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25-1839•Paul H. Yoon, Elizabeth F. Yoon, Toby Doran, Thomas J. Doran v. DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, Secretary of Veterans Af- fairs
25-1839Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitJun 26, 2025
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
PAUL H. YOON, ELIZABETH F. YOON, TOBY
DORAN, THOMAS J. DORAN,
Claimants-Appellants
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, Secretary of Veterans Af-
fairs,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2025-1839
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 25-255, Judge Grant Jaquith.
______________________
ON PETITION AND MOTION
______________________
Before DYK, MAYER, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
O R D E R
In January 2025, Paul H. Yoon and Elizabeth F. Yoon
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims for a writ of mandamus to enjoin the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs from denying their claim for educational
Case: 25-1839 Document: 37 Page: 1 Filed: 06/26/2025
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YOON v. COLLINS 2
benefits pending before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.1
Though the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has not
yet issued a decision on that petition, the petitioners have
filed an appeal, and the Yoons move for emergency relief.2
The Secretary opposes and moves to dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
The following facts, taken from the petition, are undis-
puted for our purposes: Paul Yoon served honorably in the
U.S. Army from 1998 until 2021 in one continuous period
of service. He has utilized 34 months of educational assis-
tance benefits. Mr. Yoon transferred his unused educa-
tional benefits to his daughter Elizabeth, who this fall is
entering year two of a three-year program (expected grad-
uation in May 2027). Because the length of Mr. Yoon’s pe-
riod of service, without counting any period twice, is
sufficient to qualify for educational benefits under both the
Montgomery GI Bill and Post-9/11 GI Bill, the Yoons antic-
ipated 14 months of educational benefits remaining under
the 48-month cap on receiving these benefits.
The Department of Veterans Affairs, however, granted
the Yoons only two months of benefits—the remaining por-
tion of the 36-months of benefits under only the Montgom-
ery GI Bill—because the Department understood that
benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill require a break in ser-
vice, which Mr. Yoon does not have. The Yoons appealed
that decision to the Board, and the appeal remains pend-
ing. Seeking expedited resolution, the Yoons in January
1 The petition was joined by Toby Doran and
Thomas J. Doran.
2 The Department of Veterans Affairs has since
granted the Dorans’ claim, and the Dorans do not seek
emergency relief from this court at this time. ECF No. 2 at
2, n.2.
Case: 25-1839 Document: 37 Page: 2 Filed: 06/26/2025
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YOON v. COLLINS 3
2025 petitioned the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
for a writ of mandamus to enjoin denial of the full 14
months of benefits. When the Secretary responded to the
petition, he noted a related appeal before the Court of Ap-
peals for Veterans Claims, Perkins v. Collins, involving the
same issue, that “would presumably control the Yoon ap-
peal.” Secretary Resp. at 7 (Apr. 28, 2025). The Yoons were
granted leave to reply, in which they requested relief by
May 19, 2025, noting their current allotment of benefits
would be exhausted that month.
On May 16, 2025, the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims issued its decision in Perkins, rejecting the Secre-
tary’s interpretation that had been used to deny the Yoons
12 additional months of benefits; instead, “a veteran whose
single period of service is long enough to qualify for benefits
under both the MGIB and Post-9/11 programs without us-
ing any period of time twice to establish eligibility is enti-
tled to receive benefits under both programs up to a
statutory 48-month cap on such educational benefits.” Per-
kins, No. 24-6515, slip op. at 2 (footnote omitted). On May
23, 2025, the Yoons informed the Court of Appeals for Vet-
erans Claims that Ms. Yoon’s fall tuition is due August 1,
2025 but that the Secretary continued to oppose any relief.
On June 2, 2025, the Yoons informed the court that absent
relief by June 4, 2025, they would view their petition as
constructively denied and appeal to this court. On June 5,
2025, no decision having issued, this appeal was filed.
DISCUSSION
We agree with the Secretary that this appeal falls out-
side of 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) and therefore outside of our lim-
ited jurisdiction over appeals from the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims. Section 7292(a) provides that “[a]fter a
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims is entered in a case, any party to the case may ob-
tain a review of the decision with respect to the validity of
a decision of the Court on a rule of law or of any statute or
Case: 25-1839 Document: 37 Page: 3 Filed: 06/26/2025
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YOON v. COLLINS 4
regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof . . . that was
relied on by the Court in making the decision.” Id.
§ 7292(a). Here, the Veterans Court has entered no deci-
sion on the Yoons’ petition subject to appeal.
In arguing in support of jurisdiction, appellants urge
us to look to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and cases interpreting
that statute to allow for appellate jurisdiction over certain
orders that do not expressly refuse an injunction but have
“the practical effect” of doing so. A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 145 S.
Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025) (quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc.,
450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)). But appellants fail to demonstrate
that authority applies here. Section 1292(a)(1) extends ap-
pellate jurisdiction to interlocutory orders of district courts
granting or denying injunctive relief, and the cited cases
provide a practical construction of that specific statute.3
Appellants fail to identify any similar statutory exception
authorizing our direct review where the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims has not entered a decision.4
3 Even under the general principles of those cases,
originating tribunals “have wide discretion in managing
their docket, and they do not necessarily deny a motion by
failing to rule on a parties’ requested timeline.” Ama-
zon.com Servs. LLC v. NLRB, 136 F.4th 577, 582 (5th Cir.
2025) (citation omitted). The rare exceptions that have
been made are limited to situations where the inaction had
the practical effect of denying an injunction and the appel-
lant’s only way of getting effective relief is by immediate
appeal. See Def. Distrib. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 972 F.3d 193,
200–02 (3d Cir. 2020). Appellants have not shown those
requirements existed at the time of their appeal.
4 Section 7292(b)(1) does permit a petition for inter-
locutory appeal of “an order not otherwise appealable,” but
even then only with that court’s chief judge’s certification,
which is absent here.
Case: 25-1839 Document: 37 Page: 4 Filed: 06/26/2025
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YOON v. COLLINS 5
Although we may alternatively consider the appeal as
a petition for a writ of mandamus within this court’s juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, appellants have not met the
high standard for mandamus relief, which requires them
to show: (1) “no other adequate means to attain the relief
[it] desires,” (2) a “clear and indisputable” right to relief,
and (3) that the writ is “appropriate under the circum-
stances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367,
380–81 (2004) (cleaned up). Given the Yoons’ pending ap-
peal at the Board (in which they may seek interim relief),
their pending petition at the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, and the recent entry of judgment in Perkins, we
expect that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and
the Secretary will expeditiously resolve the Yoons’ case.
Moreover, the Secretary concedes that “petitioners may be
reimbursed for statutorily required educational benefits
that were unlawfully withheld.” ECF No. 26 at 27. Under
the circumstances, we cannot say that mandamus relief is
appropriate.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The Secretary’s motion to dismiss is granted, any other
requested relief and the pending motion are denied, and
the mandate is entered forthwith.
June 26, 2025
Date
FOR THE COURT
ISSUED AS A MANDATE: June 26, 2025
Case: 25-1839 Document: 37 Page: 5 Filed: 06/26/2025
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