent failed to answer his administrative appeals from the decisions of
the Program Review Committee; second, the defendants failed to treat his appeals
seriously and expeditiously as required by this Court’s precedent and, indeed, refused to
respond at all; and, third, he substantially complied, within the meaning of our caselaw,
with the requisite administrative procedures.
Appellees’ initial response to Boyd’s very persuasive reasons as to why he had
exhausted his administrative remedies was to suggest that we need not reach the issue of
exhaustion at all because, assuming arguendo that he had exhausted, we should affirm the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Boyd has failed to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. This response prompted us to inquire at oral argument whether
appellees were conceding that Boyd had, in fact, exhausted his administrative remedies,
the only issue the District Court had decided. After some bobbing and weaving, the
answer and the only answer there could be when Boyd’s efforts were evaluated under
the procedures which apply to Administrative Custody claims was "Yes." Why, in
light of the record, appellees did not similarly concede exhaustion before the District
Court remains a mystery.
Given the concession that Boyd had exhausted his remedies as to his
Administrative Custody claims, we need go no further than to reverse and remand, for
assuredly we see no reason that we should accede to appellees’ request to ignore
exhaustion and consider his claims on the merits. We believe, however, that it is
necessary to go further to indicate our disapproval of what did or, more correctly, did not
happen here.
It is crystal clear that, in his attempts to exhaust, Boyd did everything he was
required to do and then some and at no time received a response. This is simply
impermissible. Before a prisoner is able to come into federal court, he or she is required
to follow specific administrative procedures with strict time limits. It is certainly not
asking too much of prison authorities that they comply with the requirements similarly
imposed upon them. Here, over and over again, appellees did nothing. We take this

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opportunity to put appellees on notice that conduct so lax if not altogether irresponsible
will, if it occurs again, be dealt with in other than a Not Precedential Opinion.
II. Other Prison Conditions Claims
It is unclear which, if any, of Boyd’s other prison conditions claims have been
exhausted. Boyd, now represented by counsel, seeks leave to amend his pro se complaint
to plead facts demonstrating exhaustion as to those claims which have, in fact, been
exhausted. This is a simple enough request and a request which is freely and typically
granted to pro se prisoner litigants for a variety of reasons, amending to plead exhaustion
being merely one reason. Of course, the dismissal with prejudice ordered by the District
Court rendered amendment of the complaint impossible, but that dismissal is being
reversed and the District Court on remand will no doubt permit amendment so that, if
Boyd is able to do so, exhaustion of his prison conditions claims can be pled. In this
connection, we note that we have not, at least thus far, imposed a requirement that,
beyond pleading exhaustion, a prisoner also attach to his or her complaint "the
administrative decisions showing the administrative disposition of his claims."
Appellees’ Br. at 23. We reject appellees’ request that we impose such a requirement
now.
III. Conclusion
The order of the District Court will be reversed and the case will be remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
Kindly file the foregoing Opinion.
/s/Maryanne Trump Barry
Circuit Judg

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