Edward Bravenec v. Rowland J. Martin, Jr.

N OTE: This order is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
EDWARD BRAVENEC, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
ROWLAND J. MARTIN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant
______________________
2022-2191
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas in No. 5:22-cv-00522-JKP, Judge
Jason Kenneth Pulliam.
______________________
ON MOTION
______________________
P ER CURIAM .
O R D E R
Before the court are Rowland J. Martin, Jr.’s response
to this court’s November 17, 2022, show cause order, ECF
No. 14; “opposed motion for writ of mandamus and for
emergency stay of the district court order dated September
29, 2022,” ECF No. 13; and amended notice of appeal, ECF
No. 12. For the following reasons, we now dismiss.
Case: 22-2191 Document: 17 Page: 1 Filed: 02/28/2023

-- 1 of 3 --

BRAVENEC v. MARTIN 2
Edward Bravenec and 1216 West Ave., Inc. brought
suit against Mr. Martin in Texas state court asserting a
claim for tortious interference with contractual relations in
connection with the sale of a property in San Antonio. See
Martin v. Bravenec, No. 04-14-00483-CV, 2015 WL
2255139, at *2 (Tex. App. May 13, 2015). Mr. Martin re-
moved the case to federal district court. On September 29,
2022, the district court issued an order remanding the case
to state court for lack of jurisdiction,* explaining that the
action sought to be removed was “not based on any federal
claim within Plaintiff’s state petition or on the basis of di-
versity jurisdiction,” ECF No. 6-2 at 14, and that Mr. Mar-
tin’s attempts to assert various federal claims provided no
basis for jurisdiction over the removed action, see id.
Judicial review over the district court’s remand order
is foreclosed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides that
“[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which
it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”
The Supreme Court has made clear that if the district court
“relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized as
subject-matter jurisdiction,” then the remand order is sub-
ject to § 1447(d)’s bar and therefore outside of the review
authority of any appellate court. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant
Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 234 (2007). The district
court here clearly premised its remand order on its view
that it lacked jurisdiction over the removed case. Section
1447(d) therefore requires dismissal without need to fur-
ther explore whether this appeal would otherwise come
within our review authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) or
be appropriately transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
* Although Mr. Martin filed his initial notice of ap-
peal before the district court’s remand order, he attached
the district court’s order to an amended notice of appeal he
submitted to this court on October 6, 2022, ECF No. 6-2 at
12–15.
Case: 22-2191 Document: 17 Page: 2 Filed: 02/28/2023

-- 2 of 3 --

BRAVENEC v. MARTIN 3
Mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 is likewise un-
available. By its terms, section 1447(d) bars appellate re-
view of remand orders, based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, by way of “appeal or otherwise” (emphasis
added). Review through a writ of mandamus is one such
alternative prohibited by § 1447(d). See Gravitt v. Sw. Bell
Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723–24 (1977) (“The District Court’s
remand order was . . . unreviewable by the Court of Ap-
peals, by mandamus or otherwise.”).
Accordingly,
I T I S O RDERED T HAT :
(1) The appeal is dismissed.
(2) All motions are denied as moot.
(3) Each side shall bear its own costs.
February 28, 2023
Date
F OR THE COURT
/s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
Peter R. Marksteiner
Clerk of Court
Case: 22-2191 Document: 17 Page: 3 Filed: 02/28/2023

-- 3 of 3 --