Causam Enterprises, Inc. v. International Trade Commission

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Appellant
v.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Appellee
ECOBEE TECHNOLOGIES ULC, DBA ECOBEE,
ITRON, INC., RESIDEO SMART HOMES
TECHNOLOGY (TIANJIN), ADEMCO, INC.,
ALARM.COM HOLDINGS, INC., ALARM.COM
INCORPORATED, ENERGYHUB, INC.,
Intervenors
______________________
2023-1769
______________________
Appeal from the United States International Trade
Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-1277.
______________________
Decided: October 15, 2025
______________________
J ONATHAN WEINBERG, King & Spalding LLP, Washing-
ton, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by
J EFFREY MARK T ELEP ; CHRISTOPHER CHARLES CAMPBELL ,
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, Washington, DC.
P ANYIN HUGHES , Office of the General Counsel, United
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 2
States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC,
argued for appellee. Also represented by CATHY CHEN,
MICHELLE W. K LANCNIK.
K IRK T. BRADLEY , Alston & Bird LLP, Charlotte, NC,
argued for intervenors Itron, Inc., Resideo Smart Homes
Technology (Tianjin), Ademco, Inc. Also represented by
L AUREN N ICOLE G RIFFIN, SCOTT BENJAMIN P LEUNE,
MATTHEW S. STEVENS .
MANNY CAIXEIRO, Venable LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for
intervenor ecobee Technologies ULC. Also represented by
MEGAN S. W OODWORTH , Washington, DC; STEVEN M.
L UBEZNY , Law Office of Edward H Rice, LLC, Northbrook,
IL.
K EITH HUMMEL , Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, New
York, NY, for intervenors Alarm.com Holdings, Inc.,
Alarm.com Incorporated, EnergyHub, Inc. Also repre-
sented by SHARONMOYEE G OSWAMI.
______________________
Before T ARANTO, CHEN, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
T ARANTO, Circuit Judge.
Causam Enterprises, Inc. (Causam), previously named
Causam Energy, Inc., owns several patents related to elec-
trical utilities’ ability to reduce demand for power in re-
sponse to conditions calling for a reduction, such as high
systemic demand in relation to available supply—so-called
“demand response” functionality. Causam filed a com-
plaint before the International Trade Commission (ITC or
Commission) alleging, as relevant now, that Resideo Smart
Homes Technology (Tianjin) and its domestic affiliate
Ademco, Inc. (collectively, Resideo) were violating sec-
tion 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, by im-
porting and selling certain internet-connected “smart”
thermostats whose operation infringes method claim 1 of
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 3
U.S. Patent No. 10,394,268 (issued August 27, 2019, on Ap-
plication No. 15/618,981, filed June 9, 2017)—which
Causam asserts it owns. Causam also named other re-
spondents, including ecobee, Inc., now known as ecobee
Technologies, ULC (ecobee), and their imported products
(which are not at issue in this appeal). Causam sought ex-
clusion of the accused products.
The Commission instituted an investigation in re-
sponse to Causam’s complaint. See Certain Smart Thermo-
stats, Load Control Switches, and Components Thereof,
Inv. No. 337-TA-1277, 2022 WL 17730771, at *2 (Nov. 16,
2022) (Initial Determination); J.A. 23. During the investi-
gation, as relevant here, respondents contended that
Causam did not own the ’268 patent, and Resideo con-
tended that its smart thermostats did not infringe the as-
serted claims of the patent. Initial Determination, at *14–
20, *33–38; J.A. 39–48, 72–80. The assigned administra-
tive law judge, after trial, agreed with both those conten-
tions and denied relief under section 337. Initial
Determination, at *14–20, *33–38; J.A. 39–48, 72–80. The
full Commission, on review, adopted the noninfringement
finding, while taking no position on the issue of ownership.
Certain Smart Thermostats, Load Control Switches, And
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1277, 2023 WL
2136484, at *1–3 (Feb. 16, 2023) (Commission Determina-
tion); J.A. 258–60. Causam has appealed the noninfringe-
ment determination only as to claim 1 and only as to
Resideo’s products.
Even before the Initial Determination was rendered,
the ’268 patent was challenged in the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) through a petition for an inter partes
review (IPR) under 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19, and after the
ITC’s decision, the PTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(the Board) instituted the requested review and then held
that all challenged claims (all but claim 12) were unpatent-
able. See ecobee Technologies ULC v. Causam Enterprises,
Inc., No. IPR2022-01339 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 19, 2024). Causam
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 4
appealed the Board’s final written decision, and today we
affirm that decision. See Causam Enterprises, Inc.
v. ecobee Technologies ULC, No. 24-1958, slip op. at 2, –––
F.4th –––, ––– (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (Causam v. ecobee).
In the present matter, Causam asks us to hold that it
owns the ’268 patent, arguing that ownership is a thresh-
old question because, if Causam is not the patent owner, it
lacks the injury in fact necessary for it to have Article III
standing in this court. We agree with Causam and hold
that it owns the ’268 patent. Although Causam also chal-
lenges the Commission’s noninfringement determination,
we do not reach that issue. In the Causam v. ecobee case,
we today affirm the Board’s holding that claim 1 is un-
patentable. That holding moots the noninfringement issue
in the present appeal, which we therefore dismiss.
I
The ancestry of the ’268 patent is relevant to the own-
ership issue before us. The ’268 patent issued from Appli-
cation No. 15/618,981, which is a continuation of a
continuation of Application No. 13/463,761. ’268 patent,
col. 1, lines 8–14; see 35 U.S.C. § 120; Manual of Patent Ex-
amining Procedure (MPEP) § 201.07 (“Continuation Appli-
cation”). In turn, the ’761 application was a continuation-
in-part of a continuation of a division of Application
No. 11/895,909 (filed August 28, 2007). ’268 patent, col. 1,
lines 14–22; see 35 U.S.C. § 121 (“Divisional applications”);
MPEP § 201.06 (“Divisional Application”); MPEP § 201.08
(“Continuation-in-Part Application”). The key point is that
a continuation-in-part is in the line of descent from the ’909
application to the ’268 patent.
A
Causam is listed—under its previous name, Causam
Energy, Inc.—as the owner of the ’268 patent, by assign-
ment from inventor Joseph Forbes, on the front page of the
patent and in the PTO records. J.A. 40001; see Initial
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 5
Determination, at *16 (“On January 18, 2018, Causam En-
ergy, Inc., was renamed Causam Enterprises, Inc., the
complainant in this investigation.”). The July 2017 assign-
ment document filed for the June 2017 Application
No. 15/618,981 (which issued as the ’268 patent) says that
the assignment was executed on September 16, 2014. J.A.
40000–01 (ITC Joint Exhibit JX-0009.1–0009.2). That is
the date of the assignment to Causam of the ’981 applica-
tion’s immediate parent, Application No. 14/456,306, an as-
signment that covers “continuations in whole or part.”
Certain Smart Thermostats, Load Control Switches, and
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1277, EDIS
No. 786215, at JX-0009.3–0009.4.
Earlier, on August 24, 2007, Mr. Forbes had assigned
the ’909 application (filed August 28, 2007), an ancestor of
the ’268 patent, to another entity, America Connect, Inc.
J.A. 21594–96. The 2007 assignment transferred owner-
ship of the “[i]nvention” of the ’909 application and “all pa-
tents which may be granted therefor” and “all divisions,
reissues, continuations and extensions thereof.” J.A. 21595
(emphasis added); see Intervenors’ Response Br. at 53
(quoting provision). Importantly, the 2007 assignment
does not list “continuations-in-part.”
Around 2009, Consert, Inc., of which Mr. Forbes was
both a co-founder and an employee, succeeded to America
Connect’s interest in the ’909 application. J.A. 22319. In
2010, Mr. Forbes executed an agreement with Consert, as-
signing to Consert rights in inventions he had developed or
would develop as its employee. J.A. 21762–73.
Shortly afterward, a dispute about ownership of intel-
lectual property arose between Mr. Forbes and Consert.
J.A. 22329. The parties resolved that dispute in 2013 with
a settlement that superseded the 2010 employment agree-
ment. J.A. 21880–90. Under the 2013 settlement, Mr.
Forbes assigned to Consert various patents and patent ap-
plications (termed “Consert Patents”). Causam Opening
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 6
Br. at 9; J.A. 21885. That settlement expressly excluded
certain patents (“Excluded Patents”) from the scope of the
assignment, and among the excluded patents were some
descendants of the ’909 application. Causam Opening Br.
at 9; J.A. 21885. The Consert Patents included the ’909
application itself, while its descendant continuation-in-
part, the ’761 application, was an excluded patent. J.A.
21881, 21883. Consert paid Mr. Forbes for a license to
practice the excluded patents, but it did not assign any
rights to Mr. Forbes. See J.A. 21885–86. The agreement
declared that no rights were being granted except as
stated. J.A. 21886.
The ’268 patent issued in 2019. Causam filed its ITC
complaint on July 28, 2021, alleging that Resideo and other
importers infringed the ’268 patent and several other
Causam demand-response patents in violation of sec-
tion 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. J.A.
379, 424–62; see Causam Opening Br. at 11.
B
Section 337 directs the Commission to investigate alle-
gations of importation of “articles that . . . infringe a valid
and enforceable United States patent,” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1)(B), (b), and, upon finding such infringement
and a specified domestic industry, to exclude the relevant
articles from entering the country, see id. § 1337(a)(2),
(c)–(d). Here, the Commission instituted an investigation
on September 2, 2021, in response to Causam’s complaint,
Initial Determination at *2; J.A. 23, and the matter was
tried to Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) Cheney,
Initial Determination, at *3; J.A. 25.
On November 16, 2022, CALJ Cheney issued an Initial
Determination, holding, as relevant here, that (1) Causam
did not own the four asserted patents and thus did not have
statutory standing (i.e., a statutory right of action) to bring
the complaint, Initial Determination, at *20; J.A. 48, and
(2) Resideo did not infringe the asserted claims, Initial
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 7
Determination, at *31–40, J.A. 67–83. Relevant here, the
CALJ’s holding that Causam did not own the ’268 patent
rested on his interpretation of the 2007 assignment, which
he determined assigned “all progeny” of the ’909 applica-
tion to America Connect, a formulation the CALJ viewed
as covering the ’268 patent when Mr. Forbes later at-
tempted to assign it to Causam. Initial Determination, at
*16; J.A. 42–43. The CALJ found no infringement after de-
termining that multiple claim limitations were not met by
Resideo’s accused thermostats. Initial Determination, at
*33–38; J.A. 72–80. Those determinations sufficed to con-
clude that no violation of section 337 was present.
Causam asked the full Commission to review the initial
determination, and on February 16, 2023, the Commission
rendered its decision. Commission Determination, at *1–3;
J.A. 258–60. It adopted only the CALJ’s noninfringement
finding, declining to adopt the holding that Causam did not
own the ’268 patent. Commission Determination, at *1–3;
J.A. 258–60. Causam timely appealed the Commission’s
determination to this court under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c).
Resideo and other respondents before the Commission, in-
cluding ecobee, intervened in the appeal.
After the Commission’s decision, the PTO’s Board in-
stituted a review of all claims (but claim 12) of the ’268 pa-
tent—as requested in the IPR petition filed before the
CALJ decision—and then held all challenged claims to be
unpatentable, including claim 1, which is the sole subject
of Causam’s appeal in the present matter. See ecobee
v. Causam, No. IPR2022-01339, at 2 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 19,
2024) (noting institution date of March 9, 2023). We
treated the two appeals as companion cases and heard ar-
gument in them the same day. Today, we affirm the
Board’s decision. See Causam v. ecobee, slip op. at 2, –––
F.4th at –––.
We have statutory jurisdiction over Causam’s appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) and 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c). This
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 8
case presents two jurisdictional questions: first, whether
Causam has Article III standing, and, second, whether our
decision today in ecobee moots all issues on appeal here.
II
A
We first address Causam’s Article III standing to bring
this appeal to this court. As we have explained today in
Causam v. ecobee, slip op. at 5–7, ––– F.4th at –––,
Causam, as the “party invoking federal jurisdiction[,] bears
the burden of establishing [the] elements” of Article III
standing to bring its case in federal court—namely, injury
in fact, traceability to the challenged conduct, and redress-
ability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
61 (1992). What suffices to establish standing, as with
other issues, varies with the stage of the litigation: Plead-
ings that, taken as true, plausibly allege standing suffice
to overcome a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
while evidence—specifically, of the required injury in
fact—is required at later stages such as summary judg-
ment or judgment after trial. See Causam v. ecobee, slip
op. at 5–7, ––– F.4th at ––– (discussing, e.g., Lujan and
Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1170–73
(Fed. Cir. 2017)).1
1 See, e.g., Incyte Corp. v. Sun Pharmaceutical In-
dustries, Inc., 136 F.4th 1096, 1101–02 (Fed. Cir. 2025)
(finding absence of injury in fact where unsuccessful IPR
challenger did not demonstrate substantial risk of infringe-
ment); Allgenesis Biotherapeutics Inc. v. Cloudbreak Ther-
apeutics, LLC, 85 F.4th 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2023)
(same); JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd., 898 F.3d
1217, 1219–21 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (same); Meenaxi Enterprise,
Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 38 F.4th 1067, 1072 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
2022) (stating requirement that appellant from Trademark
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 9
Here, the only interest of Causam’s assertedly injured
is its interest as owner of the ’268 patent; Causam does not
claim an interest in reversing the Commission’s denial of
section 337 relief if it is not the patent owner. See Causam
Opening Br. at 18. And the present appeal comes to this
court after development of a full evidentiary record on own-
ership and a determination on the issue by the CALJ (but
not by the Commission). Initial Determination, at *14–20;
J.A. 39–48. That ownership issue, moreover, as noted in-
fra, does not involve disputes about facts, but reduces to a
legal question of contract interpretation. A standard tied
to evidence, not mere assertion, therefore applies.
The Commission and Intervenors (Respondents before
the agency) argue that we need not decide the ownership
question because Causam’s mere assertion of ownership
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement, so that there is no
need to consider evidence on the issue. Commission’s Re-
sponse Br. at 30–34; Intervenors’ Response Br. at 49–52.
In support, they rely on two of our recent decisions: Lone
Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Technology Corp.,
925 F.3d 1225, 1234–35 (Fed. Cir. 2019), and Schwend-
imann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., 959 F.3d 1065,
1071 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Those cases are inapposite. Lone
Star, unlike this case, involved an appeal from a district
court of a motion to dismiss, and we straightforwardly ap-
plied Lujan when we said, “[a]t the pleading stage, ‘general
factual allegations’” may establish standing. 925 F.3d at
1234 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561) (emphasis added).
And similarly, in Schwendimann, although we said that al-
legations sufficed to establish standing, we were referring
Trial and Appeal Board have Article III standing); Brook-
lyn Brewery Corp. v. Brooklyn Brew Shop, 17 F.4th 129,
139–140 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding absence of standing
where trademark cancellation petitioner did not demon-
strate participation in relevant market).
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 10
to a party’s contention that the failure of the district court
to dismiss the action for lack of standing was erroneous.
See 959 F.3d at 1070–71.
The Commission also argues that Causam has consti-
tutional standing simply because it has a statutory right to
appeal an adverse decision. See Commission’s Response
Br. at 31 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c)). That contention lacks
merit. Although “Congress may elevate harms that exist
in the real world . . . to actionable legal status, it may not
simply enact an injury into existence.” TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 426 (2021) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Consumer Watchdog
v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 753 F.3d 1258,
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that Congress’s creation of a
statutory right of appeal “does not simply override the re-
quirement of injury in fact”). We have often found lack of
constitutional standing despite statutory authority for ap-
peal. See supra at p.8 n.1 (citing cases). Thus, Causam
requires evidence showing its ownership of the ’268 patent
to meet the Article III standing requirement.
Long ago, we stated: “[T]his court does not sit to review
what the Commission has not decided.” Beloit Corp. v. Val-
met Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984). On that ba-
sis, the Commission suggests that we must ignore
ownership entirely because the Commission did not take a
position on whether Causam owns the ’268 patent. Com-
mission’s Response Br. at 35–36. We reject that sugges-
tion. Beloit does not reach so far as to preclude our
consideration of evidence in the record that is relevant to
Article III standing, a matter we are duty-bound to con-
sider, just because the Commission (which is not bound by
Article III) did not make a finding about the evidence. And
we need not decide whether we would defer to factual find-
ings made in an initial determination that are relevant to
standing but were not adopted by the Commission, because
there is no dispute of fact here—only a legal issue of con-
tract interpretation.
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 11
B
We conclude that Causam has established ownership
(hence Article III standing) based on the evidence in the
record of the agency proceeding itself (with no need, as
there sometimes is, for new evidentiary submissions made
on appeal). Causam and Intervenors agree that the three
Forbes agreements—the 2007 assignment, the 2010 em-
ployment agreement, and the 2013 settlement—determine
whether Causam owns the ’268 patent. See Causam Open-
ing Br. at 18–27; Intervenors’ Response Br. at 52–61. The
Commission, for its part, has declined to address the merits
of the ownership issue. See Commission’s Response Br. at
35–37. Ownership turns, then, on a purely legal question
of contract interpretation. See Textron Defense Systems
v. Widnall, 143 F.3d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998). No party
before us suggests that any differences in state law matter
here, so we rely on general principles of contract law.
“Contract interpretation begins with the language of
the written agreement.” NVT Technologies, Inc. v. United
States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “[T]he plain
and unambiguous meaning of a written agreement con-
trols.” Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.3d 1378,
1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Craft Machine Works,
Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1110, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
“Further, we cannot insert words into the contract that the
parties never agreed to.” Anchorage v. United States, 123
F.4th 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing George Hyman
Construction Co. v. United States, 832 F.2d 574, 581 (Fed.
Cir. 1987)).
The issue of ownership boils down to the effect of the
2007 assignment. If that assignment (to America Connect,
predecessor of Consert) covered the later ’761 continuation-
in-part application (filed in 2012), then Mr. Forbes did not
own that application at the time he assigned it and its con-
tinuations (like the ’268 patent) to Causam in 2014. And if
the 2007 assignment did not cover the ’761 application,
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 12
then the 2014 assignment establishes Causam’s ownership
of the ’268 patent. See J.A. 40001.
Notably, the 2010 employment agreement between Mr.
Forbes and Consert (successor to America Connect) has no
operative effect on ownership, as it was expressly super-
seded by the Forbes-Consert 2013 settlement. J.A. 21888.
The 2013 settlement, for its part, did not transfer any
rights (back) from Consert to Mr. Forbes, so if he had al-
ready lost rights in the ’761 application, he did not regain
them by the 2013 settlement. Conversely, if Mr. Forbes
owned the ’761 application in 2013, the 2013 settlement did
not affect his rights because that application was
“[e]xcluded.” J.A. 21883.
Under the operative language of the 2007 assignment,
the crux of the matter is whether to interpret the assign-
ment of the “[i]nvention” of the ’909 application and “all di-
visions, reissues, continuations and extensions thereof” to
include the ’761 continuation-in-part application. J.A.
21595. We agree with Causam that the answer is no—so
that Mr. Forbes retained ownership of the ’761 application
and could assign it to Causam in 2014.
As an initial matter, we do not agree with Causam
about one argument it makes for that conclusion. Causam
contends that we interpreted a similar assignment in Uni-
versity of West Virginia v. VanVoorhies to exclude “second
generation” applications and reasons that the 2007 assign-
ment therefore reaches only the children of the ’909 appli-
cation (not grandchildren or further descendants). See 342
F.3d 1290, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Causam Opening Br. at
21–22. That is a misreading of VanVoorhies. The quoted
language from VanVoorhies must be understood as using
the term “second generation” not as describing the number
of filing steps in the chain from the primary application,
but as referring to different stages of development of the
underlying technology. See VanVoorhies, 342 F.3d at
1294–96; id., VanVoorhies Opening Br., No. 02-1533 (Fed.
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 13
Cir. Apr. 28, 2003), 2003 WL 24018589, at *8–9. After all,
the three cited “second generation” patents (U.S. Patent
Nos. 6,218,998, 6,239,760, and 6,320,550) do not even refer
in their “related application” paragraphs (identifying pri-
ority-affecting predecessors) to U.S. Patent Application
07/992,970, which was the primary application defining
the scope of the assignment at issue. VanVoorhies is thus
inapposite.
But we agree with Causam that the omission of “con-
tinuations-in-part” from the coverage of the 2007 assign-
ment at issue here is decisive. We reject Intervenors’
contention that the word “continuations” in the assignment
should be read to include continuations-in-part. Interve-
nors’ Response Br. at 53. Adopting Intervenors’ position
would amount to “insert[ing] words into the contract that
the parties never agreed to,” Anchorage, 123 F.4th at 1320,
because continuations and continuations-in-part are so
widely understood to be different. The difference is re-
flected in the separate treatment of the two in the MPEP—
currently, as well as in the version in effect before the 2007
assignment, and since the original edition was published
in 1948. See MPEP §§ 201.07, 201.08 (current); see also
MPEP §§ 201.07, 201.08 (8th ed., Rev. 5, Aug. 2006); MPEP
§§ 4-1-7, -8, -11 (1948). The two types of descendant appli-
cations are practically and legally distinct, in a way rele-
vant to assignment. Importantly for inventors assigning
rights, a continuation may not add any new matter to the
parent application, while a continuation-in-part does in-
clude new matter, and need only repeat a “substantial por-
tion” of the parent. MPEP § 201.08; see id. § 201.07–08.
An inventor might well wish to assign away continuations
of an invention and keep the rights to continuations-in-part
(and the included new matter). The distinction also has
legal consequences for assignments: For a continuation, re-
cordation of assignment of the parent is effective as to the
child, while the same is not true of a continuation-in-part.
See MPEP § 306. Knowing that, an assignee might wish to
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 14
contract with respect to continuations-in-part differently or
separately from continuations. Intervenors’ interpretation
is unreasonable in disregarding the familiar and signifi-
cant distinctions between a term used and one not used in
the 2007 assignment.
Alternatively, Intervenors urge us to extend the rea-
soning of Regents of University of New Mexico v. Knight to
hold that the assignment of an invention encompasses con-
tinuations-in-part. 321 F.3d 1111, 1119–20 (Fed. Cir.
2003); see Intervenors’ Response Br. at 56–57. We do not
think the suggested extension is warranted. In Knight, we
held that an assignment of an invention and certain types
of descendants reached continuations-in-part even though
the assignment mentioned only “continuations.” 321 F.3d
at 1119–20. Critically, however, there were two additional
relevant agreements involving identical parties. Id. at
1118–20. It was the combination of all three agreements,
and their “broad language,” that we held to be “sufficient
to obligate” the inventors to assign “all related patents and
applications, including [continuation-in-part] applica-
tions,” with respect to certain inventions. Id at 1120 (em-
phasis in original). Although the 2007 assignment in this
case, like the one in Knight, has an “[i]nvention” as its ob-
ject, J.A. 21595, there is no evidence here that we ought to
read “invention” as expansively as we did in Knight. And
in the absence of such evidence, the proper interpretation
is one that respects rather than overrides important dis-
tinctions in familiar terminology.
For those reasons, we conclude that the 2007 assign-
ment unambiguously excludes the ’761 application, a con-
tinuation-in-part of the ’909 application. The 2007
assignment did not affect Mr. Forbes’s rights in the ’761
application nor, by extension, the ’268 patent (a continua-
tion of a continuation of the ’761 application). Mr. Forbes
had good title to the ’268 patent when he assigned it to
Causam, and Causam therefore owns the patent. Thus,
Causam has carried its burden to show Article III standing.
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 15
III
Although we conclude that Causam has standing, we
may not exercise jurisdiction if this case is moot. “If a judg-
ment has become moot while awaiting review, [the c]ourt
may not consider its merits[.]” U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.
v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1994) (al-
terations in original removed) (quoting Walling v. James V.
Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944)). There is “no case or
controversy, and a suit becomes moot, when the issues pre-
sented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cog-
nizable interest in the outcome.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568
U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “A case remains live ‘[a]s long as the parties have
a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the
litigation’ . . . .” MOAC Mall Holdings, LLC v. Transform
Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288, 295 (2023) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172). This appeal is moot
if Causam has no right to relief under section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 851 F.2d 342, 343–44 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (finding mootness where expiration of a patent de-
prived the Commission of power to enter an exclusion or-
der); see also, e.g., Hyosung TNS Inc. v. International Trade
Commission, 926 F.3d 1353, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (find-
ing mootness in similar circumstances, even when there
was co-pending litigation).
In Causam v. ecobee, we today affirm the Patent Trial
and Appeals Board’s holding that claim 1 of the ’268 patent
is unpatentable for obviousness. See Causam v. ecobee, slip
op. at 2, ––– F.4th at –––. Causam has no right to an ex-
clusion order because section 337 requires infringement of
a “valid and enforceable” patent, but claim 1, the only claim
asserted on appeal, is not patentable. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1)(B). Although there is co-pending litigation, see
Causam Opening Br. at viii, that is not a sufficient interest
to keep the case alive, see Hyosung, 925 F.3d at 1358–59
(collecting cases). Causam concedes that affirmance in
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CAUSAM ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ITC 16
Causam v. ecobee moots all issues here. Oral Arg. at 5:00–
23, available at https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argu-
ments/2317 6909032025.mp3. We conclude that our deci-
sion in Causam v. ecobee deprives Causam of a legally
cognizable interest in reversal. We therefore dismiss this
appeal as moot.
IV
The appeal from the Commission’s decision is dis-
missed.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
DISMISSED
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