Colister Slater v. Department of Homeland Security

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
COLISTER SLATER,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondent
______________________
2023-1986
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. SF-3443-17-0029-I-1.
______________________
Decided: April 11, 2025
______________________
COLISTER SLATER , Fontana, CA, pro se.
D ELISA SANCHEZ, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by D EBORAH
ANN BYNUM , P ATRICIA M. MCCARTHY , BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, P ROST and STARK, Circuit
Judges.
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SLATER v. DHS 2
P ER CURIAM .
Colister Slater appeals a decision from the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board (Board), determining Mr. Slater is
collaterally estopped from bringing a claim of entitlement
to Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) Law En-
forcement Officer (LEO) retirement credit pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 8412. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Slater worked as a GS-0083 police officer with the
Federal Protective Service (FPS) from 1997 to 2018. In
1998, the General Services Administration1 (GSA) deter-
mined Mr. Slater’s position did not qualify for LEO retire-
ment coverage. S.Appx. 2. Mr. Slater appealed to the
Board, which affirmed GSA’s decision. Id. at 3. Mr. Slater
appealed to our court, which affirmed the Board’s decision.
Id.; Slater v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 250 F.3d 762 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (Table). Mr. Slater appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States, which denied certiorari. S.Appx. 3.
In 2001, GSA again denied Mr. Slater’s claim for LEO
retirement coverage, and GSA again denied his claim. Id.
Mr. Slater appealed to the Board, which affirmed GSA’s de-
termination finding Mr. Slater was collaterally estopped
from relitigating whether his duties qualified for LEO re-
tirement coverage. Id. Mr. Slater did not appeal the
Board’s decision.
In 2015, Mr. Slater brought another appeal to the
Board. Mr. Slater argued the duties of his position had
changed due to intervening laws and presidential direc-
tives and he was entitled to LEO retirement coverage.
1 In 2003, FPS became part of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Slater v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., SF-3443-15-0322-I-1, 2015 WL 3854017 (M.S.P.B.
June 18, 2015).
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SLATER v. DHS 3
S.Appx. 9. The Board found Mr. Slater did not show the
duties of his position were altered by any of the statutes or
directives he cited and affirmed DHS’s denial of LEO re-
tirement credit. Slater v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., SF-3443-
15-0322-I-1, 2016 WL 258308 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 21, 2016). Mr.
Slater appealed the Board’s decision to the District Court
for the Central District of California, which determined the
appeal was correctly filed in the district court because it
was a mixed case, but dismissed the appeal for lack of ju-
risdiction because the action was untimely. Minutes (in
chambers) Court Order, Slater v. Patterson, et al., No. ED
CV 16-519 PA, at 3–4 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2016).
In 2016, Mr. Slater initiated the present action with
the Board. Mr. Slater again argued he was entitled to LEO
retirement credit due to a change in job duties, citing the
same laws as in the 2015 action. S.Appx. 9. The Board
found Mr. Slater was collaterally estopped from arguing
entitlement to LEO retirement coverage. Id. at 10; S.Appx.
3. Mr. Slater appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
D ISCUSSION
Mr. Slater argues the Board improperly denied him
LEO retirement coverage. Opening Br. 2. Specifically, Mr.
Slater argues: (1) the 1998 Board erred in its decision, id.
at 3–29, and (2) the 2023 Board erred in failing to grant
LEO retirement coverage, disregarding relevant evidence,
failing to address 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) violations, and failing
to cite and follow Klipp v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 34 F.4th
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2022), id. at 29–30. DHS argues the Board
correctly determined Mr. Slater was collaterally estopped
from bringing a claim for LEO retirement coverage. Re-
sponse Br. 3. We agree with DHS Mr. Slater is collaterally
estopped.
We must affirm a Board decision unless it is “(1) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures
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SLATER v. DHS 4
required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed;
or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(c). Collateral estoppel bars litigation if: (1) the is-
sue is identical to a prior action, (2) the issue was actually
litigated in the prior action, (3) the determination of that
issue was necessary to the resulting judgment in the prior
case, and (4) the interests of the party against whom col-
lateral estoppel is sought were fully represented in the
prior case. Killeen v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 558 F.3d 1318,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Collateral estoppel is ultimately a
question of law which we review de novo. Google LLC v.
Hammond Dev. Int’l, Inc., 54 F.4th 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2022). Collateral estoppel may implicate underlying facts,
however, which we review for substantial evidence. Id.
The Board correctly determined Mr. Slater is collater-
ally estopped from bringing his claim for LEO retirement
coverage. On the first prong of collateral estoppel, the
Board found the issue of Mr. Slater’s eligibility for LEO re-
tirement coverage was the same issue litigated in his 2015
appeal to the Board. S.Appx. 10. The Board explained Mr.
Slater cited to the same laws as in the 2015 appeal in ar-
guing his job duties had changed. Id. at 9. The Board noted
Mr. Slater argued he should be granted another oppor-
tunity to relitigate the issue. Id. at 10. The Board’s finding
that the issue Mr. Slater sought to argue in this case is the
same issue argued in the 2015 case is supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
On the second and third prongs of collateral estoppel,
the Board found the issue was actually litigated and neces-
sary to the final determination in the 2015 appeal. Id. at
10. The Board cited to the 2015 appeal’s final decision,
which details the allegations made by Mr. Slater. Slater,
2016 WL 258308, at ¶ 7. The Board in the 2015 appeal
explained why each provision did not support his argument
and ultimately determined he “has not shown that the du-
ties of his position have been altered by these provisions.”
Id. The Board in the 2015 case also explained its
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SLATER v. DHS 5
affirmance of the AJ’s initial decision rested on a review of
all the issues on appeal, which necessarily included its re-
view of Mr. Slater’s claim for LEO retirement coverage and
a conclusion that Mr. Slater had not established any basis
for granting the petition for review. Id. at ¶ 1. The Board’s
findings on the second and third prongs of collateral estop-
pel are supported by substantial evidence.
On the fourth prong of collateral estoppel, the Board
found Mr. Slater had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issues in the 2015 appeal. S.Appx. 10. The Board ex-
plained that while Mr. Slater argued he was denied due
process, the record of the 2015 appeal established “he was
provided an opportunity to demonstrate how his duties
were altered by the statutory provisions cited above but
failed to do so.” Id. Mr. Slater provides no argument as to
how he was denied due process or an opportunity to fairly
litigate his 2015 appeal. Substantial evidence supports the
Board’s finding Mr. Slater had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the 2015 appeal. We see no error in
the Board’s application of collateral estoppel.
Mr. Slater’s arguments relating to the 1998 appeal do
not demonstrate any error in the 2023 Board’s decision.
While Mr. Slater states he is appealing the most recent
Board decision, most of his arguments alleging error relate
to cases that are not before this court. See, e.g., Opening
Br. 6–13 (heading “MSPB AJ Gretchen Thomas Erred In
Deciding Mr. Slater[’s] Initial Case”); see also id. at 26
(“MSPB committed gross procedural errors and Mr. Slater
was severely prejudiced by AJ Thomas’ handling of his
case.”); id. at 28 (“AJ Thomas did not support her finding
with substantial evidence violating 5 U.S. Code
§ 7703(c)(3).”). These issues are not properly before this
court, and Mr. Slater has already fully litigated the 1998
decision.
Mr. Slater does not demonstrate any error in the
Board’s 2023 decision. None of Mr. Slater’s arguments
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SLATER v. DHS 6
pertain to the sole issue on appeal, i.e., whether the Board
properly applied collateral estoppel. Instead, they all re-
late to the merits of whether Mr. Slater is entitled to LEO
retirement coverage, which the Board did not reach.2
CONCLUSION
Because the Board did not err in its determination Mr.
Slater is collaterally estopped from bringing his claim of
entitlement to LEO retirement coverage, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
Costs to the government.
2 While the Board stated in a footnote that even if
Mr. Slater was not collaterally estopped his claim would
fail on the merits, we need not reach this issue because we
see no error in the Board’s application of collateral estop-
pel.
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