Mypaq Holdings Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Dell Technologies Inc., Anker Innovations Ltd.

23-2024Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitApr 24, 2025

Full text

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD.,
Appellant
v.
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD., DELL
TECHNOLOGIES INC., ANKER INNOVATIONS
LTD.,
Appellees
______________________
2023-2024, 2023-2025
______________________
Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2022-
00311, IPR2022-00312, IPR2022-01131, IPR2022-01134.
______________________
Decided: April 24, 2025
______________________
J AMES CARMICHAEL , Carmichael Ip, Tysons, VA, ar-
gued for appellant. Also represented by S TEPHEN
MCBRIDE, MINGHUI Y ANG.
ELIOT D AMON WILLIAMS , Baker Botts LLP, Washing-
ton, DC, for appellee Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Also
represented by ERIC J. F ARAGI, N EIL P. SIROTA, New York,
NY.
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 2
L AUREN J. D REYER, Baker Botts LLP, Washington, DC,
argued for all appellees. Appellee Dell Technologies Inc.
also represented by T HOMAS A. BROWN, Dell Inc., Hopking-
ton, MA; K EVIN J. M EEK, McDermott Will & Emery LLP,
Austin, TX; BRETT T HOMPSEN, Slayden Grubert Beard
PLLC, Austin, TX.
ERIC C. COHEN, Rimon, P.C., Raleigh, NC, for appellee
Anker Innovations Ltd. Also represented by J ASON XU,
Washington, DC.
______________________
Before L OURIE, T ARANTO, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
STARK, Circuit Judge.
MyPAQ Holding LTD. (“MyPAQ”) appeals two final
written decisions of the United States Patent Trial and Ap-
peal Board (“Board”) finding all claims of two of its patents
invalid on anticipation and obviousness grounds in inter
partes review (“IPR”) proceedings. We affirm.
I
MyPAQ’s U.S. Patent Nos. 8,477,514 (“the ’514 pa-
tent”) and 7,675,759 (“the ’759 patent”) relate to power con-
verters for converting a given “input voltage” into a
regulated “output voltage.” ’514 patent at 2:42-45. The pa-
tents, which have substantially similar specifications, re-
late to switch-mode power converters; that is, “power
supply or power processing circuit[s] that convert[] an in-
put voltage waveform into a specified output voltage wave-
form.” Id. The power converters are operated by a
controller, which is “configured to dynamically increase or
decrease the duty cycle of the power switches therein to
regulate the internal or the output characteristic,” e.g., the
input or output voltage, “at a desired value,” where the out-
put voltage is used to power a load such as a computer or
processor. Id. at 2:64-67. The patents purport to improve
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 3
on prior art devices by providing a system that “adaptively
improves power conversion efficiency of a power converter
in response to a measured parameter of the power con-
verter . . . and includes consideration of” numerous poten-
tial variables, including a “system operational state of a
load coupled to the power system.” Id. at 6:36-44.
Several pieces of prior art are relevant to the issues on
appeal. U.S. Patent No. 6,873,136 (“Chagny”) discloses a
voltage regulator module (“VRM”) that efficiently powers a
computing device by “dynamically chang[ing] the switching
frequency of the VRM in accordance with the activity of the
processor.” J.A. 1056 at 3:48-50. In an embodiment de-
picted in Chagny’s Figure 2A, “VRM 200 includes, among
other things, controller module 210 operable to receive ac-
tivity input 202 indicative of levels of activity of processor
292 and to select a switching frequency of VRM 200 respon-
sive to activity input 202 so that the switching frequency
dynamically matches the level of activity of processor 292.”
J.A. 14 (citing J.A. 1056 at 3:60-65, 4:66-5:3, 5:9-12; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, U.S. Patent
No. 6,294,904 B1 (“Hirst”) “discloses a multiple frequency
switching power supply that can operate with a first
switching frequency when a load is in a normal operating
mode and with a second switching frequency when a load
is in a standby operating mode.” J.A. 85.
Samsung filed two IPR petitions which, collectively,
challenged the validity of all claims of the ’514 and ’759 pa-
tents. The Board instituted both proceedings, held a con-
solidated oral hearing, and issued two final written
decisions. The final written decisions explained that Sam-
sung had proven all of the claims of the ’514 patent to be
anticipated and/or rendered obvious by Chagny and all of
the claims of the ’759 patent to be anticipated and/or ren-
dered obvious by each of Chagny and Hirst alone. Other
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 4
grounds of unpatentability asserted by Samsung are not
pertinent to this appeal.1
MyPAQ timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
II
Claim construction presents a question of law we re-
view de novo, although any underlying factual findings the
Board bases on extrinsic evidence are reviewed for sub-
stantial evidence. See Perfect Surgical Techs., Inc. v. Olym-
pus Am., Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “The
ultimate question of obviousness is a legal question that we
review de novo with underlying factual findings that we re-
view for substantial evidence.” Roku, Inc. v. Universal El-
ecs., Inc., 63 F.4th 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2023). “What the
prior art discloses and whether a person of ordinary skill
in the art would have been motivated to combine prior-art
references are both fact questions that we review for sub-
stantial evidence.” Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Interactive Ent.
LLC, 66 F.4th 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Anticipation is
also a question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.
1 MyPAQ has not appealed the Board’s findings that
claims 1, 6-10, and 16-18 of the ’759 patent are unpatenta-
ble as both anticipated and rendered obvious by Hirst. J.A.
85-99, 103. Therefore, the challenges MyPAQ does make
as to the unpatentability of claims 1, 6, and 16 of the ’759
patent (with respect to the “power system controller” and
“duty cycle” limitations) are moot, since these three claims
would remain unpatentable even if MyPAQ were to prevail
on all the issues it presses on appeal. Because each of the
issues MyPAQ raises need to be reached in connection with
other claims, we reference claims 1, 6, and 16 of the ’759
patent where those claims are implicated by the appellate
issues, even though our discussions below have no impact
on the patentability of those three claims.
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 5
See Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d
1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Substantial evidence is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ad-
equate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
III
At the Board, the parties disputed the proper construc-
tion of just two claim terms: “system operational state,”
which is not pertinent to this appeal, and “core state.” On
appeal, MyPAQ argues that the Board erred by rejecting
its proposed construction of “core state” and further con-
tends that the prior art did not disclose the “core state” lim-
itation as correctly construed.
MyPAQ also argues that the Board implicitly con-
strued four other claim terms – “upon startup,” “processor
system,” “power system controller,” and “duty cycle” – and
that the Board’s implicit constructions of each of these
terms were incorrect. MyPAQ asserts that under what it
characterizes as the “proper constructions,” the prior art
references, specifically Chagny and Hirst, neither disclose
nor render obvious any of the disputed limitations. See
Open. Br. at 19.
We address these issues below.
1
The term “core state” appears in claims 4 and 9 of the
’514 patent and claims 4 and 14 of the ’759 patent. Claim
4 of the ’514 patent, which depends from claim 1, is illus-
trative:
1. A power converter coupled to a load, compris-
ing:
a power switch configured to conduct for a
duty cycle to provide an output character-
istic at an output thereof; and
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 6
a power converter controller configured to
receive a signal from said load indicating a
system operational state of said load and
control an internal operating characteristic
of said power converter as a function of said
signal.
4. The power converter as recited in claim 1
wherein said load is a processor and said system
operational state is dependent on one of a core state
and a performance state of said processor.
J.A. 136 (emphasis added).
In front of the Board, MyPAQ proposed that “core
state” be construed as limited to the specific list of “c-
states” identified in an industry document, the Advanced
Configuration and Power Interface Specification (“ACPI”),
which describes how to control the amount of power pro-
vided to devices in a computer system. The ACPI is incor-
porated by reference in MyPAQ’s patents. ’514 patent at
5:22-27; ’714 patent at 4:1-6. Samsung countered that
“core state” should be more broadly construed as encom-
passing additional types of “states,” including “the activity
level (e.g., the rate at which instructions are executed) of
the processor,” even though those states are not identified
in the ACPI. J.A. 12. The Board agreed with Samsung. So
do we.
MyPAQ’s proposed construction relies on reading the
specifications of the ’514 and ’759 patents as “lexicograph-
ically defin[ing]” the claimed “core state.” Open. Br. at 17.
My PAQ finds this purported “express[] defin[ition]” in fol-
lowing portion of the specification:
For example, the [ACPI] specification . . . describes
“P-states” and “C-states” of a processor . . . .
[T]he core state (“C-state”), also under software op-
erating system control, affects its level of power
consumption from another perspective. The
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 7
highest processor C-state, C0, describes a processor
at its full operational level. Lower C-state levels,
Cl, C2, . . . C4, describe various levels of a proces-
sor sleep state.
’759 patent at 4:1-6, 22-49 (emphasis added; second omis-
sion in original); see also ’514 patent at 5:44-45 (“Another
processor state indicator, the core state (‘C-state’) . . . .”);
id. at 25:27-30 (“Turning now to FIG. 12, illustrated is a
diagram of an embodiment of processor core states (‘C-
states’) in accordance with the principles of the present in-
vention illustrated.”)
To be sure, placing a quoted word or term inside paren-
theses is a conventional manner by which one may define
another term used in a document – as we have done in the
first three lines of this opinion with respect to the terms
MyPAQ, Board, and IPR – and we have found such formu-
lations may be indicative of lexicography in a patent. See,
e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1200
(Fed. Cir. 2013). It does not follow, however, that every use
of a quoted term inside a parenthetical in a patent docu-
ment is definitional; each patent must be read individually,
from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.
See generally Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669
F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] person of ordinary
skill in the art would have to read the specification and
conclude that the applicant has clearly disavowed claim
scope or has acted as its own lexicographer.”). And “[t]o act
as its own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth
a definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain
and ordinary meaning and must clearly express an intent
to redefine the term.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1368 (“Simply referring to two
terms as alternatives . . . is not sufficient to redefine a claim
term.”). Here, as the Board found, the patentee did not
“clearly set forth” a definition of “core state,” nor did it
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 8
“clearly express an intent” to define the term solely by ref-
erence to the ACPI.
As the Board recognized, while the ’514 and ’739 pa-
tents “explain[] the concept of core states by reference to C-
states as defined in ACPI,” the specifications as a whole
would tell a skilled artisan “that the ACPI C-states are
merely examples within the broader category of core
states.” J.A. 13. For instance, the specification describes
“examples indicating a system operational state include,
without limitation, a signal providing a performance state
or a core state of a processor such as a P-state or C-state,”
J.A. 13 (emphasis added by Board; quoting ‘514 patent at
9:11-23), “indicating, for example, that the system is oper-
ating from emergency power or battery reserve . . . .” ’514
patent at 9:14-23; see also ’514 patent at 5:22-23 (“For ex-
ample, the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface
(‘ACPI’) specification . . . .”); ’514 patent at 8:7-9 (describ-
ing Fig. 12, labelled “ACPI C-States – Idle Power Manage-
ment,” as depicting “an embodiment of processor core
states”) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the specification uses the term “ACPI C-
states.” ’514 patent at 25:31 (emphasis added). The modi-
fier “ACPI” in front of “c-states” would be unnecessary if
the patentee intended for an ordinary artisan to recognize
any reference to “c-state,” without a modifier or explana-
tion, always and only to refer to “c-states” as defined in the
ACPI. Thus, the presence of the modifier indicates that the
patentee contemplated “c-state” to have a different, and
broader, meaning than “ACPI c-state,” from which it logi-
cally follows that the patentee did not – by writing “core
state (‘C-state’)” or otherwise – define “core state” as lim-
ited to just “ACPI c-states.”
Additionally, as Samsung observes, the patents repeat-
edly “use the term ‘core state’ without the abbreviation [C-
state] in parentheses,” undermining MyPAQ’s suggestion
that the patents clearly express an intent to link “core
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 9
state” to “C-state.” Resp. Br. at 20 (citing ’514 patent at
8:7-9, 9:11-23, 22:63-67; ’759 patent at 7:16-28, 19:15-18.
At minimum, there is such ambiguity in how the patents
use C-state that we cannot conclude the patentee was act-
ing as its own lexicographer. See generally Renishaw PLC
v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (“The patentee’s lexicography must, of course,
appear ‘with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and preci-
sion’ before it can affect the claim.”).
Because this claim construction dispute can be resolved
based solely on the intrinsic evidence, we need not consider
MyPAQ’s contentions that the testimony of both parties’
experts supports its proposed construction. See Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evi-
dence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim
term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on ex-
trinsic evidence.”). Extrinsic evidence may not be used to
alter the meaning of a claim term that is clear from the
intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1584 (“[E]xtrinsic evidence in
general, and expert testimony in particular, may be used
only to help the court come to the proper understanding of
the claims; it may not be used to vary or contradict the
claim language.”).
Applying the Board’s correct construction of core state
as “the activity level (e.g., the rate at which instructions
are executed) of the processor,” and as including but not
limited to the ACPI’s “c-states,” substantial evidence sup-
ports the Board’s finding that the “core state” limitation of
claims 4 and 9 of the ’514 patent and claims 4 and 14 of the
’759 patent are anticipated by Chagny. See J.A. 41 (citing
J.A. 1056, Chagny at 4:23-30); J.A. 82 (citing IPR 2022-
00312, Exhibit 1002 at ¶¶ 155-57); see also J.A. 720 at ¶¶
80-81 (Samsung expert Dr. Kiaei). MyPAQ does not offer
any argument to the contrary. Accordingly, we affirm the
Board’s finding that claims 4 and 9 of the ’514 patent and
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 10
claims 4 and 14 of the ’759 patent are unpatentable as ob-
vious.
2
MyPAQ challenges what it characterizes as the Board’s
implicit construction of “upon startup,” as recited in claims
13 and 18 of the ’514 patent, as part of the limitation
“wherein said signal is provided upon startup of said pro-
cessor system.” ’514 patent at 30:16-17. In its petition,
Samsung argued “that a person of ordinary skill in the art
‘would have found it obvious that the generation and pro-
vision of Chagny’s activity input 202 signal (i.e., said sig-
nal) would occur throughout the operating time of Chagny’s
information handling system device 290, including upon
startup,’” J.A. 42-43 (quoting J.A. 745-46 at ¶¶ 138-40),
pointing specifically to Chagny’s disclosure of updating the
activity input “on a periodic basis, e.g., once every millisec-
ond, on an event basis or on an on-demand basis,” J.A.
1056, Chagny at 4:43-45. The Board agreed with Samsung
and found that claims 13 and 18 of the ’514 patent were
unpatentable as obvious based on Chagny alone.
MyPAQ’s principal argument with respect to this limi-
tation is that the Board implicitly construed “upon startup”
as including “any time after startup” when it should have,
in MyPAQ’s view, instead limited “upon startup” to only
those times “during the startup or boot sequence [and] . . .
not afterward during continued operation.” Open. Br. at
18.2 According to MyPAQ, a person of ordinary skill would
understand that its patents require the “startup” be
2 We agree with MyPAQ that it did not forfeit this
argument because it is entirely consistent with its position
at the Board that “upon startup” excludes the time directly
after startup. J.A. 483-84, 1958-59 (MyPAQ discussing
Hwang); see also J.A. 45 (Board recognizing and addressing
MyPAQ’s position).
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 11
mutually exclusive from “continued operation,” based on
the specification statement that “[u]pon power-up of such a
system, or during its continued operation, a power system
controller can enable operation of its principal components
to establish a state of maximum power drain.” ’514 patent
at 13:39-42 (emphasis added). MyPAQ’s reading of this
sentence, however, is not persuasive. The more natural
reading of it is merely that startup and continued operation
are different things, and they may or may not overlap, but
this sentence has nothing to say about that question. Noth-
ing in the claims or specification supports the absolute de-
lineation between startup and operation that MyPAQ
insists is a requirement of claims 13 and 18.
The Board had substantial evidence for its finding that,
consistent with its implicit understanding of “upon
startup” as including operations at any time after startup,
Chagny discloses the limitation. As we noted above,
Chagny discloses that its input signal “may be updated as
frequently as once every millisecond,” which the Board
pointed out would mean updating “would begin at startup.”
J.A. 44-45 (citing J.A. 746-47 at ¶ 140). As Samsung states,
“the Board pointed to the specification to confirm that the
system is already in a state of power drain when the ‘signal’
is provided.” Resp. Br. at 29 (citing J.A. 45-46). Addition-
ally, Samsung’s expert, Dr. Kiaei, testified that “it was well
known in the art that a microprocessor would send control
signals to an adaptive power supply coupled to that micro-
processor as soon as the microprocessor was powered up to
a level where its control signal was valid.” J.A. 746 ¶ 140
(cited by Board at J.A. 44). Dr. Kiaei cited specific prior art
references that corroborated his opinion. See id. The
Board credited this testimony and, again, had substantial
evidence for its finding. J.A. 44-45.
3
Next, MyPAQ contends that the Board erred by implic-
itly construing the “processor system,” as used in claims 11
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 12
and 16 of the ’514 patent, as including internal compo-
nents, “such as a control unit, a central processing unit
[CPU], a memory to store the instructions to be executed,
and input/output ports.” Open. Br. at 50. In MyPAQ’s
view, including these types of components wrongly reads
“the word ‘system’ out of the claims;” it insists a “processor
system” must instead “be a system employing a processor,
such as a server or personal computer, and not merely a
processor by itself.” Open. Br. at 39. We do not agree with
MyPAQ but, rather, share the Board’s implicit understand-
ing.
MyPAQ identifies no persuasive basis in the intrinsic
evidence for excluding internal components from what a
person of ordinary skill would understand to be part of a
processor system. MyPAQ relies on the specification’s
statement that “[a] system such as a personal computer,
processor system or a server is often constructed with a
number of system components such as memory, hard
drives, and specialized circuit cards that are specified and
installed when the system is assembled for a particular ap-
plication.” ’514 patent at 13:29-33 (emphasis added). No-
tably, this passage indicates only that a “processor system”
“often” – not always – may have multiple components. We
agree, instead, with Samsung, which aptly states: “a pro-
cessor can constitute a processor system, just as a com-
puter can constitute a computing system,” even without
additional components. Resp. Br. at 34.
As we agree with the Board’s understanding of the
scope of the claimed “processor system,” there is no dispute
that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that
Chagny’s processor 292 is “a processor system with multi-
ple components” and, hence, a “processor system.” J.A. 27-
28 (citing J.A. 525-26).
4
MyPAQ’s next challenge relates to the claim term
“power system controller,” as recited in claims 6 and 11 of
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 13
the ’514 patent and claims 1 and 6 of the ’759 patent. Rep-
resentative of this dispute is claim 6 of the ’514 patent, re-
produced below:
6. A power system, comprising:
a power system controller configured to pro-
vide a signal characterizing a power re-
quirement of a processor system; and
a power converter coupled to said processor
system, comprising:
a power switch configured to conduct for a
duty cycle to provide an output character-
istic at an output thereof, and
a power converter controller configured to
receive a signal from said power system
controller to control an internal operating
characteristic of said power converter as a
function of said signal.
’514 patent at 28:29-41 (emphasis added).
MyPAQ contends that the Board implicitly interpreted
“power system controller” too broadly, allowing that term
to capture systems that merely monitor a processor but do
not exert any control over them. MyPAQ argues that the
proper construction of “power system controller” is “a sep-
arate element that coordinates control of various elements
of the system (including power converters and components
of the load) at a system-wide level to increase efficiency.”
Open. Br. at 64.
We need not assess whether MyPAQ’s proposed con-
struction is correct because, whether it is or not, the Board
had substantial evidence for its finding that Chagny’s “soft-
ware program 296 alone or with ICH 280” meets the “power
system controller” limitation. J.A. 76. The Board specifi-
cally found: “Chagny’s software program 296 exerts control
in the same manner” as the claimed power system
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 14
controller in MyPAQ’s patents, “by providing activity input
202 to frequency selector module 215 of controller module
210, which changes the switching frequency (‘internal op-
erating characteristic’) of VRM 200 in response to activity
input 202.” J.A. 76 (citing J.A. 1057, Chagny at 5:9-12).
Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding
that Chagny’s software program controls Chagny’s proces-
sor, and does not merely monitor that processor, Chagny
teaches this claim limitation, whether or not such control
is actually required.
5
Finally, MyPAQ disagrees with the Board’s finding
that Chagny discloses the “duty cycle” of claims 2, 7, 12,
and 17 of its ’514 patent and claims 1, 6, and 16 of its ’759
patent. Specifically, MyPAQ criticizes Chagny’s failure to
refer to “duty cycles,” “cycle,” or “periodicity” by name, but
we agree with Samsung that this does not mean Chagny
fails to disclose the underlying concept of a duty cycle.
In finding that Chagny discloses the claimed limita-
tion, the Board expressly adopted the parties’ agreed-upon
construction of “duty cycle” as the “ratio represented by a
conduction period of a power switch to a switching period
thereof,” a construction derived directly from the specifica-
tion. J.A. 34-35 (citing ’514 patent at 2:57-59; ’759 patent
at 1:36-38). MyPAQ argues on appeal that despite the par-
ties’ agreement as to the meaning of the term, “the Board
applied a different construction in which ‘duty cycle’ merely
means turning a switch on and off without any ‘cycle’ or
periodicity required.” Open. Br. at 59. MyPAQ adds that
conduction is a “fixed period” of on-time during each
switching cycle.
The Board appropriately applied the agreed-upon con-
struction and had substantial evidence for its finding that
Chagny discloses the “duty cycle” limitations of MyPAQ’s
claims. As the Board explained, Chagny “discloses that
power switch 220, controlled by charge control signal 212,
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MYPAQ HOLDINGS LTD. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 15
is closed (i.e., conducts) during a charge cycle,” and goes on
to describe how “DC voltage input 205 is ‘chopped’ by the
charge switch 220 to generate the switched DC voltage out-
put 225, which is then filtered to generate regulated DC
voltage output 295.” J.A. 17 (citing J.A. 1057, Chagny at
5:40-42, 5:48-51). “By disclosing setting the switching fre-
quency and, thus, the switching period, Chagny discloses
that the duty cycle is controlled ‘in accordance’ with activ-
ity input 202, upon which the switching frequency is
based.” J.A. 37. Relying on Dr. Kiaei’s testimony, Sam-
sung explained, and the Board agreed, that “[b]y turning
on and off Chagny’s power switch at a selected switching
frequency, the result is that each on-and-off cycle has a con-
duction period (i.e., the on-time) and a switching period
(i.e., the inverse of the switching frequency).” Resp. Br. at
43; see also J.A. 37 (citing J.A. 1370 at ¶ 31). Therefore,
Chagny discloses a “duty cycle” consisting of a conduction
period and a switching period, satisfying the challenged
claims’ “duty cycle” limitation. MyPAQ criticizes the
Board’s reliance on Dr. Kiaei’s opinion, but “expert testi-
mony can constitute substantial evidence of anticipation
when the expert explains in detail how each claim element
is disclosed in the prior art reference.” Acoustic Tech., Inc.
v. Itron Networked Sols., Inc., 949 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2020).
Therefore, the Board’s determination is supported by
substantial evidence.
IV
We have considered MyPAQ’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
Case: 23-2024 Document: 54 Page: 15 Filed: 04/24/2025

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