Cecile A. Brown v. David J. Shulkin, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
CECILE A. BROWN,
Claimant-Appellant
v.
DAVID J. SHULKIN, SECRETARY OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS,
Respondent-Appellee
______________________
2018-1072
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims in No. 16-3236, Judge Margaret C.
Bartley.
______________________
Decided: January 12, 2018
______________________
CECILE A. BROWN, Alexandria, LA, pro se.
ERIC J OHN SINGLEY , Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also repre-
sented by BRYAN T HOMPSON, Office of General Counsel,
United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washing-
ton, DC.
______________________

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BROWN v. SHULKIN 2
Before L OURIE, D YK, and T ARANTO, Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
Cecile A. Brown (“Brown”) appeals from the remand
order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(the “Veterans Court”). See Brown v. Shulkin, No. 16-
3236, 2017 WL 3722598 (Vet. App. Aug. 30, 2017) (“Deci-
sion”). For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
Brown is the daughter of William Ellis (“Ellis”), a de-
ceased veteran who served on active duty from June 1986
to March 1992. Ellis died in 2009. At the time of his
death, he had claims pending before the Department of
Veterans Affairs (“VA”), including for an increased ser-
vice-connected psoriasis rating. He had a 60% disability
rating for psoriasis under Diagnostic Code (“DC”) 7816,
which is the maximum schedular rating under that code.
38 C.F.R. § 4.118. Brown filed a claim for accrued bene-
fits and dependency and indemnity compensation.
Following an unfavorable decision by the Regional Of-
fice, Brown appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
(“Board”). Although finding in favor of Brown in certain
respects, the Board denied the claim for an increased
psoriasis rating and declined to refer the matter for
extraschedular consideration. Brown appealed to the
Veterans Court.
The Veterans Court addressed only the finding of lack
of entitlement to a rating in excess of 60% for Ellis’s
service-connected psoriasis and declined to disturb the
Board’s favorable findings on the other issues. The Vet-
erans Court affirmed the Board’s selection of DC 7816 as
the appropriate DC for evaluating the skin disability, but
remanded to the Board for readjudication to address
potentially favorable evidence supporting an extraschedu-

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BROWN v. SHULKIN 3
lar rating. The Veterans Court denied Brown’s motion for
reconsideration. Brown appealed and now seeks to invoke
our jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).
D ISCUSSION
The scope of our review in an appeal from a Veterans
Court decision is limited by statute. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).
That statute does not recite a finality requirement, see
Williams v. Principi, 275 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002),
but we have nevertheless held that we ordinarily lack
jurisdiction over non-final decisions of the Veterans
Court, such as remands, id. at 1363–64; Winn v. Brown,
110 F.3d 56, 57 (Fed. Cir. 1997). That requirement avoids
“piecemeal appellate review without precluding later
appellate review of the legal issue or any other determi-
nation made on a complete administrative record.” Cabot
Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 1539, 1543 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
We have recognized a narrow exception to the general
finality requirement, and will review a remand order from
the Veterans Court if three conditions are met:
(1) there must have been a clear and final decision
of a legal issue that (a) is separate from the re-
mand proceedings, (b) will directly govern the re-
mand proceedings, or (c) if reversed by this court,
would render the remand proceedings unneces-
sary; (2) the resolution of the legal issues must
adversely affect the party seeking review; and,
(3) there must be a substantial risk that the deci-
sion would not survive a remand, i.e., that the re-
mand proceeding may moot the issue.
Williams, 275 F.3d at 1364 (footnotes omitted).
Brown has not argued that any of these conditions are
satisfied. Instead, Brown argues that we should “review
the petition because the remand is final and [she] . . .
ha[s] exceptional circumstances such as financial hard-

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BROWN v. SHULKIN 4
ship . . . .” Appellant’s Reply Br. 1–2. The government
responds that the Veterans Court’s remand order is not
sufficiently final, and there are no exceptional circum-
stances warranting review at this time.
We agree with the government that we lack jurisdic-
tion. The appealed-from order is not final because it
remanded the case to the Board for readjudication. See
Decision, 2017 WL 3722598, at *3. Accordingly, the
Williams criteria must be satisfied for us to exercise
jurisdiction over this appeal.
However, the remand order in this case does not satis-
fy the three Williams criteria. Brown has not identified a
final decision on a legal issue over which she seeks review
or explained how the Veterans Court’s decision adversely
affects her. Indeed, the Veterans Court remanded the
claim for an increased psoriasis rating to the Board to
address “potentially favorable evidence” that may support
an extraschedular rating above 60%. Id. Proper consid-
eration of such evidence appears to be what she is seeking
in this appeal, and the Veterans Court has ordered that
such review be conducted by the Board. See Appellant’s
Br. 1 (arguing there was a “fail[ure] to mention favorable
[and] medical lay evidence”). Brown has also not identi-
fied an issue “that the remand proceeding may moot.”
Williams, 275 F.3d at 1364. Thus, Brown has not met the
requirements for an exception to the general rule barring
review of non-final decisions.
We have considered the remaining arguments, but
conclude that they are without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss for lack of juris-
diction.
DISMISSED

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BROWN v. SHULKIN 5
COSTS
No costs.

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