Vincent Dewayne Gaylord v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
VINCENT DEWAYNE GAYLORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1555
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:24-cv-00910-RTH, Judge Ryan T. Holte.
______________________
Decided: October 15, 2025
______________________
VINCENT D EWAYNE G AYLORD, Topeka, KS, pro se.
K YLE SHANE B ECKRICH , Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
REGINALD T HOMAS B LADES , J R., P ATRICIA M. MCC ARTHY ,
YAAKOV R OTH .
______________________
Before D YK, HUGHES , and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
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GAYLORD v. US 2
P ER CURIAM .
Vincent Gaylord appeals the decision of the Court of
Federal Claims dismissing his complaint for either lack of
jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. Because Mr. Gay-
lord’s claims are either time-barred or do not plausibly
state a claim for relief, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Gaylord served in the United States Army from
1988 to 2002. On December 9, 2002, he was honorably dis-
charged for medical disability and received severance pay.
On August 27, 2004, Mr. Gaylord submitted his first appli-
cation for Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC)
with Army Human Resources Command (HRC), which de-
nied his request. In 2012, Mr. Gaylord appealed his mili-
tary disability rating to the Army Physical Disability
Review Board, which recharacterized his discharge to show
permanent disability retirement. Subsequently, Mr. Gay-
lord’s original honorable discharge order was rescinded,
and he was issued new orders retiring him for permanent
disability effective December 9, 2002. Mr. Gaylord became
eligible for retirement pay in April 2013 and received re-
tirement back pay from 2002 to 2013. However, Mr. Gay-
lord’s retirement back pay was offset by the VA disability
compensation he received, which is otherwise known as a
VA waiver.
Since 2013, Mr. Gaylord has sought CRSC several
times, with each request denied “because [Mr. Gaylord] of-
fered no evidence he incurred a disability while engaged in
combat, while performing duties simulating combat condi-
tions, or while performing especially hazardous duties.”
Appx 2 (quotation marks and citation omitted).1 This in-
cludes his most recent appeal to the Army Board for
1 “Appx” refers to the Appendix filed by the Govern-
ment with its Informal Brief, ECF No. 16.
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GAYLORD v. US 3
Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) in May 2024, in
which Mr. Gaylord “also sought [c]orrection of his military
records to reflect that the Army medically retired him with
a combined 60 percent disability rating, on 9 December
2002, so that he can properly calculate his benefits, verify
he received his entire disability severance pay, and receive
disability retired pay.” Id. (alteration in original) (quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). The ABCMR again de-
nied relief.
On June 10, 2024, Mr. Gaylord filed suit in the Court
of Federal Claims seeking damages for wrongful dis-
charge, retroactive disability retirement pay, and denial of
CRSC. The Government moved to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The
Court of Federal Claims first held that it did not have ju-
risdiction over Mr. Gaylord’s complaint because he “seems
to base all his claims upon a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1343,”
which is not a money mandating statute. Appx 6 (citation
omitted). While “the lack of [a] money-mandating source
of law is sufficient grounds to dismiss the entire [c]om-
plaint,” Appx 7, the Court of Federal Claims went on to al-
ternatively conclude that Mr. Gaylord’s claims for wrongful
discharge and CRSC were jurisdictionally barred by
28 U.S.C. § 2501’s six-year statute of limitations. The
Court of Federal Claims also explained that, for Mr. Gay-
lord’s claim for retroactive disability retirement pay, its
“standing and failure-to-state-a-claim analyses are factu-
ally intertwined,” and that Mr. Gaylord had failed to both
allege an injury in fact and plausibly state a claim for relief.
Appx 9.
Mr. Gaylord appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
D ISCUSSION
“This court reviews de novo whether the Court of Fed-
eral Claims possessed jurisdiction and whether the Court
of Federal Claims properly dismissed for failure to state a
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GAYLORD v. US 4
claim upon which relief can be granted, as both are ques-
tions of law.” Turping v. United States, 913 F.3d 1060,
1064 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wheeler v. United States,
11 F.3d 156, 158 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). On appeal, Mr. Gaylord
challenges the dismissal of all three of his claims: (1) dam-
ages for wrongful discharge, (2) damages for the denial of
CRSC, and (3) retroactive disability retirement pay. We
take each issue in turn.
“In a military discharge case, this court and the Court
of Claims have long held that the plaintiff’s cause of action
for back pay accrues at the time of the plaintiff’s dis-
charge.” Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (collecting cases). “If the plaintiff
does not file suit within the six-year limitation period pre-
scribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2501, the plaintiff loses all rights to
sue for the loss of pay stemming from the challenged dis-
charge.” Id. at 1304. Here, Mr. Gaylord was discharged on
December 9, 2002. He filed his claim for wrongful dis-
charge in the Court of Federal Claims on June 10, 2024,
more than two decades after his discharge from the Army.
Accordingly, Mr. Gaylord’s wrongful discharge claim is
barred by the six-year statute of limitations.
Mr. Gaylord contends that his wrongful discharge
claim is not time-barred because he “asked the army to cor-
rect the unlawful discharge in 2024.” Appellant’s Inf. Re-
ply Br. 5. However, the statute of limitations under § 2501
begins to run at the time the claim accrues. Martinez,
333 F.3d at 1303–04 (“That is, the claim accrues ‘at one
time, once and for all,’ on the date of discharge.” (citation
omitted)). And “[t]his court and the Court of Claims have
frequently addressed and rejected the argument that the
cause of action for unlawful discharge does not accrue until
the service member seeks relief from a correction board.”
Id. at 1304 (collecting cases). Because Mr. Gaylord was
discharged in 2002 and the filing of a request for correction
does not toll or restart the limitations period, his claim re-
mains barred under § 2501.
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GAYLORD v. US 5
Mr. Gaylord raises several other arguments in support
of his wrongful discharge claim. First, he relies on Holley
v. United States, 124 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997), asserting
that “statutory pay continues for unlawful discharge in the
Army.” Appellant’s Inf. Br. 1. Second, he contends that the
Court of Federal Claims erred in dismissing his claim be-
cause under the Tucker Act, it has jurisdiction over claims
involving wrongful military discharge.2 Third, he asserts
a due process violation on the grounds that “there was no
formal hearing.” Appellant’s Inf. Br. 3. None of these ar-
guments, however, displace the statute of limitations issue.
We thus need not address the merits of these arguments as
we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of his wrongful dis-
charge claim as time-barred under § 2501.
Turning next to Mr. Gaylord’s CRSC claim, we hold
this claim is also time-barred by the six-year statute of lim-
itations prescribed by § 2501. In general, “if a dispute is
subject to mandatory administrative proceedings, the
plaintiff’s claim does not accrue until the conclusion of
those proceedings.” Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1304 (citation
omitted). And specifically for military disability retirement
cases, the “first competent board rule” “provides that a ser-
vice member’s claim does not accrue until final action is
taken by the first board competent to decide the matter of
entitlement, or upon refusal of a service member’s request
for such a board.” Jones v. United States, 30 F.4th 1094,
2 While the Court of Federal Claims held it did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Gaylord’s claims
because he failed to identify a money-mandating statute in
his complaint, the Government concedes on appeal, as it
must, that the Court of Federal Claims “has jurisdiction
over wrongful discharge claims” under the Tucker Act. Ap-
pellee’s Inf. Br. 9. Any error by the Court of Federal Claims
on this issue, however, is harmless, as we conclude here
that each claim must be dismissed on other grounds.
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GAYLORD v. US 6
1100 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). The statute on
CRSC confers on the Secretary of Defense the authority to
“prescribe procedures and criteria under which a disabled
uniformed services retiree may apply to the Secretary of a
military department to be considered to be an eligible com-
bat-related disabled uniformed services retiree.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 1413a(d). Consistent with § 1413a(d)—as well as with
10 U.S.C. § 1413a(a) and (e)—the Financial Management
Regulation (FMR) provides that “[a] member may not be
paid CRSC unless he or she has applied for and elected to
receive compensation under the CRSC program by filing an
application . . . with the Military Department from which
he or she retired.” DoD 7000.14-R, FMR, vol. 7B, ch. 63,
¶ 630401. For Army service members, Army HRC is re-
sponsible for reviewing CRSC applications and making el-
igibility determinations. As CRSC claims are subject to
administrative proceedings, a claim for CRSC does not ac-
crue until the conclusion of the first Army HRC proceeding
that decides the matter of entitlement to CRSC (or upon
the refusal of a request for such a proceeding).
Here, Mr. Gaylord submitted his first CRSC applica-
tion with Army HRC on August 27, 2004. On November 3,
2004, Army HRC denied Mr. Gaylord’s request for CRSC.
Accordingly, Mr. Gaylord’s claim for CRSC started accru-
ing on November 3, 2004. But Mr. Gaylord did not file his
CRSC claim with the Court of Federal Claims until
June 10, 2024, almost 20 years after the conclusion of the
Army HRC proceedings. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s
dismissal of his CRSC claim as also time-barred under
§ 2501.3
3 Mr. Gaylord contends that Soto v. United States,
605 U.S. 360 (2025), prohibits applying a statute of limita-
tion to CRSC claims. Soto, however, is about the Barring
Act’s provision that most settlement claims against the
United States are subject to a six-year limitations period
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GAYLORD v. US 7
Finally, we turn to Mr. Gaylord’s claim for retroactive
disability retirement pay. Under 38 U.S.C. §§ 5304
and 5305, a veteran is prohibited from receiving both mili-
tary retired pay and VA disability compensation at the
same time, unless that veteran retired with 20 or more
years of service. See 10 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2). If a veteran
does not qualify to receive both military retired pay and VA
disability compensation simultaneously, the veteran must
waive his military retired pay by the amount of his VA dis-
ability compensation. See 38 U.S.C. § 5305.
Mr. Gaylord, while deemed entitled to disability retire-
ment pay and VA disability compensation, did not serve for
20 years. Thus, he cannot qualify for the 20-year-service
exception to the federal prohibition on collecting both mili-
tary retired pay and VA disability compensation. There-
fore, Mr. Gaylord’s retirement back pay was waived by the
amount of VA disability compensation he received under
§ 5305. Because Mr. Gaylord cannot plausibly plead facts
that would qualify him to simultaneously collect both mili-
tary retired pay and VA disability compensation, he cannot
state a claim to relief for retroactive disability retirement
pay that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Steffen v. United States, 995 F.3d
1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“The Court of Federal Claims
unless another law—like the CRSC statute—confers au-
thority to settle a claim instead, in which case that law dis-
places the Barring Act’s settlement mechanism in its
entirety, including its limitations period. Id. at 362. In
Soto, the Barring Act was being used to limit to six years
the length of time a veteran could recover past-due benefits
for a CRSC claim he was deemed eligible for when the
CRSC statute imposed no such defined period of recovery.
Id. at 366, 372. Soto, however, does not speak to the stat-
ute of limitations period established by § 2501 for when a
plaintiff must file his claim alleging entitlement to CRSC.
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GAYLORD v. US 8
may properly grant a motion to dismiss under [Rule of the
Court of Federal Claims (RCFC)] 12(b)(6) when a com-
plaint does not allege facts that show the plaintiff is enti-
tled to the legal remedy sought.”).
Mr. Gaylord appears to again rely on Holley to argue
that he “should have been given [his] full retired pay along
with back pay of retirement.” Appellant’s Inf. Br. 2. But
Holley is not relevant to the issue of whether a former ser-
vicemember can concurrently receive VA disability com-
pensation and military retired pay. Mr. Gaylord also
contends that, “according to my [sic] secretary of the
Army[,] they ordered my retired pay long before there was
a VA waiver, so the court should have given relief for pay.”
Id. But the VA waiver rule existed before Mr. Gaylord’s
retirement, see Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 3105, 72 Stat. 1231
(1958), and the underlying pay records show that the VA
waiver started applying at the same time he would have
first started receiving retirement pay, see Appx 61. We
thus affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Gaylord’s
claim for retroactive disability retirement pay pursuant to
RCFC 12(b)(6).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Gaylord’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons stated
above, we affirm the decision of the Court of Federal
Claims dismissing Mr. Gaylord’s complaint.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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