Realtek Semiconductor Corporation v. International Trade Commission

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION,
Appellant
v.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Appellee
FUTURE LINK SYSTEMS, LLC,
Intervenor
______________________
2023-1187
______________________
Appeal from the United States International Trade
Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-1295.
______________________
Decided: June 18, 2025
______________________
T HEODORE J. A NGELIS , K&L Gates LLP, Seattle, WA,
argued for appellant.
CATHY CHEN, Office of the General Counsel, United
States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC,
argued for appellee. Also represented by A MANDA P ITCHER
F ISHEROW , SIDNEY A. ROSENZWEIG.
BRIAN D AVID L EDAHL , Russ August & Kabat, Los
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 2
Angeles, CA, argued for intervenor. Also represented by
REZA M IRZAIE, ANDREW D. WEISS .
______________________
Before REYNA, BRYSON, and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
BRYSON, Circuit Judge.
Realtek Semiconductor Corporation appeals from a de-
cision of the United States International Trade Commis-
sion in which the Commission adopted an administrative
law judge’s order denying Realtek’s motion for sanctions
against Future Link Systems, LLC. We conclude that we
lack jurisdiction to hear Realtek’s appeal and thus dismiss
the appeal.
I
In 2019, Future Link entered into a license agreement
with MediaTek, Inc., which is not a party to this litigation.
That agreement provided that MediaTek would pay Future
Link a lump sum amount if Future Link filed a lawsuit
against Realtek. Subsequently, Future Link filed a com-
plaint before the International Trade Commission (“ITC”
or “Commission”), accusing Realtek of infringing certain
patents. Early in the litigation, Future Link entered into
a settlement agreement with a third party. Future Link
concluded that the settlement resolved the dispute under-
lying the investigation, and Future Link informed Realtek
of that agreement. Realtek then filed a motion for sanc-
tions before the administrative law judge (“ALJ”). App.
528–31.
While expressing “alarm” at the license agreement be-
tween Future Link and MediaTek, and doubting its lawful-
ness, the ALJ nonetheless concluded that sanctions were
not warranted, in part because the evidence showed that
the agreement “played no role in Future Link’s decision to
file the present Complaint.” App. 12–13. Shortly thereaf-
ter, Future Link withdrew its complaint against Realtek
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 3
and moved to terminate the investigation. That motion
was granted, App. 3326–30, and when no petition for re-
view of the ALJ’s order terminating the investigation was
filed, the Commission terminated the investigation, App.
3419–20. Realtek then petitioned the Commission for re-
view of the ALJ’s order denying the sanctions motion. App.
3426–57. The Commission declined to review the ALJ’s or-
der denying Realtek’s request for sanctions and ruled that
“[t]he sanctions proceeding is hereby terminated.” App.
18–19.
Realtek filed an appeal to this court. Realtek does not
seek relief from the order terminating the investigation,
but instead seeks an order requiring Future Link to pay a
fine to the Commission based on what Realtek regarded as
the improper agreement between MediaTek and Future
Link encouraging Future Link to file an action against Re-
altek.1 Br. 28.
II
A
Realtek argues that the Commission and the ALJ vio-
lated the Administrative Procedure Act by rejecting Real-
tek’s request for sanctions against Future Link. The ITC
and Future Link, as an intervenor, take issue with Real-
tek’s appeal on the merits, but they also argue that we lack
jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that Realtek lacks
standing to challenge the Commission’s ruling on the sanc-
tions issue. We agree that we lack jurisdiction. We
1 In its opening brief, Realtek also sought an order to
declassify certain documents. In its reply brief, however,
Realtek explicitly stated that it is no longer pursuing that
remedy. Reply Br. 22. Because Realtek has withdrawn its
request for declassification, we do not address that issue.
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 4
therefore do not reach the issue of standing, nor do we ad-
dress the merits of Realtek’s appeal.
Our jurisdiction to hear appeals from the ITC is gov-
erned by 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6). That provision states:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . to re-
view the final determinations of the United States
International Trade Commission relating to unfair
practices in import trade, made under section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337).
19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) governs determinations and review.
Pertinently, it states:
Any person adversely affected by a final determi-
nation of the Commission under subsection (d), (e),
(f), or (g) may appeal such determination, within
60 days after the determination becomes final, to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit for review in accordance with chapter 7 of
title 5. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions
of this subsection, Commission determinations un-
der subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) with respect to
its findings on the public health and welfare, com-
petitive conditions in the United States economy,
the production of like or directly competitive arti-
cles in the United States, and United States con-
sumers, the amount and nature of bond, or the
appropriate remedy shall be reviewable in accord-
ance with section 706 of title 5. Determinations by
the Commission under subsections (e), (f), and (j)
with respect to forfeiture of bonds and under sub-
section (h) with respect to the imposition of sanc-
tions for abuse of discovery or abuse of process
shall also be reviewable in accordance with section
706 of title 5.
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 5
The referenced subsection (h) governs sanctions. It reads:
“The Commission may by rule prescribe sanctions for
abuse of discovery and abuse of process to the extent au-
thorized by Rule 11 and Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”
Realtek’s first argument is that the Commission’s sanc-
tions decision was a “final determination” and that section
1295(a)(6) permits this court to hear appeals from every fi-
nal determination identified in section 1337(c). Reply Br.
4–7. We disagree. Section 1295(a)(6) cannot be read alone,
because it includes an express reference to section 1337.
Specifically, section 1295(a)(6) permits us to hear only ap-
peals from final determinations, as defined by section
1337(c). Therefore, we must look to how the term “final
determination” is used in section 1337(c). We have held
that a “final determination” for purposes of section 1337(c)
means “a final administrative decision on the merits, ex-
cluding or refusing to exclude articles from entry under 19
U.S.C. § 1337(d), (e), (f), or (g) (1994).” Crucible Materials
Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 127 F.3d 1057, 1060
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); Block
v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 777 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (quoting Imp. Motors Ltd. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 530 F.2d 940, 944 (CCPA 1976)); Amarin
Pharma, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 923 F.3d 959, 963–64
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
Realtek argues that the Commission’s determination
in this case was a final determination on the merits be-
cause the Commission ruled on the merits of Realtek’s
sanctions motion. That argument, however, misconstrues
our case law. A final decision on the merits, as contem-
plated by sections 1295(a)(6) and 1337(c), is a decision that
is tied to the entry of articles. In other words, the chal-
lenged decision must affect the exclusion or non-exclusion
of articles from entry to qualify as a “final determination”
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 6
that is appealable to this court.2 See Seagate Tech., Inc. v.
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 36 F.3d 1113, 1994 WL 513329,
at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The case that disposes of Realtek’s argument is Visco-
fan, S.A. v. U.S. International Trade Commission, 787 F.2d
544 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In that case, the appellant asked this
court to review a decision by the Commission regarding the
declassification of certain materials. The court held that
the Commission’s decision on that issue was not within this
court’s jurisdiction because section 1295(a)(6) gave this
court exclusive jurisdiction to review final determinations
of the Commission “relating to unfair practices in import
trade” made under section 1337, and Congress specifically
defined final determinations to include those set forth in
the first sentence of section 1337(c). Because the Commis-
sion’s declassification order “would not and could not in any
way affect the validity of the exclusion order,” the court
held that the appeal of that issue did not fall within the
jurisdiction of this court. Id. at 552.
2 To be clear, there are certain decisions that do not
directly prohibit or allow the entry of articles but are nev-
ertheless inherently final determinations, as contemplated
by sections 1295(a)(6) and 1337(c). For example, in Amarin
Pharma, we held that a decision not to institute an inves-
tigation was a final determination because it denied the
complainant’s request for the exclusion of articles from en-
try. 923 F.3d at 963–64. Similarly, in Amgen Inc. v. U.S.
International Trade Commission, we held that a dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction constituted a final de-
termination to not exclude articles from entry. 902 F.2d
1532, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Decisions such as those con-
stitute final determinations as contemplated by sections
1295(a)(6) and 1337(c), because they have the effect of con-
clusively denying the complainant’s request to exclude par-
ticular items from entry.
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 7
In this case, Realtek seeks an order directing Future
Link to pay a fine to the Commission. Br. 28. The entry of
such an order, or the refusal to enter such an order, has no
effect on the entry of any articles. Accordingly, it is not a
final determination on the merits, as contemplated by our
case law interpreting sections 1295(a)(6) and 1337(c).
B
In arguing that this court has jurisdiction to review the
Commission’s order regarding sanctions, Realtek focuses
on the use of the word “also” in section 1337(c) as providing
the jurisdictional hook for this appeal. Section 1337(c)
states that final determinations under subsections (d), (e),
(f), or (g) are appealable directly “to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for review in ac-
cordance with chapter 7 of title 5.” The statute adds that
“[d]eterminations by the Commission . . . under subsection
(h) with respect to the imposition of sanctions for abuse of
discovery or abuse of process shall also be reviewable in ac-
cordance with section 706 of title 5.” That use of the word
“also,” Realtek argues, must be understood to mean that
because final determinations under subsections (d), (e), (f),
and (g) are appealable to and reviewable in this court, de-
terminations under subsection (h) must also be reviewable
in this court.
The first problem with Realtek’s argument is that the
statute expressly lists which subsections give rise to final
determinations that are appealable to this court, and sub-
section (h) is not included in that list. Congress’s choice to
set out the review provision for subsection (h) separately
from the sentence in the statute that directs certain ap-
peals to this court gives rise to an inference that Congress
did not intend to add sanctions determinations that are not
issued in connection with a final determination under sub-
sections (d), (e), (f), or (g) to the scope of our jurisdiction.
That inference is supported by the way in which section
1337(c) has been amended over time. In 1974, Congress
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amended section 1337(c) to provide for judicial review of
final determinations under subsections (d) or (e) of section
1337 by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 337(c), 88 Stat. 1978,
2054 (1975). Congress later expanded the list of such sub-
sections to include subsection (f) of section 1337 (added in
1979, see Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
§ 1105(c), 93 Stat. 144, 311), and subsection (g) (added in
1988, see Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1342(b)(2), 102 Stat. 1107, 1215). By
1988, judicial review of final determinations under that list
of subsections had been assigned to this court, as the suc-
cessor to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Notably, even though Congress added both subsection
(g) and subsection (h) to the statute at the same time in
1988, see id. at 102 Stat. 1213–14, Congress included sub-
section (g), but not subsection (h), in the list of subsections
for which appeals could be taken to this court. Then, in
1994, the statute was amended again to add the final sen-
tence, which addresses review of determinations under
subsection (h). But on that occasion, unlike in 1979 and
1988, the list of subsections giving rise to determinations
that are appealable to this court was not amended to in-
clude the new subsection (h). Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 321(a)(2)(C), 108 Stat. 4809,
4943–44 (1994).
The second problem with Realtek’s argument is that
the references in section 1337(c) to review are in the con-
text of the judicial review provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (chapter 7 of title 5 generally and section 706
of title 5 in particular), which address the standard of re-
view to be applied to appeals from Commission decisions
but do not address which courts have jurisdiction over such
appeals. Therefore, the statement in section 1337(c) that
determinations under subsection (h) “shall also be review-
able in accordance with section 706 of title 5” plainly refers
to the procedures to be applied on review, not the court to
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 9
which an appeal may be taken. That understanding is sup-
ported by the immediately preceding sentence, which
states that determinations under subsections (d), (e), (f),
and (g) with respect to certain issues “shall be reviewable
in accordance with section 706 of title 5.” Accordingly, the
use of “also” in the final sentence refers back to the stand-
ard of review set forth in the proceeding sentence, not to
the directive regarding appeals set forth in the first sen-
tence.
The third problem with Realtek’s argument is that the
first sentence of section 1337(c), which addresses determi-
nations under subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), uses the term
“appeal” to refer to the court to which an appeal may be
taken, and the term “review” to refer to the standard of re-
view to be applied. That is a common formulation found in
numerous other statutes, which address the tribunal in
which an appeal is to be taken separately from the stand-
ard of review to be applied on appeal.3 Here, with respect
to subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), Congress addressed both
reviewability and the tribunal to which appeals would be
taken. But with respect to subsection (h), it addressed only
the issue of reviewability. Therefore, the use of the word
“also” must be understood to relate only to the reviewabil-
ity of determinations under subsection (h), not to the forum
in which such review may take place.
C
Importantly, because our jurisdiction extends to final
determinations under subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) of sec-
tion 1337(c), our jurisdiction also necessarily includes
“other associated matters necessary for the proper consid-
eration of those ‘final determinations.’” Refractarios
3 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(f); 15 U.S.C. § 1262(e)(3); 15
U.S.C. § 1474(b); 31 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(2); 39 U.S.C. § 3663;
42 U.S.C. § 14922(c)(3); 49 U.S.C. § 30172(h).
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 10
Monterrey, S.A. v. Ferro Corp., 606 F.2d 966, 970 n.10, 971
(CCPA 1979). Accordingly, we have found jurisdiction over
matters that clearly affect or are directly related to the pro-
priety of a final determination. See, e.g., Swagway, LLC v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 934 F.3d 1332, 1342 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (finding jurisdiction over an appeal from the denial
of a consent order motion to terminate an investigation as
part of a final determination; “[w]ith the jurisdiction to re-
view the Commission’s final determinations also comes the
jurisdiction to review matters ancillary to or affecting the
validity of those final determinations”); Akzo N.V. v. U.S.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1485 n.15 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (finding jurisdiction over a challenge to a confidenti-
ality order when “the confidentiality problem was directly
related to the propriety of the exclusion order”); Amarin,
923 F.3d at 963–64; Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1535.
Conversely, we have found no jurisdiction over matters
that would not affect a final determination on the merits.
See, e.g., Viscofan, 787 F.2d at 552 (no jurisdiction over
Commission’s refusal to declassify certain confidential
business information); Duracell, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 778 F.2d 1478, 15801 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (no juris-
diction over the President’s decision disapproving the Com-
mission’s final determination because the President’s
decision was not “the foundation” for a reviewable final de-
termination of the Commission); Block, 777 F.2d at 1571
(no jurisdiction over the decision to terminate an investiga-
tion without prejudice).
For example, orders requiring posting a bond and for-
feiting a bond under subsections (e), (f), and (j) when the
Commission’s determination becomes final would be ancil-
lary to the final determination under subsections (d), (e),
(f), or (g), and therefore the appeal from such a forfeiture
would be taken to this court. See Biocraft Lab’ys, Inc. v.
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 947 F.2d 483 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Similarly, we would have jurisdiction over the imposition
of sanctions (or the denial of sanctions) that was ancillary
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 11
to the entry of a final determination under subsections (d),
(e), (f), or (g), such as sanctions for abuse of discovery or
abuse of process in the proceedings leading to the entry of
a final determination. See Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties
& Food Ingredients GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 224 F.3d
1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). But as the court held in Vis-
cofan, we lack jurisdiction over actions of the Commission
that are not ancillary to a final determination. That is the
situation in this case, in which there was never a final de-
termination on the merits entered by the Commission,
given that Future Link withdrew its complaint following a
settlement with a third party, and then successfully moved
to terminate the proceeding based on that withdrawal of
the complaint. Indeed, Realtek concedes it “has not in-
voked this Court’s ancillary jurisdiction as a basis for re-
view” of the Commission’s sanctions decision. Reply Br. 13.
We recognize that section 1337(c) leaves open the ques-
tion of which court would have jurisdiction to review a
sanctions determination under subsection (h) that is not
ancillary to a final determination. In other settings, courts
have held that, in the absence of an indication of where ju-
dicial review will take place, “the normal default rule is
that persons seeking review of agency action go first to dis-
trict court rather than to a court of appeals.” Micei Int’l v.
Dep’t of Com., 613 F.3d 1147, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (cleaned
up); Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Ka-
vanaugh, J.) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Peña, 17
F.3d 1478, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see Bell v. New Jersey,
461 U.S. 773, 777 n.3 (1983) (“The presumption that review
is available, coupled with the absence of any indication in
the statute that the decision is committed wholly to the dis-
cretion of the agency or that review is otherwise precluded,
leads to the conclusion that the district courts would have
had jurisdiction under the general grant of jurisdiction
over cases involving federal questions.” (citations
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REALTEK SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION v. ITC 12
omitted)).4 Applying that principle here, we hold that in
the absence of clear statutory authority granting us juris-
diction to review a Commission order of the sort at issue in
this case, jurisdiction over Realtek’s appeal from the Com-
mission’s denial of its request for sanctions does not lie in
this court. Accordingly, we are required to dismiss this ap-
peal.
DISMISSED
COSTS
No costs.
4 District court review of an order falling outside the
scope of the first sentence of section 1337(c) has been
sought and obtained in at least one instance. See Jubilant
DraxImage Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 396 F. Supp.
3d 113, 119 (D.D.C. 2019).
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