National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. McDonald

13-4161-cv
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. McDonald
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
August Term, 2014 3
(Argued: August 27, 2014 Decided: February 24, 2015) 4
Docket No. 13-4161-cv 5
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NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, 7
Plaintiff-Appellant, 8
v. 9
JOAN MCDONALD, COMMISSIONER, THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF 10
TRANSPORTATION, 11
12
Defendant-Appellee. 13
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Before: WINTER, RAGGI, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges. 15
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 16
for the Southern District of New York (Colleen McMahon, Judge), 17
denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground 18
that New York’s taking of appellant’s land by eminent domain was 19
barred by federal law and granting appellee’s motion for summary 20
judgment on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity and statute of 21
limitations. We affirm on statute-of-limitations grounds. 22
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN (Christopher 23
E. Kulawik, on the brief), Quinn 24
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 25
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New York, NY, for Plaintiff- 1
Appellant. 2
3
CECELIA C. CHANG, Special Counsel 4
(Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor 5
General, Andrew W. Amend & Mark H. 6
Shawhan, Assistant Solicitors 7
General, of counsel), on the brief 8
for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney 9
General of the State of New York, 10
for Defendant-Appellee. 11
12
WINTER, Circuit Judge: 13
14
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) 15
appeals from Judge McMahon’s grant of summary judgment dismissing 16
its federal Supremacy Clause claims brought against Joan 17
McDonald, Commissioner of the New York State Department of 18
Transportation (the “Commissioner”). Amtrak’s complaint claimed 19
that, in light of federal statutes that organize and regulate 20
Amtrak, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 21
deprived the New York State Department of Transportation 22
(“NYSDOT”) of authority to condemn Amtrak’s property by eminent 23
domain. Because Amtrak brought its federal claims more than six 24
years after its claims accrued, the action was time-barred. We 25
therefore affirm. 26
BACKGROUND 27
The relevant facts are undisputed. 28
Amtrak is a private corporation created by the Rail 29
Passenger Service Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 24101 et seq., to 30
operate intercity commuter rail service throughout the United 31
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States. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 24101(a); 24301(a)(2). In furtherance 1
of its objectives, Amtrak owns and uses real property, much of 2
which was conveyed to it pursuant to the Regional Rail 3
Reorganization Act of 1973. See 45 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. 4
The NYSDOT is currently engaged in a project called the 5
Bronx River Greenway, involving joint federal and state efforts 6
to convert a 23-mile-long stretch of land along both sides of the 7
Bronx River into urban parkland. Part of the planned Greenway 8
adjoins Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor rail lines. In the course of 9
carrying out the project, NYSDOT determined that it needed to 10
build on several parcels of land owned by Amtrak. The 11
Commissioner sought to acquire the land by eminent domain under 12
the authority given her by the New York State Highway Law, N.Y. 13
High. Law §§ 22, 30 (McKinney 2004), and the Eminent Domain 14
Procedure Law (“EDPL”), N.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. Law § 101 et seq. 15
(McKinney 2004). 16
Before resorting to eminent domain, NYSDOT contacted Amtrak 17
and attempted to negotiate the purchase of the land and easements 18
it needed. As a result, beginning in 2001, NYSDOT and Amtrak 19
communicated for several years about the Greenway project’s need 20
for the land in question. However, a stalemate resulted. 21
Although Amtrak was willing to sell the land to New York, it 22
demanded indemnification from all potential environmental cleanup 23
liability and the right to pre-approve NYSDOT’s entering and 24
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working on the land. NYSDOT did not make the desired 1
concessions. 2
In April 2005, NYSDOT began proceedings under the EDPL to 3
condemn the properties. In accordance with EDPL §§ 202-203, 4
NYSDOT published notices of a public hearing. It also notified 5
Amtrak officials that the hearing would occur on May 19, 2005. 6
On May 11, 2005, Roger Weld, a NYSDOT employee, called and 7
emailed a regional Amtrak official, Earl Watson, and notified him 8
of the hearing. Watson, in turn, forwarded the NYSDOT email to 9
the Amtrak personnel with authority to act in eminent domain 10
cases, namely the Project Director of Real Estate Development -- 11
Sheila Sopper -- and the legal department. However, NYSDOT’s 12
EDPL-mandated notice was sent to an erroneous address for Amtrak, 13
not at the statutory address where Amtrak is to receive service 14
of process. See 49 U.S.C. § 24301(b); N.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. Law §§ 15
202-03. 16
On May 19, 2005, NYSDOT held the public hearing as 17
scheduled. No one from Amtrak attended, and Amtrak did not 18
submit written comments. Subsequently, on August 17, 2005, 19
NYSDOT published the determinations and findings necessary for 20
condemnation of the land. See N.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. Law § 204. 21
Amtrak could have challenged the condemnation under the EDPL’s 22
judicial review provision, see id. § 207, but did not. As it 23
conceded at oral argument, it could also have brought the present 24
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action. Instead, from 2005 through 2008, it continued to discuss 1
the Greenway project with NYSDOT. 2
Meanwhile, in 2007 and 2008, NYSDOT sent Amtrak notice that 3
it planned to condemn six parcels and made an offer of 4
compensation. On February 19, 2008, the Commissioner filed 5
notices of appropriation and maps with the county clerk. When 6
those documents were filed, title to the land vested in New York 7
state. Id. § 204; see id. § 402(A)(3). A year and a half later, 8
on August 13, 2009, Sopper sent NYSDOT “agreement of sale” 9
documents that proposed to sell the land and easements for the 10
same price as the compensation proffered by NYSDOT but also 11
provided for Amtrak’s pre-approval of construction and for 12
indemnification for environmental liability. On August 28, 2009, 13
NYSDOT responded that it had already acquired title to the 14
parcels by eminent domain. Nearly two and a half years later, on 15
April 9, 2012, Amtrak brought the present action claiming that 16
the takings were invalid under the Supremacy Clause as expressly 17
or impliedly preempted by federal law. Joint App. at 8-22. 1
18
The district court held that Amtrak’s Supremacy Clause 19
claims against the Commissioner were barred under the Eleventh 20
Amendment. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald, 978 F. Supp. 21
2d 215, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Alternatively, it held them time- 22
1 Condemnation proceedings for one parcel are not yet completed, but the
district court’s dismissal on time-bar grounds applies to that parcel as well.
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barred, because Amtrak brought suit over six years after it knew 1
or should have known that it had a claim. Id. at 242 & n.1. We 2
affirm on statute-of-limitations grounds. 3
DISCUSSION 4
We review de novo whether the Commissioner was entitled to 5
summary judgment. See, e.g., Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 6
137 (2d Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only where 7
there are no issues of material fact and the movant is entitled 8
to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We may affirm on any ground 9
with support in the record. McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 10
F.3d 635, 640 (2d Cir. 2012). 11
As noted, the district court proffered alternative 12
rationales for dismissing Amtrak’s claims: sovereign immunity 13
under the Eleventh Amendment and the time-bar of the relevant 14
statute of limitations. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 978 F. Supp. 15
at 235, 242 & n.1. 16
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state in federal 17
court unless that state has consented to the litigation. See 18
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276-77 (1986); Pennhurst State 19
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). An exception 20
exists for suits against state officers alleging a violation of 21
federal law and seeking injunctive relief that is prospective in 22
nature. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-77 (1974); 23
accord Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. 24
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Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011). If appellee is entitled to Eleventh 1
Amendment immunity, we would lack jurisdiction. See McGinty v. 2
New York, 251 F.3d 84, 100 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Woods v. 3
Rondout Valley Central Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 238 4
(2d Cir. 2006). Ordinarily, therefore, we would reach this issue 5
first. 6
However, Eleventh Amendment immunity “is a privilege which 7
may be waived.” Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 8
273, 284 (1906); see Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 9
(1947); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). Also, we 10
have discretion to dispose of a case on a non-merits issue before 11
considering a jurisdictional question. 12
Because one of the parcels is not subject to sovereign 13
immunity, see Note 1, supra, the statute of limitations issue has 14
to be resolved. The district court held that Amtrak’s Supremacy 15
Clause preemption claim as to the seventh parcel, see note 1, 16
supra, was time-barred under New York’s six-year catch-all 17
limitations period, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1) (McKinney 2004), and, 18
by footnote, that its claims as to the six parcels already 19
condemned were accordingly barred for the same reason. Nat’l 20
R.R. Passenger Corp., 978 F. Supp. 2d at 242 & n.1. 21
At oral argument, recognizing that the limitations issue 22
was dispositive as to all the parcels, the state urged us to 23
exercise our discretion to reach the statute-of-limitations issue 24
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without deciding whether the suit is barred by sovereign 1
immunity. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 21:2-7. In view of our 2
disposition of the limitations issue, we may treat the state’s 3
suggestion as a waiver of the immunity issue for purposes of this 4
appeal. 5
The parties disagree as to the relevant statute of 6
limitations. The Commissioner urges upon us the 30-day appeal 7
period under EDPL § 207 or, alternatively, the three-year period 8
applicable to Bivens actions. Kronisch v. United States, 150 9
F.3d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 1998). Amtrak argues for a six-year 10
period based on Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 162 F. Supp. 11
2d 107, 137-38 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 306 F.3d 1264 (2d Cir. 12
2002). We need not resolve this dispute because Amtrak had 13
notice of its claims well before April 9, 2006, the date six 14
years before it filed the present action on April 9, 2012. The 15
action is, therefore, barred even if the six-year limitations 16
period applies. 17
Amtrak argues that various deficiencies in the NYSDOT’s 18
giving of notice of the eminent domain proceedings prevented the 19
limitations period from beginning to run. For example, NYSDOT 20
failed to give Amtrak formal notice strictly according to the 21
procedures of the EDPL and did not serve Amtrak at the address 22
referenced in 49 U.S.C. § 24301(b). But full compliance with 23
formal notice requirements is not necessarily the trigger 24
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beginning the relevant limitations period. See, e.g., Veltri v. 1
Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 326 (2d Cir. 2004) 2
(declining to establish “mechanical rule that failure to notify a 3
claimant of her right to bring an action in court automatically 4
tolls the statute of limitations”). Rather, Amtrak’s claims 5
accrued -- and the limitations clock started running -- when 6
Amtrak had reason to know of its injury. 7
“Under federal law, a cause of action generally accrues 8
‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 9
that is the basis of the action.’” M.D. v. Southington Bd. of 10
Educ., 334 F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Leon v. Murphy, 11
988 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1993)). We do not pause to determine 12
the precise date on which NYSDOT knew, or had reason to know, 13
because both possible dates are well beyond six years from the 14
date this action was brought. In 2005, when Weld sent the email 15
informing Amtrak that NYSDOT would hold a May 2005 public hearing 16
on the subject of condemning Amtrak’s land, Amtrak arguably had 17
reason to know of the alleged Supremacy Clause violation that is 18
the basis of its present claim. Eminent domain proceedings cloud 19
title, and Amtrak concedes that it suffered not merely potential, 20
but actual injury once its property became the subject of EDPL 21
proceedings. At the very latest, Amtrak had notice of this harm 22
in August 2005, when NYSDOT announced its findings. See Didden 23
v. Village of Port Chester, 173 F. App’x 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2006) 24
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(summary order). Accordingly, Amtrak had actual notice more than 1
six years before it filed its lawsuit. 2
Amtrak argues that it suffered two separate injuries: the 3
first when it learned that NYSDOT planned to take its land, and 4
the second in 2008, when the Commissioner actually executed the 5
takings. However, the completion of the takings was merely the 6
final act of the intrusion on Amtrak’s alleged Supremacy Clause 7
rights that accrued in 2005 at the outset of the condemnation 8
proceedings. See City of Plattsburgh v. Weed, 945 N.Y.S. 2d 812, 9
813 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012) (exercise of eminent domain is a 10
single “two-step process under the EDPL”). It would make no 11
sense to begin a limitations period -– or restart it –- when 12
title to the real estate actually vests in the state, an act that 13
occurs only after notice to interested parties and the requisite 14
findings have been made. Indeed, Amtrak’s proposed rule would 15
leave the validity of a condemnation of its property in doubt for 16
some six years after title has passed. Common sense, not to 17
mention the record of Amtrak’s failure to take any of the obvious 18
protective measures, directs otherwise. 2 The limitations period, 19
therefore, did not reset when NYSDOT took formal title in 2008. 20
2 In that regard, Amtrak advances a post hoc argument to explain and
avoid the consequences of its lassitude in the face of events that
unambiguously portended condemnation. At oral argument, we were asked not to
“impose a practical nightmare on Amtrak by inviting states to come in and do
piecemeal takings . . . because it will be too much of a burden for Amtrak to
come into court every time someone wants to take [its] property.” See Tr.
of Oral Arg. at 18. We know of no record evidence of such a “nightmare” or
its purported consequences, and, even if we did, a legislative, rather than
judicial remedy, would seem appropriate.
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Similarly, the takings are not an “ongoing violation” of 1
federal law. Once title vested in New York, the state acquired 2
the right to use the land by virtue of its title. What Amtrak 3
considers an “ongoing violation” -- New York’s entry onto and use 4
of the land -- is not even a violation of the law, because New 5
York has legal title to it. To hold otherwise would toll the 6
statute of limitations indefinitely for eminent domain challenges 7
by Amtrak. 8
CONCLUSION 9
Amtrak’s injury accrued at the very latest when the state 10
announced its findings. See Didden, 173 F. App’x at 933. The 11
judgment of the district court is, therefore, affirmed. 12
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