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2009-1484•Opposition No. 91169175) ROHIT PRAKASH v. Max Rohr, Inc.
2009-1484Court of Appeals for the Federal CircuitNov 9, 2009
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# United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2009-1484
(Opposition No. 91169175)
ROHIT PRAKASH,
Appellant,
V.
MAX ROHR, INC.,
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
ON MOTION
Before RADER, CLEVENGER, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
## ORDER
Max Rohr, Inc. moves to dismiss Rohit Prakash's appeal. Prakash opposes.
Max Rohr replies.
Prakash appeals the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's May 8, 2009 decision
that, inter alia, denied his request for leave to amend his pleadings. In the May 8 order,
the Board further indicated that there were genuine issues of material fact that required
a trial and set forth deadlines for further proceedings.
Max Rohr argues that the May 8 decision was not a final, appealable decision
pursuant to our decision in Copelands Enter., Inc. v. CNV, Inc., 887 F.2d 1064 (Fed. Cir.
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1989\) (en banc). Prakash argues that Copelands "is irrelevant because the leave to
amend pleadings was not denied" (emphasis in original).
In Copelands, the court ruled that it would review decisions of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board only if the decision "put an end to the litigation before the
Board." In this case, the May 8 decision did not put an end to litigation before the Board
and thus Prakash's appeal is premature. Prakash has not shown that the fact that
Copelands did not involve the denial of a motion for leave to amend pleadings merits a
different result in this case. Prakash's argument that his appeal is proper pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is unavailing as those provisions apply to
district court cases and not proceedings before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
Thus, the appeal is dismissed.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1)
The motion to dismiss is granted.
(2)
Each side shall bear its own costs.
FOR THE COURT
NOV 0 9 2009
/s/ Jan Horbaly
Date
Jan Horbaly
Clerk
FILEB
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
cc:
Rohit Prakash
Charles W. Grimes, Esq.
s17
NOV 0 9 2009
ISSUED AS A MANDATE:
NOV 0 9 2009
JAN HORBALY
CLERK
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