Kachalsky et al. v. Cty. of Westchester et al. 1 2 3

11-3642 (L)
Kachalsky et al. v. Cty. of Westchester et al.
1
2
3
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 4
5
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 6
7
8
9
August Term, 2012 10
11
(Argued: August 22, 2012 Decided: November 27, 2012) 12
13
Docket Nos. 11-3642 (Lead) 14
11-3962 (XAP) 15
16
17
ALAN KACHALSKY, CHRISTINA NIKOLOV, JOHNNIE NANCE, ANNA 18
MARCUCCI-NANCE, ERIC DETMER, SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, 19
INC., 20
21
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, 22
23
–v.– 24
25
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 26
27
Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, 28
29
SUSAN CACACE, JEFFREY A. COHEN, ALBERT LORENZOR, ROBERT K. 30
HOLDMAN, 31
32
Defendants-Appellees. 33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

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2
Before: 1
KATZMANN, WESLEY, LYNCH, Circuit Judges. 2
3
Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from a September 2, 2011 4
Opinion and Order of the United States District Court for 5
the Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.), granting 6
Defendants-Appellees summary judgment. Plaintiffs seek 7
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 8
barring New York State handgun licensing officials from 9
requiring that applicants prove “proper cause” to obtain 10
licenses to carry handguns for self-defense pursuant to New 11
York Penal Law section 400.00(2)(f). They argue that 12
application of section 400.00(2)(f) violates the Second and 13
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Because the 14
proper cause requirement is substantially related to New 15
York’s compelling interests in public safety and crime 16
prevention, we affirm. 17
18
19
AFFIRMED. 20
21
22
23
ALAN GURA, Gura & Possessky, PLLC, Alexandria, VA, 24
for Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. 25
26
THOMAS G. GARDINER, Sr. Assistant County Attorney 27
(James Castro-Blanco, Chief Deputy County 28
Attorney, on the brief), for Robert F. Meehan, 29
County Attorney for the County of Westchester, 30
Westchester, NY, for Defendant-Appellee- 31
Cross-Appellant. 32
33
SIMON HELLER, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara 34
D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Richard 35
Dearing, Deputy Solicitor General, on the 36
brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney 37
General of the State of New York, New York, 38
NY, for Defendants-Appellees. 39
40
41
42
43
44

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1 The State Defendants include Susan Cacace, Jeffrey A.
Cohen, Albert Lorenzo, and Robert K. Holdman.
3
WESLEY, Circuit Judge: 1
This appeal presents a single issue: Does New York’s 2
handgun licensing scheme violate the Second Amendment by 3
requiring an applicant to demonstrate “proper cause” to 4
obtain a license to carry a concealed handgun in public? 5
Plaintiffs Alan Kachalsky, Christina Nikolov, Johnnie 6
Nance, Anna Marcucci-Nance, and Eric Detmer (together, the 7
“Plaintiffs”) all seek to carry handguns outside the home 8
for self-defense. Each applied for and was denied a full- 9
carry concealed-handgun license by one of the defendant 10
licensing officers (the “State Defendants” 1
) for failing to 11
establish “proper cause”—a special need for self- 12
protection—pursuant to New York Penal Law section 13
400.00(2)(f). Plaintiffs, along with the Second Amendment 14
Foundation (“SAF”), thereafter filed this action to contest 15
New York’s proper cause requirement. They contend that the 16
proper cause provision, on its face or as applied to them, 17
violates the Second Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme 18
Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 19
(2008). 20
21

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2 Because we affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ suit, we do
not address whether SAF has standing. Where, as here, at least
one plaintiff has standing, jurisdiction is secure and we can
adjudicate the case whether the additional plaintiff has standing
or not. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64 (1977). We also do not address
Defendant County of Westchester’s contention that it is not a
proper party to this case.
4
The State Defendants moved for summary judgment. The 1
district court granted that motion and granted Defendant 2
County of Westchester summary judgment sua sponte. 3
Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 4
2011). The district court found that SAF lacked standing to 5
sue on its own behalf or on behalf of its members. Id. at 6
251. Addressing the merits, the district court concluded 7
that the concealed carrying of handguns in public is 8
“outside the core Second Amendment concern articulated in 9
Heller: self-defense in the home.” Id. at 264. In the 10
alternative, the district court determined that the proper 11
cause requirement would survive constitutional scrutiny even 12
if it implicated the Second Amendment. Id. at 266-72. For 13
the reasons that follow, we affirm. 2
14
I 15
A 16
New York’s efforts in regulating the possession and use 17
of firearms predate the Constitution. By 1785, New York had 18

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5
enacted laws regulating when and where firearms could be 1
used, as well as restricting the storage of gun powder. 2
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 22, 1785, ch. 81, 1785 Laws of N.Y. 3
152; Act of Apr. 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 Laws of N.Y. 627. 4
Like most other states, during the nineteenth century, New 5
York heavily regulated the carrying of concealable firearms. 6
In 1881, New York prohibited the concealed carrying of “any 7
kind of fire-arms.” 1881 Laws of N.Y., ch. 676, at 412. In 8
1884, New York instituted a statewide licensing requirement 9
for minors carrying weapons in public, see 1884 Laws of 10
N.Y., ch. 46, § 8, at 47, and soon after the turn of the 11
century, it expanded its licensing requirements to include 12
all persons carrying concealable pistols, see 1905 Laws of 13
N.Y., ch. 92, § 2, at 129–30. 14
Due to a rise in violent crime associated with 15
concealable firearms in the early twentieth century, New 16
York enacted the Sullivan Law in 1911, which made it 17
unlawful for any person to possess, without a license, “any 18
pistol, revolver or other firearm of a size which may be 19
concealed upon the person.” See 1911 Laws of N.Y., ch. 195, 20
§ 1, at 443 (codifying N.Y. Penal Law § 1897, ¶ 3); see also 21
N.Y. Legislative Service, Dangerous Weapons—“Sullivan Bill,” 22

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6
1911 Ch. 195 (1911). A study of homicides and suicides 1
completed shortly before the law’s enactment explained: “The 2
increase of homicide by shooting indicates . . . the urgent 3
necessity of the proper authorities taking some measures for 4
the regulation of the indiscriminate sale and carrying of 5
firearms.” Revolver Killings Fast Increasing, N.Y. Times, 6
Jan. 30, 1911 (quoting N.Y. State Coroner’s Office Report). 7
As a result, the study recommended that New York 8
should have a law, whereby a person having a revolver in 9
his possession, either concealed or displayed, unless for 10
some legitimate purpose, could be punished by a severe 11
jail sentence. . . . [A] rigid law, making it difficult 12
to buy revolvers, would be the means of saving hundreds 13
of lives. 14
15
Id. (quoting N.Y. State Coroner’s Office Report). 16
The Sullivan Law survived constitutional attack shortly 17
after it was passed. People ex rel. Darling v. Warden of 18
City Prisons, 154 A.D. 413, 422 (1st Dep’t 1913). Although 19
the law was upheld, in part, on what is now the erroneous 20
belief that the Second Amendment does not apply to the 21
states, the decision provides additional background 22
regarding the law’s enactment: 23
There had been for many years upon the statute books 24
a law against the carriage of concealed weapons. . . . It 25
did not seem effective in preventing crimes of violence 26
in this State. Of the same kind and character, but 27

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7
proceeding a step further with the regulatory 1
legislation, the Legislature has now picked out one 2
particular kind of arm, the handy, the usual and the 3
favorite weapon of the turbulent criminal class, and has 4
said that in our organized communities, our cities, towns 5
and villages where the public peace is protected by the 6
officers of organized government, the citizen may not 7
have that particular kind of weapon without a permit, as 8
it had already said that he might not carry it on his 9
person without a permit. 10
11
Id. at 423 (emphasis added). 12
In 1913, the Sullivan Law was amended to impose a 13
statewide standard for the issuance of licenses to carry 14
firearms in public. 1913 Laws of N.Y., ch. 608, at 1627-30. 15
To obtain a license to carry a concealed pistol or revolver 16
the applicant was required to demonstrate “good moral 17
character, and that proper cause exists for the issuance [of 18
the license].” Id. at 1629. One hundred years later, the 19
proper cause requirement remains a feature of New York’s 20
statutory regime. 21
B 22
New York maintains a general prohibition on the 23
possession of “firearms” absent a license. See N.Y. Penal 24
Law §§ 265.01-265.04, 265.20(a)(3). A “firearm” is defined 25
to include pistols and revolvers; shotguns with barrels less 26
than eighteen inches in length; rifles with barrels less 27
than sixteen inches in length; “any weapon made from a 28

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3 The possession of rifles and shotguns is also regulated.
Subject to limited exceptions, it is unlawful to possess a rifle
or shotgun “in or upon a building or grounds, used for
educational purposes, of any school, college or university . . .
or upon a school bus.” N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01(3). It is also
unlawful for a person under the age of sixteen to possess a rifle
or shotgun unless he or she has a hunting permit issued pursuant
to the environmental conservation law. N.Y. Penal Law § 265.05;
see also N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-0929.
4 The prohibition on carrying rifles and shotguns on school
grounds, in a school building, and on a school bus also applies
to those licensed to carry a firearm under section 400.00. N.Y.
Penal Law §§ 265.20(3), 265.01(3).
8
shotgun or rifle” with an overall length of less than 1
twenty-six inches; and assault weapons. N.Y. Penal Law 2
§ 265.00(3). Rifles and shotguns are not subject to the 3
licensing provisions of the statute. 3
4
Section 400.00 of the Penal Law “is the exclusive 5
statutory mechanism for the licensing of firearms in New 6
York State.” 4 O’Connor v. Scarpino, 83 N.Y.2d 919, 920 7
(1994) (Mem.); see N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20(a)(3). Licenses 8
are limited to those over twenty-one years of age, of good 9
moral character, without a history of crime or mental 10
illness, and “concerning whom no good cause exists for the 11
denial of the license.” N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1)(a)-(d), 12
(g). 13
Most licenses are limited by place or profession. 14
Licenses “shall be issued” to possess a registered handgun 15

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9
in the home or in a place of business by a merchant or 1
storekeeper. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(2)(a)-(b). And 2
licenses “shall be issued” for a messenger employed by a 3
banking institution or express company to carry a concealed 4
handgun, as well as for certain state and city judges and 5
those employed by a prison or jail. § 400.00(2)(c)-(e). 6
This case targets the license available under section 7
400.00(2)(f). That section provides that a license “shall 8
be issued to . . . have and carry [a firearm] concealed . . 9
. by any person when proper cause exists for the issuance 10
thereof.” N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f). This is the only 11
license available to carry a concealed handgun “without 12
regard to employment or place of possession.” Id. Given 13
that New York bans carrying handguns openly, applicants—like 14
Plaintiffs in this case—who desire to carry a handgun 15
outside the home and who do not fit within one of the 16
employment categories must demonstrate proper cause pursuant 17
to section 400.00(2)(f). 18
“Proper cause” is not defined by the Penal Law, but New 19
York State courts have defined the term to include carrying 20
a handgun for target practice, hunting, or self-defense. 21
When an applicant demonstrates proper cause to carry a 22

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5 A license restricted to target practice or hunting permits
the licensee to carry concealed a handgun “in connection” with
these activities. In re O’Connor, 585 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003
(Westchester Cty. Ct. 1992). For instance, a license restricted
to target practice permits the licensee to carry the weapon to
and from the shooting range. Bitondo v. New York, 182 A.D.2d
948, 948 (3d Dep’t 1992).
10
handgun for target practice or hunting, the licensing 1
officer may restrict a carry license “to the purposes that 2
justified the issuance.” 5 O’Connor, 83 N.Y.2d at 921. In 3
this regard, “a sincere desire to participate in target 4
shooting and hunting . . . constitute[s] a legitimate reason 5
for the issuance of a pistol permit.” In re O’Connor, 585 6
N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (Westchester Cty. Ct. 1992) (citing 7
Davis v. Clyne, 58 A.D.2d 947, 947 (3d Dep’t 1977)). 8
To establish proper cause to obtain a license without 9
any restrictions—the full-carry license that Plaintiffs seek 10
in this case—an applicant must “demonstrate a special need 11
for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general 12
community or of persons engaged in the same profession.” 13
Klenosky v. N.Y City Police Dep’t, 75 A.D.2d 793, 793 (1st 14
Dep’t 1980), aff’d on op. below, 53 N.Y.2d 685 (1981). 15
There is a substantial body of law instructing licensing 16
officials on the application of this standard. Unlike a 17
license for target shooting or hunting, “[a] generalized 18

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11
desire to carry a concealed weapon to protect one’s person 1
and property does not constitute ‘proper cause.’” In re 2
O’Connor, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 1003 (citing Bernstein v. Police 3
Dep’t of City of New York, 85 A.D.2d 574, 574 (1st Dep’t 4
1981)). Good moral character plus a simple desire to carry 5
a weapon is not enough. Moore v. Gallup, 293 N.Y. 846 6
(1944) (per curiam), aff’g 267 A.D. 64, 66 (3d Dep’t 1943); 7
see also In re O’Connor, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. Nor is 8
living or being employed in a “high crime area[].” Martinek 9
v. Kerik, 294 A.D.2d 221, 221-22 (1st Dep’t 2002); see also 10
Theurer v. Safir, 254 A.D.2d 89, 90 (1st Dep’t 1998); Sable 11
v. McGuire, 92 A.D.2d 805, 805 (1st Dep’t 1983). 12
The application process for a license is “rigorous” and 13
administered locally. Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 79 (2d 14
Cir. 2005). Every application triggers a local 15
investigation by police into the applicant’s mental health 16
history, criminal history, moral character, and, in the case 17
of a carry license, representations of proper cause. See 18
N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1)-(4). As part of this 19
investigation, police officers take applicants’ fingerprints 20
and conduct a series of background checks with the New York 21
State Division of Criminal Justice Services, the Federal 22

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6 Except in New York City, Nassau County, and Suffolk
County, a “licensing officer” is defined as a “judge or justice
of a court of record having his office in the county of
issuance.” N.Y. Penal Law § 265.00(10). “Licensing officer” is
defined in New York City as “the police commissioner of that
city”; in Nassau County as “the commissioner of police of that
county”; and in Suffolk County as “the sheriff of that county
except in the towns of Babylon, Brookhaven, Huntington, Islip and
Smithtown, the commissioner of police of that county.” Id.
12
Bureau of Investigation, and the New York State Department 1
of Mental Hygiene. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(4). Upon 2
completion of the investigation, the results are reported to 3
the licensing officer. Id. 4
Licensing officers, often local judges, 6 are “vested 5
with considerable discretion” in deciding whether to grant a 6
license application, particularly in determining whether 7
proper cause exists for the issuance of a carry license. 8
Vale v. Eidens, 290 A.D.2d 612, 613 (3d Dep’t 2002); see 9
also Kaplan v. Bratton, 249 A.D.2d 199, 201 (1st Dep’t 10
1998); Unger v. Rozzi, 206 A.D.2d 974, 974-75 (4th Dep’t 11
1994); Fromson v. Nelson, 178 A.D.2d 479, 479 (2d Dep’t 12
1991). An applicant may obtain judicial review of the 13
denial of a license in whole or in part by filing a 14
proceeding under Article 78 of New York’s Civil Practice Law 15
and Rules. A licensing officer’s decision will be upheld 16
unless it is arbitrary and capricious. O’Brien v. Keegan, 17
87 N.Y.2d 436, 439-40 (1996). 18

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7 Plaintiffs Nance, Marcucci-Nance, and Detmer have carry
licenses limited to the purpose of target shooting. Their
applications sought to amend their licenses to full-carry
licenses.
13
C 1
Each individual Plaintiff applied for a full-carry 2
license under section 400.00(2)(f). Four of the five 3
Plaintiffs made no effort to comply with New York’s 4
requirements for a full-carry license, that is, they did not 5
claim a special need for self-protection distinguishable 6
from that of the general community or of persons engaged in 7
the same profession. Plaintiff Kachalsky asserted that the 8
Second Amendment “entitles him to an unrestricted permit 9
without further establishing ‘proper cause.’” J.A. 33. He 10
noted: “[W]e live in a world where sporadic random violence 11
might at any moment place one in a position where one needs 12
to defend onself or possibly others.” J.A. 33-34. 13
Plaintiffs Nance and Marcucci-Nance asserted that they 14
demonstrated proper cause because they were citizens in 15
“good standing” in their community and gainfully employed. 16
J.A. 43-44, 48-49. Plaintiff Detmer asserted that he 17
demonstrated proper cause because he was a federal law 18
enforcement officer with the U.S. Coast Guard. 7 J.A. 39. 19
Unlike the other Plaintiffs, Plaintiff Nikolov attempted to 20

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8 Plaintiff Kachalsky was the only Plaintiff who appealed
the denial of his full-carry license application. The Appellate
Division, Second Department affirmed the denial, holding that
Kachalsky “failed to demonstrate ‘proper cause’ for the issuance
of a ‘full carry’ permit.” Kachalsky v. Cacace, 65 A.D.3d 1045
(2d Dep’t 2009). The New York Court of Appeals dismissed
Kachalsky’s application for leave to appeal “upon the ground that
no substantial constitutional question [was] directly involved.”
Kachalsky v. Cacace, 14 N.Y.3d 743, 743 (2010).
14
show a special need for self-protection by asserting that as 1
a transgender female, she is more likely to be the victim of 2
violence. J.A. 36. Like the other applicants, she also 3
asserted that being a law-abiding citizen in itself entitled 4
her to a full-carry license. Id. 5
Plaintiffs’ applications were all denied for the same 6
reason: Failure to show any facts demonstrating a need for 7
self-protection distinguishable from that of the general 8
public. J.A. 34 (Kachalsky), 37 (Nikolov), 39 (Detmer), 9
43-44 (Nance), 48-49 (Marcucci-Nance). Nikolov’s contention 10
that her status as a transgender female puts her at risk of 11
violence was rejected because she did not “report . . . any 12
type of threat to her own safety anywhere.” J.A. 36. 13
Plaintiffs aver that they have not reapplied for full-carry 14
licenses because they believe it would be futile, and that 15
they would carry handguns in public but for fear of arrest, 16
prosecution, fine, and/or imprisonment. 8 J.A. 75, 77, 79, 17
81, 83, 85. 18

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15
II 1
Invoking Heller, Plaintiffs contend that the Second 2
Amendment guarantees them a right to possess and carry 3
weapons in public to defend themselves from dangerous 4
confrontation and that New York cannot constitutionally 5
force them to demonstrate proper cause to exercise that 6
right. Defendants counter that the proper cause requirement 7
does not burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment. 8
They share the district court’s view that the Supreme 9
Court’s pronouncement in Heller limits the right to bear 10
arms for self-defense to the home. 11
Heller provides no categorical answer to this case. 12
And in many ways, it raises more questions than it answers. 13
In Heller, the Supreme Court concluded that the Second 14
Amendment codifies a pre-existing “individual right to 15
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 554 16
U.S. at 592. Given that interpretation, the Court struck 17
down the District of Columbia’s prohibition on the 18
possession of usable firearms in the home because the law 19
banned “the quintessential self-defense weapon” in the place 20
Americans hold most dear—the home. Id. at 628-29. 21
There was no need in Heller to further define the scope 22
of the Second Amendment or the standard of review for laws 23

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9 A number of courts and academics, take the view that
Heller’s reluctance to announce a standard of review is a signal
that courts must look solely to the text, history, and tradition
of the Second Amendment to determine whether a state can limit
the right without applying any sort of means-end scrutiny. See
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271-74 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Eugene Volokh,
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self–Defense: An
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443,
1463 (2009); Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in
First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375, 405
(2009). We disagree. Heller stands for the rather unremarkable
proposition that where a state regulation is entirely
inconsistent with the protections afforded by an enumerated
right—as understood through that right’s text, history, and
tradition—it is an exercise in futility to apply means-end
scrutiny. Moreover, the conclusion that the law would be
unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny”
applicable to other rights implies, if anything, that one of the
conventional levels of scrutiny would be applicable to
regulations alleged to infringe Second Amendment rights.
16
that burden Second Amendment rights. As the Court saw it, 1
“[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to 2
the severe restriction of the District's handgun ban.” Id. 3
at 629. Because the Second Amendment was directly at odds 4
with a complete ban on handguns in the home, the D.C. 5
statute ran roughshod over that right. Thus, the Court 6
simply noted that the handgun ban would be unconstitutional 7
“[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have 8
applied to enumerated constitutional rights.” Id. at 628. 9
Heller was never meant “to clarify the entire field” of 10
Second Amendment jurisprudence. 9 Id. at 635. 11
12

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17
Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court held that the 1
Second Amendment’s protections, whatever their limits, apply 2
fully to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026, 3042 4
(2010). In McDonald, the Court struck down a Chicago law 5
that banned handguns in the home. Id. at 3050. But it also 6
reaffirmed Heller’s assurances that Second Amendment rights 7
are far from absolute and that many longstanding handgun 8
regulations are “presumptively lawful.” Heller 554 U.S. at 9
627 n.26; see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047. The Court also 10
noted that the doctrine of “incorporation does not imperil 11
every law regulating firearms.” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 12
3047. 13
What we know from these decisions is that Second 14
Amendment guarantees are at their zenith within the home. 15
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29. What we do not know is the 16
scope of that right beyond the home and the standards for 17
determining when and how the right can be regulated by a 18
government. This vast “terra incognita” has troubled courts 19
since Heller was decided. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 20
F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., for the 21
Court). Although the Supreme Court’s cases applying the 22

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10 The plain text of the Second Amendment does not limit the
right to bear arms to the home.
18
Second Amendment have arisen only in connection with 1
prohibitions on the possession of firearms in the home, the 2
Court’s analysis suggests, as Justice Stevens’s dissent in 3
Heller and Defendants in this case before us acknowledge, 4
that the Amendment must have some application in the very 5
different context of the public possession of firearms. 10
6
Our analysis proceeds on this assumption. 7
A 8
Plaintiffs contend that, as in Heller, history and 9
tradition demonstrate that there is a “fundamental right” to 10
carry handguns in public, and though a state may regulate 11
open or concealed carrying of handguns, it cannot ban both. 12
While Plaintiffs concede that state legislative efforts have 13
long recognized the dangers presented by both the open and 14
concealed carrying of handguns in public places, they 15
contend that states must suffer a constitutionally imposed 16
choice between two equally inadequate alternatives. Thus, 17
according to Plaintiffs, “access to [New York’s] only 18
available handgun carry license can[not] be qualified by 19

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11 Plaintiffs’ argument is premised, in part, on Heller’s
enunciation of certain “longstanding” regulatory measures,
including concealed carry bans, that the Court deemed
“presumptively lawful.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27; see also
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion) (same). Thus,
plaintiffs contend that regulations that are not similarly
“longstanding” are not valid restrictions on Second Amendment
rights. We do not view this language as a talismanic formula for
determining whether a law regulating firearms is consistent with
the Second Amendment. While we find it informative, it simply
makes clear that the Second Amendment right is not unlimited.
Moreover, even if this language provided a “test” for
determining the validity of a handgun regulation, it is not
self-evident what that test might be. The “longstanding”
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill were identified as “presumptively lawful,” Heller,
554 U.S. at 626-27 and n. 26, but these laws were not enacted
until the early twentieth century, see Carlton F.W. Larson, Four
Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller
and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1374-79 (2009).
New York’s proper cause requirement is similarly
“longstanding”—it has been the law in New York since 1913. 1913
Laws of N.Y., ch. 608, at 1627-30.
19
‘proper cause.’” 11 Appellants’ Br. at 38. 1
To be sure, some nineteenth-century state courts 2
offered interpretations of the Second Amendment and 3
analogous state constitutional provisions that are similar 4
to Plaintiffs’ position. In State v. Reid, the Supreme 5
Court of Alabama upheld a prohibition on the concealed 6
carrying of “any species of fire arms” but cautioned that 7
the state’s ability to regulate firearms was not unlimited 8
and could not “amount[] to a destruction of the right, or . 9
. . require[] arms to be so borne as to render them wholly 10

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12 Nunn is cited in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in
Heller as an example of state court responses to handgun
regulatory efforts within the states. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
13 Notably, Chandler and Reid conflict with Plaintiffs’
position, at least in part. Plaintiffs contend that a state may
choose to ban open carrying so long as concealed carrying is
permitted. But both Chandler and Reid suggest that open carrying
must be permitted. The Reid court explained:
Under the provision of our constitution, we
incline to the opinion that the Legislature
cannot inhibit the citizen from bearing arms
openly, because it authorizes him to bear them
for the purposes of defending himself and the
State, and it is only when carried openly,
that they can be efficiently used for defence.
1840 WL 229, at *5; see also Chandler, 1850 WL 3838, at
*1.
20
useless for the purpose of defence.” 1 Ala. 612, 1840 WL 1
229, at *2-3 (1840). Relying on Reid, the Supreme Court of 2
Georgia held that a statute prohibiting the carrying of 3
concealed pistols was unconstitutional insofar as it also 4
“contains a prohibition against bearing arms openly.” Nunn 5
v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 1846 WL 1167, at *11 (1846) (emphasis 6
in original). 12 And in State v. Chandler, the Supreme Court 7
of Louisiana upheld a concealed-carry ban because “[i]t 8
interfered with no man’s right to carry arms . . . in full 9
open view.” 5 La. Ann. 489, 1850 WL 3838, at *1 (1850) 10
(internal quotation marks omitted). 13
11
12

-- 20 of 49 --

14 These cases were decided on the basis of an interpretation
of the Second Amendment—that pistols and similar weapons are not
“arms” within the meaning of the Second Amendment or its state
constitutional analogue—that conflicts with the Supreme Court’s
present reading of the Amendment. Fife, 1876 WL 1562, at *4;
English, 1872 WL 7422, at *3; Andrews, 1871 WL 3579, at *11. For
instance, the Texas court construed the Second Amendment as
protecting only the “arms of a militiaman or soldier,” which
include “the musket and bayonet . . . holster pistols and carbine
. . . [and] side arms.” 1872 WL 7422, at *3. To refer to the
non-military style pistols covered by the statute as necessary
for a “well-regulated militia” was, according to the court,
“simply ridiculous.” Id. Similarly, the Tennessee court
invalidated the statute to the extent it covered revolvers
“adapted to the usual equipment of a solider.” Andrews, 1871 WL
3579, at *11.
21
But this was hardly a universal view. Other states 1
read restrictions on the public carrying of weapons as 2
entirely consistent with constitutional protections of the 3
right to keep and bear arms. At least four states once 4
banned the carrying of pistols and similar weapons in 5
public, both in a concealed or an open manner. See, e.g., 6
Ch. 96, §§ 1-2, 1881 Ark. Acts at 191-92; Act of Dec. 2, 7
1875, ch. 52, § 1, 1876 Wyo. Terr. Comp. Laws, at 352; Ch. 8
13, § 1, 1870 Tenn. Acts at 28; Act of Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 9
34, § 1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws at 25. And the statutes in 10
Texas, Tennessee, and Arkansas withstood constitutional 11
challenges. See, e.g., Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 1876 WL 12
1562, at *4 (1876); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 1872 WL 13
7422, at *3 (1871); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 1871 WL 14
3579, at *11 (1871). 14
15

-- 21 of 49 --

15 The extensive history of state regulation of handguns in
public is discussed in detail in Part II.B.
22
It seems apparent to us that unlike the situation in 1
Heller where “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have 2
come close” to D.C.’s total ban on usable handguns in the 3
home, New York’s restriction on firearm possession in public 4
has a number of close and longstanding cousins. 15 Heller, 5
554 U.S. at 629. History and tradition do not speak with 6
one voice here. What history demonstrates is that states 7
often disagreed as to the scope of the right to bear arms, 8
whether the right was embodied in a state constitution or 9
the Second Amendment. Compare Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 10
90, 1822 WL 1085, at *3 (1822) (concluding that a 11
prohibition on carrying concealed weapons was 12
unconstitutional), with Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 1840 13
WL 1554, at **4-6 (1840) (citing to Bliss but reaching the 14
opposite conclusion). 15
Even if we believed that we should look solely to this 16
highly ambiguous history and tradition to determine the 17
meaning of the Amendment, we would find that the cited 18
sources do not directly address the specific question before 19
us: Can New York limit handgun licenses to those 20
demonstrating a special need for self-protection? Unlike 21

-- 22 of 49 --

16 Plaintiffs also contend that New York’s requirement that
license applicants be “of good moral character” is an
unconstitutional prior restraint. Because, as Plaintiffs admit,
this provision was not challenged in their complaint or below, we
choose not to consider it here.
23
the cases and statutes discussed above, New York’s proper 1
cause requirement does not operate as a complete ban on the 2
possession of handguns in public. Analogizing New York’s 3
licensing scheme (or any other gun regulation for that 4
matter) to the array of statutes enacted or construed over 5
one hundred years ago has its limits. 6
Plaintiffs raise a second argument with regard to how 7
we should measure the constitutional legitimacy of the New 8
York statute that takes a decidedly different tack. They 9
suggest that we apply First Amendment prior-restraint 10
analysis in lieu of means-end scrutiny to assess the proper 11
cause requirement. 16 They see the nature of the rights 12
guaranteed by each amendment as identical in kind. One has 13
a right to speak and a right to bear arms. Thus, just as 14
the First Amendment permits everyone to speak without 15
obtaining a license, New York cannot limit the right to bear 16
arms to only some law-abiding citizens. We are hesitant to 17
import substantive First Amendment principles wholesale into 18
Second Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, no court has done 19

-- 23 of 49 --

24
so. See, e.g., Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 1
472 (D. Md. 2012); Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 2
813, 835-36 (D.N.J. 2012). 3
We recognize that analogies between the First and 4
Second Amendment were made often in Heller. 554 U.S. at 5
582, 595, 606, 635. Similar analogies have been made since 6
the Founding. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 7
304, 314 (1825) (“The liberty of the press was to be 8
unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in 9
case of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which 10
does not protect him who uses them for annoyance or 11
destruction.”). Notably, these analogies often used the 12
states’ power to regulate firearms, which was taken as 13
unassailably obvious, to support arguments in favor of 14
upholding limitations on First Amendment rights. But it 15
would be as imprudent to assume that the principles and 16
doctrines developed in connection with the First Amendment 17
apply equally to the Second, as to assume that rules 18
developed in the Second Amendment context could be 19
transferred without modification to the First. Endorsing 20
that approach would be an incautious equation of the two 21
amendments and could well result in the erosion of hard-won 22
First Amendment rights. As discussed throughout, there are 23

-- 24 of 49 --

25
salient differences between the state’s ability to regulate 1
each of these rights. See generally L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, 2
Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 Wm. & Mary L. 3
Rev. 1311 (1997) (discussing problems with efforts to 4
associate firearms with the First Amendment’s prohibition on 5
prior restraints). 6
But even if we decided to apply prior-restraint 7
doctrine to Second Amendment claims, this case would be a 8
poor vehicle for its maiden voyage. To make out a 9
prior-restraint argument, Plaintiffs would have to show that 10
the proper cause requirement lacks “narrow, objective, and 11
definite standards,” thereby granting officials unbridled 12
discretion in making licensing determinations. Forsyth 13
Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992) 14
(quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 15
(1969)). But Plaintiffs’ contention that the proper cause 16
requirement grants licensing officials unbridled discretion 17
is something of a red herring. Plaintiffs admit that there 18
is an established standard for determining whether an 19
applicant has demonstrated proper cause. The proper cause 20
requirement has existed in New York since 1913 and is 21
defined by binding judicial precedent as “a special need for 22
self-protection distinguishable from that of the general 23

-- 25 of 49 --

26
community or of persons engaged in the same profession.” 1
Klenosky, 75 A.D.2d at 793; see e.g., Brando v. Sullivan, 2
290 A.D.2d 691, 693 (3d Dep’t 2002); Bernstein, 85 A.D.2d at 3
574. 4
Plaintiffs’ complaint is not that the proper cause 5
requirement is standardless; rather, they simply do not like 6
the standard—that licenses are limited to those with a 7
special need for self-protection. This is not an argument 8
that licensing officials have unbridled discretion in 9
granting full-carry permits. In fact, the State Defendants’ 10
determinations that Plaintiffs do not have a special need 11
for self-protection are unchallenged. Rather, Plaintiffs 12
question New York’s ability to limit handgun possession to 13
those demonstrating a threat to their safety. This is 14
precisely the type of argument that should be addressed by 15
examining the purpose and impact of the law in light of the 16
Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right. 17
Plaintiffs’ attempts to equate this case with Heller or 18
to draw analogies to First Amendment concerns come up short. 19
B 20
Thus, given our assumption that the Second Amendment 21
applies to this context, the question becomes how closely to 22

-- 26 of 49 --

27
scrutinize New York’s statute to determine its 1
constitutional mettle. Heller, as noted above, expressly 2
avoided deciding the standard of review for a law burdening 3
the right to bear arms because it concluded that D.C.’s 4
handgun ban was unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the 5
standards of scrutiny [traditionally] applied to enumerated 6
constitutional rights.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. The Court 7
did, however, rule out a rational basis review because it 8
“would be redundant with the separate constitutional 9
prohibitions on irrational laws.” Id. at 629 n.27. 10
We have held that “heightened scrutiny is triggered 11
only by those restrictions that (like the complete 12
prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a 13
substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to 14
possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or for other 15
lawful purposes).” United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 16
166 (2d Cir. 2012). Decastro rejected a Second Amendment 17
challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), which makes it unlawful 18
for an individual to transport into his state of residence a 19
firearm acquired in another state. Because we concluded 20
that § 922(a)(3) did not impose a substantial burden on the 21
defendant’s Second Amendment right, we left unanswered “the 22
level of scrutiny applicable to laws that do impose such a 23

-- 27 of 49 --

17 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261–64
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to prohibition
on possession of magazines with a capacity of more than ten
rounds of ammunition); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25
(1st Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9), which prohibits the possession of firearms by a person
28
burden.” Id. at 165. Here, some form of heightened 1
scrutiny would be appropriate. New York’s proper cause 2
requirement places substantial limits on the ability of law- 3
abiding citizens to possess firearms for self-defense in 4
public. And unlike Decastro, there are no alternative 5
options for obtaining a license to carry a handgun. 6
We do not believe, however, that heightened scrutiny 7
must always be akin to strict scrutiny when a law burdens 8
the Second Amendment. Heller explains that the “core” 9
protection of the Second Amendment is the “right of law- 10
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 11
hearth and home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35. Although we 12
have no occasion to decide what level of scrutiny should 13
apply to laws that burden the “core” Second Amendment 14
protection identified in Heller, we believe that applying 15
less than strict scrutiny when the regulation does not 16
burden the “core” protection of self-defense in the home 17
makes eminent sense in this context and is in line with the 18
approach taken by our sister circuits. 17 It is also 19

-- 28 of 49 --

convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012); United States v. Masciandaro, 638
F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b), which prohibits “carrying or possessing a
loaded weapon in a motor vehicle” within national park areas),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011); United States v. Chester,
628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny
to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 18
U.S.C. § 922(k), which prohibits the possession of firearms with
obliterated serial numbers), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 958 (2011);
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which
prohibits the possession of firearms while subject to a domestic
protection order), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2476 (2011); United
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(applying form of intermediate scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(9)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011).
29
consistent with jurisprudential experience analyzing other 1
enumerated rights. For instance, when analyzing First 2
Amendment claims, content-based restrictions on 3
noncommercial speech are subject to strict scrutiny, see 4
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 5
813 (2000), while laws regulating commercial speech are 6
subject to intermediate scrutiny, see Florida Bar v. Went 7
For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1995). 8
The proper cause requirement falls outside the core 9
Second Amendment protections identified in Heller. New 10
York’s licensing scheme affects the ability to carry 11
handguns only in public, while the District of Columbia ban 12
applied in the home “where the need for defense of self, 13

-- 29 of 49 --

30
family, and property is most acute.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 1
628. This is a critical difference. The state’s ability to 2
regulate firearms and, for that matter, conduct, is 3
qualitatively different in public than in the home. Heller 4
reinforces this view. In striking D.C.’s handgun ban, the 5
Court stressed that banning usable handguns in the home is a 6
“policy choice[]” that is “off the table,” id. at 636, but 7
that a variety of other regulatory options remain available, 8
including categorical bans on firearm possession in certain 9
public locations, id. at 626-27 & n.26. 10
Treating the home as special and subject to limited 11
state regulation is not unique to firearm regulation; it 12
permeates individual rights jurisprudence. For instance, in 13
Stanley v. Georgia, the Court held that in-home possession 14
of obscene materials could not be criminalized, even as it 15
assumed that public display of obscenity was unprotected. 16
394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). While “the States retain broad 17
power to regulate obscenity[] that power simply does not 18
extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy 19
of his own home.” Id. Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas, the 20
Court emphasized that the state’s efforts to regulate 21
private sexual conduct between consenting adults is 22
especially suspect when it intrudes into the home: “Liberty 23

-- 30 of 49 --

18 That the home deserves special protection from government
intrusion is also reflected in the Third Amendment, which
provides: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but
in a manner to be prescribed by law.” U.S. Const. amend. III.
31
protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions 1
into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition 2
the State is not omnipresent in the home.” 539 U.S. 558, 3
562 (2003); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 4
(2001) (“In the home, our [Fourth Amendment] cases show 5
[that] the entire area is held safe from prying government 6
eyes.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) 7
(discussing general right to privacy that was closely 8
connected to “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies 9
of life” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 18
10
But while the state’s ability to regulate firearms is 11
circumscribed in the home, “outside the home, firearm rights 12
have always been more limited, because public safety 13
interests often outweigh individual interests in self- 14
defense.” Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470. There is a 15
longstanding tradition of states regulating firearm 16
possession and use in public because of the dangers posed to 17
public safety. See Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well 18
Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 19

-- 31 of 49 --

19 Regulations concerning the militia and the storage of gun
powder were also common. See Act of May 8, 1792, 1792 Conn. Pub.
Acts 440 (forming the state militia); Act of July 19, 1776, ch.
I, 1775-1776 Mass. Acts 15 (regulating the militia of
Massachusetts); Act of Apr. 3, 1778, ch. 33, 1778 Laws of N.Y. 62
(regulating the militia of New York State); Act of Mar. 20, 1780,
ch. CLXVII, 1780 Pa. Laws 347 (regulating the militia of
Pennsylvania); Act of Mar. 26, 1784, 1784 S.C. Acts 68
(regulating militia); see also Act of June 26, 1792, ch. X, 1792
Mass. Acts 208 (regulating storage of gun powder in Boston); Act
of Apr. 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 Laws of N.Y. 627 (regulating
storage of gun powder in New York); Act of Dec. 6, 1783, ch. CIV,
1783 Pa. Laws 161, ch. MLIX, 11 Pa. Stat. 209 (protecting the
city of Philadelphia from the danger of gunpowder) .
32
73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 502-16 (2004). During the Founding 1
Era, for instance, many states prohibited the use of 2
firearms on certain occasions and in certain locations. 3
See, e.g., Act of April 22, 1785, ch. 81, 1785 Laws of N.Y. 4
152; Act of Nov. 16, 1821, ch. LXLIII, 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 5
78; Act of Jan. 30, 1847, 1846-1847 Va. Acts ch. 79, at 67; 6
Act of Dec. 24, 1774, ch. DCCIII, 1774 Pa. Stat. 410. 19
7
Other states went even further. North Carolina prohibited 8
going armed at night or day “in fairs, markets, nor in the 9
presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, nor in 10
no part elsewhere.” See Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of 11
the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus 12
Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 31- 13
32 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks 14
omitted). Massachusetts and Virginia enacted similar laws. 15

-- 32 of 49 --

20 Curiously, North Carolina referred to the “King's
Justices” after the colonies had won their independence. The
laws in North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Virginia track
language from the 1328 Statute of Northampton, which provided
that no person shall “go nor ride armed by Night nor by Day in
Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of the Justices or other
Ministers nor in no Part elsewhere.” 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328)
(Eng.). There is debate in the historical literature concerning
whether the Statute of Northampton, and laws adopting similar
language, prohibited the carrying of weapons in public generally
or only when it would “terrorize” the public. See Charles, The
Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, 60 Clev. St. L.
Rev. at 31-32.
21 See Act of Feb. 1, 1839, ch. 77, 1839 Ala. Acts at 67-68;
Act of Apr. 1, 1881, ch. 96, § 1, 1881 Ark. Acts at 191; Act of
Feb. 1, 1881, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws at 74; Act of Feb. 12, 1885,
ch. 3620, 1885 Fla. Laws at 61; Act of Apr. 16, 1881, 1881 Ill.
Laws at 73-74; Act of Jan. 14, 1820, ch. 23, 1820 Ind. Acts at
39; 29 Ky. Gen. Stat. art. 29, § 1 (as amended through 1880); Act
of Mar. 25, 1813, 1813 La. Acts at 172; 1866 Md. Laws, ch. 375,
§1; Neb. Gen. Stat., ch. 58, ch. 5, § 25 (1873); Act of Mar. 5,
1879, ch. 127, 1879 N.C. Sess. Laws at 231; N.D. Pen. Code § 457
(1895); Act of Mar. 18, 1859, 1859 Ohio Laws at 56; Act of Feb.
18, 1885, 1885 Or. Laws at 33; Act of Dec. 24, 1880, no. 362,
1881 S.C. Acts at 447; S.D. Terr. Pen. Code § 457 (1883); Act of
Apr. 12, 1871, ch. 34, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws at 25-27; Act of Oct.
20, 1870, ch. 349, 1870 Va. Acts at 510; Wash. Code § 929 (1881);
W. Va. Code, ch. 148, § 7 (1891); see also Cornell & DeDino, A
Well Regulated Right, 73 Fordham L. Rev. at 502-16.
33
Id.20
1
In the nineteenth century, laws directly regulating 2
concealable weapons for public safety became commonplace and 3
far more expansive in scope than regulations during the 4
Founding Era. Most states enacted laws banning the carrying 5
of concealed weapons. 21 And as Heller noted, “the majority 6
of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held 7
that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful 8

-- 33 of 49 --

34
under the Second Amendment or state analogues.” Heller, 554 1
U.S. at 626. Indeed, the nineteenth century Supreme Court 2
agreed, noting that “the right of the people to keep and 3
bear arms . . . is not infringed by laws prohibiting the 4
carrying of concealed weapons.” Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 5
U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897). 6
In some ways, these concealed-carry bans were similar 7
to New York’s law because while a few states with concealed- 8
carry bans considered self-defense concerns, the exceptions 9
were extremely limited. For instance, in Ohio there was an 10
exception if “the accused was, at the time of carrying [the 11
concealed weapon] engaged in a pursuit of any lawful 12
business, calling or employment, and that the circumstances 13
. . . justif[ied] a prudent man in carrying the weapon . . . 14
for the defense of his person.” Act of Mar. 18, 1859, 1859 15
Ohio Laws at 56-57. Similarly, in Tennessee, a person was 16
exempted from the concealed carry ban who was “on a journey 17
to any place out of his county or state.” Act of Oct. 19, 18
1821, ch. XIII, 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts at 15-16. By contrast, 19
Virginia’s concealed-carry ban was even stricter than New 20
York’s statute because it explicitly rejected a self-defense 21
exception. A defendant was guilty under Virginia’s 22
concealed-carry ban even if he was acting in self-defense 23
when using the weapon. 1838 Va. Acts ch. 101 at 76. 24

-- 34 of 49 --

35
Some states went even further than prohibiting the 1
carrying of concealed weapons. As discussed above, several 2
states banned concealable weapons (subject to certain 3
exceptions) altogether whether carried openly or concealed. 4
See Part II.A. Other states banned the sale of concealable 5
weapons. For instance, Georgia criminalized the sale of 6
concealable weapons, effectively moving toward their 7
complete prohibition. Act of Dec. 25, 1837, 1837 Ga. Laws 8
at 90 (protecting citizens of Georgia against the use of 9
deadly weapons). Tennessee enacted a similar law, which 10
withstood constitutional challenge. Act of Jan. 27, 1838, 11
ch. CXXXVII, 1837-1838 Tenn. Pub. Acts 200. In upholding 12
the law, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reasoned that "[t]he 13
Legislature thought the evil great, and, to effectually 14
remove it, made the remedy strong.” Day v. State, 37 Tenn. 15
(5 Sneed) 496, 500 (1857). 16
The historical prevalence of the regulation of firearms 17
in public demonstrates that while the Second Amendment’s 18
core concerns are strongest inside hearth and home, states 19
have long recognized a countervailing and competing set of 20
concerns with regard to handgun ownership and use in public. 21
Understanding the scope of the constitutional right is the 22

-- 35 of 49 --

36
first step in determining the yard stick by which we measure 1
the state regulation. See, e.g., Bd. Of Trustees of Univ. 2
of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (“The first 3
step in [analyzing legislation intersecting with enumerated 4
rights] is to identify with some precision the scope of the 5
constitutional right at issue.”). 6
We believe state regulation of the use of firearms in 7
public was “enshrined with[in] the scope” of the Second 8
Amendment when it was adopted. Heller, 554. U.S. at 634. 9
As Plaintiffs admitted at oral argument, “the state enjoys a 10
fair degree of latitude” to regulate the use and possession 11
of firearms in public. The Second Amendment does not 12
foreclose regulatory measures to a degree that would result 13
in “handcuffing lawmakers’ ability to prevent armed mayhem 14
in public places.” Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471 (internal 15
quotation marks omitted). 16
Because our tradition so clearly indicates a 17
substantial role for state regulation of the carrying of 18
firearms in public, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny 19
is appropriate in this case. The proper cause requirement 20
passes constitutional muster if it is substantially related 21
to the achievement of an important governmental interest. 22

-- 36 of 49 --

37
See, e.g., Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 1
641-42; see also Ernst J. v. Stone, 452 F.3d 186, 200 n.10 2
(2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he label ‘intermediate scrutiny’ carries 3
different connotations depending on the area of law in which 4
it is used.”). 5
As the parties agree, New York has substantial, indeed 6
compelling, governmental interests in public safety and 7
crime prevention. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro–Choice Network, 8
519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 9
264 (1984); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 10
452 U.S. 264, 300 (1981); Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 166 11
(2d Cir. 2010). The only question then is whether the 12
proper cause requirement is substantially related to these 13
interests. We conclude that it is. 14
In making this determination, “substantial deference to 15
the predictive judgments of [the legislature]” is warranted. 16
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). 17
The Supreme Court has long granted deference to legislative 18
findings regarding matters that are beyond the competence of 19
courts. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 20
2705, 2727 (2010); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. at 21
195–196; see also Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation 22

-- 37 of 49 --

38
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330-31 n.12 (1985). In the context 1
of firearm regulation, the legislature is “far better 2
equipped than the judiciary” to make sensitive public policy 3
judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the 4
dangers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those 5
risks. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 6
(1994). Thus, our role is only “to assure that, in 7
formulating its judgments, [New York] has drawn reasonable 8
inferences based on substantial evidence.” Id. at 666. 9
Unlike strict scrutiny review, we are not required to ensure 10
that the legislature’s chosen means is “narrowly tailored” 11
or the least restrictive available means to serve the stated 12
governmental interest. To survive intermediate scrutiny, 13
the fit between the challenged regulation need only be 14
substantial, “not perfect.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97. 15
New York’s legislative judgment concerning handgun 16
possession in public was made one-hundred years ago. In 17
1911, with the enactment of the Sullivan Law, New York 18
identified the dangers inherent in the carrying of handguns 19
in public. N.Y. Legislative Service, Dangerous Weapons - 20
“Sullivan Bill,” 1911 Ch. 195 (1911). And since 1913, New 21
York’s elected officials determined that a reasonable method 22

-- 38 of 49 --

22 New York’s statutory scheme was the result of a “careful
balancing of the interests involved” and not a general animus
towards guns. Report of the N.Y. State Joint Legislative Comm.
On Firearms & Ammunition, Doc. No. 6, at 12 (1965). The
legislature explained that “[s]tatutes governing firearms . . .
are not desirable as ends in themselves.” Id. Rather, the
purpose was “to prevent crimes of violence before they can
happen, and at the same time preserve legitimate interests such
as training for the national defense, the right of self defense,
and recreational pursuits of hunting, target shooting and trophy
collecting.” Id.
39
for combating these dangers was to limit handgun possession 1
in public to those showing proper cause for the issuance of 2
a license. 1913 Laws of N.Y., ch. 608, at 1627-30. The 3
proper cause requirement has remained a hallmark of New 4
York’s handgun regulation since then. 22
5
The decision to regulate handgun possession was 6
premised on the belief that it would have an appreciable 7
impact on public safety and crime prevention. As explained 8
in the legislative record: 9
The primary value to law enforcement 10
of adequate statutes dealing with dangerous 11
weapons is prevention of crimes of violence 12
before their consummation. 13
14
. . . . 15
16
. . . In the absence of adequate weapons 17
legislation, under the traditional law of 18
criminal attempt, lawful action by the 19
police must await the last act necessary to 20
consummate the crime. . . . Adequate 21
statutes governing firearms and weapons 22
would make lawful intervention by police 23

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40
and prevention of these fatal consequences, 1
before any could occur. 2
3
Report of the N.Y. State Joint Legislative Comm. On Firearms 4
& Ammunition, Doc. No. 6, at 12-13 (1965). Similar concerns 5
were voiced in 1987, during a floor debate concerning 6
possible changes to the proper cause requirement. See N.Y. 7
Senate Debate on Senate Bill 3409, at 2471 (June 2, 1987). 8
The connection between promoting public safety and 9
regulating handgun possession in public is not just a 10
conclusion reached by New York. It has served as the basis 11
for other states’ handgun regulations, as recognized by 12
various lower courts. Piszczatoski, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813 at 13
835-36; Richards v. Cty. of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172 14
(E.D. Cal. 2011); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 15
2d 1106, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 16
Given New York’s interest in regulating handgun 17
possession for public safety and crime prevention, it 18
decided not to ban handgun possession, but to limit it to 19
those individuals who have an actual reason (“proper cause”) 20
to carry the weapon. In this vein, licensing is oriented to 21
the Second Amendment’s protections. Thus, proper cause is 22
met and a license “shall be issued” when a person wants to 23

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41
use a handgun for target practice or hunting. N.Y. Penal 1
Law § 400.00(2)(f); see, e.g., Clyne, 58 A.D.2d at 947. And 2
proper cause is met and a license “shall be issued” when a 3
person has an actual and articulable—rather than merely 4
speculative or specious—need for self-defense. N.Y. Penal 5
Law § 400.00(2)(f); see, e.g., Klenosky, 75 A.D.2d at 793. 6
Moreover, the other provisions of section 400.00(2) create 7
alternative means by which applicants engaged in certain 8
employment may secure a carry license for self-defense. As 9
explained earlier, a license “shall be issued” to merchants 10
and storekeepers for them to keep handguns in their place of 11
business; to messengers for banking institutions and express 12
companies; to state judges and justices; and to employees at 13
correctional facilities. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(2)(b)-(e). 14
Restricting handgun possession in public to those who 15
have a reason to possess the weapon for a lawful purpose is 16
substantially related to New York’s interests in public 17
safety and crime prevention. It is not, as Plaintiffs 18
contend, an arbitrary licensing regime no different from 19
limiting handgun possession to every tenth citizen. This 20
argument asks us to conduct a review bordering on strict 21
scrutiny to ensure that New York’s regulatory choice will 22

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42
protect public safety more than the least restrictive 1
alternative. But, as explained above, New York’s law need 2
only be substantially related to the state’s important 3
public safety interest. A perfect fit between the means and 4
the governmental objective is not required. Here, instead 5
of forbidding anyone from carrying a handgun in public, New 6
York took a more moderate approach to fulfilling its 7
important objective and reasonably concluded that only 8
individuals having a bona fide reason to possess handguns 9
should be allowed to introduce them into the public sphere. 10
That New York has attempted to accommodate certain 11
particularized interests in self defense does not somehow 12
render its concealed carry restrictions unrelated to the 13
furtherance of public safety. 14
To be sure, we recognize the existence of studies and 15
data challenging the relationship between handgun ownership 16
by lawful citizens and violent crime. Plaintiffs' Reply Br. 17
at 37-38. We also recognize that many violent crimes occur 18
without any warning to the victims. But New York also 19
submitted studies and data demonstrating that widespread 20
access to handguns in public increases the likelihood that 21
felonies will result in death and fundamentally alters the 22

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23 Plaintiffs are quick to embrace the majority’s view in
Heller that handguns are the “quintessential self-defense weapon”
for law abiding Americans today and extrapolate that right to
public possession of a handgun. Thus, for Plaintiffs, handgun
possession in public has the ring of an absolute constitutional
right. This of course overlooks Heller’s careful restriction of
43
safety and character of public spaces. J.A. 453, 486-90. 1
It is the legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting 2
evidence and make policy judgments. Indeed, assessing the 3
risks and benefits of handgun possession and shaping a 4
licensing scheme to maximize the competing public-policy 5
objectives, as New York did, is precisely the type of 6
discretionary judgment that officials in the legislative and 7
executive branches of state government regularly make. 8
According to Plaintiffs, however, New York’s 9
conclusions as to the risks posed by handgun possession in 10
public are “totally irrelevant.” Plaintiffs’ Reply Br. at 11
38. Because the constitutional right to bear arms is 12
specifically for self-defense, they reason that the state 13
may not limit the right on the basis that it is too 14
dangerous to exercise, nor may it limit the right to those 15
showing a special need to exercise it. In Plaintiffs’ view, 16
the “‘enshrinement’” of the right to bear arms “‘necessarily 17
takes [these] policy choices off the table.’” Id. at 39 18
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 636). 23 We disagree. 19

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its reach to the home and is in sharp contrast with New York’s
view of concealed handguns one-hundred years ago as “the handy,
the usual and the favorite weapon of the turbulent criminal
class.” Darling, 154 A.D. at 423-24. It seems quite obvious to
us that possession of a weapon in the home has far different
implications than carrying a concealed weapon in public.
44
Plaintiffs misconstrue the character and scope of the 1
Second Amendment. States have long chosen to regulate the 2
right to bear arms because of the risks posed by its 3
exercise. As Plaintiffs admit and Heller strongly suggests, 4
the state may ban firearm possession in sensitive places, 5
presumably on the ground that it is too dangerous to permit 6
the possession of firearms in those locations. 554 U.S. at 7
626-27. In fact, New York chose to prohibit the possession 8
of firearms on school grounds, in a school building, or on a 9
school bus precisely for this reason. N.Y. Penal Law § 10
265.01(3); see also N.Y. Legislative Service, Governor’s 11
Bill Jacket, 1974 Ch. 1041, at 2-4 (1974). Thus, as the 12
Supreme Court has implicitly recognized, regulating firearms 13
because of the dangers posed by exercising the right is 14
entirely consistent with the Second Amendment. 15
We are also not convinced that the state may not limit 16
the right to bear arms to those showing a “special need for 17
self-protection.” Plaintiffs contend that their “desire for 18
self-defense . . . is all the ‘proper cause’ required . . . 19

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45
by the Second Amendment to carry a firearm.” Plaintiffs’ 1
Br. at 45. They reason that the exercise of the right to 2
bear arms cannot be made dependent on a need for self- 3
protection, just as the exercise of other enumerated rights 4
cannot be made dependent on a need to exercise those rights. 5
This is a crude comparison and highlights Plaintiffs’ 6
misunderstanding of the Second Amendment. 7
State regulation under the Second Amendment has always 8
been more robust than of other enumerated rights. For 9
example, no law could prohibit felons or the mentally ill 10
from speaking on a particular topic or exercising their 11
religious freedom. Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York 12
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (invalidating a 13
state law requiring profits from books authored by criminals 14
to be distributed to crime victims). And states cannot 15
prohibit speech in public schools. Tinker v. Des Moines 16
Indep. Comty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can 17
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 18
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 19
the schoolhouse gate.”). Not so with regard to the Second 20
Amendment. Laws prohibiting the exercise of the right to 21
bear arms by felons and the mentally ill, as well as by law- 22

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24 There is no question that using a handgun for self-
defense constitutes deadly physical force. See, e.g., People v.
Magliato, 68 N.Y.2d 24, 29–30 (1986).
46
abiding citizens in certain locations including public 1
schools, are, according to Heller, “presumptively lawful.” 2
554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 3
Moreover, as discussed above, extensive state 4
regulation of handguns has never been considered 5
incompatible with the Second Amendment or, for that matter, 6
the common-law right to self-defense. This includes 7
significant restrictions on how handguns are carried, 8
complete prohibitions on carrying the weapon in public, and 9
even in some instances, prohibitions on purchasing handguns. 10
In this vein, handguns have been subject to a level of state 11
regulation that is stricter than any other enumerated right. 12
In light of the state’s considerable 13
authority—enshrined within the Second Amendment—to regulate 14
firearm possession in public, requiring a showing that there 15
is an objective threat to a person’s safety—a “special need 16
for self-protection”—before granting a carry license is 17
entirely consistent with the right to bear arms. Indeed, 18
there is no right to engage in self-defense with a firearm 19
until the objective circumstances justify the use of deadly 20
force. 24 See, e.g., People v. Aiken, 4 N.Y.3d 324, 327-29 21
(2005) (discussing duty to retreat in New York). 22

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47
Plaintiffs counter that the need for self-defense may 1
arise at any moment without prior warning. True enough. 2
But New York determined that limiting handgun possession to 3
persons who have an articulable basis for believing they 4
will need the weapon for self-defense is in the best 5
interest of public safety and outweighs the need to have a 6
handgun for an unexpected confrontation. New York did not 7
run afoul of the Second Amendment by doing so. 8
To be sure, “the enshrinement of constitutional rights 9
necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.” 10
Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. But there is also a “general 11
reticence to invalidate the acts of [our] elected leaders.” 12
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 13
2579 (2012). “‘Proper respect for a coordinate branch of 14
government’ requires that we strike down [legislation] only 15
if ‘the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the] act 16
in question is clearly demonstrated.’” Id. (quoting United 17
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)). Our review of 18
the history and tradition of firearm regulation does not 19
“clearly demonstrate[]” that limiting handgun possession in 20
public to those who show a special need for self-protection 21
is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Id. 22

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25 We also decline to consider Plaintiffs’ claim under the
Equal Protection Clause. “It is a settled appellate rule that
issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some
effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” Tolbert
v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 75 (2d Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs made
only passing references to the Equal Protection Clause in their
brief, noting that “[t]o the extent that [New York’s proper cause
requirement] implicates the Equal Protection Clause . . . the
case might well be decided under some level of means-end
scrutiny.” Plaintiffs’ Br. at 15-16; 54. Thus, this claim is
forfeited.
48
Accordingly, we decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to strike 1
down New York’s one-hundred-year-old law and call into 2
question the state’s traditional authority to extensively 3
regulate handgun possession in public. 4
III 5
In view of our determination that New York’s proper 6
cause requirement is constitutional under the Second 7
Amendment as applied to Plaintiffs, we also reject their 8
facial overbreadth challenge. 25 Overbreadth challenges are 9
generally limited to the First Amendment context. United 10
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). But even if we 11
assume that overbreadth analysis may apply to Second 12
Amendment cases, it is well settled “that a person to whom a 13
statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to 14
challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably 15
be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations 16

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49
not before the Court.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 1
610 (1973). This principle “reflect[s] the conviction that 2
under our constitutional system courts are not roving 3
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the 4
Nation's laws.” Id. at 610–11; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 5
550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007). Accordingly, we reject 6
Plaintiffs’ facial challenge. 7
IV 8
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 9
court is hereby AFFIRMED. 10

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