Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, of the United States District Court for the… v. Oyewumi, Et Al. 1 United States Court of Appeals 2 3 for the Second Circuit 4 5 6 7…

* Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation.
Page 1 of 21
10-3427(L)
USA v. OYEWUMI, ET AL.
1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2
3
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 4
5
6
7
August Term, 2011 8
9
(Argued February 6, 2012 Decided: March 29, 2012) 10
11
Docket Nos. 10-3427(Lead), 10-3911(Con), 10-4035(Con) 12
13
14
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , 15
16
Appellee, 17
18
–v.– 19
20
K AY O YEWUMI , T AIWO A DEKANBI , AKA T AIYE , A DEMILOLA O GUNMOKUN , AKA 21
J IMMY , AKA A BURO , AKA O LASUPO O GUNMOKUN , 22
23
Defendants, 24
25
F NU L NU , AKA T ONY M C K INNON , AKA R EGINAL D AVIS , AKA S AEED , AND T UNDE 26
O GUNRINKA , AKA B ABA T OLANI , 27
28
Defendants-Appellants. 29
30
31
32
Before: 33
34
W ESLEY , C ARNEY , Circuit Judges, C EDARBAUM , District Judge. *
35
36

-- 1 of 21 --

1 We refer herein to Defendant-Appellant as Saeed even though
Defendant-Appellant’s true identity remains unknown both to us
and the government. Defendant-Appellant refers to himself, in
his briefing, as Reginald Davis. We decline to use “Davis” to
identify Defendant-Appellant, however, because the jury convicted
him of aggravated identity theft based on his use of the Davis
identity. We therefore refer to Defendant-Appellant as Saeed,
which is a religious name he has used in the past.
Page 2 of 21
Appeal from an order of the United States District 1
Court for the Southern District of New York (Sullivan, J.), 2
sentencing Defendant Appellant Saeed 1 to 110 months’ 3
imprisonment pursuant to Saeed’s conviction, after a jury 4
trial, for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 18 U.S.C. 5
§ 1028A(a)(1), (c)(4), and 21 U.S.C. § 846. 6
7
A FFIRMED . 8
9
10
11
STEVEN R. PEIKIN (Alexander J. Willscher, Allison 12
Caffarone, on the brief), Sullivan & Cromwell, 13
New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant. 14
15
DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, Assistant United States 16
Attorney, (Katherine Polk Failla, Assistant 17
United States Attorney, on the brief), for 18
Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the 19
Southern District of New York, New York, NY. 20
21
22
23
WESLEY, Circuit Judge: 24
Appellant Saeed appeals his convictions for aggravated 25
identity theft and false statements, the district court’s 26
pre-trial denials of his motions to suppress statements made 27
during a safety-valve proffer and for severance of Count One 28

-- 2 of 21 --

Page 3 of 21
from Counts Four and Six of the indictment, and his 110- 1
month sentence. We hold that (1) Saeed’s conviction was 2
supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the court’s pre-trial 3
decisions on Saeed’s motions were not erroneous; and (3) 4
Saeed’s 110-month sentence is both procedurally and 5
substantively reasonable. Concluding that Saeed’s claims on 6
appeal have no merit, we affirm both his convictions and 7
sentence. 8
Background 9
Following a jury trial, Saeed was convicted of 10
conspiring to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. 11
§ 846, aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 12
§ 1028A(a)(1) & (c)(4), and making false statements on a 13
matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency in 14
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 15
Saeed’s criminal activity came to light after Customs 16
and Border Patrol at Newark International Airport seized a 17
FedEx package from India containing 787 grams of heroin. 18
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents executed 19
a controlled delivery of the package to its intended 20
Brooklyn address, which resulted in the arrest of two of 21
Saeed’s co-conspirators, Temitope Mohammed and Bolaji 22

-- 3 of 21 --

2 Oyewumi is also an Appellant in this case. His appeal as
well as the appeal of Ogunrinka, another co-conspirator whose
case was also consolidated with this one, is being decided in a
summary order filed concurrently with this opinion.
Page 4 of 21
Olaiye. Subsequently, ICE received authorization to 1
intercept calls over a cell phone belonging to Kay Oyewumi, 2
2
a leader of the heroin trafficking organization. The 3
intercepted calls implicated Saeed in the conspiracy and led 4
to his arrest on April 30, 2009. 5
Saeed was initially charged with participating in a 6
conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to 7
distribute, one kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 8
21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. During a 9
post-arrest interview Saeed identified himself as Reginald 10
Davis and admitted to some of his criminal activity. 11
On December 10, 2009, Saeed’s counsel advised the 12
government that his review of his client’s record indicated 13
that Saeed might be eligible for safety-valve relief 14
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The government responded 15
that it would not agree to recommend safety-valve relief 16
unless defendant revealed his true identity. Despite the 17
government’s position regarding the safety valve, Saeed and 18
his attorney met with the government on December 21, 2009, 19

-- 4 of 21 --

Page 5 of 21
to provide the government with information proving he was 1
safety-valve eligible. 2
The meeting was held pursuant to a safety-valve proffer 3
agreement signed by Saeed, Saeed’s counsel, the Assistant 4
United States Attorney, and a witness. During the 5
safety-valve proffer, the government questioned Saeed about 6
his identity. He identified himself (again) as Reginald 7
Davis; claimed he was born in Houston, Texas in 1984; and 8
provided what he asserted were the final four digits of his 9
social security number. During the meeting, the government 10
also asked Saeed questions about the narcotics conspiracy, 11
his involvement with Oyewumi and Olaiye, the length of his 12
participation in the conspiracy, and the amounts of heroin 13
he distributed. 14
After the safety-valve proffer, the government further 15
investigated Saeed’s identity and informed the court that it 16
might seek additional charges against Saeed for false 17
statements and identity theft. 18
On March 4, 2010, the grand jury returned a superseding 19
indictment charging Saeed with four new counts related to 20
his false statements to the government about his identity 21
during his post-arrest interview and safety-valve proffer. 22

-- 5 of 21 --

Page 6 of 21
Ultimately, the government dropped two of these counts and 1
proceeded to trial only on: (1) Count One, involving the 2
narcotics conspiracy; (2)Count Four, charging Saeed with 3
making false statements about his identity during the 4
safety-valve proffer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; and 5
(3) Count Six, charging Saeed with aggravated identity theft 6
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A based on his use of the 7
identity of “Reginald Davis” during the safety valve 8
proffer. 9
Saeed made a number of pre-trial motions that are now 10
at issue on appeal. He moved to suppress statements he made 11
during the safety-valve proffer, arguing that the government 12
acted in bad faith when it continued the proffer after Saeed 13
continued to lie about his identity. Saeed also moved to 14
sever Count One from Counts Four and Six on the basis that 15
joinder was improper pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal 16
Procedure 8 and 14. Both motions were denied. A jury trial 17
followed and Saeed was found guilty on all counts. 18
During sentencing, the government opposed safety-valve 19
relief on the basis that Saeed lied about his identity. The 20
district court denied safety-valve relief, imposed an 21
obstruction of justice enhancement, and ultimately sentenced 22

-- 6 of 21 --

Page 7 of 21
Saeed to 110 months’ imprisonment. The 110-month sentence 1
included 86 months’ imprisonment for Counts One and Four, 2
and 24 months’ imprisonment (the mandatory minimum) to be 3
served consecutively (as required by statute) on Count Six. 4
Saeed appeals the jury’s verdict on Counts Four and 5
Six, the district court’s pretrial rulings, and his 6
sentence. 7
Discussion 8
On appeal, Saeed argues that: (1) there was 9
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict 10
on Counts Four and Six; (2) the district court erred in 11
denying his motion to suppress his safety-valve statements; 12
(3) the district court erred in denying his motion to sever 13
Count One from Counts Four and Six; and (4) his sentence is 14
both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. These 15
arguments lack merit and there was no error below. We 16
therefore affirm Saeed’s conviction and sentence. 17
I. The Jury’s Guilty Verdict on Counts Four and Six 18
was Supported by Sufficient Evidence. 19
Saeed argues that there was insufficient evidence to 20
support the jury verdict on Counts Four and Six because the 21
government failed to present evidence that proved, as 22

-- 7 of 21 --

3 In addressing Saeed’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we “review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 459 (2d Cir. 2004). We
will only reverse a conviction “if no rational factfinder could
have found the crimes charged proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. at 459-60.
Page 8 of 21
required by 18 U.S.C. § 1001, that his false statements were 1
material. 3 Under § 1001, a statement is material if it has 2
“a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of 3
influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to 4
which it was addressed,” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 5
506, 509 (1995), or if it is “capable of distracting 6
government investigators’ attention away from” a critical 7
matter, United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 318 (2d Cir. 8
2006). 9
Here, Saeed’s lies about his identity during the 10
safety-valve proffer clearly meet the definition of 11
“material.” As a matter of common sense, providing a false 12
identity to officials conducting a safety-valve proffer has 13
both a “natural tendency to influence” and is “capable of 14
distracting” those officials. Indeed, there is little doubt 15
that providing a false identity can result in a significant 16
hindrance to law enforcement’s investigation or prosecution 17
of crimes: Giving a false identity can impede the 18

-- 8 of 21 --

4 Certainly, the government could have more explicitly
connected the dots for the jury by introducing testimony
regarding the way in which a defendant’s truthful statements
about his identity make it easier for the government to determine
criminal history, or by presenting a witness to testify more
specifically about the importance of truthfulness. But that the
government could have done a better job does not mean it did not
do a sufficient job.
Page 9 of 21
government’s ability to develop information about the 1
subject crime, and to inform itself about the defendant and 2
any relevant criminal history. See, e.g., United States v. 3
Oladipupo, 346 F.3d 384, 385-86 (2d Cir. 2003). 4
Accordingly, any reasonable juror could have appropriately 5
concluded that Saeed’s lies about his identity were material 6
to the government’s investigation. 7
But the government offered more to support its burden 8
of proof. It introduced testimony that the purpose of a 9
safety-valve proffer is to determine eligibility for safety- 10
valve relief and that both truthfulness and criminal history 11
are elements to be considered in determining whether a 12
defendant is safety-valve eligible. 4 This testimony was 13
enough to support the jury’s finding that a defendant’s lies 14
about his identity during a safety-valve proffer have a 15
natural tendency to influence or are capable of distracting 16
the government agents. That is all that is required for 17
materiality. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most 18

-- 9 of 21 --

Page 10 of 21
favorable to the government-as we are required to do-the 1
jury’s finding of materiality was eminently reasonable. See 2
United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993); 3
United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 576-77 (2d Cir. 4
1991). 5
Nevertheless, Appellant argues that a few out-of- 6
circuit cases that found evidence insufficient to support a 7
§ 1001 conviction counsel in favor of reversing his 8
conviction here. See United States v. Ismail, 97 F.3d 50 9
(4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kwiat, 817 F.2d 440 (7th 10
Cir. 1987). We disagree; the cases are inapposite. Both 11
Ismail and Kwiat involved false statements made to one 12
agency when the government had to show the statements were 13
material to a different agency. 14
In Ismail, for example, defendant made a false 15
statement to a bank, and the government argued the statement 16
was material to the FDIC because the bank was FDIC insured. 17
The Fourth Circuit noted that the false statement charge 18
would have been appropriate if it was for “making a false 19
material statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of 20
the Secretary of Treasury, or the Internal Revenue Service,” 21
but was not appropriate where the charge was making a false 22

-- 10 of 21 --

Page 11 of 21
statement within the jurisdiction of the FDIC because the 1
statement was not made to that agency. 97 F.3d at 60-61. 2
Ismail thus holds only that where the connection between the 3
agency to which the statement is made and the agency to 4
which the statement is alleged to be material is tenuous, 5
the government must do more to prove materiality. 6
Similarly, in Kwiat, the Seventh Circuit found that a 7
false statement on a HUD form was not material to the FDIC 8
where the government’s only evidence tending to prove 9
materiality was that the FDIC “sometimes looks at HUD-1 10
forms in banks’ files to obtain information concerning real 11
estate loan transactions.” 817 F.2d at 445. Again, the 12
connection between the agency to which the statement was 13
made and the agency to which it was alleged to be material 14
was speculative. 15
The connection here is apparent and direct. The false 16
statement was made to the same government agency to which it 17
was deemed material. Moreover, materiality in this instance 18
was obvious as a matter of common sense, and furthermore it 19
was a finding more than adequately supported by testimony 20
regarding the purposes and requirements of a safety-valve 21
proffer. We hold, therefore, that Saeed’s convictions for 22

-- 11 of 21 --

5 When a defendant challenges the denial of a suppression
motion, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear
error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, and the legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Stewart, 551 F.3d 187, 190-91 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 144 (2d Cir. 2003).
Page 12 of 21
making false statements and aggravated identity theft were 1
well supported by sufficient evidence and affirm his 2
convictions on Counts Four and Six. 3
II. The District Court Properly Denied Appellant’s 4
Motion to Suppress Statements Made During the 5
Safety-Valve Proffer. 5
6
Saeed contends the district court erred in allowing the 7
government to introduce statements he made during the 8
safety-valve proffer held pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) 9
because the government acted in bad faith in continuing the 10
proffer after realizing Appellant did not plan to meet their 11
pre-condition that he reveal his identity and because the 12
government breached the proffer agreement. Appellant 13
misunderstands the nature and purpose of a safety-valve 14
proffer under § 3553(f). 15
Section 3553(f) gives defendants an opportunity to 16
prove their eligibility for safety-valve relief by providing 17
the government with “all information and evidence the 18

-- 12 of 21 --

6 The government is not required to participate in a
debriefing requested by a defendant pursuant to § 3553(f).
However, if it does not participate, its refusal to meet with the
defendant may “weigh in favor of a finding that a defendant’s
written proffer is complete.” United States v. Schreiber, 191
F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999). To avoid such consequences, the
government often participates in safety-valve debriefings when
requested by the defendant.
Page 13 of 21
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were 1
part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or 2
plan.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). 6
3
Once a defendant has made a safety-valve proffer, 4
either in writing or through a debriefing, the government’s 5
role is to evaluate the defendant’s information and make a 6
recommendation to the court regarding the defendant’s 7
safety-valve eligibility. The court, and not the 8
government, is ultimately charged with determining a 9
defendant’s eligibility for safety-valve relief under 10
§ 3553(f). United States v. Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105, 1110 11
(2d Cir. 1997). 12
In this case, Saeed, through counsel, requested a 13
safety-valve debriefing having been advised by the 14
government that it would recommend against safety-valve 15
relief unless Saeed came “clean about his true 16
identification.” The government did not induce Saeed to 17

-- 13 of 21 --

Page 14 of 21
participate in a safety-valve proffer. Saeed voluntarily 1
attended the safety-valve proffer with his attorney and 2
signed the proffer agreement, which informed him that any 3
statements he made during the session would be fully 4
admissible against him. Having been informed of the 5
government’s precondition for recommending safety-valve 6
relief, Saeed nonetheless lied about his identity during the 7
proffer. 8
Contrary to Saeed’s argument, the government was under 9
no obligation to save Saeed from himself once he failed to 10
reveal his true identity. The government had an obligation 11
to allow him to proffer pursuant to § 3553(f) to fulfill its 12
duty to evaluate whether safety-valve relief was appropriate 13
and make a recommendation to the judge. Cf. United States 14
v. Schreiber, 191 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999). The 15
government fully complied with its obligations under 16
§ 3553(f). 17
Appellant’s claim that the government violated the 18
proffer agreement is meritless. Saeed likens his 19
safety-valve proffer agreement to a plea agreement and 20
argues that cases like United States v. Roe, 445 F.3d 202, 21
207 (2d Cir. 2006), counsel in favor of suppressing his 22

-- 14 of 21 --

7 We review a district court’s ruling on joinder de novo.
United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 96 (2d Cir. 2007).
Page 15 of 21
proffer statements. But, safety-valve agreements are 1
fundamentally different from plea agreements: in a safety- 2
valve agreement, unlike in a plea agreement, the government 3
makes no representation that it will seek any downward 4
departure or recommend safety-valve relief. In Saeed’s 5
case, the government merely promised to evaluate Appellant’s 6
eligibility for safety-valve relief after the proffer, 7
subject to the conditions that it made known to Appellant. 8
That is exactly what it did. The government neither 9
breached the agreement nor acted in bad faith in allowing 10
the proffer to continue after Saeed lied about his identity. 11
Saeed’s safety-valve statements were, therefore, properly 12
admissible at trial. 13
III. The District Court Properly Denied Appellant’s 14
Motion to Sever Count One from Counts Four and 15
Six. 7
16
Saeed argues that the district court violated Federal 17
Rules of Criminal Procedure 8(a) (joinder) and 14(a) 18
(discretionary severance) by permitting a joint trial of his 19
narcotics offenses and identity-related offenses. More 20

-- 15 of 21 --

Page 16 of 21
particularly, he contends that evidence of his participation 1
in the heroin distribution conspiracy prejudiced the jury’s 2
consideration of the false statement and identity theft 3
charges brought against him. Assuming without deciding that 4
it was error to allow joinder, we easily conclude the error 5
was harmless. 6
To compel reversal on appeal by reason of misjoinder, 7
the defendant must demonstrate that joinder was erroneous 8
under Rule 8(a) and that it “result[ed] in actual prejudice 9
because it had substantial and injurious effect or influence 10
in determining the jury’s verdict.” United States v. 11
Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 12
marks omitted). Alternatively, if joinder was proper under 13
Rule 8(a), defendant must show that the district court 14
abused its discretion by failing nonetheless to order 15
severance under Rule 14(a), and that the failure caused 16
“prejudice so severe that his conviction constituted a 17
miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Rittweger, 524 18
F.3d 171, 179 (2d Cir. 2008). 19
Here, the independent evidence of Saeed’s guilt on each 20
count was so overwhelming that the jury’s knowledge of 21
Saeed’s involvement in the drug conspiracy could not have 22

-- 16 of 21 --

Page 17 of 21
had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the 1
verdict, and Saeed’s conviction in no way could be said to 2
constitute a “miscarriage of justice.” To focus only on the 3
highlights: Agent DiFilippo, who participated in the 4
proffer, testified that Saeed told him (among other things) 5
that Saeed’s name was “Reginald Lynn Davis”; that Saeed was 6
born in Houston, Texas, in October 1984; and provided what 7
he asserted were the last four digits of his social security 8
number. These statements were wholly disproved by the 9
testimony of the real Reginald Lynn Davis, who came to New 10
York to testify at Saeed’s trial. Davis verified that the 11
information given by Saeed to Agent DiFilippo pertained not 12
to Saeed, but to Davis. Davis’s testimony was corroborated 13
by his duly authenticated birth certificate, issued by the 14
Texas Bureau of Vital Statistics. 15
In addition, the district court gave a limiting 16
instruction directing the jury that, “[e]ach count is a 17
separate offense or crime. Each crime must therefore be 18
considered separately by you, and you must return a separate 19
verdict on each count.” Juries are presumed to follow such 20
instructions. United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 191 21
(2d Cir. 2010). On this record Saeed’s generalized claim of 22

-- 17 of 21 --

8 For instance, in this case, if Saeed had two prior felony
convictions he would have been eligible for a term of life
imprisonment. 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(a). This example
demonstrates that identity may be material for a number of
reasons, and that the full extent of the benefit to Saeed of
Page 18 of 21
prejudice from the alleged misjoinder falls woefully short 1
of demonstrating any actual “substantial and injurious 2
effect or influence” such as would warrant reversal of his 3
convictions on these counts. 4
IV. Appellant’s 110-Month Sentence is Both 5
Procedurally and Substantively Reasonable. 6
A. Procedural Reasonableness 7
Saeed argues his sentence was procedurally unreasonable 8
because the court denied safety-valve relief. As discussed 9
above, the court’s denial of safety-valve relief was 10
appropriate. By lying about his identity Saeed failed to 11
satisfy § 3553(f), which requires a defendant to truthfully 12
provide the government with all the information he has about 13
the offense and requires that a defendant not have more than 14
one criminal history point. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), (5). A 15
defendant’s identity is part of the information about which 16
section 3553(f)(5) requires a defendant to be truthful. By 17
lying about his identity, Saeed prevented the court from 18
determining his criminal history. 8 Therefore, denial of the 19

-- 18 of 21 --

lying about his identity cannot be known.
Page 19 of 21
safety-valve did not make Saeed’s sentence procedurally 1
unreasonable. 2
B. Substantive Reasonableness 3
Appellant’s argument that his sentence is substantively 4
unreasonable rests on his contention that the court relied 5
on Appellant’s false statements as the basis for multiple 6
enhancements to his sentence. Specifically, Saeed claims 7
that the district court used his false-identity conduct as 8
the basis for: (i) a 24-month consecutive sentence on the 9
aggravated identity theft conviction; (ii) application of 10
the Guidelines’ obstruction-of-justice enhancement; (iii) 11
denial of Saeed’s application for an 12
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment; and (iv) denial of 13
safety-valve relief. 14
As an initial matter, Appellant is mistaken when he 15
argues that the court relied on his false-identity conduct 16
when denying Appellant an acceptance-of-responsibility 17
adjustment or as a basis for imposing a 24-month consecutive 18
sentence on the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The 19
court denied acceptance points because although Saeed had 20
earlier offered to plead guilty to distribution of the 21

-- 19 of 21 --

Page 20 of 21
amount of heroin for which the jury ultimately found him 1
responsible, he argued for acquittal at trial. The court 2
pointed out that had Appellant admitted to the substantive 3
offense and gone to trial only on the limited issue of the 4
quantity of heroin for which he was responsible, he might 5
have been eligible for acceptance points. The court imposed 6
a 24-month consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A 7
because the statute required it. The statute also required 8
the court not to consider this mandatory minimum in 9
determining the appropriate sentence for the other 10
convictions. 11
The court properly considered Appellant’s lies about 12
his identity in denying safety-valve relief, in applying an 13
obstruction of justice enhancement, and in applying the 14
sentencing factors in § 3553(a). We have previously 15
recognized that “[m]ultiple adjustments are properly imposed 16
. . . when they aim at different harms emanating from the 17
same conduct.” United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 251 18
(2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is 19
exactly what happened here. 20
21
22

-- 20 of 21 --

Page 21 of 21
Conclusion 1
Appellant’s convictions on Counts Four and Six were 2
supported by sufficient evidence; the judge’s pre-trial 3
rulings regarding suppression of statements made during the 4
safety-valve proffer and the propriety of joinder were not 5
error; and Appellant’s sentence was both procedurally and 6
substantively reasonable. Appellant’s conviction and 7
sentence are hereby A FFIRMED. 8

-- 21 of 21 --