Ruiz-Hernandez v. Barr BIA Straus, IJ A206 714 879

17-2298
Ruiz-Hernandez v. Barr
BIA
Straus, IJ
A206 714 879
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 1
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 2
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 3
New York, on the 20
th
day of February, two thousand twenty. 4
5
PRESENT: 6
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 7
BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 8
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 9
Circuit Judges. 10
_____________________________________ 11
12
ILEANA MELISSA RUIZ-HERNANDEZ, 13
Petitioner, 14
15
v. 17-2298 16
NAC 17
WILLIAM P. BARR, 18
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 19
Respondent. 20
_____________________________________ 21
22
FOR PETITIONER: Jon E. Jessen, Law Offices Jon E. 23
Jessen LLC, Stamford, CT. 24
25
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 26
Attorney General; Holly M. Smith, 27
Senior Litigation Counsel; Jesse 28
Lloyd Busen, Trial Attorney, 29
Office of Immigration Litigation, 30
United States Department of 31
Justice, Washington, DC. 32

2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 2
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 3
is DENIED. 4
Petitioner Ileana Melissa Ruiz-Hernandez, a native and 5
citizen of Honduras, seeks review of a June 26, 2017, decision 6
of the BIA affirming a December 15, 2016, decision of an 7
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Ruiz-Hernandez’s application 8
for asylum and withholding of removal. In re Ileana Melissa 9
Ruiz-Hernandez, No. A
206 714 879 (B.I.A. June 26, 2017), 10
aff’g No. A
206 714 879 (Immig. Ct. Hartford, CT Dec. 15, 11
2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 12
underlying facts and procedural history. 13
Under the circumstances of this case, where the BIA’s 14
opinion closely tracks the IJ’s reasoning, we have reviewed 15
both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions. See Zaman v. Mukasey, 16
514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards 17
of review are well established: the Court reviews factual 18
findings for substantial evidence and legal issues de novo. 19
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 20
510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 21

3

To obtain asylum or withholding of removal, Ruiz-1
Hernandez was required to establish that “race, religion, 2
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 3
political opinion was or will be at least one central 4
reason for” the claimed persecution. 8 U.S.C. §§ 5
1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum), 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding); 6
Matter of C-T-L, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 346 (B.I.A. 2010) 7
(holding that the “one central reason” standard also 8
applies to withholding of removal). Ruiz-Hernandez asserts 9
that she was persecuted on account of her membership in the 10
social group of defenseless, Honduran women. To constitute 11
a particular social group, a group must be “(1) composed of 12
members who share a common immutable characteristic, 13
(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct 14
within the society in question.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. 15
& N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); see Paloka v. Holder, 762 16
F.3d 191, 195–97 (2d Cir. 2014). An “immutable 17
characteristic” is one that members of the group “either 18
cannot change, or should not be required to change because 19
it is fundamental to their individual identities or 20
consciences.” Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72-73 21

4

(2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1
“Particularity refers to whether the group is sufficiently 2
distinct that it would constitute a discrete class of 3
persons.” Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 210 4
(B.I.A. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To be 5
socially distinct, a group . . . must be perceived as a 6
group by society.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 7
240. 8
We review for substantial evidence whether an applicant 9
was targeted on account of group membership, see Edimo-10
Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 282 (2d Cir. 2006), but 11
review the agency’s determination of whether a group is 12
cognizable de novo, see Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195. We find no 13
error in the agency’s conclusion that Ruiz-Hernandez’s 14
proposed social group of defenseless, Honduran women is not 15
cognizable, or in its determination that she was not targeted 16
based on her membership in that proposed social group. 17
In an analogous context, we have agreed with the BIA’s 18
determination that a group based on wealth is not sufficiently 19
particular: “When the harm visited upon members of a group is 20
attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary 21

5

criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped 1
away from considering those people a ‘particular social 2
group’ within the meaning of the INA.” Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d 3
at 73. Such is the case here. Ruiz-Hernandez argues that 4
her group is distinguished based on gender, claiming that the 5
agency “failed [to] consider the social distinction and 6
particularity of women victims when compared to that of male 7
victims of gang violence,” but she does not establish that 8
the characteristic of being a “defenseless woman” has a 9
“commonly accepted definition[]” in Honduran society such 10
that the social group has a “definable boundar[y].” Matter 11
of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214. We thus perceive no error 12
in the agency’s determination that a social group of 13
defenseless, Honduran women was not cognizable. See Paloka, 14
762 F.3d at 195–96. 15
In addition, even if such a group were cognizable, Ruiz-16
Hernandez did not demonstrate that criminals targeted her on 17
account of her membership in that group, as opposed to 18
ordinary criminal motives. Her written statement explained 19
that she fled Honduras “because of the high crime there,” 20
that she was a victim of several assaults, and that the area 21

6

where she worked was gang-infested. And her testimony was 1
that her family members and neighbors had also been crime 2
victims and that her assailants never told her why she had 3
been targeted. This testimony was significant; it 4
demonstrated that the criminality she feared was 5
indiscriminate and not related to her social group. Although 6
Ruiz-Hernandez’s country-conditions evidence established 7
that Honduras has persistent problems with violence, 8
extortion, and police corruption, it did not demonstrate that 9
women, particularly defenseless women, are targeted by 10
criminals more than other members of society. 11
In sum, Ruiz-Hernandez established only that she was 12
victimized by criminals in a high-crime neighborhood in a 13
country plagued by violence. But status as a crime victim, 14
without more, does not establish a nexus to a protected 15
ground. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d 16
Cir. 1999) (“general crime conditions” do not lend support to 17
an asylum claim because they are not an “enumerated ground.”); 18
Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73. 19
Because Ruiz-Hernandez did not establish either a 20
cognizable social group or that her assailants targeted her 21

7

for any reason other than general criminal motives, she did 1
not establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of 2
removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum), 3
1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding). 4
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 5
DENIED. All pending motions are hereby DENIED and stays are 6
LIFTED. 7
FOR THE COURT: 8
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 9
Clerk of Court 10