Chateau Lynch-Bages v. Chateau Angelus S.a.

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
CHATEAU LYNCH-BAGES,
Appellant
v.
CHATEAU ANGELUS S.A.,
Appellee
______________________
2024-1197
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No.
91268431.
______________________
Decided: June 13, 2025
______________________
M ICHAEL STEVEN C ULVER, Millen, White, Zelano &
Branigan PC, Arlington, VA, argued for appellant.
D AVID C. BREZINA , Ladas & Parry LLP, Chicago, IL, ar-
gued for appellee. Also represented by JOHN EGBERT, Eg-
bert, McDaniel & Swartz PLLC, Houston, TX.
______________________
Case: 24-1197 Document: 43 Page: 1 Filed: 06/13/2025

-- 1 of 8 --

CHATEAU LYNCH - BAGES v. CHATEAU ANGELUS S . A. 2
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, CUNNINGHAM , Circuit Judge,
and SCARSI, District Judge.1
SCARSI, District Judge.
Appellant Chateau Lynch-Bages (“Opposer”) appeals
from a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) deci-
sion partially dismissing its opposition to a trademark ap-
plication filed by Appellee Chateau Angelus S.A.
(“Applicant”). The Board determined that there was no
likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s mark, “ECHO
D’ANGÉLUS,” and Opposer’s mark, “ECHO DE LYNCH
BAGES.” For the reasons below, we vacate the Board’s rul-
ing and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
BACKGROUND
Opposer asked the Board to deny an application seek-
ing to register the mark “ECHO D’ANGÉLUS,” claiming
that the proposed mark was likely to cause confusion with
Opposer’s mark, “ECHO DE LYNCH BAGES.” Appx. 34,
36–37. The Board dismissed the opposition in part, finding
that there was no likelihood of confusion as to the use of
Applicant’s mark with certain classes of goods. Appx. 12–
27.
In its analysis, the Board considered the relevant fac-
tors outlined in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“DuPont factors”). Appx. 13–
26. First, the Board found that the similarity of the goods
described in both Opposer’s registration and Applicant’s
application weighed in favor of a finding of likelihood of
confusion. Id. at 14–15. Second, the Board concluded that
the identical goods at issue, wine, “are presumed to move
1 The Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge,
United States District Court for the Central District of Cal-
ifornia, sitting by designation.
Case: 24-1197 Document: 43 Page: 2 Filed: 06/13/2025

-- 2 of 8 --

CHATEAU LYNCH - BAGES v. CHATEAU ANGELUS S . A. 3
in the same channels of trade to the same classes of con-
sumers,” such that “the parties’ trade channels and classes
of customers are the same.” Id. at 15–16. Third, the Board
determined that the degree of purchaser care was neutral.
Id. at 16–17. And fourth, based on Applicant’s submission
of third-party registrations that included the term
“ECHO,” the Board ruled that “ECHO” is “a fairly com-
monly-chosen term in the field,” which “weighs somewhat
against finding that confusion is likely.” Id. at 17–19.
With two factors weighing in favor of confusion, one
factor neutral, and one factor weighing “somewhat” against
confusion, the Board then considered the similarities of the
marks, which the Board correctly noted was “one of the
most important considerations.” Id. at 20. The Board an-
alyzed each mark as a “unitary expression” and found that
the term “ECHO” did not dominate either mark. Id. at 22.
Instead, the Board placed substantial weight on the terms
“ANGÉLUS” and “LYNCH BAGES.” Id. While neither
party appeared to argue that the subject marks included
house marks, the Board nevertheless opined that “[i]t ap-
pears that ANGÉLUS and LYNCH BAGES are the parties’
‘house marks.’” Id.
In support of this finding, the Board noted that Appli-
cant owned four registrations that included the term
“ANGELUS,” and that Opposer’s name and its letterhead
contained the phrase “LYNCH BAGES.” Id. Based on this,
the Board “assess[ed] the effect of house marks” in evalu-
ating the similarity of the marks. Id. at 22–25. Indeed, the
bulk of the Board’s similarity analysis consisted of evalu-
ating case law to determine how much weight to place on
the presence of the supposed house marks. Ultimately, the
Board found that “ECHO” had “some conceptual weakness
in connection with the goods at issue,” and that “the use of
ECHO with D’ and DE followed by the parties’ house marks
contributes significantly to the overall commercial impres-
sions of the marks as invoking the respective house
marks.” Id. at 25–26. Because the common term between
Case: 24-1197 Document: 43 Page: 3 Filed: 06/13/2025

-- 3 of 8 --

CHATEAU LYNCH - BAGES v. CHATEAU ANGELUS S . A. 4
the marks was “somewhat weak,” the Board concluded that
“the dissimilarities outweigh[ed] the similarities in the re-
spective marks” given that the marks “incorporate[d] dif-
ferent-appearing house marks as part of unitary
expressions.” Id. at 26. Weighing all the factors “in light
of all the evidence,” the Board found the dissimilarities in
the marks to be a “predominant” factor, and “the overall
balance of factors weigh[ed] against likely confusion.” Id.
at 26–27.
Opposer then filed the present appeal. We have juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B).
S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
A mark may be denied registration under Section 2(d)
of the Lanham Act if it is “likely, when used on or in con-
nection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion”
with an already registered mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
Likelihood of confusion is a legal determination based on
factual findings relating to the DuPont factors. On-Line
Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1084 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). We review the Board’s factual findings for sub-
stantial evidence, and we review the ultimate weighing of
the DuPont factors de novo. QuikTrip W., Inc. v. Weigel
Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2021). “Sub-
stantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
D ISCUSSION
On appeal, Opposer argues that the “Board erred in de-
termining that each of the subject marks contained a house
mark” because such a finding lacked substantial evidence.
Appellant’s Br. 4, 15–17. In Opposer’s view, this “errone-
ous determination” warrants reversal and remand. Id. at
4, 25. We agree remand is appropriate, and conclude that
the Board’s similarity analysis was flawed because its
Case: 24-1197 Document: 43 Page: 4 Filed: 06/13/2025

-- 4 of 8 --

CHATEAU LYNCH - BAGES v. CHATEAU ANGELUS S . A. 5
finding that the marks contained each party’s house mark
was not supported by substantial evidence. See Stratus
Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Commc’ns Inc., 955 F.3d
994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[W]e evaluate whether the
Board’s factual findings for each considered DuPont factor
are supported by substantial evidence.”).
In considering the similarity of the marks, the Board
declined to place an emphasis on the common term
“ECHO” because it believed that the marks were unitary
expressions not dominated by this term.2 Appx. 21–22.
Therefore, the Board’s analysis primarily revolved around
comparing the terms “ANGÉLUS” and “LYNCH BAGES.”
Here, rather than simply concluding that the substantial
differences in the sound, appearance, and commercial im-
pression of these terms rendered the marks dissimilar, see
In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2017), the Board opted to find that the terms “appear” to
be the parties’ house marks. Appx. 22.
“The term ‘house mark’ refers to a trademark that is
used throughout the commercial operations of the trade-
mark owner.” 1 Anne Gilson LaLonde, G ILSON ON
TRADEMARKS § 1.02[1][e] (Dec. 2024). Typically, parties ap-
ply for the registration of a house mark and must provide
evidence showing the broad use of the mark, as well as the
mark’s use in commerce. See Trademark Manual of Exam-
ining Procedure § 1402.03(b) (Nov. 2024). Therefore, the
Board must first find substantial evidence of a mark’s use
in commerce before determining that it is a house mark in
the context of the DuPont factors.
2 Opposer argues that the Board also erred in con-
sidering the marks as unitary expressions, but we do not
expressly address this issue because it is unclear to what
extent the house mark findings informed the Board’s deci-
sion to view the marks as unitary expressions.
Case: 24-1197 Document: 43 Page: 5 Filed: 06/13/2025

-- 5 of 8 --

CHATEAU LYNCH - BAGES v. CHATEAU ANGELUS S . A. 6
There was limited evidence of such commercial use be-
fore the Board. As a preliminary matter, the record does
not suggest that either party argued that the subject marks
contained house marks. Instead, the Board made this ob-
servation based on its own investigation. Regarding
“ANGÉLUS,” the Board noted that four of Applicant’s
other registrations contain variations of the term. Appx.
22. The Board did not cite any authority supporting the
proposition that merely owning multiple registrations with
a common term renders that term a house mark. Nor did
the Board find that these marks had a “broad use” or were
used in commerce. The evidence that “LYNCH BAGES”
was Opposer’s house mark was even more sparse. The
Board dedicated a single sentence to the analysis, noting
that Opposer’s name is “Chateau Lynch Bages”—impre-
cisely omitting a hyphen—and that its letterhead used
“LYNCH BAGES.” Id. The Board provided no further
analysis, law, or citations to the record to support its find-
ing. Id.
If that were the extent of the Board’s discussion of
house marks, perhaps the error would be harmless. How-
ever, the Board appeared to place great weight on its find-
ings. Indeed, the Board expressly “assess[ed] the effect of
house marks” on the similarity factor. Id. at 23. But, even
here the Board’s analysis was unclear, as its survey of the
case law resulted in a conclusion that “none of [its] prece-
dents” governed the situation that it concocted itself: where
the competing marks supposedly contained both a shared
word and each party’s house mark. Id. at 24–25.
After this underdeveloped house mark analysis, the
Board considered the similarities of the two marks. It
acknowledged that the identical term “ECHO” contributes
to a finding of similarity, but that the “remainder of the
marks are visually and aurally different.” Id. at 25. Again,
if the Board had arrived at this conclusion without the
house mark discussion, its analysis may have been sound.
However, it opined, “ECHO with D’ and DE followed by the
Case: 24-1197 Document: 43 Page: 6 Filed: 06/13/2025

-- 6 of 8 --

CHATEAU LYNCH - BAGES v. CHATEAU ANGELUS S . A. 7
parties’ house marks contributes significantly to the over-
all commercial impressions of the marks as invoking the
respective house marks.” Id. at 25–26. And, because the
Board considered “ECHO” weak, the Board reasoned that
the marks were dissimilar given that they “incorporate dif-
ferent appearing house marks.” Id. at 26. The house mark
findings were critical in the Board’s analysis and nearly
dispositive to its conclusion that the marks were not simi-
lar.
Applicant does not attempt to justify the Board’s house
mark findings. Instead, Applicant simply states that “the
‘house’ marks are the ‘main’ components” in each mark.
Appellee’s Br. 7–8. However, Applicant fails to engage
with the relevant issue as to whether there was substantial
evidence to determine that the marks contained house
marks at all. Indeed, if there had been such evidence or
argument, we agree that the Board would have had discre-
tion to consider the prominence of the house marks in its
similarity analysis. But that was not the case.
For the reasons above, the Board’s determination that
the competing marks contained house marks was errone-
ous, and because this finding was critical in the Board’s
similarity analysis, the conclusion of dissimilarity lacked
substantial evidence. Moreover, since the Board gave “pre-
dominant” weight to the similarity factor in its
DuPont analysis, it is not clear whether the Board would
have arrived at the same conclusion of no likelihood of con-
fusion absent this error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Board’s deci-
sion and remand the case for additional proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
Case: 24-1197 Document: 43 Page: 7 Filed: 06/13/2025

-- 7 of 8 --

CHATEAU LYNCH - BAGES v. CHATEAU ANGELUS S . A. 8
COSTS
Costs to Opposer.
Case: 24-1197 Document: 43 Page: 8 Filed: 06/13/2025

-- 8 of 8 --