Bonnie J. Goodrich v. Department of Justice

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
BONNIE J. GOODRICH,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondent
______________________
2020-2224
______________________
Petition for review of a decision of the Bureau of Justice
Assistance in PSOB Claim No. 2012-083.
______________________
Decided: June 9, 2021
______________________
ROBERT B ERNARD B RUNER, Norton Rose Fulbright US
LLP, Houston, TX, argued for petitioner.
ERIN M URDOCK -PARK , Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by
BRIAN M. BOYNTON , M ARTIN F. H OCKEY, JR., TARA K.
H OGAN , SONIA W. M URPHY.
______________________
Before LOURIE, PROST* , and O’M ALLEY, Circuit Judges.
______________________
* Sharon Prost vacated the position of Chief Judge on
May 21, 2021.
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GOODRICH v. DOJ 2
PROST, Circuit Judge.
Bonnie J. Goodrich appeals the final decision of the
Bureau of Justice Assistance (“BJA”) denying her claim for
death benefits under the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits
Act of 1976 (“PSOB Act”), Pub. L. No. 94-430, 90 Stat. 1346
(codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 10281–10288).
Because the BJA’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and properly applies the statute and the BJA’s
implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 32.13, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Goodrich filed her claim under the PSOB Act
following the death of her brother, Assistant Fire Chief
John W. Jeffers of the Wellington-Greer Fire Protection
District (“WGFD”) in Illinois. Mr. Jeffers had been a
volunteer firefighter for the WGFD since 1975 and served
as assistant chief from 1989 until his death in April 2009.
It is undisputed that Mr. Jeffers was a public safety officer
who died in the line of duty within the meaning of the
PSOB Act.
At the time of his death, Mr. Jeffers was not married
and had no children. He was survived by two sisters, one
being Ms. Goodrich. Mr. Jeffers had filed one designation-
of-beneficiary form with the WGFD, a form bearing the
header “Court of Claims – State of Illinois” and naming
Ms. Goodrich as sole beneficiary of Mr. Jeffers’s Illinois
line-of-duty death benefits “[i]n accordance with the
provisions of the ‘Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen
Compensation Act’” (“Illinois Form”). J.A. 48. It is
undisputed that at the time of Mr. Jeffers’s death, the
Illinois Form was the only designation-of-beneficiary form
of any sort on file with the WGFD for Mr. Jeffers.
The PSOB Act lists a hierarchy of potential claimants
for death benefits. As relevant here, the PSOB Act
provides that “if there is no surviving spouse of the public
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GOODRICH v. DOJ 3
safety officer and no surviving child,” death benefits shall
be paid
(A) to the surviving individual . . . designated by
the public safety officer to receive benefits under
this subsection in the most recently executed desig-
nation of beneficiary of the public safety officer on
file at the time of death with the public safety
agency, organization, or unit; or
(B) if there is no individual qualifying under sub-
paragraph (A), to the surviving individual . . . des-
ignated by the public safety officer to receive
benefits under the most recently executed life in-
surance policy of the public safety officer on file at
the time of death with the public safety agency, or-
ganization, or unit.
34 U.S.C. § 10281(a)(4)(A)–(B) (emphases added).1 The im-
plementing regulation in turn provides:
Execution of a designation of beneficiary under the
Act, at 34 U.S.C. [§] 10281(a)(4)(A) means the legal
and valid execution, by the public safety officer, of
a writing that, designating a beneficiary, expressly,
specifically, or unmistakably refers to—
(1) The Act (or the program it creates); or
(2) All the death benefits with respect to
which such officer lawfully could designate
a beneficiary (if there be no writing that
satisfies paragraph (1) of this definition).
. . .
1 The statute directs to continue down the hierarchy
if no individual qualifies under § 10281(a)(4)(A)–(B).
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GOODRICH v. DOJ 4
Life insurance policy on file—A life insurance pol-
icy is on file with a public safety agency, -organiza-
tion, or -unit, only if—
(1) It is issued through (or on behalf of) the
same; or
(2) The original (or a copy) of one of the fol-
lowing is deposited with the same by the
public safety officer whose life is insured
under the policy, for it to maintain with its
personnel or similar records pertaining to
him:
(i) The policy (itself);
(ii) The declarations page or -state-
ment from the policy’s issuer;
(iii) A certificate of insurance (for
group policies);
(iv) Any instrument whose execu-
tion constitutes the execution of a
life insurance policy; or
(v) The substantial equivalent of
any of the foregoing.
28 C.F.R. § 32.13 (emphases added).
On December 30, 2011, Ms. Goodrich filed her claim for
death benefits with the BJA’s PSOB Office. The office
denied Ms. Goodrich’s claim and on April 28, 2014,
Ms. Goodrich requested determination of her claim by an
independent hearing officer. The hearing officer found that
Ms. Goodrich was not eligible as a payee under
§ 10281(a)(4)(A) because Mr. Jeffers’s Illinois Form (the
only relevant form on file with WGFD) did not reference
benefits available under the PSOB Act or contain a general
statement concerning all Mr. Jeffers’s death benefits. The
hearing officer further found that Ms. Goodrich was not
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GOODRICH v. DOJ 5
eligible under § 10281(a)(4)(B) because Mr. Jeffers did not
have a life insurance policy on file with the WGFD.
Ms. Goodrich then appealed the hearing officer’s denial
of her claim to the BJA. The BJA reviewed Ms. Goodrich’s
claim de novo and adopted the hearing officer’s findings,
holding that Mr. Jeffers’s Illinois Form was not a
designation of beneficiary under the PSOB Act or a “life
insurance policy” within the meaning of the PSOB Act. See
J.A. 1–12. Ms. Goodrich now appeals the BJA’s decision.
We have jurisdiction under 34 U.S.C. § 10287.
D ISCUSSION
Our review of a denial of a claim for death benefits by
the BJA “is limited to three inquiries: (1) whether there has
been substantial compliance with statutory requirements
and provisions of implementing regulations; (2) whether
there has been any arbitrary or capricious action on the
part of the government officials involved; and (3) whether
substantial evidence supports the decision denying the
claim.” Amber-Messick v. United States, 483 F.3d 1316,
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see Li v. Dep’t of Just., 947 F.3d 804,
807 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In this case, we review the BJA’s
determination that Ms. Goodrich is not eligible as a payee
under either § 10281(a)(4)(A) or § 10281(a)(4)(B). We agree
with the BJA that Ms. Goodrich’s claim does not meet the
requirements of either prong.
First, the BJA correctly applied the statute and
implementing regulation in determining that Ms. Goodrich
does not qualify as a payee under § 10281(a)(4)(A). To
qualify under this prong, a payee must be “designated by
the public safety officer to receive benefits under this
subsection in the most recently executed designation of
beneficiary . . . on file.” § 10281(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
This language is clear that a qualifying designation under
this prong must encompass PSOB benefits—the benefits
that arise “under this subsection.” Here, it is undisputed
that Mr. Jeffers’s Illinois Form does not reference the
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GOODRICH v. DOJ 6
PSOB Act, PSOB benefits, federal death benefits, or all
death benefits to which Mr. Jeffers could have designated
a beneficiary. Instead, the Illinois Form refers only and
specifically to Mr. Jeffers’s state line-of-duty death benefits
arising under state law. See J.A. 48. Therefore, we cannot
plausibly read the Illinois Form to encompass a
designation of PSOB benefits. The implementing
regulation is consistent with the statutory language and
clarifies that a designation of beneficiary under
§ 10281(a)(4)(A) must “expressly, specifically, or
unmistakably” refer to either “[t]he [PSOB] Act (or the
program it creates)” or “[a]ll the death benefits with respect
to which [the] officer lawfully could designate a
beneficiary.” 28 C.F.R. § 32.13. The Illinois Form does not
meet any of these criteria.
Second, the BJA correctly applied the statute and
implementing regulation in determining that Ms. Goodrich
does not qualify as a payee under § 10281(a)(4)(B). To
qualify under this prong, a payee must be “designated . . .
to receive benefits under the most recently executed life
insurance policy of the public safety officer on file.”
§ 10281(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). This language is clear
that the officer’s life insurance designation on file
“determines the proper beneficiary for PSOB benefits.” Li,
947 F.3d at 808. Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Jeffers did
not have a life insurance policy on file with the WGFD.2
Accordingly, Ms. Goodrich cannot qualify for PSOB
benefits under the plain language of § 10281(a)(4)(B).
Ms. Goodrich argues that the Illinois Form may
nonetheless stand in as a “life insurance policy” under this
prong because the implementing regulation defines the
term “‘life insurance policy on file’ broadly to include ‘[t]he
2 Mr. Jeffers did name Ms. Goodrich as a beneficiary
under a private life insurance policy that was not on file
with the WGFD. J.A. 34–36, 386.
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GOODRICH v. DOJ 7
substantial equivalent’ of a life insurance policy.”
Appellant’s Br. 26 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 32.13). We disagree
with Ms. Goodrich’s reading of the regulation. The
regulation defines a life insurance policy as “on file . . . only
if . . . (1) It is issued through (or on behalf of) the [public
safety agency]; or (2) The original (or a copy) of one of
[several filing options] is deposited with the [public safety
agency] by the . . . officer whose life is insured under the
policy.” 28 C.F.R. § 32.13 (emphases added). The
“substantial equivalent” language referenced by
Ms. Goodrich is only then stated as one of the several filing
options—namely, the “substantial equivalent of any of”
“[t]he policy (itself),” “[t]he declarations page or -statement
from the policy’s issuer,” “[a] certificate of insurance (for
group policies),” or “[a]ny instrument whose execution
constitutes the execution of a life insurance policy.” Id.
But the overarching language makes clear that these
options must be filed by the public safety officer “whose life
is insured under the policy.” Id. Therefore, the regulation
requires an actual life insurance policy, consistent with the
plain language of § 10281(a)(4)(B).
Ms. Goodrich also contends that she “was
Mr. Jeffers’[s] intended beneficiary for PSOB Act benefits
and that the WGFD and Mr. Jeffers believed (and
intended) that his [Illinois Form] would designate his
beneficiary under the PSOB Act.” Appellant’s Br. 25. But
the statute “leaves no room” for us to consider what
Mr. Jeffers may have intended in contrast to what
Mr. Jeffers placed on file. See Li, 947 F.3d at 808 (rejecting
evidence of alleged intent because to consider the evidence
would “be inconsistent with the text of § 10281(a)(4)(B)”).
We have considered Ms. Goodrich’s remaining argu-
ments but find them unpersuasive in view of the statutory
language and implementing regulation. As discussed,
Mr. Jeffers’s Illinois Form does not satisfy § 10281(a)(4)(A)
or (B). Accordingly, the BJA’s denial of Ms. Goodrich’s
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GOODRICH v. DOJ 8
claim was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by
substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Jeffers served the WGFD honorably for decades,
first as a firefighter and then as Assistant Fire Chief. But
we, like the BJA, have a duty to apply the statutory re-
quirements of the PSOB Act. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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