Janice Stevenson v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JANICE STEVENSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1478
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:25-cv-00016-PSH, Judge Philip S. Hadji.
______________________
Decided: October 15, 2025
______________________
J ANICE W. STEVENSON , Gloucester, MA, pro se.
T ARA K. HOGAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
P ATRICIA M. MC CARTHY , YAAKOV ROTH .
______________________
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, P ROST and T ARANTO, Circuit
Judges.
Case: 25-1478 Document: 24 Page: 1 Filed: 10/15/2025

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STEVENSON v. US 2
P ER CURIAM .
Janice Stevenson appeals a Court of Federal Claims
decision dismissing her complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Stevenson is a legally blind enrollee in a cyberse-
curity training program offered by Per Scholas, a nonprofit
organization receiving federal funds under the Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA). S. Appx. 1;
S. Appx. 10.1 Despite federal requirements to accommo-
date disabled individuals, Per Scholas allegedly denied
Ms. Stevenson’s requests for screen-reading software, ac-
cessible course materials, and extended time for assign-
ments. S. Appx. 13–15. Ms. Stevenson contends Per
Scholas deprived her of the educational and employment
benefits the federal funding intended, resulting in financial
harm and lost career opportunities. S. Appx. 1; S. Appx.
16–17. She filed a complaint in the Court of Federal
Claims asserting claims under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and WIOA.
S. Appx. 1; S. Appx. 9. She further asserted Per Scholas’
failure to provide reasonable accommodations constituted
a constructive taking under the Fifth Amendment.
S. Appx. 2–3, 10–11. The Court of Federal Claims dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. S. Appx. 1–3. Ms. Steven-
son appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(3).
D ISCUSSION
We review the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Allen v. United
States, 88 F.4th 983, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The petitioner
1 “S. Appx.” refers to the supplemental appendix at-
tached to Respondent’s brief.
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STEVENSON v. US 3
bears the burden to establish jurisdiction by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Allen, 88 F.4th at 986. We review the
Court of Federal Claims’ decision whether to transfer the
case for abuse of discretion. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v.
United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The Court of Federal Claims determined Ms. Steven-
son’s allegations implicated conduct by a private entity, not
the United States, and that no statute she cited was money
mandating under the Tucker Act. S. Appx. 2–3. The Court
of Federal Claims further determined her attempt to re-
frame her claims as a Fifth Amendment taking failed to
identify a cognizable property interest. Id. As a result, the
Court of Federal Claims held the relief Ms. Stevenson
sought fell outside its jurisdiction. S. Appx. 3. We agree.
Even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se liti-
gants, Ms. Stevenson’s complaint does not allege facts suf-
ficient to establish jurisdiction over any of her claims.
First, under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal
Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims against any party
other than the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (conferring
jurisdiction over “any claim against the United States”
alone). Ms. Stevenson argues the Tucker Act’s jurisdic-
tional reach extends to Per Scholas as a recipient of federal
funds. Petitioner’s Br. 6. But the Tucker Act does not dis-
tinguish between private parties based on whether, or the
extent to which, they received federal funds. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491. Further, Ms. Stevenson’s complaint does not name
the United States as a defendant. S. Appx. 8. Instead, it
names Per Scholas and two government officials. The
Tucker Act, however, “grants the Court of Federal Claims
jurisdiction over suits against the United States, not
against individual federal officials.” Brown v. United
States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a). The Court of Federal Claims therefore correctly
dismissed the case because it has no jurisdiction over
claims against private entities or government officials.
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STEVENSON v. US 4
Second, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction
over Ms. Stevenson’s claims under the ADA and RA.
S. Appx. 9. Ms. Stevenson argues Per Scholas discrimi-
nated against her by refusing to accommodate her im-
paired vision, and that the ADA and RA guaranteed her
meaningful participation in the federally funded program.
Petitioner’s Br. 6–7; S. Appx. 14–15. But neither statute is
money mandating under the Tucker Act because they do
not “mandat[e] compensation by the Federal Government
for the damages sustained.” United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 400 (1976) (quoting Eastport Steamship Corp. v.
United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967)); Lane v.
Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) (establishing that § 504(a) of the
RA is not money mandating); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), (5),
12112 (establishing that the ADA is not money mandating
as it omits the federal government from an enumerated list
of covered entities). As non-money-mandating sources,
those statutes cannot create jurisdiction for the Court of
Federal Claims. Boddie v. United States, 86 F.3d 1178,
1996 WL 252832, at *2 (Fed. Cir. May 14,1996) (affirming
dismissal of petitioner’s complaint because non-money-
mandating sources could not substantiate a “claim upon
which the Court of Federal Claims [can] grant relief”). Ac-
cordingly, the Court of Federal Claims correctly dismissed
those claims for lack of jurisdiction. S. Appx. 2.
Third, Ms. Stevenson’s reliance on the WIOA does not
grant the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction. S. Appx. 9.
Ms. Stevenson maintains WIOA’s grant funding structure
imposed enforceable obligations to provide accessible train-
ing opportunities. Petitioner’s Br. 8–10. Per Scholas alleg-
edly disregarded its obligations, ultimately depriving
Ms. Stevenson of federally supported educational and em-
ployment benefits. Petitioner’s Br. 14, 16–17. Yet WIOA
expressly disclaims any individual entitlement to services
and provides no private right of action. 29 U.S.C.
§ 3254(12). Because it creates no right to money damages
from any party, let alone the United States, it is non-
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STEVENSON v. US 5
money-mandating under the Tucker Act. Thus, the Court
of Federal Claims correctly determined it could not exercise
jurisdiction over Ms. Stevenson’s alleged WIOA violation.
Fourth, Ms. Stevenson’s constructive takings theory
does not grant the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction.
S. Appx. 8. Ms. Stevenson argues she had a cognizable
property interest in federally guaranteed educational ben-
efits, including their attendant economic opportunities.
Petitioner’s Br. 12–13. In her view, the United States’ in-
action after Per Scholas denied her disability accommoda-
tions amounted to a deprivation of those interests without
just compensation. Petitioner’s Br. 13–15. But govern-
ment inaction cannot support a takings claim. St. Bernard
Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“On a takings theory, the government cannot be lia-
ble for failure to act, but only for affirmative acts by the
government.”). The Court of Federal Claims correctly de-
termined that the alleged deprivation stemmed from Per
Scholas rather than any government action. S. Appx. 2–3.
Without a government-attributable taking, the Court of
Federal Claims cannot exercise jurisdiction over this claim.
Finally, the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction
over Ms. Stevenson’s implied-in-fact contract claim. Peti-
tioner’s Br. 8–11. On appeal, Ms. Stevenson argues her en-
rollment in a federally funded program created an implied-
in-fact contract with the United States through Per Scholas
as the agent. Id. She further maintained the federal gov-
ernment’s oversight and accessibility requirements signi-
fied mutual intent to contract. Petitioner’s Br. 9–10.
Ms. Stevenson’s complaint, however, did not plausibly
plead a breach of contract theory. See generally S. Appx.
8–22 (neglecting to mention the word “contract” and using
“breach” only in the limited context of Per Scholas’ distinct
fiduciary duty to students). Nor does her complaint plead
the specific implied-in-fact breach of contract theory she
improperly introduced on appeal. Kachanis v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 212 F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
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STEVENSON v. US 6
(“[A]ppellants may not raise issues on appeal for the first
time.”). Even if she had, that cause of action would have
been futile because WIOA forecloses individual entitlement
to such a claim. 29 U.S.C. § 3254(12). Thus, Ms. Steven-
son’s breach-of-contract claim as pleaded does not fall
within the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction.
The Court of Federal Claims also did not abuse its dis-
cretion by dismissing her case rather than transferring it
under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Ms. Stevenson argues that, even
if jurisdiction were lacking, the Court of Federal Claims
should have transferred the case to a district court in the
interest of justice, emphasizing her pro se status, her disa-
bility, and that her claims relied on statutes typically adju-
dicated in district courts. Petitioner’s Br. 18. The Court of
Federal Claims did not abuse its discretion in not transfer-
ring this case given that Ms. Stevenson first requested
transfer on appeal to this Court. See Kachanis, 212 F.3d
at 1293.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ms. Stevenson’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we af-
firm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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