Mary Caston-Goodjohn v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

# United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

MARY CASTON-GOODJOHN,
Claimant-Appellant,
v.
ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee.

2010-7107

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in case no. 09-1190, Judge Ronald M.
Holdaway.

## ON MOTION

## ORDER

Before LINN, DYK, AND PROST, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
₱

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs moves to summarily
affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims denying Mary Caston-Goodjohn

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entitlement to recognition as a "surviving spouse" under
38 U.S.C. § 1310(a). Caston-Goodjohn opposes.

Pursuant to § 1310(a), a veteran's surviving spouse is
eligible for benefits when a veteran dies from a service-
connected or compensable disability. Caston-Goodjohn
sought entitlement to such benefits based on her prior
marriage to veteran Floyd Goodjohn who she divorced in
1977 and who died in 2006. The Board of Veteran's
Affairs denied her claim on the grounds that she was not
married to Goodjohn at the time of his death and there-
fore could not constitute a "surviving spouse."

The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims sustained
the Board's determination, and we agree with the Secre-
tary that it was so clearly correct as to warrant summary
affirmance. Section 103(3) of title 38 defines "surviving
spouse" as "a person of the opposite sex who was the
spouse of the veteran at the time of the veteran's death,
and who lived with the veteran continuously from the
date of marriage to the date of the veteran's death (except
where there was a separation that was due to the miscon-
duct of, or procured by, the veteran without the fault of
the spouse)."

Under the plain language of the statute, to be a "sur-
viving spouse" requires that the person seeking benefits
be "the spouse of a veteran at the time of the veteran's
death," which the appellant here was not. We therefore
grant the motion.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The motion is granted. The judgment is summa-
rily affirmed.

(2) Each side shall bear their own costs.

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3

CASTON-GOODJOHN v. DVA

OCT 2 7 2010

Date

FOR THE COURT
/s/ Jan Horbaly
Jan Horbaly
Clerk

cc: Mary Caston-Goodjohn
Jane C. Dempsey, Esq.

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
OCT 2 7:2010

s19

JAN HORBALY
CLERK