In re: ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, LLP, RING, INC v. Selna. ON PETITION Before PROST , Chief Judge, O’MALLEY

N OTE: This order is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
In re: ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE,
LLP, RING, INC.,
Petitioners
______________________
2019-109
______________________
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California
in No. 8:18-cv-00014-JVS-JDE, Judge James V. Selna.
______________________
ON PETITION
______________________
Before P ROST , Chief Judge, O’MALLEY and STOLL , Circuit
Judges.
O’MALLEY , Circuit Judge.
O R D E R
The United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California granted plaintiff SkyBell Technologies,
Inc.’s motion to disqualify the law firm of Orrick, Herring-
ton & Sutcliffe LLP (“Orrick”) from representing defend-
ant Ring, Inc. in this patent infringement case. Ring and
Orrick (collectively “Petitioners”) now seek a writ of
mandamus vacating that disqualification order. We deny
the petition without a response.
Case: 19-109 Document: 7 Page: 1 Filed: 02/07/2019

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IN RE ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 2
BACKGROUND
In October 2017, SkyBell approached Travis Jensen, a
partner at Orrick, about potentially representing SkyBell
in a lawsuit against some of its competitors, including
Ring. At the time, Jensen asked SkyBell to provide him
no more information than necessary to conduct a conflicts
check. After advising SkyBell that there would be no
conflict, Jensen engaged in substantive discussions with
SkyBell concerning its potential lawsuit against Ring
(among others). As part of this process, Jensen obtained
confidential information from SkyBell concerning its
potential lawsuit against Ring. Ultimately, SkyBell did
not select Jensen as counsel.
SkyBell filed this suit against Ring in January 2018.
Shortly thereafter, Ring retained Clement Roberts, who
was then a partner at the law firm of Durie Tangri, LLP.
In June 2018, however, Roberts notified SkyBell that he
had joined Orrick as a partner. And while Orrick had
engaged in substantive discussions with SkyBell about its
lawsuit against Ring, Roberts explained that Orrick
would implement an ethical screen between individuals
who had previously advised SkyBell, e.g., Jensen, and
individuals representing Ring, e.g., Roberts.
The next month, SkyBell filed a motion to disqualify
Orrick based on California Rule of Professional Conduct
3-310. Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that
Orrick’s representation was permissible based on Califor-
nia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.18, which went into
effect in November 2018 (after Jensen met with SkyBell,
after Roberts joined Orrick, after Petitioners filed their
response, and after the district court’s decision here).
On September 18, 2018, the district court granted the
motion to disqualify Orrick. The court first considered the
applicability of Rule 1.18(d)—still not yet in effect—
because it reflected “current judicial thinking on matters
of attorney ethics.” J.A. 18. In doing so, the district court
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IN RE ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 3
concluded that Rule 1.18(d) “explicitly contemplates that
the attorney take some type of affirmative step or act to
limit or avoid exposure to more information than is neces-
sary.” J.A. 24. By contrast, the district court found that
Jensen did not take any reasonable steps to avoid expo-
sure to “more information than [was] necessary” after
advising SkyBell about his initial conflicts check. Id.
Indeed, the district court found that Jensen “obtained a
considerable amount of SkyBell’s confidential infor-
mation.” J.A. 29. The district court also concluded that
Orrick would be disqualified under Rule 3-310—in effect
during all relevant times in this case—because Orrick
rendered legal advice to SkyBell and then “switch[ed]
sides” to represent Ring in the same case. J.A. 30.
D ISCUSSION
Petitioners ask this court to grant mandamus to va-
cate the district court’s disqualification order. Petitioners
contend that the district court clearly erred in determin-
ing that Rule 1.18(d) requires an attorney to undertake
affirmative steps to avoid exposure to information. They
also contend that mandamus review is appropriate be-
cause no other court has addressed Rule 1.18(d).
“The remedy of mandamus is available only in ex-
traordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discre-
tion or usurpation of judicial power.” In re MSTG, Inc.,
675 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A party seeking a
writ bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that it has
no “adequate alternative means” to obtain the desired
relief, Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989), and that the right to issuance of
the writ is “clear and indisputable,” Will v. Calvert Fire
Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 666 (1978) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Even when these two requirements are
met, the court must still be satisfied that issuance of “the
writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367,
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IN RE ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 4
381 (2004). Failure to establish any of these elements
justifies denying a petition. See Waymo LLC v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 870 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
We conclude that, at a minimum, Petitioners have
failed to show a clear and indisputable right to the relief
they seek. To begin, it is not clear that Rule 1.18(d) even
applies here. Indeed, no relevant event in this case
occurred while Rule 1.18 was in effect. Moreover, the
district court found that Orrick would also be disqualified
under Rule 3-310. J.A. 28–30. Orrick provides no basis to
say that this conclusion was an abuse of discretion.
Even assuming Rule 1.18 is relevant, Petitioners have
not shown a clear abuse of discretion. In reviewing the
district court’s disqualification decision, we look to re-
gional circuit and state law. See In re Shared Memory
Graphics LLC, 659 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2011). But
neither the Ninth Circuit nor the California Supreme
Court has interpreted Rule 1.18. The district court’s
interpretation, however, finds sufficient support in the
text of Rule 1.18. See Waymo, 870 F.3d at 1359 (explain-
ing that mandamus is not appropriate to correct “ordinary
error”). We also cannot say that the district court’s appli-
cation of Rule 1.18 to the facts of this case was an abuse of
discretion.
Accordingly,
I T I S O RDERED T HAT :
The petition is denied.
F OR THE COURT
Feb 07, 2019 /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
Date Peter R. Marksteiner
Clerk of Court
s25
Case: 19-109 Document: 7 Page: 4 Filed: 02/07/2019

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