Teresa M. Young v. Department of Defense

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
TERESA M. YOUNG,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Respondent
______________________
2025-1575
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. DC-1221-21-0296-W-4.
______________________
Decided: October 7, 2025
______________________
T ERESA M. YOUNG, Frederick, MD, pro se.
CATHERINE M. YANG, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by T ARA K.
HOGAN, P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY , YAAKOV R OTH .
______________________
Before L OURIE, REYNA , and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
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YOUNG v. DEFENSE 2
P ER CURIAM .
Teresa M. Young appeals pro se a final decision of the
Merit Systems Protection Board denying corrective action
in her individual right of action appeal. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 26, 2020, Ms. Young started working as a pro-
gram support assistant within the Department of Defense
(“agency”), subject to an initial probationary period.
SAppx46.1 Shortly after assuming her role, Ms. Young and
her supervisor, Dr. John Mark Young, had several disa-
greements that led to the following events. On June 25,
2020, Ms. Young emailed human resource officials, alleging
that her supervisor had made “verbal threatening state-
ments and gestures” towards her. SAppx13 (citation omit-
ted). On June 29, 2020, her supervisor sent her a letter
documenting his concerns with her behavior and perfor-
mance. SAppx47–49. From July to August 2020,
Ms. Young contacted additional human resource officials,
alleging that she had suffered verbal harassment and a
hostile work environment, that she needed accommodation
due to mental health, and that her supervisor attempted to
physically assault her. SAppx13–14. In a July 27, 2020
memorandum, her supervisor requested that the agency
immediately terminate Ms. Young, listing various con-
cerns with her behavior and performance. SAppx71–74.
Ms. Young obtained a Temporary Peace Order (“TPO”)
from the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery
County,2 which, on August 25, 2020, police served on her
1 “SAppx” refers to the appendix accompanying the
government’s responsive brief.
2 A TPO may order limited contact between two par-
ties, typically for seven days, and provides notice of a
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YOUNG v. DEFENSE 3
supervisor. SAppx14. The following day, the agency ter-
minated Ms. Young, stating that her conduct and work per-
formance were unsatisfactory. SAppx50–52.
Ms. Young filed a complaint with the Office of Special
Counsel (“OSC”). SAppx42. The OSC terminated its in-
quiry into Ms. Young’s complaint, and shortly thereafter,
Ms. Young filed an individual right of action (“IRA”) appeal
with the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”).
SAppx41–45. The administrative judge (“AJ”) assigned to
Ms. Young’s case ruled that Ms. Young met her jurisdic-
tional burden of proof regarding three alleged disclosures:
(1) her June 25, 2020 email to human resources; (2) her
July to August 2020 notifications to human resources; and
(3) her TPO. SAppx53–70.
In his initial decision, the AJ denied Ms. Young’s re-
quest for corrective action. SAppx11–22. The AJ ruled
that Ms. Young failed to prove that she made a protected
disclosure by failing to prove a reasonable belief in the
truth of any of her disclosures. SAppx16–19. The AJ found
that Ms. Young’s allegations were “wholly without merit
and detached from reality.” SAppx19. The AJ also ruled
that even if Ms. Young had proved that she made one or
more protected disclosures, she failed to prove that any of
her disclosures were a contributing factor to her termina-
tion. SAppx20–22. The AJ so concluded because
Ms. Young failed to allege that the deciding official had
knowledge of her disclosures when he made the decision to
remove her, and because the agency submitted “unrefuted”
evidence to show that the deciding official had no
knowledge of the disclosures. Id.
Ms. Young petitioned the full Board for review of the
AJ’s initial decision. SAppx1. The Board denied
forthcoming final peace order hearing. See MD. CODE A NN.,
CTS . & J UD. P ROC. § 3-1504 (West 2021).
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YOUNG v. DEFENSE 4
Ms. Young’s petition for review and affirmed the AJ’s ini-
tial decision, which became the Board’s final decision.
SAppx1–2.
Ms. Young appeals. We have jurisdiction over her IRA
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our review of Board decisions is limited. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(c). We set aside a Board decision only when it is “(1)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without proce-
dures required by law, rule, or regulation having been fol-
lowed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id.
D ISCUSSION
Ms. Young raises two arguments on appeal. First, Ms.
Young asserts that the Board failed to consider the tem-
poral proximity between service of the TPO and her termi-
nation. Appellant Br. 2. Second, Ms. Young asserts that
the Board failed to consider that the agency retaliated
against her after her termination. Id. We address each
argument in turn.
As to Ms. Young’s first argument, the Board’s ruling
that the TPO was not a contributing factor in her termina-
tion is supported by substantial evidence. As the Board
noted, “the record reflects that the agency initiated
3 Ms. Young raises an IRA appeal, which is within
our jurisdiction. Young v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 961 F.3d
1323, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2020). To the extent that
Ms. Young alleges discrimination or other allegations un-
related to her whistleblower allegations, we do not consider
such allegations. Id. at 1327 (“[I]n an IRA appeal to the
Board, the Board’s review is limited to the merits of allega-
tions of violations of the Whistleblower Protection Act.”);
see Appellant Br. 2; see ECF No. 4.
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YOUNG v. DEFENSE 5
procedures to terminate [Ms. Young] 1 month prior to the
events” surrounding the TPO. SAppx3 & n.3. Ms. Young
does not dispute that her supervisor requested that the
agency immediately terminate her as early as July 27,
2020, or that police served the TPO on her supervisor
nearly a month later on August 25, 2020. Thus, the Board’s
determination that the TPO was not a contributing factor
in Ms. Young’s termination is supported by substantial ev-
idence.
As to Ms. Young’s second argument, the Board cor-
rectly ruled that Ms. Young cannot seek corrective action
for an alleged personnel action that occurred after her ter-
mination. Ms. Young’s IRA appeal centers on 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302, which prohibits certain personnel actions taken
“with respect to any employee or applicant for employ-
ment.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The plain language of the
statute does not cover personnel actions that occur after
termination. While nonprecedential, our court has previ-
ously reached the same conclusion. Guzman v. Off. of Pers.
Mgmt., 53 F. App’x 927, 929–30 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (nonprec-
edential). Ms. Young’s argument does not compel a differ-
ent result.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ms. Young’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons stated, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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