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24-2338•Federal Circuit disposition — 24-2338
24-2338Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitMay 15, 2025
N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
IN RE: ROBYN AYLOR HAINES, ROBERT
BENSON AYLOR,
Appellants
______________________
2024-2338
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 12/925,221.
______________________
Decided: May 15, 2025
______________________
ROBYN AYLOR HAINES , Franklin, TN, pro se.
ROBERT B ENSON A YLOR, I, Blue Ash, OH, pro se.
J USTIN BOVA, Office of the Solicitor, United States Pa-
tent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee
Coke Morgan Stewart. Also represented by MONICA
BARNES L ATEEF , AMY J. N ELSON.
______________________
Before L OURIE, D YK, and CUNNINGHAM , Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
Robin Aylor Haines and Robert Benson Aylor (collec-
tively, “Haines”) appeal from a decision of the United
Case: 24-2338 Document: 29 Page: 1 Filed: 05/15/2025
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IN RE: HAINES 2
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (“the Board”) affirming an examiner’s
rejection of all pending claims of U.S. Patent Application
12/925,221 (“the ’221 application”), S.A 32–75.1 In re
Haines, No. 2024-000693, 2024 WL 3200435 (P.T.A.B. Mar.
29, 2024) (“Decision”). For the reasons provided below, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The ’221 application is generally directed to diagnostic
testing. ’221 application, S.A. 75. The ’221 application pro-
vides that the claimed invention collects a sample of a vol-
atile material (e.g., breath or urine) produced by a living
entity (e.g., person or animal) and then analyzes the sam-
ple using a mass spectrometer to create a digital health
record with information such as the living entity’s age or
weight. Id., S.A. 32, 38, 44. The digital health record is
used to diagnose whether the living entity has a particular
condition. Id., S.A. 44.
Claim 112 is representative.
112. A computer readable digital health record for
a living entity at a specific time comprising:
the results obtained by collecting at least
one sample of volatile headspace material
from around said living entity,
electron-ionization of said volatile head-
space material using a headspace-mass
spectrometer to obtain mass spectral chan-
nel signals (m/z),
and then storing said mass spectral chan-
nel signals, the identity of said living entity
1 “S.A.” refers to the supplemental appendix filed in
connection with Appellee’s brief.
Case: 24-2338 Document: 29 Page: 2 Filed: 05/15/2025
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IN RE: HAINES 3
and the specific time to create said com-
puter readable digital health record.
Id., S.A. 27 (spacing adjusted).
The examiner rejected all pending claims (claims 112–
115 and 117–129) of the ’221 application on one or more
grounds: (1) claims 112–114 and 117 as anticipated by
Cranley2 as evidenced by Han;3 (2) claims 112–115 and
117–129 as obvious over Cranley and other references, (3)
claims 124–129 as indefinite and lacking adequate written
description, and (4) claims 112–115 and 117–128 as di-
rected to patent-ineligible subject matter. S.A. 1815–45.
Cranley, entitled “Personal Computer Breath Analyzer for
Health-Related Behavior Modification and Method,” dis-
closes “[a] medical breath component analyzer which main-
tains a data-base profile of a patient over time.” S.A. 1972.
Han provides an overview of how mass spectrometers op-
erate. S.A. 2033–34. Haines appealed the examiner’s final
rejection to the Board, which affirmed each of the exam-
iner’s rejections. See Decision at *8.
Haines timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
D ISCUSSION
Haines challenges the Board’s conclusions as to antici-
pation, obviousness, indefiniteness, written description,
and subject matter eligibility. We focus our analysis only
on the anticipation of claim 112, which is dispositive of the
appeal. “We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo
and its factual findings for substantial evidence.” Incept
LLC v. Palette Life Scis., Inc., 77 F.4th 1366, 1371 (Fed.
2 U.S. Patent Application Publication 2002/0007249,
S.A. 1972–89.
3 Xuemei Han, Aaron Aslanian & John R. Yates III,
Mass Spectrometry for Proteomics, 12 CURRENT O P . CHEM .
BIOLOGY 483 (2008), S.A. 2033–45.
Case: 24-2338 Document: 29 Page: 3 Filed: 05/15/2025
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IN RE: HAINES 4
Cir. 2023). “[A]nticipation is a question of fact subject to
substantial evidence review.” IOENGINE, LLC v. Ingenico
Inc., 100 F.4th 1395, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citation omit-
ted).
We first address Haines’s argument that it was errone-
ous for the Board to affirm the examiner’s reliance on Cran-
ley as a prior art reference. Specifically, Haines argues
that, as provided in Haines’s affidavit pursuant to 37
C.F.R. § 1.131, the ’221 application was “made prior to the
effective date of Cranley.” Haines Br. 8. But 37 C.F.R. §
1.131 does not apply if the rejection is “based upon a stat-
utory bar,” such as when the asserted reference is a pub-
lished patent application, as Cranley is here. See
37 C.F.R. § 1.131(a)(2) (“Prior invention may not be estab-
lished under this section if . . . [t]he rejection is based upon
a statutory bar.”). Therefore, because the earliest priority
date of Haines’s application is October 29, 2009, see S.A.
32, and Cranley was published on January 17, 2002, see
S.A. 1972, Cranley was properly determined to be prior art.
We therefore proceed to Haines’s challenges on the merits.
Next, Haines challenges the Board’s determination
that it was permissible for the examiner to rely on Han in
concluding that Cranley implicitly discloses the “electron-
ionization of said volatile headspace material using a head-
space-mass spectrometer to obtain mass spectral channel
signals (m/z)” limitation. See Decision at *7; ’221 applica-
tion, S.A. 27. Specifically, Haines asserts that the use of
Han as an additional reference was error because anticipa-
tion findings must be based on only a single reference.
Haines Br. 7.
We are unpersuaded. Han was not used as an addi-
tional reference to meet a limitation of claim 112. Rather,
as explained by the Board, the examiner “utilize[d] Han
only as evidence to explain” why Cranley’s disclosure of a
mass spectrometer implicitly discloses “obtain[ing] mass
spectral channel signals (m/z).” Decision at *7 (cleaned up);
see S.A. 1823 (citing S.A. 2034 (Han), explaining that
Case: 24-2338 Document: 29 Page: 4 Filed: 05/15/2025
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IN RE: HAINES 5
“[m]ass spectrometers consist of . . . a mass analyzer that
separates ionized analytes based on m/z ratio, and a detec-
tor that records the number of ions at each m/z value”).
Such a use was permissible. Telemac Cell. Corp. v. Topp
Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (permit-
ting recourse to additional reference in anticipation inquiry
to “determine whether a feature, while not explicitly dis-
cussed, is necessarily present in a[n] [asserted] reference”).
Haines also challenges the Board’s affirmance of the
examiner’s finding that Cranley meets the “collecting at
least one sample of volatile headspace material from
around [a] living entity” limitation. See Decision at *7; S.A.
1988. Haines asserts that was error because Cranley re-
quires that its collected sample is a patient’s breath, e.g.,
S.A. 1981 ¶ 1, and therefore “teaches away” from the
claimed limitation, which is not so narrowed. Haines Br. 8.
We disagree. First, “the question [of] whether a refer-
ence ‘teaches away’ from the invention is inapplicable to an
anticipation analysis.” Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell
Intern. Corp, 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Fur-
thermore, dependent claim 114 of the ’221 application ex-
plicitly states that the living entity’s “breath” can
constitute the “sample of volatile headspace material,” as
recited in claim 112. ’221 application, S.A. 27. As the
Board explained, “Cranley’s breath sample cannot teach
away from a sample that, itself, includes a breath sample.”
Decision at *7.
Similarly, Haines asserts that the Board’s anticipation
determination as a whole was infected with legal error be-
cause Cranley additionally requires its breath sample to
“not [be] contaminated” and to be “processed in a quantita-
tive analyzer,” see S.A. 1982 ¶ 21, 1983 ¶ 23, and thus
again “teaches away” from claim 112, which does not con-
tain such requirements. Haines Br. 8. We again disagree.
First, as explained above, whether a reference teaches
away from an invention is irrelevant for anticipation
Case: 24-2338 Document: 29 Page: 5 Filed: 05/15/2025
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IN RE: HAINES 6
purposes. Celeritas Techs., 150 F.3d at 1361. Second, that
a reference discloses additional requirements absent from
a claim does not detract from the reference’s disclosure of
the claimed limitations. See, e.g., Exergen Corp. v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (af-
firming the Board’s anticipation determination despite ref-
erence disclosing unclaimed requirements).
For those reasons, we conclude that the Board did not
legally err in affirming the examiner’s rejection of claim
112 as anticipated, and that the Board’s analysis was sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Because Haines does not
present any separate challenges to the Board’s other antic-
ipation or obviousness conclusions, we affirm the Board’s
decision sustaining the examiner’s rejection of all pending
claims. See In re Bindshedler, 427 F.2d 1261, 1264 (CCPA
1970) (“[W]e are constrained to sustain” an examiner’s re-
jection when the applicant does “not challenge[] the rejec-
tion of th[e] claim on the prior art”).4
CONCLUSION
We have considered Haines’s other arguments and find
them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
4 Haines also requests a patent term adjustment
(“PTA”) for the ’221 application. Haines Br. 3, 10. We re-
ject this argument because, (1) we do not have jurisdiction
over PTA requests, see 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A) (giving the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ex-
clusive jurisdiction over such requests), and (2) PTA re-
quests only apply to an issued patent, which Haines does
not possess.
Case: 24-2338 Document: 29 Page: 6 Filed: 05/15/2025
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