Ats Ford Drive Investment, LLC v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT, LLC, ET AL.,
Plaintiff
GODBY PROPERTIES, LP, REZIN FAMILY
INVESTMENTS LLS, C/O GREENSTONE ASSET
MANAGEMENT, BRIAN L. SCHOONVELD, GRACE
L. SCHOONVELD, CO-TRUSTEES OF THE BRIAN
L. SCHOONVELD AND GRACE L. SCHOONVELD
REVOCABLE TRUST UTA 6/13/00, MAYS
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT COMPANY LLP,
JULIA ANN MCKIM, KIMBERLY A. JONES,
CAESAR B. DOYLE, VASCO WALTON, BRINKLEY
INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2023-1760
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:19-cv-00471-MMS, Senior Judge Margaret M.
Sweeney.
______________________
Decided: May 5, 2025
______________________
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ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT , LLC v. US 2
M ARK F. H EARNE , II, True North Law Group, LLC, St.
Louis, MO, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also repre-
sented by S TEPHEN S. DAVIS.
D AVID S. FRANKEL , Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division, United States Department of Justice,
Boston, MA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
sented by T ODD K IM, Washington, DC.
______________________
Before LOURIE , S TOLL, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
This appeal originates from a rails-to-trails conversion
in Indiana. Plaintiffs-Appellants are a group of landown-
ers1 who own land adjacent to, and purportedly underlying,
the former Indiana Nickel Plate Line. Plaintiffs sued the
United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking com-
pensation for an alleged taking arising from the operation
of the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983
(“Trails Act”), 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Specifically, Plaintiffs
alleged that the issuance of Notices of Interim Trail Use
(“NITUs”) constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. The
Court of Federal Claims rejected Plaintiffs’ request to cer-
tify a question to the Indiana Supreme Court, held that
Plaintiffs lacked a compensable property interest, and
granted summary judgment to the United States. See ATS
Ford Drive Invest., LLC v. United States, 156 Fed. Cl. 397,
406, 418–19 (2021) (“Decision”).2 We affirm.
1 Several other Indiana landowners with similar
claims, joined by two professors of property law, filed an
amicus brief supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants.
2 Plaintiffs-Appellants were joined by other plain-
tiffs at the Court of Federal Claims. The Court of Federal
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I. BACKGROUND
In 1846, the Indiana General Assembly chartered the
Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company and tasked it
with building a railroad. Decision at 400; 1846 Ind. Acts
ch. CLXXXVI (the “Charter”). Sections 15 and 16 of the
Charter authorized the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad
Company to acquire land either voluntarily through “relin-
quishment of so much of the land as may be necessary for
the construction and location of the road” or by eminent do-
main. Charter §§ 15, 16. Section 19 of the Charter pro-
vides that when the corporation “shall have procured the
right of way, as hereinbefore provided, they shall be seized,
in fee simple, of the right to such land, and they shall have
sole use and occupancy of the same.” Id. § 19 (emphasis
added).
By 1853, the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company
had persuaded Appellants’ predecessors-in-interest to sign
written releases (the “Releases”) relinquishing strips of
land on which to build the railroad. Decision at 401; see
J.A. 217–304. Each of the Releases contains materially
identical language stating that the landowner agrees to
“release and relinquish to the Peru and Indianapolis Rail-
road Company the right of way for so much of said road as
Claims divided the plaintiffs into three groups based on the
different liability issues and threshold title issues faced.
Decision at 403. The Court of Federal Claims decision in
2021 addresses the summary judgment motions for one of
these groups. Id. at 404–05. The Court of Federal Claims
later issued an opinion addressing the summary judgment
motions for another group of plaintiffs that applied this
earlier decision for a subgroup of plaintiffs. See ATS Ford
Drive Investment, LLC v. United States, 159 Fed. Cl. 132,
155 (2022) (citing Decision at 414–15).
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may pass through or cut”3 a described parcel. Decision
at 401–03; see, e.g., J.A. 218, 221–22, 235, 239, 244, 249,
254, 259, 263, 268, 272, 275, 281, 285, 289, 293, 298, 302;
see also J.A. 226, 230 (containing immaterial wording dif-
ferences); cf. Charter § 15 (authorizing the Peru and Indi-
anapolis Railroad Company to acquire land through
“relinquishment of so much of the land as may be necessary
for the construction and location of the road”).
A railroad line, now known as the Nickel Plate Line,
was constructed on the relinquished land. Decision at 403;
J.A. 371–75. The ownership of the railroad line subse-
quently passed through several successors until Hamilton
County and the cities of Fishers and Noblesville became
joint owners of the line. Decision at 403; see, e.g.,
J.A. 104–05.
In 2017, the municipalities informed the Surface
Transportation Board that they wanted to invoke the
Trails Act to convert the railroad line into a recreational
trail. Decision at 403; J.A. 103, 106, 107. In 2018, the mu-
nicipalities formally requested that the Surface Transpor-
tation Board issue NITUs for the portions of the railroad
line passing through their municipalities. Decision at 403;
J.A. 125–26; J.A. 139; J.A. 373–75. The Surface Transpor-
tation Board issued the NITUs on December 21, 2018, and
the municipalities became trail sponsors in 2019. Decision
at 403; J.A. 139–41; J.A. 371.
In 2020, Plaintiffs sued the United States in the Court
of Federal Claims, alleging that the trail corridor conver-
sion constituted a compensable taking under the Fifth
Amendment. Decision at 400; see J.A. 73–100. The parties
each moved for partial summary judgment. Decision
at 403; J.A. 170; J.A. 314. The United States contended
3 Capitalization, spacing, and punctuation differ
among the Releases.
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ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT , LLC v. US 5
that, under settled Indiana law, the Releases conveyed the
land underlying the Nickel Plate Line in fee simple and
that Plaintiffs therefore lacked any property interest in the
land they alleged was taken. Decision at 407; J.A. 322–26.
While Plaintiffs argued that the Releases conveyed only an
easement, they also sought certification of the question of
the scope of the Releases’ conveyance to the Indiana Su-
preme Court. Decision at 407, 418; J.A. 177; J.A. 215.
The Court of Federal Claims agreed with the United
States and granted summary judgment on the claims now
on appeal. Decision at 406–19. It held that the Indiana
Supreme Court’s decisions in Newcastle & Richmond Rail-
road Co. v. Peru & Indianapolis Railroad Co., 3 Ind. 464
(1852) (“Newcastle”) and Indianapolis, Peru, & Chicago
Railway Co. v. Rayl, 69 Ind. 424 (1880) (“Rayl”) are “bind-
ing precedent” that conclusively establish that releases au-
thorized by and executed under the Peru and Indianapolis
Railroad Company’s legislative charter “conveyed fee sim-
ple estates.” Decision at 412; see also Decision at 412–15
(finding that the relevant portions of Newcastle and Rayl
were not dicta and that the Indiana Supreme Court has not
abrogated Newcastle and Rayl). Thus, the Court of Federal
Claims held that the Releases conveyed fee simple title to
the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company and that
Plaintiffs therefore lacked a compensable property interest
under the Takings Clause. Decision at 414–17. The Court
of Federal Claims declined to certify Plaintiffs’ proposed
question to the Indiana Supreme Court, holding that these
cases were “directly applicable to the legislative charter
and releases at issue in this case.” Decision at 414. Fur-
thermore, fairness and judicial efficiency weighed against
certification. See Decision at 418.
Plaintiffs-Appellants timely appealed. We have juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
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II. S TANDARD OF REVIEW
“Whether a taking has occurred is a question of law
based on factual underpinnings.” Chi. Coating Co.
v. United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (ci-
tation omitted). However, summary judgment is “in all re-
spects reviewed de novo.” Cienega Gardens v. United
States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Court of
Federal Claims “grant[s] summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims R. 56(a).
A decision of whether to certify a question “rests in the
sound discretion of the federal court.” Lehman Bros.
v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). Appellate courts thus
retain their own independent discretion when considering
a request that they certify a question. See, e.g., id.
at 389–92 (reviewing an appellate court’s exercise of that
discretion); Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1235
(10th Cir. 2007) (“Certification by this court in no way im-
plies an abuse of discretion by the district court in failing
to certify, but only indicates our independent judgment on
that question.”). While Appellants have appealed the trial
court’s decision not to certify, Appellants’ Br. 26, because
Appellants have made a renewed request for certification
to this court, Appellants’ Br. 7, “[o]ur consideration of the
renewed request makes it unnecessary to determine
whether the [trial] court abused its discretion in refusing
the earlier one.” Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d
88, 100 n. 11 (1st Cir. 1999).
III. D ISCUSSION
This case turns on whether the Releases conveyed fee
simple estates or easements to the Peru and Indianapolis
Railroad Company. If the Releases conveyed fee simple es-
tates, Appellants “would have no right or interest in those
parcels and could have no claim related to those parcels for
a taking.” Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533
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(Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc). “If, on the other hand, the Rail-
road acquired only easements for use,” the next inquiry
would be to determine the scope of the easements and
whether the easements were terminated prior to the al-
leged taking. Id. Appellants and Amici argue that the
Court of Federal Claims erred by refusing to certify a ques-
tion to the Indiana Supreme Court and instead finding that
Newcastle and Rayl dictated that the Releases conveyed fee
simple estates. As explained below, we disagree.
A.
We first address the parties’ substantive arguments re-
garding whether the Releases convey fee simple estates or
easements. As “we must apply the law of the state where
the property interest arises,” we apply Indiana law. Chi.
Coating, 892 F.3d at 1170. We conclude that Indiana law
at the time of the relinquishments is clear: the Releases
conveyed to the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company
fee simple estates.
The text of the Charter supports holding that the Re-
leases conveyed fee simple title. Section 15 of the Charter
authorizes the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company to
obtain property via “a relinquishment of so much of the
land as may be necessary for the construction and location
of the road . . . .” Charter § 15. Section 19 states that
“when said corporation shall have procured the right of
way, as hereinbefore provided, they shall be seized, in fee
simple, of the right to such land, and they shall have the
sole use and occupancy of the same . . . .” Charter § 19.
Thus, the plain language of the charter supports a convey-
ance in fee simple rather than an easement. Charter § 19;
cf. J.A. 217–304.
The Indiana Supreme Court confirmed in Newcastle
that the Charter, at the time of the relinquishments, gave
rise to the conveyance of fee simple estates. In that case,
the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company sought to
block a competitor from constructing a railroad that would
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ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT , LLC v. US 8
cross over the Nickel Plate Line, arguing that Section 19
provided that the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Com-
pany “shall have the sole use and occupancy of the” land it
acquires. Newcastle, 3 Ind. at 468 (quoting Charter § 19).
The Indiana Supreme Court held that Section 19 of the
Charter did not grant the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad
Company the right to prevent other railroads from crossing
its lines or the exclusive possession of that land. Id. In-
stead, the court held Section 19 was:
[S]imply intended as declaratory of the effect
which the releases and condemnations of land spo-
ken of in the 15th and 16th sections should have;
that is, whether they should be taken to convey an
easement, a right of way merely, or a fee simple ti-
tle, and declaring it should be the latter . . . .
Id. In other words, the Indiana Supreme Court held that
Section 19 of the Charter provided that landowners con-
veyed fee simple titles, rather than easements, when
standard releases of land pursuant to Section 15 of the
Charter were executed.
The Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed this under-
standing of the Charter in Rayl. In Rayl, the parties dis-
puted whether the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad
Company’s successor railroad had the right to construct a
side-track to its railway line. 69 Ind. at 424–25. The Rayl
plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest signed a release with ma-
terially identical granting language to the Releases. Com-
pare id. at 426 (“I . . . release and relinquish to the Peru
and Indianapolis Railroad Company the right of way for so
much of said road as may pass through and out the follow-
ing piece or parcel of land . . . .”), with e.g., J.A. 235 (agree-
ing to “RELEASE and RELINQUISH to the ‘PERU AND
INDIANAPOLIS RAILROAD COMPANY’ the right of way
for so much of said road as may pass through or cut the
following piece, parcel, or lot of land . . . .”). The Releases
were also to the same company, were governed by the same
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ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT , LLC v. US 9
legislative charter, and were executed around the same
time as the release at issue in Rayl. J.A. 217–304; 69 Ind.
at 426.
The plaintiffs in Rayl raised two arguments to void the
relinquishment: (1) the relinquishment “did not specify the
extent or width of the land intended to be relinquished by
it;” and (2) “at the time such relinquishment was made, the
legal title to the land described in it was not in [the plain-
tiffs’ predecessor-in-interest], but in the United States.”
69 Ind. at 428. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the
first argument by holding that the Charter “form[ed] a part
of the contract of relinquishment” so the Peru and Indian-
apolis Railroad Company received the “right to take and
appropriate a strip of ground, over the tract specified, not
exceeding eighty feet in width.” Id. at 429. The Indiana
Supreme Court rejected the second argument by holding
that it did not need to inquire as to whether the plaintiffs’
predecessor-in interest, “at the time he executed the relin-
quishment, had such an inchoate interest in the land as
enabled him to convey some estate in it.” Id. The court
held “[t]hat relinquishment, as we have construed it, sup-
plemented by section 19 . . . purported to convey to the
company an estate in fee-simple to so much of the land de-
scribed in it as constituted the right of way through the
land under such relinquishment.” Id. The Indiana Su-
preme Court stated that “whatever title [the plaintiffs’ pre-
decessor-in-interest] subsequently acquired to the land
relinquished by him enured to the benefit of the company.”
Id. Thus, the court concluded that the strip of land for the
side-track was, “and has since continued to be, the property
of the Indianapolis, Peru and Chicago Railway Company.”
Id. at 429–30.
Appellants and Amici argue that Newcastle and Rayl
are distinguishable despite holding that materially identi-
cal releases conveyed fee simple estates. Appellants’ Br.
47–50; Amicus Br. 6–12. We disagree. While Appellants
contend that the court in Newcastle only held that the
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Charter permitted, but did not mandate, conveyance of fee
simple estates and did not address the effect of any specific
conveyance, Appellants’ Br. 48–50, the court in Newcastle
plainly stated that Section 19 of the Charter was “declara-
tory of the effect which the releases and condemnations of
land spoken of in the 15th and 16th sections should have”
and “whether [the releases] should be taken to convey an
easement, a right of way merely, or a fee-simple title, and
declaring it should be the latter.” 3 Ind. at 468. By its
terms, Newcastle purports to resolve the question in this
case. Moreover, Rayl resolves the effect of a materially
identical conveyance by stating that it “purported to convey
to the company an estate in fee-simple.” 69 Ind. at 429.
Amici argue that Rayl dealt with what the release at issue
“purported to” convey, as opposed to what it actually con-
veyed. Amicus Br. 10–11. However, the context in Rayl
indicates that the Indiana Supreme Court was merely ac-
knowledging the dispute about whether the grantor pos-
sessed the title he purported to convey, not casting doubt
on the effect of that conveyance. 69 Ind. at 429. Neither
Newcastle nor Rayl is distinguishable from this case.
Amici argue that the relevant portions of Newcastle
and Rayl, addressing whether the Peru and Indianapolis
Railroad Company received a fee simple title or an ease-
ment, are dicta. Amicus Br. 5, 8, 11. We again disagree.
In Newcastle, the Indiana Supreme Court faced a choice on
how to interpret Section 19 of the Charter and whether it
gave the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company an ex-
clusive right to the land or only declared that fee simple
title was conveyed by releases and relinquishments pursu-
ant to the Charter. 3 Ind. at 465–68. Thus, by deciding
that Section 19 of the Charter did not grant an exclusive
right to the land, the court in Newcastle necessarily decided
that Section 19 declared that releases of land executed pur-
suant to Section 15 transferred fee simple estates. Id.
at 468; see also State v. Hardy, 7 N.E.3d 396, 401
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (explaining that a statement is “not
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ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT , LLC v. US 11
dicta” when it is “necessary for [the court’s] determination
of the issues”) (emphasis omitted). Similarly, the determi-
nation in Rayl that the release conveyed a fee simple title
was necessary to the holdings that “whatever title [the pre-
decessor-in-interest] subsequently acquired to the land re-
linquished by him enured to the benefit of the company”
and that “the strip of ground in controversy” was “the prop-
erty of the Indianapolis, Peru and Chicago Railway Com-
pany.” 69 Ind. at 429–30. Stated differently, for the land
to be the property of the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad
Company’s successor railway company, and for any title to
have enured to the railway company, it necessarily must
have been true that fee simple title was conveyed. Accord-
ingly, the holdings of Newcastle and Rayl that the Peru and
Indianapolis Railroad Company received fee simple title
are not dicta.
Appellants and Amici point to several cases that they
contend demonstrate that Indiana law has shifted over
time toward the general proposition that the language of a
charter is less important than the language of the convey-
ance. Appellants’ Br. 33–41; Amicus Br. 16–23; see, e.g.,
Ross, Inc. v. Legler, 199 N.E.2d 346, 347–49 (Ind. 1964);
Cincinnati, I., St. L & C.R. Co. v. Geisel, 21 N.E. 470, 470
(Ind. 1889); Vandalia R. Co. v. Topping, 113 N.E. 421, 422
(Ind. 1916). The cases cited by Appellants and Amici sup-
port the proposition that modern Indiana law “generally”
presumes that conveying a “right of way,” absent contrary
indication, conveys only an easement. Brown v. Penn Cent.
Corp., 510 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ind. 1987); cf. Macy Elevator,
Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 708, 727–28 (2011) (ac-
knowledging this “general rule” of conveying easements
but also recognizing that it has exceptions). However, none
of the cited cases purports to overturn Newcastle and Rayl
as to the effect of the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Com-
pany’s legislative charter or the effect of a release materi-
ally identical to those at issue in this case. See Quick
v. Taylor, 16 N.E. 588, 589 (Ind. 1888) (noting, in the
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prescription context, that an “express statute authorizing
the appropriation of the fee-simple” is an exception to the
general rule that an easement is conveyed). Separately,
even if Indiana law has changed such that the Releases
would convey an easement today, we must apply “the law
in effect at the time the various arrangements were en-
tered into.” Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2005). Thus, Appellants’ and Amici’s argument
that the general approach today is different is unpersua-
sive compared to the specific and binding holdings of New-
castle and Rayl.
Indeed, subsequent precedent has reaffirmed the hold-
ings of Newcastle and Rayl. The Indiana Supreme Court
has recognized that the “judicial construction” of Section 19
of the Charter in Newcastle and Rayl was binding not just
upon future interpretations of the Charter but upon future
interpretations of similarly worded charters. Cleveland,
C., C. & I.R. Co. v. Coburn, 91 Ind. 557, 557–60 (Ind. 1883).
In Coburn, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed a simi-
larly worded railroad charter and cited Newcastle for the
proposition that “unconditional relinquishment of the land
undoubtedly would have vested in the railroad company
the absolute fee simple of the land . . . .” Id. at 569–70.
While the court in Coburn ultimately concluded that the
release in that case was conditional because the landowner
had “reserve[d] the right to lay down and keep a railroad
track in front of the lots adjoining the road,” and thereby
conveyed “an estate upon condition subsequent” rather
than a fee simple estate, Coburn demonstrates that New-
castle and Rayl are binding for unconditional grants such
as those in the Releases. See id. at 560–562.
The Indiana Supreme Court again reaffirmed Newcas-
tle and Rayl in Douglass v. Thomas, where it explained that
“it was held in [Rayl] that an instrument conveying the
right of way to the railroad company there concerned, sup-
plemented by the nineteenth section of the act under which
it was incorporated, did have th[e] effect” of conveying “a
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ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT , LLC v. US 13
fee-simple” rather than “a mere right of way.” 2 N.E. 562,
563–64 (Ind. 1885).4 The court in Douglass distinguished
Rayl by noting that there was no information in the record
about the nature of the Fort Wayne & Chicago Railroad
Company’s charter and that, without information about
the charter, it had to “construe the deed according to the
terms employed in the instrument.” Id. at 564. Douglass
thus supports the binding nature of Newcastle and Rayl as
to the effect of the Charter and similarly worded charters.
See also Meyer v. Pittsburgh, C., C & St. L. Ry. Co.,
113 N.E. 443, 445–46 (Ind. App. 1916) (citing Newcastle
and Coburn and noting that “the question of the title ac-
quired by relinquishment or condemnation under the act is
not an open one” because “in the absence of a contract to
the contrary, the lands involved are acquired in fee”). In-
diana courts have consistently recognized Newcastle and
Rayl are clear and controlling binding precedent, albeit
limited to cases like this one with unconditional releases
governed by particularly worded charters.
In sum, we conclude that, under Indiana law, the Re-
leases here conveyed fee simple titles.
B.
Appellants ask this court to certify to the Indiana Su-
preme Court the question of the scope of the Releases’ con-
veyance. Appellants’ Br. 27–33, 52. We decline to do so.
The presence of clear, binding Indiana law precludes
Appellants’ request for certification. The Indiana Supreme
Court accepts certified questions only when “it appears to
the federal court that a proceeding presents an issue of
state law that is determinative of the case and on which
there is no clear controlling Indiana precedent.”
4 Douglass contains a typo: it refers to “Rayl” as
“Rage” but cites the holding and case number of Rayl.
2 N.E. at 563.
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ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT , LLC v. US 14
Ind. R. App. P. 64; see Cedar Farm, Harrison Cnty., Inc.
v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 658 F.3d 807, 813
(7th Cir. 2011) (describing lack of clear controlling prece-
dent as a requirement for certification to the Indiana Su-
preme Court). This court has similarly emphasized that
we do not certify questions absent “real doubt about the
state’s law on one or several of the issues to be decided.”
Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2004); see also id. at 1381 (“[C]ourts have a duty
to decide the cases before them whenever it reasonably can
be done. Basic fairness, avoidance of unwarranted delay
and the imposition of additional costs on the parties, and
conservation of judicial resources, all dictate that we
should decide . . . case[s] . . . on the law [when] we can.”);
cf. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,
79 (1997) (“Novel, unsettled questions of state law . . . are
necessary before federal courts may avail themselves of
state certification procedures.”).
The question before this court, according to Indiana
courts, is “not an open one.” Meyer, 113 N.E. at 445–46.
Even if we were to characterize Appellants and Amici as
arguing that the Indiana Supreme Court could overturn
Newcastle and Rayl, the “purpose of certification is to as-
certain what the state law is, not, when the state court has
already said what it is, to afford a party an opportunity to
persuade the court to say something else.” Tarr v. Man-
chester Ins. Corp., 544 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1976); accord
Wright & Miller 17A Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4248 (2024) (“If the state court has already said what the
law is, a federal court . . . should not certify a question in
the hope of persuading the state court to change its mind.”);
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471 (1987) (“It would
be manifestly inappropriate to certify a question in a case
where, as here, there is no uncertain question of state
law . . . . A federal court may not properly ask a state court
if it would care in effect to rewrite a statute.”). Moreover,
the Indiana Supreme Court affords special force to stare
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ATS FORD DRIVE INVESTMENT , LLC v. US 15
decisis where, as here, “disturb[ing] the prior ruling would
probably affect real property and vested rights.” Nash
Eng’g Co. v. Marcy Realty Corp., 54 N.E.2d 263, 268
(Ind. 1944); accord Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620
(1983) (“Our reports are replete with reaffirmations that
questions affecting titles to land, once decided, should no
longer be considered open.”), decision supplemented,
466 U.S. 144 (1984). Appellants’ request to certify a ques-
tion fails because the Indiana Supreme Court has said
what the law is: the Releases conveyed fee simple titles to
the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company.
For the reasons stated, we decline to certify the ques-
tion of the scope of the Releases’ conveyance to the Indiana
Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have considered Appellants’ remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the above reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims.
AFFIRMED
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