Corey L. Sanders v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
COREY L. SANDERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-1067
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:23-cv-00103-EJD, Senior Judge Edward J.
Damich.
______________________
Decided: January 28, 2025
______________________
COREY L. SANDERS , Maple Heights, OH, pro se.
J ANA MOSES , Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Di-
vision, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BRIAN M.
BOYNTON, P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY , L OREN MISHA P REHEIM .
______________________
Before D YK, REYNA, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
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SANDERS v. US 2
P ER CURIAM .
Corey Sanders appeals the dismissal of his action by
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (the “Claims Court”).
Sanders v. United States, No. 23-103, 2023 WL 6307661
(Fed. Cl. Sept. 28, 2023). Mr. Sanders alleged that the
U.S. Army: (1) improperly discharged him in 2003 by giv-
ing him a discharge document that he did not sign; and
(2) erred by failing to (a) correct his military records,
(b) retroactively promote him and provide associated back-
pay, (c) provide his family legal assistance and transition
benefits upon his discharge, and (d) award disability retire-
ment based on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and
antisocial personality disorder. The Claims Court held
that Mr. Sanders’ claims related to the 2003 discharge—
including correction of his military records, retroactive pro-
motion, and associated backpay—were time-barred, that
Mr. Sanders failed to identify a money-mandating statute
for his legal assistance and transition benefits claim, and
that he failed to state a claim for disability retirement. For
the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Sanders enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve De-
layed Entry Program on March 18, 2002. SAppx360–62.1
According to his March 2002 medical examination report,
Mr. Sanders was qualified for service at the time of his en-
listment. On April 2, 2002, Mr. Sanders enlisted in the ac-
tive Army for a contract period of three years. On
February 25, 2003, after a bout of misconduct—including
being absent without leave—the Army discharged
1 SAppx refers to the Supplemental Appendix filed
by the Government.
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SANDERS v. US 3
Mr. Sanders. At that time, he was stationed in Friedberg,
Germany.2
On December 3, 2002, before his separation, the Army
medically cleared Mr. Sanders for discharge. On Febru-
ary 11, 2003, also before his separation, Mr. Sanders met
with a military attorney, who advised him of the basis of
the contemplated separation and its effects, and the rights
available to him. Though he had the opportunity,
Mr. Sanders did not submit any statements for the Army
to consider before his separation. See SAppx399–403.
At the time of discharge, the Army issued Mr. Sanders
a Discharge Document Form 214 (“DD Form 214”).
SAppx451; Sanders, 2023 WL 6307661, at *2. Under
block “21,” “Signature of Member Being Separated,” the
form noted, “Soldier Not Available For Signature.”3 Sand-
ers, 2023 WL 6307661, at *2. The form indicated that the
“discharge was for misconduct with a character of service
2 As the Claims Court described, Mr. Sanders al-
leged (without explaining) that upon discharge the Army
stranded him in Germany and that German authorities de-
ported his daughter from Germany. The reason why
Mr. Sanders remained in Germany after his discharge is
not in the record, however. Cf. SAppx214 (“[Mr. Sanders’]
application to the U.S. Department of State for a regular-
fee U.S. Passport in May 2003 does not show an error on
the part of the Army or that he was stranded in Germany
upon discharge”). At the time he filed this appeal in 2023,
Mr. Sanders was incarcerated in Ohio. See, e.g., ECF
Nos. 1, 3.
3 The Claims Court explained that it was “unclear”
why Mr. Sanders did not sign the separation papers, but it
determined that “this issue is immaterial” because
Mr. Sanders’ “claims challenging his discharge are time-
barred.” Sanders, 2023 WL 6307661, at *2 n.5.
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SANDERS v. US 4
of under honorable conditions (general) and [that
Mr. Sanders] was provided a reentry code of 3.”4 Id.
Mr. Sanders appealed his discharge to several agencies
within the Army, including to the Army Discharge Review
Board (ADRB), the Army Board for Correction of Military
Records (ABCMR), and the Joint Service Review Activity
(JSRA). The ADRB reviewed his claims three times and
the ABCMR reviewed his case two times. Both Boards de-
nied his applications for correction of his military records.
Relevant here, the March 2018 ABCMR Record of Proceed-
ings provides: “There is no evidence of record and
[Mr. Sanders] did not provide any evidence showing he suf-
fered from or was treated for PTSD, PTSD-like symptoms,
or any other mental or behavioral health conditions during
his term of service.” SAppx199.
In July 2018, Mr. Sanders underwent a U.S. Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) medical examination. The
VA examiner diagnosed Mr. Sanders with antisocial per-
sonality disorder and unspecified anxiety disorder. The VA
ultimately “denied service connection for an acquired psy-
chiatric disorder.” Sanders, 2023 WL 6307661, at *5.
On January 20, 2023, Mr. Sanders filed suit before the
Claims Court, alleging that the Army: (1) improperly dis-
charged him in 2003 by giving him a discharge document
that he did not sign; and (2) erred by denying him medical
disability, a discharge upgrade, retroactive promotion, and
transition benefits. In September 2023, the Claims Court
granted the Government’s motion to dismiss.
Mr. Sanders appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
4 A reentry code of “3” “only authorizes a reenlist-
ment of the discharged soldier if he is granted a waiver.”
Sanders, 2023 WL 6307661, at *3.
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SANDERS v. US 5
D ISCUSSION
We review a Claims Court decision to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction de novo. Diaz v. United States, 853 F.3d
1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We also review the Claims
Court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted de novo. Hearts Bluff
Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.3d 1326, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2012). Mr. Sanders bears the burden of estab-
lishing jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. Diaz,
853 F.3d at 1357.
In his informal brief and appended materials, which
are at points difficult to decipher, Mr. Sanders appears to
raise the following issues and/or arguments on ap-
peal: (1) the Government concealed facts from him; (2) his
disability retirement claim; (3) alleged due process viola-
tions; (4) “[t]he ABCMR and ADRB were arbitrary and ca-
pricious,” Appellant’s Br. 2; (5) he was “never legally
discharged from [the] military according to law, and [he is]
MIA/POW during actual war,” Appellant’s Br. 6; (6) the
Claims Court applied the wrong law and should have ap-
plied 10 U.S.C. § 1168(a), which covers discharge from ac-
tive duty; (7) the Claims Court failed to consider
“constructive service credit entitlement,” Appellant’s Br. 7;
(8) the Government violated the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization Status of Forces Agreement (NATO–SOFA);
(9) the DD Form 214 should be considered void; (10) he
“was not provided final accounting of pay before discharge
or even in a timely manner,” Appellant’s Br. 12–13;
(11) several awards and entitlements are not listed on his
DD Form 214; (12) the VA improperly denied his request
for benefits; and (13) his “educational accomplishments are
not listed” in “his official military record,” Appellant’s
Br. 16–17.
Mr. Sanders asks us to apply the Servicemembers’
Civil Relief Act, direct the Army to evaluate his medical
records, award backpay, and order transfer to a VA medical
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SANDERS v. US 6
facility for treatment of service-connected disabilities,
among other things. The Government asks us to affirm,
arguing that Mr. Sanders fails to address the Claims
Court’s reasons for its dismissal and that most of his argu-
ments are waived.
For the following reasons, we affirm the Claims Court’s
decision to dismiss Mr. Sanders’ action. We address each
of his contentions in turn.
I
We first address Mr. Sanders’ assertion that he
“demonstrated that the government concealed facts” from
him and, as a result, he “was unable to know anything was
wrong.” Appellant’s Br. 1. There are two issues with this
contention: waiver and contradiction by the record.
First, in evaluating whether the accrual of Mr. Sand-
ers’ claim was suspended,5 the Claims Court explained
that “[Mr. Sanders] does not allege nor show that the Gov-
ernment concealed any acts of which he was unaware at the
time of discharge making his discharge unlawful. Nor does
he allege that the wrongfulness of his discharge was ‘inher-
ently unknowable’ at the time of discharge.” Sanders,
2023 WL 6307661, at *8 (emphases added). In other
words, before the trial court, Mr. Sanders did not allege
that the Government concealed information or that certain
circumstances were inherently unknowable. He cannot
vaguely raise such allegations for the first time on appeal
to our court. Even where a party appears pro se, as
Mr. Sanders does here, “[i]ssues not properly raised before
the [trial] court are waived on appeal.” Stauffer v. Brooks
Bros. Grp., Inc., 758 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see
5 As we discuss further in Part IV, a “claim based on
an alleged unlawful discharge accrues on the date of dis-
charge.” Kennedy v. United States, 845 F.3d 1376, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
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SANDERS v. US 7
also, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 198–
99 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although a pro se litigant like Brazil
may be entitled to great leeway when the court construes
his pleadings, those pleadings nonetheless must meet some
minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of
what it is that it allegedly did wrong. Brazil’s complaint,
fairly read, gave the Navy no inkling that he wished to
bring his ultimate termination before the district court for
review. We therefore find that the issue was not raised be-
low; it is waived on appeal.”).
Second, as the Claims Court explained, “[Mr. Sanders’]
allegations regarding the wrongfulness of his discharge
concern factual circumstances of which he was fully aware
at the time of discharge.” Sanders, 2023 WL 6307661,
at *8. At the time of discharge on February 25, 2003, after
Mr. Sanders met with a military attorney who advised him
of the basis of his separation, its effects, and the rights
available to him, the Army issued Mr. Sanders the
DD Form 214. Id. at *2. Less than six months later, on
August 21, 2003, Mr. Sanders filed an application with the
ADRB, requesting a change in his reentry code on his
DD Form 214 from a “3” to a “1,” so that he could “rejoin
[his] unit.” Id. at *3 (alteration in original); SAppx453.
Plainly, Mr. Sanders had the DD Form 214 in his posses-
sion during and shortly after his discharge. Mr. Sanders’
allegation that he “was unable to know anything was
wrong,” Appellant’s Br. 1, is thus belied by the record. Ac-
cordingly, we reject this contention by Mr. Sanders.
To the extent that Mr. Sanders challenges the Claims
Court’s determination that “there is no basis for accrual
suspension, and thus [his] challenges to his discharge are
time-barred,” Sanders, 2023 WL 6307661, at *8, we see no
error by the trial court. “The accrual suspension rule is
strictly and narrowly applied: the plaintiff must either
show that defendant has concealed its acts with the result
that plaintiff was unaware of their existence or [he] must
show that [his] injury was inherently unknowable at the
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SANDERS v. US 8
accrual date.” Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295,
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (cleaned up), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1777 (2004). For the reasons explained above,
Mr. Sanders has not made this showing.
II
We next address Mr. Sanders’ disability retirement
claim and his contention that “[t]he ABCMR and ADRB
were arbitrary and capricious,” Appellant’s Br. 2.
As the Claims Court explained, “[t]he ABCMR and
ADRB both concluded [Mr. Sanders] was fit for duty at the
time of his discharge” and both Boards “found that no sup-
port existed for the notion that referral to a Medical Eval-
uation Board, the first step towards establishing
entitlement to medical retirement, was indicated at any
time during [Mr. Sanders’] service.” Sanders, 2023 WL
6307661, at *9 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., SAppx173–74
(December 2002 mental health evaluation resulted in “no
evidence of treatable psychiatric disorder that warranted
disposition through medical channels or a Medical Evalua-
tion Board”); SAppx221 (“[Mr. Sanders’] medical records do
NOT at the time of his discharge reasonably support his
having had a boardable medical condition” and “he did
meet mental-health standards”); see also Barnick v. United
States, 591 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A claim for
disability is first considered by a Medical Evaluation Board
(‘MEB’), which reviews the individual’s medical records to
determine the nature of the disability.”). The Claims Court
also explained that Mr. Sanders “does not allege that the
decisions of the military review boards were irrational or
unsupported by substantial evidence” and that he “does not
articulate any procedural defects or failure on the part of
the Army to follow its own regulations or procedures during
his separation.” Sanders, 2023 WL 6307661, at *9. In-
stead, as the Government points out, Mr. Sanders raises
the allegation that the ABCMR’s and ADRB’s decisions
were arbitrary and capricious for the first time in this
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SANDERS v. US 9
appeal. Mr. Sanders has thus waived this contention. See
Stauffer, 758 F.3d at 1322; Brazil, 66 F.3d at 198–99.
Because the record contains no evidence that
Mr. Sanders suffered from a medical condition while on ac-
tive duty that rendered him unfit to serve, we affirm the
Claims Court’s determination that he failed to state a claim
for disability retirement. Disability retirement cases “are
governed by 10 U.S.C. § 1201,” Chambers v. United States,
417 F.3d 1218, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which provides that,
“[u]pon a determination by the Secretary concerned that
[an eligible member] is unfit to perform the duties of the
member’s office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical
disability incurred while entitled to basic pay or while ab-
sent . . . , the Secretary may retire the member, with re-
tired pay.” 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a). But, as the ABCMR
explained in March 2018, Mr. Sanders’ “available service
records do not show” that “he suffered from a medical con-
dition, physical or mental, that affected his ability to per-
form the duties required by his military occupational
specialty and/or grade or rendered him unfit for military
service.” SAppx193, 199.
III
We next turn to Mr. Sanders’ contentions regarding
due process and NATO–SOFA,6 which we reject for the fol-
lowing reasons.
6 “Litigation against members of foreign military
forces who are within the United States (and against mem-
bers of the U.S. military abroad) is guided by so-called sta-
tus-of-forces agreements, or ‘SOFAs.’” Moore v. United
Kingdom, 384 F.3d 1079, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2004). NATO–
SOFA “contain[s] provisions that create an implied obliga-
tion for the sending state to return an accused serviceman
to the host state for prosecution when the host state has
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SANDERS v. US 10
We have explained that, in general, the Claims Court
does “not have jurisdiction over money claims that are
based upon an alleged violation by the government of the
due process clause. This is so because the due process
clause does not obligate the government to pay money dam-
ages.” Collins v. United States, 67 F.3d 284, 288 (Fed. Cir.
1995). Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Sanders’ due pro-
cess claims have an independent money-mandating statu-
tory basis, the ADRB explained that Mr. Sanders’
“discharge was consistent with the procedural and sub-
stantive requirements of the regulation, was within the
discretion of the separation authority, and [Mr. Sanders]
was provided full administrative due process,” SAppx50,
and we see no error with this conclusion. Finally,
Mr. Sanders raises his due process argument for the first
time on appeal and thus has waived the argument.
As for NATO–SOFA, we agree with the Government
that “it is unclear” how it applies “to any of the matters in
this case, and regardless, Mr. Sanders failed to raise this
argument before the review boards and the trial court.”
Appellee’s Br. 21–22. Again, the reason why Mr. Sanders
remained in Germany after his discharge is not in the rec-
ord. While we acknowledge that Mr. Sanders appears pro
se, his assertion regarding NATO–SOFA is “insufficiently
developed.” Arunachalam v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
989 F.3d 988, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Accordingly, Mr. Sand-
ers has waived his argument regarding NATO–SOFA. See
id.; Stauffer, 758 F.3d at 1322; Brazil, 66 F.3d at 198–99.7
been given the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over
the accused.” In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1478–79 n.2
(7th Cir. 1984).
7 On page 11 of his brief, Mr. Sanders points us to
United States v. Melanson, 50 M.J. 641 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
1999). In Melanson, the appellant was “outprocessing from
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SANDERS v. US 11
IV
We now turn to Mr. Sanders’ other allegations related
to his discharge: that he was “never legally discharged
from [the] military according to law, and [he is] MIA/POW
during actual war,” Appellant’s Br. 6; that the Claims
Court applied the wrong law and should have applied
10 U.S.C. § 1168(a)8; that the Claims Court failed to con-
sider “constructive service credit entitlement,”9 Appellant’s
his unit” in Germany pursuant to his approved separation
for wrongful drug use. Id. at 643. The appellant’s company
commander “received both command and legal advice” to
let appellant depart Germany to go home to Massachu-
setts, unless an eyewitness could positively identify the ap-
pellant as one of the people who attacked a Staff Sergeant
outside of a club in Germany. Id. Then, two eyewitnesses
identified appellant as one of the attackers, the command
revoked the appellant’s administrative separation, and
German authorities took the appellant into custody. Id. In
Melanson, “[t]he question of in personam jurisdiction in ap-
pellant’s case was extensively briefed by the parties and
addressed through the taking of testimony and evidence at
trial.” Id. The situation presented in Melanson is thus
highly distinguishable from the record now before us. Ac-
cordingly, we do not find citation to Melanson persuasive.
8 A servicemember “may not be discharged or re-
leased from active duty until his discharge certificate or
certificate of release from active duty, respectively, and his
final pay or a substantial part of that pay, are ready for
delivery to him or his next of kin or legal representative.”
10 U.S.C. § 1168(a).
9 “Under the constructive service doctrine, ‘military
personnel who have been illegally or improperly separated
from service are deemed to have continued in active service
until their legal separation.’” Barnick, 591 F.3d at 1379
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SANDERS v. US 12
Br. 7; that the DD Form 214 should be considered void; and
that he “was not provided final accounting of pay before
discharge or even in a timely manner,” Appellant’s Br. 12–
13.
The Claims Court held that Mr. Sanders’ challenges to
“his 2003 discharge and related grievances are time-
barred.” Sanders, 2023 WL 6307661, at *6. It agreed with
the Government’s argument that “[Mr. Sanders’] claims
challenging his discharge from the Army . . . are plainly
barred by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 2501.” Id. at *7. We, too, agree with the Gov-
ernment. As we explained in Martinez:
The service member . . . has the right to sue imme-
diately upon discharge for the funds improperly be-
ing withheld. . . . [A] Tucker Act claim for back pay
accrues all at once at the time of discharge . . . . If
the plaintiff does not file suit within the six-year
limitation period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2501,
the plaintiff loses all rights to sue for the loss of pay
stemming from the challenged discharge. That is,
the claim accrues “at one time, once and for all,” on
the date of discharge . . . .
333 F.3d at 1303–05 (quoting Mathis v. United States,
391 F.2d 938, 939 (Ct. Cl. 1968)) (declining the invitation
“to announce a new rule that a service member’s cause of
action challenging his discharge in the Court of Federal
Claims does not accrue until after the service member has
exhausted all administrative remedies before a correction
board”).
The Army discharged Mr. Sanders on February 25,
2003. He filed his Claims Court Complaint on January 20,
(quoting Christian v. United States, 337 F.3d 1338, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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SANDERS v. US 13
2023, almost twenty years later. Because Mr. Sanders did
not file suit within the six-year limitation period, he lost all
rights to sue for loss of pay stemming from his challenged
discharge. Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1304; see also id. at 1316
(statutes of limitations for causes of action against the
United States are jurisdictional).10 We, like the Claims
Court, thus reject Mr. Sanders’ untimely challenges re-
lated to his discharge.
V
We next address Mr. Sanders’ allegations concerning
his awards and entitlements not being listed on his
DD Form 214, Appellant’s Br. 13–15, and his educational
accomplishments not being listed in “his official military
record,” Appellant’s Br. 16–17.
As for the contention that not all his awards and enti-
tlements are listed on his discharge form, a “claim for a
military decoration” is “not a claim for money damages,
and, accordingly, does not meet the standards of the Tucker
Act.” Curtis v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 586, 589 (1995),
aff’d, 86 F.3d 1175 (Table), 1996 WL 232489 (Fed. Cir.
1996); see also, e.g., Visconi v. United States, 455 F. App’x
986, 987–88 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (complaint requesting correc-
tion of service records to reflect awards of disputed medals
and citations sought only equitable relief, over which the
Tucker Act does not provide independent jurisdiction).
“Although the Tucker Act has been amended to permit the
Court of Federal Claims to grant equitable relief ancillary
to claims for monetary relief over which it has jurisdiction,”
Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. United States,
160 F.3d 714, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added), as we
10 We also note that Mr. Sanders failed to raise any
argument regarding constructive service or final account-
ing of pay before the Claims Court. As such, these claims
would be waived if they were not already time-barred.
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SANDERS v. US 14
have explained, Mr. Sanders’ discharge-related claims are
time-barred and so the Claims Court has no jurisdiction
over them. See, e.g., MacLean v. United States, 454 F.3d
1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Moreover, the Claims Court
has held that the decision whether to award a medal is one
left to the discretion of the military. See Wilson v. United
States, 24 Cl. Ct. 842, 843–44, 846 (1992) (the Air Force’s
decision to award one medal to the plaintiff instead of an-
other is “purely a discretionary one and therefore is not re-
viewable by this court”).
Mr. Sanders also raises the contention that his educa-
tional accomplishments are not listed in his official mili-
tary record for the first time on appeal to our court. As
such, he has waived it. See Stauffer, 758 F.3d at 1322; Bra-
zil, 66 F.3d at 198–99.
VI
Last, we address Mr. Sanders’ contention that the VA
improperly denied his request for service connection for
PTSD and his accompanying statements that he was “r[u]n
over by a truck and walk[s] with a cane now.” Appellant’s
Br. 15–16. Though we empathize with his plight,
Mr. Sanders provides no further details of this truck acci-
dent, including when it happened, and the record shows
that Mr. Sanders “did not provide any evidence showing he
suffered from or was treated for PTSD, PTSD-like symp-
toms, or any other mental or behavioral health conditions
during his term of service.” SAppx199; see also SAppx183
(VA examiner determined that “it was less likely than not
any psychiatric disorder began during service, was caused
by service, or was permanently aggravated by [Mr. Sand-
ers’] military service”). For our court “to reach the merits
of an issue on appeal, it must be adequately developed,”
and, unfortunately, this contention does not meet that
standard. Arunachalam, 989 F.3d at 999 (citation omit-
ted).
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SANDERS v. US 15
CONCLUSION
We have considered Mr. Sanders’ remaining conten-
tions, many of which are also raised for the first time on
appeal and/or insufficiently developed, and they do not per-
suade us that the Claims Court erred. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm the dismissal by the Claims Court.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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