Garland Williamson v. Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
GARLAND WILLIAMSON,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2024-1770
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 23-526, Judge Amanda L. Mere-
dith.
______________________
Decided: July 16, 2025
______________________
G ARLAND O. WILLIAMSON, Baltimore, MD, pro se.
J OSHUA MOORE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
BRIAN M. BOYNTON , ERIC P. BRUSKIN, P ATRICIA M.
MCCARTHY ; MATTHEW ALBANESE , D EREK SCADDEN, Office
of General Counsel, United States Department of Veter-
ans Affairs, Washington, DC.
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WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS 2
______________________
Before P ROST , CLEVENGER , and C UNNINGHAM , Circuit
Judges.
P ER CURIAM.
Garland O. Williamson challenges the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(“CAVC”), which upheld the Board of Veteran’s Appeals’
(“Board”) dismissal of his claim to equitable relief under
38 U.S.C. § 503 for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Williamson
contends that the dismissal is in error and submits that
he is entitled to equitable relief under the plain language
of the statute, as well as for clear and unmistakable error
(“CUE”) committed by the Department of Veteran’s Af-
fairs (“VA”) Regional Office (“RO”) and the Board. For the
following reasons, we affirm the CAVC’s decision.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Williamson honorably served in active duty in the
Navy from November 13, 1963 to March 11, 1966. 1972,
Mr. Williamson submitted a claim for service-connected
disability. The RO denied his claim and mailed its rating
decision and subsequent confirmation of denial to the
incorrect address.
In 2007, Mr. Williamson filed a petition to reopen his
1972 claim. In May of 2021, nearly 50 years after filing
his original claim, the Board granted Mr. Williamson a
100% service connection disability rating, effective from
March 30, 1972. Mr. Williamson received retroactive
payment of his benefits. In June and September of 2021,
Mr. Williamson filed for equitable relief under
35 U.S.C. § 503 seeking approximately $1.7 million to
compensate him for the costs of real estate losses and
dependent health care during the long period when he
was not in receipt of the benefits to which he was entitled.
Mr. Williamson stated that he had relied, to his detri-
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WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS 3
ment, on the denial of his 1972 claim, which he alleges
was erroneous due to CUE in the RO’s denial.
The Secretary’s Decision
The Executive Director of the VA’s Compensation
Service, on behalf of the Secretary, denied
Mr. Williamson’s request for equitable relief on Septem-
ber 30, 2021. The Secretary explained that
38 U.S.C. § 503 grants the Secretary discretion to dis-
pense equitable relief where the veteran has (a) been
deprived of his rightful benefits due to administrative
error, or (b) suffered a loss due to reliance on an erroneous
decision by the VA. The Secretary found that neither
§ 503(a) nor § 503(b) is applicable to Mr. Williamson’s
case. For § 503(a), the Secretary stated that recompense
for disadvantageous financial decisions is not a benefit to
which Mr. Williamson is entitled under the law. For
§ 503(b), the Secretary explained that though the Board
eventually reached a different decision than the RO on
Mr. Williamson’s 1972 claim, there was no CUE in the
RO’s earlier decisions. The Secretary ended by “noting
equitable relief decisions are not appealable,” citing
CAVC authority. Appx. 37.1 The RO reaffirmed this
denial in a December 2021 notice letter to
Mr. Williamson.
The Board’s Decision
Mr. Williamson filed a notice of disagreement with
the Secretary’s denial and appealed to the Board for
review. In October of 2022, the Board notified
Mr. Williamson that it “did not have jurisdiction to review
[the Secretary’s] decision,” but afforded time for
“[Mr. Williamson] to submit additional evidence and
1 “Appx.” refers to the Appellant’s Corrected Ap-
pendix, ECF No. 11.
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WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS 4
argument on the jurisdiction question or to request a
hearing on that question.” See Appx. 17. Mr. Williamson
declined a hearing but submitted additional written
argument. Mr. Williamson stated that “he assumed, for
purposes of his appeal, that the Board does not have
authority to review the Secretary’s decisions under
38 U.S.C. § 503.” Id. The Board found Mr. Williamson’s
argument lacked merit and that CAVC precedent held
that “38 U.S.C. § 503 does not provide the Board jurisdic-
tion to review the Secretary’s decisions on equitable relief
claims.” Appx. 18–19.
The CAVC’s Decision
Mr. Williamson appealed to the CAVC. The CAVC
noted that in his appeal, Mr. Williamson did not dispute
the Board’s lack of reviewing authority over the Secre-
tary’s equitable decisions, but instead “raised a number of
challenges to the factual and legal bases for the Secre-
tary’s 2021 [denial]” of equitable relief. Appx. 14. In
dismissing his appeal, the CAVC found that
Mr. Williamson’s arguments ignored controlling case law,
and so failed to meet his burden to establish jurisdiction.
Mr. Williamson filed a motion for reconsideration, or in
the alternative, a panel decision. The CAVC denied
reconsideration but granted a panel decision, which
upheld the CAVC’s dismissal. Mr. Williamson timely
appealed to this court.
D ISCUSSION
The CAVC has long held that the Secretary’s discre-
tion to provide equitable relief under 38 U.S.C. § 503 is
beyond the review authority of the Board and the CAVC.
See Darrow v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 303, 306 (1992);
Zimick v. West, 11 Vet. App. 45, 50–51 (1998). This court
agrees with the CAVC’s precedent. See Burris v. Wilkie,
888 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Burkhart v. Wilkie,
971 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Andrews
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WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS 5
v. McDonough, No. 2022-1979, 2023 WL 3220216, at *1–2
(Fed. Cir. May 3, 2023).
This body of law holds that Congress, in enacting
38 U.S.C. § 511, unambiguously specified that decisions
by the Secretary under § 503 are not judicially reviewable
by the Board, and consequently the CAVC and this court
do not have the authority to provide the requested relief.
See, e.g., Burris, 888 F.3d at 1357–62; Andrews, 2023 WL
3220216 at *1–2. Mr. Williamson recognized this body of
law when he stated to the Board that he knew the Board
lacked authority to review the Secretary’s § 503 decisions.
Appx. 17.
Before this court, Mr. Williamson does not challenge
what the case law holds, but instead boldly challenges the
correctness of that body of law, asserting that denial of
judicial review of the Secretary’s § 503 decisions deprives
him of fundamental due process and violates, in addition,
the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
He also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper
Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024),
supports his case, see ECF Nos. 20, 32, 34, 37, 38, and
that the RO and Board committed CUE in denying his
1972 claim. However, Mr. Williamson’s attempt to avoid
application of settled law is unsuccessful.
Mr. Williamson has not been deprived of due process.
The Secretary’s grant or denial of equitable relief is
undeniably discretionary. 38 U.S.C. § 503. As such,
Mr. Williamson cannot show he is entitled by right to any
of the equitable relief he seeks. See Town of Castle Rock,
Colo. v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (“[T]he Due
Process Clause does not protect everything that might be
described as a ‘benefit.’” Instead, the claimant must
“have a legitimate claim of entitlement to [the benefit
sought],” which cannot be so “if government officials may
grant or deny it in their discretion.”) (internal citation
omitted). Also, “[d]ue process of law has been interpreted
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WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS 6
to include notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.”
Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir.
2009). Should the Board detect a jurisdictional defect, it
must notify the veteran and grant the veteran time to
submit additional written argument or evidence that may
remedy such defect, as well as the opportunity for a
hearing. 38 C.F.R. § 20.104(c). The record shows the
Board informed Mr. Williamson of the jurisdictional
defect and offered him the opportunity to present addi-
tional written and oral argument. Appx. 17.
Mr. Williamson declined a hearing but submitted addi-
tional written arguments on his entitlement to equitable
relief, which the Board found unavailing. Appx. 17–18.
Mr. Williamson was granted due process to plead his case
for equitable relief. That he does not agree with the
outcome does not deprive him of the due process he was
fully afforded.
Mr. Williamson also cannot show that § 511, the stat-
ute denying him judicial review of the Secretary’s adverse
decision on his request for relief under § 503, violates the
APA. Section 702 of the APA provides for judicial review
of a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
but at the same time, leaves unaffected “other limitations
on judicial review,” such as 38 U.S.C. § 511.
5 U.S.C. § 702. By its unambiguous terms, § 702 bars
APA review of the Secretary’s decisions under § 503,
which are denied judicial review by § 511.
Mr. Williamson’s reliance on Loper Bright is mis-
placed. Loper Bright held that courts may not defer to
agency interpretation of laws in the manner previously
permitted under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Loper
Bright, 603 U.S. at 412. The body of law that
Mr. Williamson attacks, cited above, did not arise from
judicial deference to agency interpretation under Chevron,
but instead resulted from the application of traditional
statutory construction cannons unaffected by Chevron.
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WILLIAMSON v. COLLINS 7
“[B]ased on a plain reading of the Veteran’s Court’s
jurisdictional statute, in conjunction with § 503 and the
other [traditional statutory construction cannons] recited
above, we conclude that the Veterans Court lacks jurisdic-
tion to grant the equitable relief that Appellants seek.”
Burris, 888 F.3d at 1360. Therefore, Loper Bright is not
relevant to this appeal.
Lastly, Mr. Williamson has failed to show the pres-
ence of any CUE. CUE claims apply to Board decisions.
38 U.S.C. § 7111. A CUE is an error that “had it not been
made, would have manifestly changed the outcome.”
38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(c). The Board’s earlier denials of
benefits based on Mr. Williamson’s 1972 claim were not
erroneous simply because, by way of the appeals process,
the Board ultimately concluded in 2021 that
Mr. Williamson was entitled to benefits for service-
connected disability, retroactive to 1972.
CONCLUSION
While we are sympathetic to Mr. Williamson’s cir-
cumstances, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the
CAVC’s decision.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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