Rebecca Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
REBECCA CURTIN,
Appellant
v.
UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.,
Appellee
______________________
2023–2140
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No.
91241083.
______________________
Decided: May 22, 2025
______________________
RYAN C. MORRIS , Workman Nydegger, Salt Lake City,
UT, argued for appellant. Also represented by MATTHEW
BARLOW , J OHN C. STRINGHAM , D AVID R. T ODD.
ERIK P ELTON, Erik M. Pelton & Associates, PLLC, Falls
Church, VA, argued for appellee.
SARAH E. CRAVEN, Office of the Solicitor, United States
Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for
amicus curiae Coke Morgan Stewart. Also represented by
CHRISTINA J. HIEBER , AMY J. N ELSON, F ARHEENA YASMEEN
RASHEED.
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 1 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 1 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 2
______________________
Before T ARANTO and HUGHES , Circuit Judges, and
BARNETT , Judge.1
HUGHES , Circuit Judge.
Rebecca Curtin filed an opposition under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1063 to United Trademark Holdings’ registration of the
mark RAPUNZEL in International Class 28, which covers
dolls and toy figures. The Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board dismissed her opposition after concluding she was
not statutorily entitled to oppose a registration under
§ 1063. Because the Board properly applied the Lexmark
framework to conclude that Ms. Curtin was not entitled to
bring her opposition under § 1063, we affirm.
I
This appeal concerns whether Ms. Curtin was entitled
to oppose United Trademark Holdings’ (UTH’s) registra-
tion of a trademark under the Lanham Act, alleging that
the mark fails to function as a trademark and that the
mark is generic and descriptive. We begin with an overview
of the structure of the Lanham Act.
The Lanham Act created a system “for the registration
and protection of trademarks used in commerce.” Lanham
(Trademark) Act, Pub. L. No. 79–489, 60 Stat. 427 (July 5,
1946), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. The Lanham Act
established an administrative process administered by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office by which
trademark owners may register their marks on the princi-
pal register and sets forth conditions for refusing registra-
tion of certain trademarks. One basis for refusing a
trademark registration is when “a mark which . . . when
1 Honorable Mark A. Barnett, Chief Judge, United
States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 2 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 2 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 3
used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is
merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them.”
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1). Another basis for refusing a trade-
mark registration is because it is generic, meaning it “is the
common descriptive name of a class of goods or services”
such that it is incapable of denoting a unique source as re-
quired by the statutory definition of trademark. Royal
Crown Co., Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l
Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir.
1986)); see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining a trademark as being
used “to identify and distinguish . . . goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by oth-
ers”). In that way, genericness is encompassed by descrip-
tiveness. See Bullshine Distillery LLC v. Sazerac Brands,
LLC, 130 F.4th 1025, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“The term de-
scriptive encompasses generic terms because a generic
term is the ultimate in descriptiveness and is ineligible for
federal trademark registration.” (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)). A third basis for refusing regis-
tration is that the mark “comprises any matter that, as a
whole, is functional,” for which trademark protection would
intrude on the subject addressed by patent law. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(e)(5); see Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d
1268, 1273–75 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
After a trademark application is filed, it is referred to
an examiner who determines whether the mark is entitled
to registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1062. If the USPTO examining
attorney allows the applicant to register the mark, the
USPTO publishes the mark in its Official Gazette. Id.
§ 1062(a). 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (Section 13 of the Lanham Act)
provides that “[a]ny person who believes that he would be
damaged by the registration of a mark . . . may . . . file an
opposition” with the USPTO within 30 days of the USPTO’s
publication of the mark in the Official Gazette. In the case
of an opposition, the USPTO “Director shall give notice to
all parties and shall direct a Trademark Trial and Appeal
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 3 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 3 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 4
Board to determine and decide the respective rights of reg-
istration.” 15 U.S.C. § 1067. “In such proceedings,” the
Board (on behalf of the Director) “may refuse to register the
opposed mark, . . . may modify the application . . . , or may
register the mark.” Id. § 1068. Grounds for opposing the
registration of a mark include any ground for refusing the
registration. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual
Procedure § 309.03(c)(1) (June 2023). “Unless registration
is successfully opposed,” the USPTO shall register the
trademark if it is “entitled to registration,” issue a certifi-
cate of registration, and publish a notice of registration in
the Official Gazette. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(b); see Heritage All.
v. Am. Pol’y Roundtable, 133 F.4th 1063, 1071 (Fed. Cir.
2025) (“The opposition provision of the Lanham Act says
that registration generally follows when an opposition, if
any, fails, but the stated precondition is that the mark at
issue be a ‘mark entitled to registration,’ 15 U.S.C.
§ 1063(b), which might allow the PTO, after an opposition
fails, to reconsider the examiner’s pre-opposition allow-
ance.”).
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (Section 14 of the Lanham Act) estab-
lishes a similar administrative process to seek cancellation
of a trademark registration after it has been registered on
the USPTO’s principal register. Like § 1063, it provides
that “[a]ny person who believes that he is or will be dam-
aged . . . by the registration of a mark” may initiate an ad-
ministrative process by applying to cancel said registration
“[w]ithin five years from the date of the registration of the
mark[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1064. Such a person may also apply to
cancel the registration “[a]t any time if the registered mark
becomes the generic name for the goods or services,” the
mark “has been abandoned, or its registration was ob-
tained fraudulently,” or certain other circumstances arise.
Id. § 1064(3). The Lanham Act separately provides trade-
mark holders various avenues to enforce their mark in dis-
trict court. See id. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1).
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 4 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 4 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 5
II
UTH sells dolls, including dolls with long blonde hair
under the name Rapunzel. On November 20, 2017, UTH
filed an application to register the RAPUNZEL trademark
(Ser. No. 87/690,863), asserting use of the mark in com-
merce in connection with dolls and toy figures in Interna-
tional Class 28. J.A. 38–40. UTH’s application was
approved by the USPTO examiner and published in the Of-
ficial Gazette for opposition on April 10, 2018.
On May 9, 2018, Ms. Curtin filed an opposition under
15 U.S.C. § 1063 to UTH’s registration of the mark
RAPUNZEL. Ms. Curtin first amended her opposition in
July 2018. UTH moved to dismiss both oppositions, claim-
ing Ms. Curtin did not have statutory standing to oppose
UTH’s mark. This appeal arises from Ms. Curtin’s Second
Amended Notice of Opposition filed on January 22, 2019,
in which she opposed the RAPUNZEL mark as descriptive,
generic, failing to function as a trademark, and for fraud in
the application. Regarding her interest in bringing this op-
position, Ms. Curtin alleged that, as a doll collector and
mother to a young daughter, she is “a consumer who par-
ticipates amongst other consumers in the marketplace for
dolls and toy figures of fairytale characters, including Ra-
punzel.” J.A. 266. Regarding the injury that justified her
opposition, she claimed that “[she] and other consumers
will be denied access to healthy marketplace competition
for products that represent” Rapunzel if private companies
are allowed “to trademark the name of a famous fairy tale
character in the public domain.” J.A. 266. She further al-
leged that “[she] and other consumers will also likely face
an increased cost of goods associated with Rapunzel mer-
chandise, given the lack of competition.” J.A. 266. She
stated her belief that registration of UTH’s mark “could
chill the creation of new dolls and toys by fans of the fair-
ytale, crowding out the substantial social benefit of having
diverse interpreters of the fairy tale’s legacy,” and deny her
and other consumers “access to classic, already existing,
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 5 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 5 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 6
Rapunzel merchandise.” J.A. 266. She included a petition
with 432 signatures of those who shared her belief that reg-
istration of the RAPUNZEL mark would impact consum-
ers’ ability to find Rapunzel dolls and adversely affect
marketplace competition for Rapunzel dolls. UTH denied
her allegations in its answer.
Ms. Curtin twice moved for partial summary judgment
on the grounds that the RAPUNZEL mark is generic, de-
scriptive, and fails to function as a trademark; the Board
denied both motions. The Board bifurcated the opposition
proceeding into two separate trial phases, with the first
phase to focus solely on the issue of Ms. Curtin’s entitle-
ment to a statutory cause of action, and, if necessary, a sec-
ond phase to focus on the specific grounds pleaded.
Following briefing for Phase One by the parties, the Board
dismissed the opposition, finding Ms. Curtin “failed to
prove she is entitled to the statutory cause of action she
invoked—opposing registration of Applicant’s mark.” J.A.
6. The Board relied on this court’s opinion in Corcamore,
LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2020), which
invokes the zone-of-interests test set forth by the Supreme
Court in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Com-
ponents, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), to evaluate whether
Ms. Curtin was entitled to bring her opposition. J.A. 5, 10.
Specifically, the Board read Corcamore to instruct that “[a]
plaintiff may oppose registration of a mark when doing so
is within the zone of interests protected by the statute and
she has a reasonable belief in damage that would be proxi-
mately caused by registration of the mark.” J.A. 5. The
Board explained that while “[e]ntitlement to the statutory
cause of action . . . is a requirement in every inter partes
case,” and “mere consumers such as [Ms. Curtin] are gen-
erally not statutorily entitled to oppose registration under
15 U.S.C. § 1063.” J.A. 5–6. The Board explained this devi-
ation from its prior denial of UTH’s motion to dismiss the
prior versions of Ms. Curtin’s Notices of Opposition for lack
of statutory entitlement was based mostly on Ritchie v.
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 6 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 6 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 7
Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999), “a case that ad-
dressed a section of the Trademark Act barring registration
of ‘immoral’ or ‘scandalous’ matter,” but “the Supreme
Court [had since] found the bar on registration of ‘immoral’
or ‘scandalous’ matter unconstitutional” in Iancu v. Bru-
netti, 588 U.S. 388 (2019). J.A. 3 n.4.
Ms. Curtin timely appealed the Board’s dismissal of
her opposition. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(2). We have jurisdiction
over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B) and
15 U.S.C. § 1071(a).
III
The issue before us is not whether the RAPUNZEL
mark UTH seeks to register is properly registrable under
trademark law. Rather, the question presented is a narrow
one: whether Ms. Curtin, in her capacity as a consumer, is
entitled to oppose UTH’s registration of the RAPUNZEL
mark under 15 U.S.C. § 1063 as generic, descriptive, and
fraudulent. Where entitlement to oppose or cancel a trade-
mark registration “turns on statutory interpretation,” we
“review[] the question de novo.” Empresa Cubana Del
Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 1274 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
Ms. Curtin challenges the Board’s decision to apply the
Lexmark framework to determine whether she was entitled
to bring an opposition under § 1063. She then argues that,
even if its use of the Lexmark framework was proper, the
Board erred in concluding that she did not fall within the
class of individuals authorized by the statute to bring an
opposition of the nature she brought here. We address each
argument in turn.
A
1
The parties disagree over whether the Board’s use of
the Supreme Court’s zone-of-interests framework set forth
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 7 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 7 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 8
in Lexmark was proper in determining whether Ms. Curtin
was entitled to oppose UTH’s registration of the
RAPUNZEL mark under § 1063. Ms. Curtin contends that
this court’s decision in Ritchie v. Simpson is controlling au-
thority on entitlement to oppose a trademark registration,
and that the Board erred in applying the Lexmark frame-
work instead.
Ritchie v. Simpson concerned a party’s entitlement to
oppose the registration of a mark under § 1063 on the basis
that the mark comprised “immoral or scandalous matter.”2
170 F.3d at 1093. In Ritchie, this court noted that “‘case’
and ‘controversy’ restrictions for [Article III] standing do
not apply to matters before administrative agencies and
boards[.]” Id. at 1094 (internal citations omitted). Instead,
we held “the starting point for a standing determination for
a litigant before an administrative agency . . . is the statute
that confers standing before that agency.” Id. at 1095. Ac-
cordingly, we held that § 1063’s provision that “[a]ny per-
son who believes that he would be damaged by the
registration of a mark . . . may . . . file an opposition in the
Patent and Trademark Office, stating the grounds there-
for” “establishes a broad class of persons who are proper
opposers; by its terms the statute only requires that a per-
son have a belief that he would suffer some kind of damage
if the mark is registered.” Id. We explained that an opposer
under § 1063 must also “meet two judicially-created re-
quirements—the opposer must have a ‘real interest’ in the
2 As mentioned above, this basis for barring trade-
mark registration, stated in § 1052(a), has since been in-
validated by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional on
First Amendment grounds. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U.S.
388, 388 (2019); cf. Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 218 (2017)
(affirming Federal Circuit’s invalidation of “dispar-
age[ment]” portion of § 1052(a) on First Amendment
grounds).
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 8 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 8 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 9
proceedings and must have a ‘reasonable’ basis for his be-
lief of damage.” Id. The real interest requirement man-
dates that the opposer have “a legitimate personal interest
in the opposition;” that is, a “direct and personal stake in
the outcome.” Id. The reasonable basis requirement re-
quires that the opposer’s belief of damage “have a reasona-
ble basis in fact.” Id. at 1098 (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). Ms. Curtin argues that an op-
poser bringing a claim under § 1063 “need only satisfy the
language of [§ 1063], as well as the ‘real interest’ and ‘rea-
sonable’ basis requirements.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 29.
Fifteen years later, in Lexmark, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed entitlement to sue under the cause of action for
false advertising provided by the Lanham Act (codified as
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)). 572 U.S. at 129. The Supreme Court
explained that “we presume that a statutory cause of action
extends only to plaintiffs whose interests ‘fall within the
zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’” Id. (inter-
nal citation and quotation marks omitted). After noting
that the zone-of-interests test is not “especially demand-
ing,” the Supreme Court held that “to come within the zone
of interests in a suit for false advertising under § 1125(a),
a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest in
reputation or sales. A consumer who is hoodwinked into
purchasing a disappointing product may well have an in-
jury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot in-
voke the protection of the Lanham Act[.]” Id. at 130, 131–
32 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
Supreme Court in Lexmark further noted that “a statutory
cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are
proximately caused by violations of the statute.” Id. at 132.
The zone-of-interests test and proximate cause require-
ment are together referred to as the Lexmark framework
for evaluating entitlement to exercise a statutory cause of
action.
In Corcamore, this court held there is “no principled
reason why the analytical framework articulated by the
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 9 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 9 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 10
Court in Lexmark should not apply” to determine the class
of parties who may seek cancellation of a mark under
§ 1064. 978 F.3d at 1305. We then applied the Lexmark
framework to conclude that the party seeking to cancel the
mark at issue “f[ell] within the class of parties whom Con-
gress has authorized to sue under the statutory cause of
action of § 1064.” Id. at 1307. Specifically, we found that
trademark challenger SFM had sufficiently alleged that it
sold substantially similar goods under its mark SPROUTS
to those that Corcamore, the owner of the registration for
the mark SPROUT, sold under its mark. Thus, we con-
cluded that “SFM’s allegation . . . identifie[d] an interest
falling within the zone of interests protected by § 1064.” Id.
at 1306–07. We also found that SFM had sufficiently al-
leged proximate causation by demonstrating its “reasona-
ble belief of damage resulting from a likelihood of confusion
between SFM’s SPROUTS mark and Corcamore’s
SPROUT mark.” Id. at 1307.
2
Ms. Curtin argues that the entitlement to bring oppo-
sition proceedings to a trademark registration under
§ 1063 provides for an administrative proceeding, not a
cause of action, and that the Lexmark framework is only
applicable to parties seeking to assert a statutory cause of
action. Invoking this court’s statement in a citation in
Ritchie that “[a]dministrative adjudications . . . are not an
[A]rticle III proceeding to which either the ‘case or contro-
versy’ or prudential standing requirements apply,’”
170 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Ecee, Inc. v. Fed.l Energy Regul.
Comm’n, 645 F.2d 339, 349–50 (5th Cir.1981)), she argues
that § 1063 does not provide a cause of action in court, but
rather a “basis for ‘[a]ny person’ to oppose registration of a
trademark in an administrative proceeding before an
agency,” and “[t]he distinction between participation in an
administrative proceeding and a private right of action in
court is critical,” Appellant’s Opening Br. 21, 26. Ms. Cur-
tin argues that the Board thus erroneously relied on
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 10 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 10 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 11
Corcamore, because Corcamore concerns entitlement to
bring a cancellation proceeding against an existing regis-
tration under § 1064. She argues that, unlike § 1063,
§ 1064 does provide a cause of action to which the Lexmark
framework is properly applied to determine who is entitled
to bring such a cancellation proceeding.
Ms. Curtin accordingly contends that only the lan-
guage of § 1063 and cases specifically addressing entitle-
ment to bring an opposition under § 1063 are applicable in
determining whether she is authorized to oppose the regis-
tration of UTH’s RAPUNZEL mark under § 1063. See Ap-
pellant’s Opening Br. 31–33. She argues that any person
may oppose registration of a trademark under § 1063 sub-
ject only to the requirements articulated in Ritchie that she
“show ‘a belief that he would suffer some kind of damage if
the mark is registered,’ ‘have a “real interest in the pro-
ceedings,”’ and ‘have a “reasonable” basis for his belief of
damage.’” Appellant’s Opening Br. 26–27 (quoting Ritchie,
170 F.3d at 1095). We disagree.
To start, Ms. Curtin does not address this court’s prior
observation that “[g]iven [their] similarities in purpose and
application, a party that demonstrates a real interest in
cancelling a trademark under § 1064 has demonstrated an
interest falling within the zone of interests protected by
§ 1064.” Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1306. That is, she does not
explain why applying the real-interest test articulated in
Ritchie instead of the Lexmark analytical framework would
change the Board’s ultimate determination that she is not
entitled to oppose UTH’s mark under § 1063.3
3 Indeed, if the Board had applied Ritchie’s pre-
Lexmark real-interest test, it likely would have reached the
same conclusion that Ms. Curtin was not entitled to bring
her opposition based only on her interests as a consumer,
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 11 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 11 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 12
Regardless, Ritchie is distinguishable from the present
case because in Ritchie, the basis for opposition under
§ 1063 was disparagement and reputational harm to the
opposer based on statutory prohibitions of the registration
of immoral or scandalous marks which may disparage per-
sons or beliefs (which were later invalidated on First
Amendment grounds). Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1093–94. In
Ritchie, we held that an opposer who stated he would suffer
disparagement of his beliefs from the opposed mark’s reg-
istration had adequately alleged a real interest in the out-
come of that opposition proceeding. Id. at 1097. This basis
for opposing a trademark is unrelated to protecting any
commercial interest, and the person who alleged he would
be disparaged by the mark’s registration was properly
found eligible to oppose the mark on that basis.
In this case, the bases for Ms. Curtin’s opposition to
UTH’s mark (that the mark fails to function as a trade-
mark and is generic and descriptive) are rooted in commer-
cial interests, as discussed in more detail in the next
section. Lexmark and Corcamore, which provide a frame-
work for evaluating whether a party falls within the zone-
of-interests of statutory provisions of the Lanham Act, pro-
vide the better line of cases by which to evaluate Ms. Cur-
tin’s ability to bring her opposition in this case.
Ms. Curtin further argues that Corcamore cannot ap-
ply to this case because it pertains to entitlement to initiate
cancellation proceedings under § 1064. Her attempt to dis-
tinguish between § 1063 and § 1064 is unavailing in view
of our clear precedent on this matter. First, both statutes
state in nearly identical terms that the group of individuals
entitled to bring an action challenging a trademark
as we explain in the next section. See, e.g., Corcamore,
978 F.3d at 1305–06 (“[L]ike the zone-of-interests test, a
petitioner can satisfy the real-interest test by demonstrat-
ing a commercial interest.”).
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 12 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 12 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 13
registration under their respective sections are those who
believe they will be damaged by the mark’s registration.
Compare § 1063 (“Any person who believes that he would
be damaged by the registration of a mark upon the princi-
pal register . . . may . . . file an opposition[.]”), with § 1064
(“A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the
grounds relied upon, may . . . be filed . . . by any person
who believes that he is or will be damaged . . . by the regis-
tration of a mark on the principal register[.]”). This court
has observed that “[t]he linguistic and functional similari-
ties between the opposition and cancellation provisions of
the Lanham Act mandate that we construe the require-
ments of these provisions consistently. There is no basis for
interpreting them differently.” Young v. AGB Corp.,
152 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal citation
omitted); see also Meenaxi Enter., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
38 F.4th 1067, 1072–73 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Corca-
more, 978 F.3d at 1305) (explaining that the “similar stat-
utory language” between 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)’s false-
advertising provision at issue in Lexmark and § 1064 justi-
fied “hold[ing] that the Lexmark zone-of-interests and
proximate-causation requirements control the statutory
cause of action analysis under § 1064”). Indeed, in our
court’s most recent case addressing which parties are au-
thorized to commence administrative proceedings chal-
lenging a trademark under the Lanham Act, Luca
McDermott Catena Gift Trust v. Fructuoso-Hobbs SL, we
noted that “[t]he statutory requirements to cancel registra-
tion of a mark under § 1064 are substantively equivalent to
those required to oppose registration under § 1063.”
102 F.4th 1314, 1321 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (emphasis
added). We reject Ms. Curtin’s argument that our caselaw
regarding entitlement to challenge a trademark under
§ 1064 is inapplicable to entitlement to challenge a trade-
mark under § 1063. The Board correctly applied the
Lexmark framework in assessing whether Ms. Curtin was
entitled to bring her opposition to UTH’s mark under
§ 1063.
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 13 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 13 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 14
B
Ms. Curtin next argues that even if the Board was cor-
rect to apply the Lexmark framework in determining
whether she was entitled to oppose registration under
§ 1063, the Board erred in its application of the framework
to conclude that she does not fall within the class of indi-
viduals whom the statutory scheme empowers to bring an
opposition of the nature she brought in the present case.
Under the Lexmark framework, a plaintiff may oppose
registration of a mark when (1) her interests are within the
zone of interests protected by the statute and (2) she has a
reasonable belief in damage that would be proximately
caused by registration of the mark in violation of the oppo-
sition statute. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129–134; see also Cor-
camore, 978 F.3d at 1303. In Corcamore, this court
specified “that the purpose of the zone-of-interests test is
to ‘foreclose[ ] suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes im-
plicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed
that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.’” Id. (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 130, 134).
Applying this framework, the Board concluded that
Ms. Curtin, who asserts only interests in the mark’s regis-
tration related to her status as a consumer of dolls, did not
fall within the zone of interests to bring an opposition un-
der § 1063, and that the damage she sought to avoid is too
remote to be proximately caused by violations of the stat-
ute. We agree with the Board on both conclusions.
1
In discerning whether Ms. Curtin’s interests as a con-
sumer were within the zone of interests of § 1063, the
Board determined that it must look to the interests pro-
tected by the Lanham Act as a whole. J.A. 7. The Board
concluded that Lexmark had already addressed what those
interests were: “regulat[ion] [of] commerce and protect[ing]
plaintiffs with commercial interests.” J.A. 7. The Board
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 14 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 14 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 15
held that “Lexmark’s holdings on entitlement to a statutory
(Trademark Act) cause of action apply to opposition pro-
ceedings such as this one,” under § 1063, even though
Lexmark itself concerned the cause of action in § 1125(a)
J.A. 10. And because Ms. Curtin is a “mere consumer that
buys goods or services,” the Board concluded she “is not un-
der the Trademark Act’s aegis” and that the “statutory
cause of action is reserved for those with commercial inter-
ests,” meaning actual or potential competitors or other of-
ferors of goods or services (using sufficiently similar
marks), as opposed to consumers. J.A. 10–11.
Ms. Curtin first argues that the Board erred in con-
cluding that her interests as “a consumer of fairytale-
themed products” did not fall within the zone of interests
protected by § 1063 because this “statutory cause of action
is reserved for those with commercial interests.” J.A.
10–11; see Appellant’s Opening Br. 34. She argues that the
Board incorrectly overextended the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Lexmark to conclude that a commercial interest is
necessary to oppose a mark’s registration under § 1063.
J.A. 7–10; see Appellant’s Opening Br. 35–36 (“The Su-
preme Court in Lexmark nowhere suggested that it was
opining broadly about all interests that might fall within
the zone of interests protected by all provisions of the Lan-
ham Act. Rather, the Supreme Court emphasized that ‘the
breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the pro-
visions of law at issue.’”) (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S.
at 130). In reaching this conclusion, the Board invoked
15 U.S.C. § 1127, which states “[t]he intent of this chapter
is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks in such commerce; . . . [and] to protect persons en-
gaged in such commerce against unfair competition.” The
Board also quoted the Supreme Court’s conclusion in
Lexmark that “‘to come within the zone of interests in a
suit’ under Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(1) – which, similar to [§ 1063], may be invoked
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 15 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 15 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 16
only by a plaintiff ‘who believes that he or she is or is likely
to be damaged’ by the challenged act – ‘a plaintiff must al-
lege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or
sales.’” J.A. 8 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lexmark,
572 U.S. at 131–32). UTH invokes Corcamore to argue for
the broader position that “a commercial interest is required
to satisfy the zone-of-interests requirement.” Appellee’s
Br. 18.
As the United States Patent and Trademark Office
points out in its amicus brief, “given the potential for dif-
ferent provisions of the Lanham Act to protect different in-
terests,” we should not adopt UTH’s “broader position that
a commercial interest is always required to satisfy the
zone-of-interests test,” since “[o]ther grounds for opposing
or seeking to cancel the registration of a mark may or may
not call for a different analysis, and may or may not protect
different interests.” USPTO Amicus Br. 23 (citing as an ex-
ample 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b), which disallows “registration of
marks that consist of the ‘flag or coat of arms’ of certain
governments”). The USPTO correctly notes that “[w]hether
a zone-of-interests limitation applies in a particular admin-
istrative context, and whether the class of people who may
seek administrative relief in a particular context is coex-
tensive with the class of people who may sue in court, will
depend on the language of the particular statute and the
particular interests involved.” USPTO Amicus Br. 23. The
interest protected by a particular provision of the Lanham
Act should not be subject to a blanket rule that always as-
sumes the intended protected interest is commercial. In-
stead, the protected interest should be evaluated based on
the particular ground for the challenge, since there are
clearly grounds against registration of a mark in the Lan-
ham Act that are not intended to protect commercial inter-
ests. In the context of challenges to a trademark under the
Lanham Act, both in the form of an opposition proceeding
under § 1063 or a cancellation proceeding under § 1064, the
zone-of-interests test should be tailored based on the
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 16 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 16 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 17
specific bases cited for opposing registration or seeking
cancellation of the registration for a mark.
In the present case, the opposition under § 1063 is
based on allegations that the mark fails to function as a
trademark and is generic and descriptive. Ms. Curtin ar-
gues the Board failed to assess the specific interests pro-
tected by her opposition under § 1063. However, as noted
above, the Board did assess her grounds for opposition and
concluded the interests protected by those grounds were
commercial. See J.A. 7 n.6 (“Opposer’s grounds for opposi-
tion in this case arise out of the Trademark Act’s ‘intent’ to
‘protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair
competition.’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127)). Ms. Curtin does
not contest our binding precedent, which unequivocally
provides that the prohibitions against descriptive and ge-
neric marks protect commercial interests. This court’s pre-
decessor has noted that “[t]he major reasons for not
protecting [descriptive] marks are: (1) to prevent the owner
of a mark from inhibiting competition in the sale of partic-
ular goods; and (2) to maintain freedom of the public to use
the language involved, thus avoiding the possibility of har-
assing infringement suits by the registrant against others
who use the mark when advertising or describing their own
products”—these are commercial interests. In re Abcor
Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1978). We have
similarly explained that the prohibition against granting
trademark registration for generic terms was established
to avoid “grant[ing] the owner of the mark a monopoly,” an-
other commercial interest. In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating
Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal cita-
tion and quotation marks omitted).
Insofar as Ms. Curtin contends that the risk to consum-
ers from registering this mark exists in the form of decep-
tive or misleading use, which may implicate consumer
interests, these were not among her bases for opposing the
mark before the Board, so we need not consider whether
these provisions also protect commercial interests. And to
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 17 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 17 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 18
the extent Ms. Curtin contends that § 1063 is also intended
to protect the interests of consumers because trademark
law exists to some extent to protect consumers in their abil-
ity to distinguish among products, the Supreme Court has
explained that this goal may be served by conferring rights
that only commercial actors have statutory standing to ex-
ercise. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S.
102, 107 (2014) (“Though in the end consumers also benefit
from the [Lanham] Act’s proper enforcement, the cause of
action [for false advertising] is for competitors, not consum-
ers.”); USPTO v. Booking.com B. V., 591 U.S. 549, 552
(2020) (explaining that while “[g]uarding a trademark
against use by others . . . secures to the owner of the mark
the goodwill of her business and protects the ability of con-
sumers to distinguish among competing producers,” “[t]he
Lanham Act . . . arms trademark owners with federal
claims for relief.” (alteration omitted) (emphasis added) (in-
ternal citations and quotation marks omitted)). The
Board’s holding that only commercial actors affected by the
mark’s registration fall within the zone of interests to op-
pose the registration as generic, descriptive, or functional
under § 1063 is not inconsistent with the Lanham Act’s
purpose of protecting consumers.
2
The Board also found Ms. Curtin’s showing of injury
insufficient to invoke an opposition proceeding under
§ 1063. The Board correctly found Ms. Curtin’s evidence
too “limited” and the damage “too remote” to establish
proximate causation where all her alleged harms are deriv-
ative of those harms that may be suffered by UTH’s com-
mercial competitors as a result of UTH’s registration of the
mark. J.A. 12. We agree.
Ms. Curtin’s alleged injury from the registration of the
RAPUNZEL mark is that “[she] and other consumers will
be denied access to healthy marketplace competition for
products that represent” Rapunzel if private companies are
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 18 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 18 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 19
allowed “to trademark the name of a famous fairy tale char-
acter in the public domain.” J.A. 266. She further alleged
that “[she] and other consumers will also likely face an in-
creased cost of goods associated with Rapunzel merchan-
dise, given the lack of competition.” J.A. 266. She stated
her “belie[f] that a trademark registration [for the name
Rapunzel] could chill the creation of new dolls and toys by
fans of the Rapunzel fairytale, crowding out the substantial
social benefit of having diverse interpreters of the fairy
tale’s legacy.” J.A. 266. She further testified that “[she] and
other consumers will also likely be denied access to classic,
already existing, Rapunzel merchandise whose sale may be
precluded if Applicant receives a registration for the name
‘Rapunzel.’” J.A. 266. Ms. Curtin included with her
amended notice of opposition a petition with 432 signa-
tures from people who shared her belief that registration of
the “RAPUNZEL” mark would impact consumers’ ability to
find Rapunzel dolls and adversely affect marketplace com-
petition for Rapunzel dolls.
The Board held that a person opposing a registration
“must show economic or reputational injury flowing di-
rectly from” the registration, and “‘[t]hat showing is gener-
ally not made when’ a defendant’s conduct ‘produces
injuries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the
plaintiff.’” J.A. 11–12 (alteration in original) (quoting
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133–34). The Board found Ms. Cur-
tin’s “limited evidence . . . is too remote from registration
and is entirely speculative.” J.A. 12. It found that insofar
as Ms. Curtin relied on “general economic theories” to as-
sume registration of the mark would “harm ‘healthy mar-
ketplace competition,’” there was no evidence in the record
about any specific economic theory nor evidence that fairy-
tale related markets perform according to general economic
principles. J.A. 12.
Ms. Curtin first argues the Board’s analysis of direct
economic or reputational injury is faulty for being limited
to commercial interests. We reject this argument for the
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 19 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 19 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 20
same reasons we rejected this argument in the context of
the zone of interests; only injury to those interests that fall
within the zone of interests are relevant to this inquiry.
Ms. Curtin then argues that the Board erred in concluding
her alleged injuries were “too remote, because the alleged
damage to [her] depends first on the alleged effect of regis-
tration on other commercial doll makers or sellers.” J.A. 13.
The Board noted that the proximate cause showing “is gen-
erally not made when’ a defendant’s conduct ‘produces in-
juries to a fellow commercial actor that in turn affect the
plaintiff.” J.A. 11–12 (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133–
34). Ms. Curtin contests this analysis as at odds with
Lexmark’s instruction that an “intervening step” in causa-
tion “is not fatal to showing of proximate causation.” Ap-
pellant’s Opening Br. 43 (quoting Lexmark, 572 U.S.
at 133). However, as we explained in Luca McDermott, “a
harm will be ‘too remote’ from the alleged unlawful conduct
if it ‘is purely derivative of misfortunes visited upon a third
person by the defendant’s acts.’” 102 F.4th at 1327 (quoting
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133). This court concluded that the
challenger of a registered mark had not satisfied the prox-
imate causation requirement where the “alleged injury is
merely derivative of any injury suffered by [another party],
it is too remote to provide [the challenger] with a cause of
action under § 1064.” Id. at 1327. Ms. Curtin’s alleged
harms are all, as UTH points out, “speculative tertiary ef-
fects of registration, namely, reduced marketplace compe-
tition, increased cost of RAPUNZEL merchandise, and
fewer interpretations and creations of RAPUNZEL dolls.”
Appellee’s Br. 23. These harms are insufficient to establish
proximate causation for the same reasons provided by Luca
McDermott—they are downstream harms first suffered by
a commercial actor.
Ms. Curtin’s only response to the Board’s contention
that her evidence of harm is too speculative is a citation to
the Supreme Court’s statement in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Brothers, Inc., that a trademark may distort
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 20 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 20 of 21 --

CURTIN v. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. 21
competition “not merely by successful suit but by the plau-
sible threat of successful suit.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 45
n.3 (citing 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000)). However, Ms. Curtin
does not address how the Board erred in concluding that
her speculative evidence does not establish such a plausi-
ble threat of suit that would chill competition in the ways
she alleges. Neither party addresses the fact that the party
alleging injury must establish that their belief is reasona-
ble: Ms. Curtin has not provided any arguments refuting
the Board’s findings that her reliance on general economic
theories without any case-specific data fails to establish a
reasonable belief of proximate causation of injury. The
Board properly found Ms. Curtin’s allegations of harm
were at best downstream effects of harms to commercial
actors and were too remote to support a reasonable belief
in injury.
IV
We have considered the remainder of Ms. Curtin’s ar-
guments and find them unpersuasive. Because the Board
correctly applied the Lexmark framework to find that
Ms. Curtin did not have statutory standing to oppose
UTH’s registration of the RAPUNZEL mark under § 1063,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED
Case: 23-2140 Document: 74 Page: 21 Filed: 05/22/2025

-- 21 of 21 --