John Murray, Spout Springs Mountain Resort v. United States

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JOHN MURRAY, SPOUT SPRINGS MOUNTAIN
RESORT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
NANCY MURRAY,
Plaintiff
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2023-2287
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:21-cv-01492-EGB, Senior Judge Eric G. Bruggink.
______________________
Decided: July 18, 2025
______________________
K EVIN G ARDEN , The Garden Law Firm PC, Alexandria,
VA, argued for plaintiffs-appellants.
AN H OANG , Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Divi-
sion, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
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MURRAY v. US 2
BRIAN M. BOYNTON , PATRICIA M. M CCARTHY, FRANKLIN E.
WHITE, J R.
______________________
Before REYNA, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK , Circuit Judges.
CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
Spout Springs Mountain Resort (“Spout Springs”) and
John Murray appeal from a decision of the United States
Court of Federal Claims granting the government’s motion
to dismiss their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Murray
v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 729 (2023) (“Decision”). The
Court of Federal Claims held that Plaintiffs’ complaint was
time-barred by the applicable six-year statute of
limitations. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Spout Springs is a ski resort located on federal land in
Oregon. Id. at 731; App’x 21.1 John and Nancy Murray
paid for improvements to Spout Springs in 1999. Decision
at 731; App’x 22. On December 31, 1999, the United States
Forest Service (“Forest Service”) issued the Murrays a Ski
Area Term Special User Permit (the “Permit”) authorizing
them to use the land to operate a ski area. Decision at 731;
App’x 21–22; see App’x 53–65. The Permit granted the
Murrays a nonexclusive right to use the area and gave the
Forest Service the right to permit others to use “any part
of the permitted area for any purpose, provided such use
does not materially interfere with the rights and privileges
hereby authorized.” App’x 54; Decision at 732. The Permit
also required the Murrays to use the Spout Springs ski
area at least 90 days each year. Decision at 732; App’x 55.
1 We refer to the appendix filed at ECF No. 25 as
“App’x” throughout this opinion.
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MURRAY v. US 3
In 2004, the Forest Service asked the Murrays if Spout
Springs would agree to allow certain snowmobile-related
activity in the ski area parking lot. Decision at 732;
App’x 23. “The Murrays agreed to the Forest Service’s
request to allow snowmobile-related activities ‘subject to
the caveat that if such activity became
unacceptable . . . the activity would again be prohibited.’”
Decision at 732 (quoting App’x 24).
Appellants contend that snowmobilers began to affect
the operation of Spout Springs. Id.; App’x 24. According to
Appellants, the snowmobilers would operate at high
speeds, nearly collide with children, drink alcohol, and
otherwise cause problems. Decision at 733; App’x 24. In
July 2010, Mr. Murray informed the Forest Service that he
intended to prohibit snowmobile trailers and recreational
vehicles from the Spout Springs parking lot beginning in
the 2010–2011 season. Decision at 733; App’x 95. The
Forest Service responded to Mr. Murray that his actions
were inconsistent with equal access requirements and
informed him that he needed to remove the “Resort
Parking Only-No Trailers” signs that he had installed.
Decision at 733; App’x 96; see App’x 355–56.
Mr. Murray testified that the snowmobiler problem
“wasn’t really severe” and was “manageable” at first but
became “worse and worse” over time, until it grew out of
control. App’x 135, 286, 292; see id. at 286–94; Decision
at 733–34. In 2016, when the Murrays’ insurance agent
expressed serious concerns about liability, he again asked
the Forest Service for permission to ban snowmobiling in
the Spout Springs parking lot. Decision at 734; App’x 25.
When the Forest Service refused, Mr. Murray closed Spout
Springs beginning in the 2016–2017 season. Decision
at 734; App’x 118. The Forest Service repeatedly
attempted to persuade Mr. Murray to reopen Spout
Springs. See, e.g., App’x 99, 103–107. In 2021 and after
failure to reach an agreement, the Forest Service revoked
the Permit. Decision at 734; App’x 28.
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MURRAY v. US 4
The Murrays and Spout Springs sued in the Court of
Federal Claims on June 21, 2021, seeking monetary
damages and alleging that the Forest Service breached the
contract, here the Permit, by permitting snowmobile
related activity in the Spout Springs parking lot that
materially interfered with Plaintiffs’ operations. Decision
at 735; App’x 19–30. The Forest Service moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Court of Federal Claims Rule (“RCFC”) 12(b)(1), alleging
that the statute of limitations had run, or alternatively for
summary judgment (the latter request being based solely
on the different ground that the Murrays had caused their
own injuries). Decision at 731; App’x 31–50. The Court of
Federal Claims granted the motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Plaintiffs’ claim
was untimely and not reaching the alternative request for
summary judgment. Decision at 736. Plaintiffs moved for
reconsideration, contending that the trial court’s decision
was based on an erroneous holding that Plaintiffs’ claim
was for partial breach of contract and not total breach of
contract. See App’x 13–15. The Court of Federal Claims
denied the motion for reconsideration and explained that it
did not interpret Plaintiffs’ claim as only a claim for partial
breach of contract. Id.
Mr. Murray and Spout Springs appealed. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II. STANDARD OF R EVIEW
The Court of Federal Claims lacks subject matter
jurisdiction “unless the petition thereon is filed within six
years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
“Whether a claim brought under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C.
§ 1491) is barred by the statute of limitations is a question
of law that may be based on underlying fact findings.”
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. United States, 104 F.4th 1314,
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2024). “Where a RCFC 12(b)(1) motion
‘simply challenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction
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MURRAY v. US 5
based on the sufficiency of the pleading’s allegations—that
is, the movant presents a ‘facial’ attack on the pleading—
then those allegations are taken as true and construed in a
light most favorable to the complainant.’” Id. at 1320–21
(quoting Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). However, where “a RCFC 12(b)(1)
motion challenges the truth of jurisdictional facts alleged
in the complaint,” the Court of Federal Claims must
“accept[] as true [the] uncontroverted factual allegations in
the complaint and construe[] them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff,” and may make further
jurisdictional fact-findings. Id. at 1320 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Jurisdictional fact-finding is
only appropriate in reviewing a “factual” attack.2 Moyer v.
United States, 190 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Fact-
finding is proper when considering a motion to dismiss
where the jurisdictional facts in the complaint . . . are
challenged.”).
“This court reviews de novo decisions of the Court of
Federal Claims on matters of law and reviews for clear
error findings of fact. Therefore, this court reviews the
Court of Federal Claims’ decision to dismiss de novo while
its jurisdictional findings of fact are reviewed for clear
error.” Banks v. United States, 314 F.3d 1304, 1307–08
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
III. D ISCUSSION
As an initial matter, in this case the government was
not clear about whether its motion was a “facial” or
“factual” challenge, and the Court of Federal Claims did
not expressly characterize the motion as one or the other.
2 If a motion to dismiss presents a factual attack,
“discovery is available to ascertain the facts bearing on
such issues.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 351 n.13 (1978).
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MURRAY v. US 6
Nevertheless, it is clear that the motion was a “factual”
attack because it was not limited to the pleadings and was
largely predicated on Mr. Murray’s deposition testimony.
See App’x 455 (government telling trial court its “motion
stems entirely from Mr. Murray’s deposition testimony”).
While the Murrays suggested that the Rule 12(b)(1) motion
was instead a “facial” challenge, see App’x 170–71 (citing
standard of review for facial attack), the Murrays have
never contended they were deprived of notice that the court
might engage in fact-finding or that they did not have an
opportunity to take discovery. Therefore, the Court of
Federal Claims did not err by making a jurisdictional
finding of fact, and we review that finding of fact for clear
error.
Appellants argue that the Court of Federal Claims
erred because the record does not support a finding that
the impact of snowmobile-related activity prior to 2016
constituted a “material interference” with the operation of
Spout Springs. Appellants’ Br. 13–25. Additionally,
Appellants argue that the trial court misinterpreted their
complaint as raising only a “partial breach” of contract
claim. Id. at 28–40. We address each argument in turn.
A.
Because the complaint was filed on June 21, 2021,
App’x 19–30, Appellants must establish that the claim did
not accrue before June 21, 2015. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The six-
year statute of limitations is a jurisdictional requirement
that cannot be waived or equitably tolled. FloorPro, Inc.
v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S.
130, 136–39 (2008). The burden of establishing timeliness
rests on the plaintiffs. Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States,
161 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A cause of action
accrues when the breach of contract occurs. Id. (citation
omitted). While the plaintiff must have actual or
constructive knowledge that a breach occurred, Holmes
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MURRAY v. US 7
v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011), we
have “‘soundly rejected’ the notion ‘that the filing of a
lawsuit can be postponed until the full extent of the
damage is known.’” San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United
States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
The relevant question before the Court of Federal
Claims was when Appellants knew or should have known
of the material interference with the operation of Spout
Springs—that the snowmobiling activity got worse over
time as a result of the breach is legally irrelevant. See, e.g.,
San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1354; Alder Terrace,
161 F.3d at 1377.
In their complaint, Appellants alleged that the Forest
Service breached the contract, here the Permit, by not
prohibiting snowmobilers from the Spout Springs parking
lot. Decision at 731; App’x 28. Appellants alleged that the
Forest Service materially interfered with their operations
by refusing to ban snowmobilers who were “consuming
alcohol in the parking lot,” driving “at very high and unsafe
speeds,” and causing “several close calls where serious
injury was narrowly averted.” App’x 24; see also Decision
at 733–34. The complaint does not contain express, specific
allegations as to when this alleged activity happened; how
frequent it was; or when it impacted the Murrays’ business
at Spout Springs. See App’x 24 (generally stating that
“[o]ver time, the snowmobile activity increased” without
alleging that the material interference occurred after
2015). Thus, based on the uncontroverted allegations of
the complaint, the question of when the alleged
snowmobile activity became material remained an open
question.
The government explored the issue of timing during
Mr. Murray’s deposition. Mr. Murray testified that the
problematic snowmobile behavior began “around 2010.”
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MURRAY v. US 8
App’x 148; see also Decision at 733. He testified that “in
2010” there were close calls where people were “speeding
on snowmobiles,” would “s[w]erve and miss people,”
including kids, and that snowmobilers were frequently
intoxicated. App’x 135–37; see Decision at 733.
Mr. Murray further testified that “attendance was falling
off” by 2013, by which time Spout Springs was “starting to
get a reputation of a snowmobile/ski area.” App’x 148;
Decision at 733. In other words, as the trial court
reasonably found, Mr. Murray testified that the conditions
that the complaint contends constituted material
interference began in 2010 and had grown enough by 2013
that they noticeably impacted his business and its
reputation. See Decision at 731–33; App’x 135–37, 148.
The Court of Federal Claims reasonably rejected
Appellants’ contention that the snowmobile-related
activity did not constitute material interference until 2016.
See Appellants’ Br. 13–25. Appellants point to a 2017
email from Mr. Murray, reaffirmed at his deposition, that
every year after 2011 the snowmobile activity got “a little
more unmanageable.” Appellants’ Br. 15 (emphasis in
original) (quoting App’x 217; id. at 141). Appellants also
highlight Mr. Murray’s testimony that the snowmobile
problem “‘started out small, just a couple people doing it’ in
2010-2012” and that it got “‘progressively worse’” until
2016 when it was “‘getting crazy.’” Appellants’ Br. 15–17
(quoting App’x 291–95). As an initial note, Mr. Murray’s
statement that “[t]he only difference year to year is that
every year it [got] a little more unmanageable” supports a
finding that the conditions in 2011 were not materially
different from the conditions in 2016. App’x 217; id. at 141;
see Decision at 734. By contrast, Mr. Murray testified that
2010 and 2011 were like “day and night” from prior years,
due to the creation of oversized snowmobiles and larger
trailers. Decision at 736 (quoting App’x 146–47).
Mr. Murray’s testimony that the “day and night” change
was in 2010–2012, while only little changes occurred later,
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MURRAY v. US 9
supports the finding of the Court of Federal Claims that
any material interference occurred prior to June 21, 2015.
Decision at 733–34; App’x 141–47. The Court of Federal
Claims reasonably rejected Appellants’ arguments and
properly weighed the record.
The trial court found, and cited evidence for its finding,
that the Murrays’ claim accrued prior to June 21, 2015, and
was, therefore, not timely filed. In doing so, the court
committed no procedural error; nor did it make a clearly
erroneous finding of fact in its evaluation of the complaint
and Mr. Murray’s deposition testimony. Instead, the trial
court credited the uncontroverted, though also undated,
allegations of the complaint and made a finding as to
timing based on Mr. Murray’s own testimony. The Court
of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction turned on the timing by
which the Murrays’ breach of contract claim accrued, and
this issue was put before the court in the government’s
“factual” challenge to jurisdiction. Because the Murrays
had been given adequate notice and opportunity to respond
to the motion, the Court of Federal Claims was free to make
a jurisdictional fact-finding about when the alleged
materially interfering events occurred and that finding
was not clearly erroneous. The Murrays’ arguments to the
contrary lack merit.
B.
Appellants contend that Mr. Murray was entitled to
bring a breach of contract claim for total breach only at the
time he ceased operations. Appellants’ Br. 28–40. As an
initial matter, this argument is forfeited because it was
“inherently knowable” but raised for the first time “in a
motion for reconsideration under [RCFC] 59(a).” Caldwell
v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see
App’x 13–15. In any event, we agree with the Court of
Federal Claims that Appellants’ argument fails on the
merits: this is not a case where the parties owed each other
compartmentalized performances that can be segmented
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MURRAY v. US 10
into partial breaches, see, e.g., Ind. Mich. Power Co.
v. United States, 422 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005), but
“a claim based on a single distinct event which has ill
effects that continue to accumulate over time.” Ariadne
Fin. Servs. Pty. Ltd. v. United States, 133 F.3d 874, 879
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (refusing to extend the statute of
limitations when the government’s actions did “not give
rise to a separate cause of action.”). Thus, Appellants’ cited
partial breach cases are inapposite, and the Court of
Federal Claims did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion for reconsideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have considered Appellants’ remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons above, we
affirm the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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