Atos, LLC, Dba Ridemetric v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Cross-Appellant 2023-1621, 2023-1849 Appeals from the…

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ATOS, LLC, DBA RIDEMETRIC,
Appellant
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Cross-Appellant
______________________
2023-1621, 2023-1849
______________________
Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2021-
01449.
______________________
Decided: May 23, 2025
______________________
ADAM G. U NIKOWSKY , Jenner & Block LLP, Washing-
ton, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by
BENJAMIN J. BRADFORD, REGINALD J. HILL , Chicago, IL.
N ATHANIEL C. L OVE , Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL,
argued for cross-appellant. Also represented by S TEPHANIE
P. K OH .
______________________
Before L OURIE, REYNA , and CUNNINGHAM , Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 1 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 1 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 2
REYNA, Circuit Judge.
ATOS, LLC appeals from an inter partes review final
written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board hold-
ing claim 5 of U.S. Patent No. 9,846,174 is unpatentable.
Allstate Insurance Company cross-appeals the Board’s
holding that claims 1–4 were not shown to be unpatenta-
ble. We affirm the Board’s decision as to claims 1, 2, and
5. We vacate and remand the Board’s decision as to claims
3 and 4.
BACKGROUND
ATOS, LLC (“Atos”) owns U.S. Patent No. 9,846,174
(the “’174 patent”). J.A. 3. The ’174 patent discloses meth-
ods for using sensors on a portable device (e.g., a cell phone)
for detecting vehicle dependent movement, such as acci-
dents and acceleration, and “vehicle independent move-
ment of the phone,” such as a user handling the phone.
J.A. 58, 1:12–18. Claims 1–4 refer to methods for detecting
a condition of a vehicle, such as turning or a change in
speed. J.A. 59–60, 4:58–5:11. Claim 5 relates to a method
for utilizing onboard sensors of a portable device to deter-
mine changes in the operational state of a vehicle. J.A. 60,
5:12–24.
On October 20, 2020, Atos sued Allstate Insurance
Company (“Allstate”) for infringing the ’174 patent, as well
as two other patents not at issue in this appeal, in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. See Atos, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co. et al., No.
1:20-cv-06224 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2020), ECF No. 1. Atos’s
action also included non-patent claims. Id. Allstate moved
to dismiss the patent infringement claims, arguing the pa-
tents are directed to patent ineligible subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at ECF No. 30. The district court
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 2 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 2 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 3
granted the motion. The non-patent claims remain pend-
ing in district court.1
On August 31, 2021, Allstate filed a petition for inter
partes review of the ’174 patent. J.A. 82. The Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (the “Board” or “PTAB”) instituted re-
view and then issued a final written decision, finding
claim 5 is anticipated and that Allstate failed to show
claims 1–4 were unpatentable. J.A. 52–53.
Atos appeals the Board’s decision that claim 5 is antic-
ipated. J.A. 83. Allstate cross-appeals the Board’s finding
that claims 1–4 were not shown to be unpatentable. Id.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) and
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
D ISCUSSION
I. Atos’s Appeal
Atos challenges the Board’s finding that claim 5 is an-
ticipated, arguing that the Board’s finding rests on two er-
roneously construed claim terms. See Appellant Br. 5–6.
We address each construction in turn.
This Court “review[s] the Board’s claim constructions
de novo and review[s] any underlying factual determina-
tions for substantial evidence.” Kamstrip A/S v. Axioma
Metering UAB, 43 F.4th 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “[T]he
ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary
skill in the art in question at the time of the invention[.]”
1 Following the district court’s dismissal of Atos’s pa-
tent infringement claims, Atos filed a motion for entry of
partial final judgment, seeking to appeal the Section 101
decision. See Atos, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co. et al., No. 1:20-
cv-06224 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2023), ECF No. 110. The mo-
tion remained pending before the district court as of the
issuance of this opinion. Id. at ECF No. 133.
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 3 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 3 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 4
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc). “[T]he person of ordinary skill in the art
is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of
the particular claim in which the disputed term appears,
but in the context of the entire patent, including the speci-
fication.” Id.
A.
Claim 5 requires the step of “monitoring at least one
operation indicator . . . wherein the . . . operation indicator
is created by an onboard component[.]” J.A. 60, 5:14–16
(emphases added). Atos argues the Board’s construction of
“operation indicator” as “a sensor measurement deter-
mined from signals from the environment” is incorrect. Ap-
pellant Br. 7; J.A. 20. According to Atos, an “operation
indicator” is “[i]nformation derived by converting sensing
device output determined from signals from the environ-
ment.” Appellant Br. 7. In other words, because the oper-
ation indicator is “created by” an onboard component, an
“operation indicator” is “converted” from signals from the
environment “into new information.” According to Atos,
Allstate’s construction, which the Board adopted, effec-
tively reads out this conversion step such that the claim is
satisfied if any signal is merely detected by the on-board
component and not converted into new information. Appel-
lant Reply Br. 6.
Atos’s argument mischaracterizes the Board’s con-
struction. The Board’s construction accounts for conver-
sion. The Board stated that an operation indicator is a
“sensor measurement” which is “determined from signals
from the environment.” J.A. 20 (emphasis added). The
Board did not say that an operation indicator is merely sig-
nals from the environment. Rather, the determination step
in the Board’s construction captures the conversion of a
“signal” to a “measurement.” This is all the claim requires
of an “operation indicator.” See J.A. 60, 5:14–18.
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 4 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 4 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 5
Supporting the Board’s construction is the specification
of the related ’140 patent.2 The specification discloses that
an output sensor “may measure forces over time (i.e. the
signals) and convert them into a number of vibrations
measured per second (operation indicators).” J.A. 75,
3:52–55. In other words, the vibrations measured per sec-
ond (operation indicators) are determined from the forces
over time (signals). To the extent Atos argues that an “op-
eration indicator” must be further converted into “infor-
mation” other than sensor measurements, the ’140
specification discloses that no further conversion is re-
quired.
We conclude that the Board did not err in its construc-
tion of “operation indicator.”
B.
Atos next argues that the Board misconstrued the “ve-
hicle independent states” limitation of claim 5. Appellant
Br. 17. The Board construed this term to mean “a state
triggered when the portable device is moved independently
of the movement of the vehicle,” whether that portable de-
vice is inside or outside of the vehicle. J.A. 24. According
to Atos, this construction is incorrect because “vehicle in-
dependent states” only refers to a device’s movement when
it is solely within the vehicle. Appellant Br. 18. As support
for its proposed construction, Atos relies on an earlier por-
tion of claim 5 and what the parties refer to as “Limitation
5(a).” Appellant Br. 18–19. Limitation 5(a) refers to a port-
able device “located inside a vehicle.” J.A. 60, 5:17–18.
2 The ’174 patent does not define the term “operation
indicator,” but it does incorporate by reference U.S. Patent
No. 8,527,140 (the “’140 patent”) and “relies on terminol-
ogy” found in the ’140 patent. J.A. 58, 1:18–28. Thus, we
refer to the specification of the ’140 patent.
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 5 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 5 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 6
Limitation 5(a)’s location requirement, however, can-
not be read as requiring the portable device to remain in
the vehicle for the remainder of the steps disclosed in claim
5. Rather, when read as a whole, claim 5 supports the
Board’s construction of “vehicle independent states.”
Claim 5 provides:
5. The method of performing one or more
actions on a portable device carried by an
individual, comprising:
a. monitoring at least one operation in-
dicator transparently to the individual,
wherein the at least one operation indi-
cator is created by an on-board compo-
nent of the device when the portable
device is located inside a vehicle; [Lim-
itation 5(a)]
b. detecting when the at least one oper-
ation indicator meets one or more pre-
determined criteria:
c. determining entirely or in part the
following states based on the one or
more predetermined criteria: [Limita-
tion 5(c)]
i. one or more vehicle independent
states;
ii. one or more vehicle dependent
states.
J.A. 60, 5:12–24. While Limitation 5(a)’s creation of the on-
board component occurs when the device is in the vehicle,
there is no similar requirement that the device be in the
vehicle for Limitation 5(c)’s determination of a “vehicle in-
dependent state[].” Additionally, the claim does not re-
quire that Limitation 5(a)’s creation step occur
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 6 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 6 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 7
simultaneously with Limitation 5(c)’s determination step,
such that the device necessarily remains in the vehicle.
Confirming the Board’s construction is the ’174 specifi-
cation, and by incorporation, the ’140 specification. The
’174 patent broadens the invention’s application beyond
mere braking and acceleration detection to circumstances
where the user is outside the vehicle. See J.A. 59, 4:39–52.
For example, the ’174 patent notes that “as described in
the” ’140 patent, the “instant invention” covers methods for
detecting whether a vehicle has stopped driving. J.A 59,
4:39–43. This detection method is a “useful feature” for
“finding parked vehicles.” J.A. 59, 4:48–50. The ’140 pa-
tent then describes that the embodiments concerning find-
ing parked vehicles include instances where the “user with
the portable device is outside the car[.]” J.A. 77, 7:53–54
(emphasis added). Because the ’174 patent incorporates
the ’140 patent by reference, it is logical to conclude that
the claimed invention also contemplates such embodi-
ments. Thus, “vehicle independent states” extends to in-
stances where the portable device is outside the vehicle.
Absent any evidence that the inventor intended to exclude
such embodiments, it would be improper to construe “vehi-
cle independent states” as limited to circumstances where
the device remains in the vehicle. See, e.g., Oatey Co. v. IPS
Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Atos argues that the purpose of the invention, which is
to eliminate chances of erroneous driving events from be-
ing registered, supports construing a “vehicle independent
state[]” as one where the device remains in the vehicle. See
Appellant Br. 20. We agree with Atos that the purpose of
the invention is to reduce erroneous driving events from
being registered. The ’174 patent notes that:
[I]t is important to be able to detect vehicle
dependent states such as cornering, accelerat-
ing and braking, while also recognizing vehi-
cle independent event (movement caused by
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 7 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 7 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 8
the user handling the phone, phone falling to
the ground, etc.) in order to eliminate or sig-
nificantly reduce the chances of erroneous
driving events being registered.
J.A. 58, 1:39–45 (emphasis added). However, we disagree
that this purpose necessarily excludes scenarios where the
device is outside of the car. The disclosure is broadly writ-
ten so that a “vehicle independent event” encompasses
“movement caused by the user handling the phone,” such
as the “phone falling to the ground.” J.A. 58, 1:42–43.
Thus, this would encompass a user (a) dropping the phone
to the ground within the car and (b) dropping the phone
outside of the car, such as accidentally dropping the phone
from the car window. Atos agrees that the former falls
within the scope of the claim because it is movement that
is independent of the vehicle and that could be confused
with a vehicle dependent event, such as braking. See Ap-
pellant Br. 21. But Atos presents no logical reason as to
why the latter must be excluded from the scope of the
claim. In both scenarios, the phone falls to the ground and
thus arguably could be confused with a vehicle abruptly
braking. We reject Atos’s argument that the invention’s
purpose requires a narrow reading of “vehicle independent
states.”
In sum, the Board properly construed claim 5’s “opera-
tion indicator” and “vehicle independent states.” We affirm
the Board’s holding that claim 5 is anticipated.
II. Allstate’s Cross Appeal
Allstate raises two challenges on appeal. First, All-
state argues the Board’s determination that claims 1 and 2
were not shown to be obvious rests on an improper con-
struction of “rotation vector.” Cross-Appellant Br. 46. Sec-
ond, Allstate argues that the Board’s determination that
claims 3 and 4 were not shown to be obvious rests on an
improper construction of “movement vector.” Id. at 53. We
address each argument in turn.
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 8 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 8 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 9
A.
Allstate challenges the Board’s finding that it failed to
show the “rotation vector” limitation in claims 1 and 2 was
obvious. Cross-Appellant Br. 46. According to Allstate,
this finding is flawed because the Board deviated from its
original construction of rotation vector, i.e., a “vector that
describes a motion of a body that is rotating around a
point,” when analyzing the prior art reference,
“Kleppner.”3 Id. at 47–48. Allstate argues the Board im-
posed additional requirements on a rotation vector, such as
requiring it to have a “point of origin,” or a specific unit of
measurement, when considering Kleppner’s disclosures.
See id. 49–52.
Allstate misreads the Board’s opinion. The Board ob-
served differences between Kleppner’s angular momentum
vector and a rotation vector, such as the former being de-
scribed in units of kg·m 2 /sec and having a point of origin.
J.A. 30–31. However, these observations do not detract
from the Board’s ultimate and supported determination
that Kleppner’s angular momentum vector is not a rotation
vector under the original construction of this claim term.
Id. The Board determined that Kleppner’s angular mo-
mentum vector was not a “vector that describes the motion
of a body that is rotating around a point” because angular
momentum cannot be used to detect a vehicle turning. Id.
(emphasis added). The Board rested this conclusion on two
findings. Id. First, angular momentum does not differen-
tiate between an object turning and an object moving in a
straight line. J.A. 30 (citing Atos’s expert testimony). Sec-
ond, angular momentum is not inherent to an object and
thus has no physical meaning in the context of vehicle mo-
tion. J.A. 30–31 (citing Atos’s expert testimony). These
3 The “Kleppner” reference is a college physics text-
book on Newtonian mechanics, titled “An Introduction to
Mechanics.” J.A. 1058–1115.
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 9 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 9 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 10
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the form
of expert testimony. We thus affirm the Board’s holding
that Allstate failed to show claims 1 and 2 are unpatenta-
ble as obvious.
B.
Finally, Allstate challenges the Board’s determination
that it failed to show claims 3 and 4 were unpatentable.
Cross-Appellant Br. 53. According to Allstate, the Board’s
determination rests on an incorrect construction of a
“movement vector.” We agree. The Board erred in conclud-
ing that Atos acted as its own lexicographer when constru-
ing “movement vector.”
“A patentee is free to be his own lexicographer.” Men-
tor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc., 851 F.3d 1275, 1294
(Fed. Cir. 2017). However, “[t]o act as its own lexicogra-
pher, a patentee must clearly set forth a definition of the
disputed claim term other than its plain and ordinary
meaning.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC,
669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotations
omitted). A patentee may not “simply disclose a single em-
bodiment or use a word in the same manner in all embodi-
ments” but rather “must clearly express an intent to
redefine the term.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The
standard for lexicography is exacting. See id. at 1366.
Here, the specification provided that “[t]he movement
vector can be derived from the cross product between the
centrifugal force and rotation vector[.]” J.A. 58, 2:29–31
(emphasis added). The Board determined this statement
to be Atos acting as a lexicographer and thus construed a
“movement vector” as “a vector derived from the cross prod-
uct of the centrifugal force vector and the rotation vector.”
J.A. 16. This was error for two independent reasons.
First, the specification’s description of a movement vec-
tor is permissive and thus not definitional. The specifica-
tion discloses that the “movement vector can be derived” in
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 10 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 10 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 11
a particular manner, not that it must be. J.A. 58, 2:29–31
(emphasis added). The term “can” is non-limiting. See i4i
Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 844 (Fed. Cir.
2010), aff’d, 564 U.S. 91 (2011). This permissive language
does not clearly indicate that “movement vector” is limited
to a vector derived by the specific cross product of the cen-
trifugal force vector and the rotation vector.
Second, the specification’s description of a movement
vector is not definitional when considered with the remain-
der of the specification. When Atos wanted to define a
term, it did so clearly and explicitly. See, e.g., J.A. 58,
2:64–65 (“As used herein, the term ‘real-time’ means . . .”);
J.A. 59, 3:19–20 (“As used herein, the terms ‘dynamic(ly)’
and ‘automatically’ mean . . .”). However, Atos used no
clear definitional statement for “movement vector,” indi-
cating that Atos did not intend to redefine that term. See
Medicines Co. v. Mylan, Inc., 853 F.3d 1296, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that a statement in the specifica-
tion was not definitional when it did not “accord with the
linguistic formula used by the patentee to signal the desig-
nation of other defined terms”). For these reasons, Atos did
not act as a lexicographer, and thus, the Board’s construc-
tion of “movement vector” is incorrect.
“In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel
meaning to the claim terms, the words are presumed to
take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed
to them by those of ordinary skill in the art.” Brookhill-
Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298
(Fed. Cir. 2003). While Allstate requests that we construe
“movement vector” according to its ordinary and customary
meaning, we decline to do so in the first instance. See
MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC, 934 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2019); Wavetronix LLC v. EIS Elec. Integrated Sys.,
573 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). On remand, and with
more fulsome briefing by the parties, the Board shall con-
strue “movement vector” in accordance with its ordinary
and customary meaning.
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 11 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 11 of 12 --

ATOS, LLC v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 12
CONCLUSION
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the Board’s decision as to claims 1, 2, and 5. We
vacate the Board’s decision as to claims 3 and 4 and re-
mand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 23-1621 Document: 51 Page: 12 Filed: 05/23/2025

-- 12 of 12 --