Charles Medwetz v. Merit Systems Protection Board

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
CHARLES MEDWETZ,
Petitioner
v.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
Respondent
______________________
2024-1969
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. PH-0752-22-0113-I-1.
______________________
Decided: May 14, 2025
______________________
CHARLES ANTHONY M EDWETZ, Mountain Top, PA, pro
se.
ELIZABETH W. F LETCHER , Office of the General Coun-
sel, United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Wash-
ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by ALLISON
J ANE BOYLE, K ATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH .
______________________
Before L OURIE, D YK, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam.
Case: 24-1969 Document: 61 Page: 1 Filed: 05/14/2025

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MEDWETZ v. MSPB 2
Charles Medwetz petitions pro se for review of a deci-
sion of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”)
dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Medwetz was employed by the Department of the
Army as a Supervisory IT Cybersecurity Specialist.
Mr. Medwetz was interviewed by two detectives on No-
vember 15, 2021, after which he signed a sworn statement
that he had misused his government travel card to fund
more than $7,000 in online gambling activities.
Based on Mr. Medwetz’s signed November statement,
the Army formally suspended Mr. Medwetz’s security
clearance and placed him on paid, non-duty status pend-
ing the outcome of the Army’s investigation. On Decem-
ber 14, 2021, the Army issued a notice of proposed
removal, again relying on his November statement,
charging him with conduct unbecoming a federal employ-
ee, fraud, making false statements, and failure to observe
written regulations, orders, rules or procedures. On
January 31, 2022, the Army informed Mr. Medwetz that,
effective midnight, February 1, 2022, he would be re-
moved from his position. He was also told by the deciding
officer that “his only other alternative to the removal was
to resign, which would at least keep the removal from
appearing on . . . [his] . . . employment record.” Pet’r’s
App’x 3–4 (alterations in original). The Army provided
him with only a day to decide whether to resign or face
involuntary removal. Mr. Medwetz resigned from his
position by letter later that day, before his removal be-
came effective. The Army memorialized Mr. Medwetz’s
resignation on his personnel records, explaining that he
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MEDWETZ v. MSPB 3
“resigned in lieu of removal.” Pet’r’s App’x 133;
S. App’x 66–67.1
Mr. Medwetz appealed to the Board. The Board lacks
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an employee who has
voluntarily resigned from his position and can only hear
claims of involuntary resignation. Garcia v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(en banc). Mr. Medwetz alleged that he had been forced
to resign and that his resignation was thus involuntary.
An administrative judge (AJ) of the Board ordered
Mr. Medwetz “to file evidence and argument that this
action is within the Board’s jurisdiction.” Pet’r’s App’x 26.
Mr. Medwetz, through counsel, timely filed the re-
quested documents, arguing that he was coerced to con-
fess to the charged misconduct by the detectives’
overbearing interview tactics and that the Army relied on
this coerced confession. Mr. Medwetz alleged that his
November interview with two detectives lasted six hours,
during which he was allegedly forced to write a sworn
statement stating that he had misused his government
travel charge card to fund more than $7,000 in online
gambling activities. The detectives allegedly coerced
Mr. Medwetz by accusing him of illicit drug use, threaten-
ing to conduct a polygraph test on him, and forcing him to
type his sworn statement while dictating what the state-
ment should include.
The AJ considered Mr. Medwetz’s submission and
concluded that Mr. Medwetz had failed to raise a nonfriv-
olous allegation that his resignation was involuntary and
that the Board thus lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.
Mr. Medwetz sought review from the full Board, which
denied the petition for review and affirmed. S. App’x 2, 5.
1 Citations to “S. App’x” are to the supplemental
appendix filed by the government.
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MEDWETZ v. MSPB 4
Mr. Medwetz filed this timely petition for review. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A).
D ISCUSSION
We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is
“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without
procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having
been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evi-
dence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review the Board’s juris-
dictional determinations de novo. Jones v. Merit Sys.
Prot. Bd., 98 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2024).
“[E]mployee resignations are presumed voluntary
[and] [t]his presumption will prevail” unless the appellant
makes a nonfrivolous allegation “that the resignation was
involuntarily extracted.” Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329 (sec-
ond and third alterations in original) (quoting Christie
v. United States, 518 F.2d 584, 587 (Ct. Cl. 1975)). To
raise a nonfrivolous allegation of involuntariness based on
coercion, an appellant must allege that “(1) the agency
effectively imposed the terms of the employee’s resigna-
tion[;] . . . (2) the employee had no realistic alternative but
to resign[;] . . . and (3) the employee’s resignation . . . was
the result of improper acts by the agency.” Id. at 1329
(quoting Shoaf v. Dep’t of Agr., 260 F.3d 1336, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). An employee merely “faced with the
unpleasant alternative of resigning or being subjected to
an adverse action” cannot nonfrivolously allege involun-
tary resignation unless the employee can show that the
“agency lacked reasonable grounds for threatening to take
the adverse action.” Terban v. Dep’t of Energy, 216 F.3d
1021, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
As a threshold matter, Mr. Medwetz argues that the
Board’s order to show cause regarding jurisdiction was
improper. Pet’r’s Br. 20–21. But that order was not only
proper but required by regulation, as the AJ must “inform
the parties of the proof required as to the issues of juris-
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MEDWETZ v. MSPB 5
diction.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(d). This follows from the
Board’s inherent authority to “determine its jurisdiction.”
Cruz v. Dep’t of Navy, 934 F.2d 1240, 1244 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (en banc). We thus disagree with Mr. Medwetz’s
contention that the Board “overstepped [its] authority and
committed a harmful procedural error.” Pet’r’s Br. 20.
Mr. Medwetz appears to argue that his proposed re-
moval was the result of improper acts by the Army (and
hence, his resignation was involuntary) because the Army
coerced his November statement admitting misconduct
and relied on that statement in proposing removal. The
Board made no determination as to whether the state-
ment was coerced. It is established that the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination ap-
plies only when that statement is used in a criminal case.
See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 264 (1990); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767
(2003) (plurality). But it may nonetheless be improper for
an agency to rely on some types of coerced statements in a
removal proceeding, even though it appears permissible to
compel testimony by threats of job loss for failure to
cooperate. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801,
806 (1977). The parties have offered no relevant authori-
ty.
We need not here address whether reliance on a co-
erced statement would be permissible because, even if the
Army had been barred from relying on his November
statement, that reliance was at most harmless error since,
as the Board concluded, Mr. Medwetz “ha[d] not alleged
that he did not engage in the misconduct with which he
was charged.” Medwetz v. Dep’t of Army, No. PH-0752-22-
0113-I-1, 2024 WL 1698846, at *4 (M.S.P.B. Apr. 18,
2024). On appeal, Mr. Medwetz specifically agrees that
he engaged in the challenged conduct. See Pet’r’s Reply
Br. 4 (“Yes, I did use my Government Travel Card, but it
was not intentional. I made a mistake, owned it and paid
the card off 1 month prior to being interviewed by law
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MEDWETZ v. MSPB 6
enforcement. Did I deserve a reprimand, possible suspen-
sion or some other form of punishment, yes, I did.”).
Under such circumstances, reliance on the November
statement is not a ground finding his resignation involun-
tary.
Mr. Medwetz argues that the Board in other respects
improperly concluded that he failed to nonfrivolously
allege that his retirement was involuntary. Pet’r’s Br. 26.
Other than his allegation that the Army coerced his
resignation by giving him only a single day to resign,
Mr. Medwetz does not direct this court’s attention to any
other factual allegation made before the Board establish-
ing that his resignation was involuntary. In fact, he
alleged in his jurisdictional submission that he had “se-
lect[ed] the option that would cause the least damage to
his career in the future.” S. App’x 71.
Lastly, Mr. Medwetz argues that the Army misled
him into believing his security clearance had been sus-
pended. Pet’r’s Br. 24–25. But in his opening brief,
Mr. Medwetz concedes that this “issue [was] not present-
ed to the Merit Systems Protection Board.” Id. at 26.
Because Mr. Medwetz did not raise this argument before
the Board, it is forfeited, and we do not consider it on
appeal. See Hansen v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 911 F.3d
1362, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Bosley v. Merit Sys. Prot.
Bd., 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Medwetz’s remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm the final decision of the Board.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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