Yoldas Askan v. Faro Technologies, Inc.

N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
YOLDAS ASKAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-2258
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida in No. 6:23-cv-00920-PGB-DCI,
Judge Paul G. Byron.
______________________
Decided: May 12, 2025
______________________
Y OLDAS A SKAN, Birmingham, United Kingdom, pro se.
A SHLEY BOLAND SUMMER , Nelson Mullins Riley & Scar-
borough LLP, New York, NY, for defendant-appellee. Also
represented by R OBERT H. MC WILLIAMS, J R ., Columbia, SC;
N ICOLETTE V ILMOS, Berger Singerman LLP, Orlando, FL.
______________________
Before P ROST, REYNA , and STARK, Circuit Judges.
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ASKAN v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES , INC. 2
P ER C URIAM .
Yoldas Askan appeals pro se from a district court deci-
sion dismissing his complaint with prejudice. We affirm.
B ACKGROUND
Yoldas Askan (“Mr. Askan”) owns U.S. Patent
Nos. 9,300,841 (“’841 patent”) and 10,032,255 (“’255 pa-
tent”), which relate to smoothing three-dimensional im-
ages. In May 2023, Mr. Askan filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Flor-
ida, alleging that certain products of FARO Technologies,
Inc. (“FARO”) infringed both patents. See SAppx2.1
Mr. Askan then filed a First Amended Complaint. See id.,
SAppx23.
In July 2023, FARO moved to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). SAppx948–61. In October 2023, the
magistrate judge recommended granting FARO’s motion to
dismiss due to conclusory allegations that did not explain
how the accused products infringe at least claim 1 of each
patent. SAppx1185–89. In December 2023, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
SAppx1315–16. The court issued an order granting
Mr. Askan leave to file a Second Amended Complaint but
stated that the court would dismiss the action with preju-
dice if the complaint did not “compl[y] with this Order and
all applicable rules and law.” SAppx1317–18.
On January 12, 2024, Mr. Askan filed a Second
Amended Complaint. SAppx1319–1455. On February 8,
2024, FARO filed a motion to dismiss this complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6). SAppx1497–1698. The next day, FARO filed
1 “SAppx” refers to the supplemental appendix ac-
companying the Appellee’s responding brief.
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ASKAN v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES , INC. 3
an answer to the Second Amended Complaint.
SAppx1699–1765. On February 21, 2024, Mr. Askan filed
a response opposing the motion to dismiss and requesting
that FARO disclose certain accused source code in discov-
ery. SAppx2138–56.
On March 27, 2024, the magistrate judge issued a re-
port and recommendation that recommended denying
FARO’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
because, according to the magistrate judge, FARO’s answer
to the Second Amended Complaint mooted the motion to
dismiss. SAppx2228–29. On March 31, 2024, FARO ob-
jected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommenda-
tion. SAppx2230–41. On April 24, 2024, the district court
reviewed and rejected the report and recommendation.
SAppx2280–82. The court explained that FARO had been
understandably “confus[ed]” about whether there would be
a timeliness question regarding its answer, and the court
thus struck the answer and allowed the motion to dismiss
to remain pending. SAppx2281–82. On April 26, 2024,
Mr. Askan moved to strike the motion to dismiss.
SAppx2283–304.
On June 26, 2024, the district court denied Mr. Askan’s
motion to strike, granted FARO’s motion to dismiss, and
entered judgment dismissing the Second Amended Com-
plaint with prejudice. SAppx6–10. The court also stated,
erroneously, that Mr. Askan had not responded to the mo-
tion to dismiss. SAppx3; see also SAppx12–13.2 Based on
2 According to FARO, the district court’s mistake oc-
curred because Mr. Askan’s February 2024 opposition to
FARO’s motion to dismiss and Mr. Askan’s April 2024 mo-
tion to strike the motion to dismiss “created confusion such
that” the court “inadvertently overlooked” the first of these
two filings. Appellee Br. 9 n.3.
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ASKAN v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES , INC. 4
the court’s error, on July 1, 2024, Mr. Askan moved for re-
lief from judgment under Rule 60(b). SAppx2340–65.
On July 17, 2024, the district court construed
Mr. Askan’s motion for relief as a request for reconsidera-
tion and granted it. SAppx12–13. On reconsideration, the
court considered Mr. Askan’s February 2024 opposition to
FARO’s motion to dismiss, which the court had overlooked.
SAppx15–17. The court affirmed its prior grant of the mo-
tion to dismiss and judgment of dismissal with prejudice.
SAppx17. The court explained that Mr. Askan “freely ad-
mits” that, to establish a plausible claim on the ’255 patent,
he “must take apart” and “reverse engineer[]” FARO’s
product, and that, to establish a plausible claim on the ’841
patent, FARO must disclose the accused source code.
SAppx15 (quoting SAppx2146, SAppx2148) (quotations
omitted).
With respect to the ’841 patent, the court declined
Mr. Askan’s request to conduct discovery. SAppx15–17.
The court emphasized that the requested source code is
“highly confidential” and cannot be considered “before a
cognizable claim is laid out.” SAppx15–16.
Mr. Askan appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under the law of the applicable regional circuit.
AlexSam, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 119 F.4th 27, 34 (Fed. Cir.
2024). Here, the Eleventh Circuit applies de novo review.
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
We apply Federal Circuit law “to the specific question of
whether a complaint states a claim of patent infringement
on which relief may be granted.” AlexSam, 119 F.4th at 35.
Generally, a complaint is sufficiently pled under
Rule 12(b)(6) if the claim is plausible, rather than merely
“possib[le]” or “conceivable.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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ASKAN v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES , INC. 5
662, 678, 680 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted). A
complaint claiming patent infringement must contain “fac-
tual allegations that, when taken as true, articulate why it
is plausible that the accused product infringes the patent
claim,” and must do more than “recit[e] the claim elements
and merely conclud[e] that the accused product has those
elements.” Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2021). We construe pro se litigants’ plead-
ings “liberally,” but “a pro se plaintiff must still meet min-
imal standards to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1135, 1141 (Fed. Cir.
2018); see Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir.
2008).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Askan raises several arguments on appeal, which
we construe liberally. First, Mr. Askan argues that it was
improper for the district court to treat his motion for relief
under Rule 60(b) as a motion for reconsideration. Appel-
lant Br. 1–2, 14–16, 20–21. According to Mr. Askan, the
court should have reopened, not reconsidered, the case,
and, regardless, should not have considered the pleading
requirements under Rule 12(b)(6). Appellant Br. 20–21. To
the contrary, district courts have discretion to reconsider a
judgment or order sua sponte. Horne v. U.S., No. 20-14503,
2022 WL 656097, at *4 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2022) (citing
McDowell v. Celebrezze, 310 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1962));
Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d
1354, 1359 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Here, the court was well
within its discretion to reconsider the case. Additionally,
the court accounted for the error that prompted
Mr. Askan’s Rule 60(b) motion. The court considered
Mr. Askan’s overlooked opposition to FARO’s motion to dis-
miss under Rule 12(b)(6), ultimately affirming the previous
dismissal with prejudice. See SAppx12–17.
Second, Mr. Askan argues that the court erred by strik-
ing FARO’s answer to the Second Amended Complaint.
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ASKAN v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES , INC. 6
Appellant Br. 10–14. A court has inherent authority to
strike a pleading to “ensure prompt disposition of legal ac-
tions.” State Exch. Bank v. Hartline, 693 F.2d 1350, 1352
(11th Cir. 1982). We review the exercise of this power for
abuse of discretion. Id. Here, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it struck FARO’s answer, partic-
ularly as it recognized FARO had legitimate grounds for
confusion as to the proper timing for its answer. Doing so
was within the court’s inherent authority “to manage [its]
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious dis-
position of cases.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,
43–46 (1991) (citation and quotations removed).
Third, Mr. Askan argues that the court erred in dis-
missing the Second Amended Complaint for insufficient
pleading. Appellant Br. 2–10. But Mr. Askan’s Second
Amended Complaint made conclusory assertions of in-
fringement, failing to allege sufficient factual allegations.
See SAppx2143–55. In the complaint, Mr. Askan admitted
that he failed to allege sufficient factual allegations when
he argued that he could address deficiencies in the plead-
ing by either amending the complaint, which he never did,
or taking discovery. See SAppx2147–49, SAppx2155–56.
Moreover, Mr. Askan conceded that he failed to allege plau-
sible infringement in his February 2024 opposition. There,
he argued that, to establish plausibility under
Rule 12(b)(6), he would need to reverse-engineer FARO’s
accused product and obtain FARO’s accused, confidential
source code. See SAppx15–16 (quoting SAppx2146,
SAppx2148). These statements indicate that the Second
Amended Complaint contained conclusory allegations that
did not show the elements of infringement and thus could
not meet the plausibility requirement.
Fourth, Mr. Askan argues that the court erred by de-
clining his request under Rule 56(d) to conduct discovery to
obtain the accused source code. Appellant Br. 16–19. The
court properly determined it could not permit discovery in
order for Mr. Askan to obtain enough facts upon which to
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ASKAN v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES , INC. 7
plausibly plead an infringement claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 685–86; Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d
1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Facial challenges to the legal
sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dis-
miss based on failure to state a claim for relief, should,
however, be resolved before discovery begins.”). Moreover,
Rule 56(d) only pertains to motions for summary judgment,
not motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
C ONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Askan’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons stated, we
affirm the district court’s reconsideration order; its order
striking FARO’s answer to the Second Amended Com-
plaint; and its order dismissing with prejudice Mr. Askan’s
complaint and declining his discovery request.
AFFIRMED
C OSTS
Costs against Mr. Askan.
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