John Thomas Schoolcraft v. Warden, G.S.P.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13717
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JOHN THOMAS SCHOOLCRAFT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, G.S.P.,
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00087-LGW-BWC
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13717
Before W ILSON , N EWSOM, and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Schoolcraft, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. He asserts that the district court erred by concluding that
the Georgia Court of Appeals didn’t unreasonably apply federal law
in determining that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before he made a
self-incriminating statement to the police. He also contends that
the Georgia Court of Appeals unreasonably applied federal law be-
cause, he argues, it failed to consider whether the state trial court
incorrectly determined that he was not in custody for Miranda pur-
poses before the police read him his Miranda rights.
I
If a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, a fed-
eral court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s decision
(1) was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly es-
tablished federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2)
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-
court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the
benefit of the doubt. Sears v. Warden GDCP, 73 F.4th 1269, 1279
(11th Cir. 2023). This deference also applies to factual
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22-13717 Opinion of the Court 3
determinations made by a state court; a factual determination
made by a state court is presumed correct, and the petitioner has
the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).
Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings of the
Supreme Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court
decision. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). A state court
unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if it identifies
the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreason-
ably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner’s case. Putman v.
Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). To be clear, though, an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incor-
rect application of federal law. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. A state
prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must show that the state
court’s ruling was “so lacking in justification” that its error was well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possi-
bility for reasonable disagreement. Id. at 103. In other words, a
state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes fed-
eral habeas relief so long as reasonable jurists could disagree about
the correctness of the state court’s decision. Id. at 101.
If the petitioner establishes that the state court unreasonably
applied clearly established federal law, we still consider whether
the state court’s error was harmless. Sears, 73 F.4th at 1280, 1292.
An error is harmless unless “actual prejudice” results from it, mean-
ing the error must have had a “substantial and injurious effect or
influence” in determining the jury’s verdict. Id. at 1292. To assess
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13717
the extent of any prejudicial effect, we examine the state court’s
ruling in the context of the petitioner’s trial. Id. An error is not
harmless if, after reviewing the record, we are left with a “grave
doubt about the effect of the error.” Id.
II
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the pros-
ecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory on inculpa-
tory, stemming from a defendant’s custodial interrogation unless it
“demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
The Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way.” Id. Miranda requires that, prior to any questioning, the
suspect "must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that
any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has the right to an attorney. Id. The suspect may waive
these rights, but only if the waiver is made “voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently.” Id. Of course, Miranda protects a right to have
counsel present during any custodial interrogation; accordingly,
absent such interrogation, no right arises, no infringement can oc-
cur, and there is no need to determine whether a valid waiver oc-
curred. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981).
To invoke his rights under Miranda, a suspect must unequiv-
ocally state that he wants to remain silent or that he does not want
to talk to the officers or request that an attorney be present.
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22-13717 Opinion of the Court 5
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381–82 (2010). If the suspect
makes a statement concerning the right to counsel that is ambigu-
ous or equivocal or makes no statement, the police need not end
the interrogation or ask questions to clarify whether the accused
wants to invoke his Miranda rights. Id. at 381.
Whether a suspect was in custody and entitled to Miranda
warnings is a mixed question of fact and law. Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 102, 112–13 (1995). In determining whether an indi-
vidual was in custody, a court must first examine the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation—a factual inquiry.
Id. at 112–13. The court then must consider whether, under those
circumstances, there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest—the ulti-
mate and legal inquiry. Id. The initial determination concerning
custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interroga-
tion, not on anyone’s subjective views; accordingly, the only rele-
vant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s posi-
tion would have felt that he was free to end the interrogation and
leave. Id. The ultimate inquiry requires application of the control-
ling legal standard to the historical facts. Id. Relevant factors in
determining whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes
include the location of the questioning, the duration of the ques-
tioning, statements made during the interview, the presence or ab-
sence of physical restraints during the interview, and whether the
interviewee is released at the end of the interview. Howes v. Fields,
565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012).
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In Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Supreme Court considered
whether the defendant, Alvarado, who was a minor at the time,
had been in custody for Miranda purposes. 541 U.S. 652, 652–55
(2004). The Court listed certain factors indicating that a reasonable
person in Alvarado’s position would have felt free to end his inter-
view at the police station and leave: (1) the police did not transport
Alvarado to the police station or require him to appear at a certain
time; (2) they did not threaten him or place him under arrest; (3)
his parents remained in the lobby during the interview, suggesting
it would be brief; (4) during the interview, the detective focused on
Alvarado’s codefendant’s crimes, rather than Alvarado’s; (5) the de-
tective appealed to Alvarado’s interest in telling the truth and being
helpful, rather than threatening him; (6) the detective twice asked
Alvarado if he wanted to take a break; and (7) Alvarado went home
after the interview. Id. at 664–65. The Court also listed counter-
vailing factors suggesting that a reasonable person would not have
felt free to leave: (1) the interview lasted two hours; (2) the detec-
tive did not tell Alvarado that he was free to leave; (3) Alvarado was
brought to the police station by his legal guardian rather than by
arriving on his own accord; and (4) Alvarado’s parents were not
allowed to be present during the interview. Id. at 665.
In Yarborough, which arose out of a habeas petition filed un-
der § 2254, the Supreme Court held that though reasonable jurists
could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody, the state
court’s application of clearly established federal law was reasona-
ble. Id. at 664. The Court explained that the differing indications
led it to hold that the state court’s application of the custody
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22-13717 Opinion of the Court 7
standard was reasonable. Id. at 665. The Court further held that
the more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching
outcomes in case-by-case determinations, and considering that the
custody test is general, the state court applied federal law that fit
within the matrix of the Court’s prior decisions. Id. at 664–65. The
Court held that it could not grant relief under § 2254 by conducting
its own independent inquiry into whether the state court was cor-
rect as a de novo matter. Id. at 665.
Before the state may introduce a defendant’s uncounseled,
self-incriminating statements made during a custodial interroga-
tion, the state must show that the defendant knowingly and volun-
tarily waived his Miranda rights, but the state need not show that
the waiver was expressly given. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382, 384. The
state needs to show that the waiver (1) “was the product of a free
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or decep-
tion,” and (2) was “made with a full awareness of both the nature
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision
to abandon it.” Id. at 382–83. Only if the circumstances surround-
ing the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the req-
uisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that
the Miranda rights have been waived. See id. at 383–85. Factors
when considering the totality of the circumstances include the de-
fendant’s lack of education or low intelligence, failure to appraise
the defendant of his rights, the length of detention, the repeated
and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical
punishment, including deprivation of food or sleep. Schneckloth v.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13717
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). No single factor is controlling.
Id.
III
Here, the district court correctly concluded that the Georgia
Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law in deter-
mining that Schoolcraft knowingly and voluntarily waived his Mi-
randa rights before making a self-incriminating statement to the po-
lice. See § 2254(d); Sears, 73 F.4th at 1279; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
As an initial matter, several objective factors support the
conclusion that Schoolcraft was not in custody for Miranda pur-
poses—(1) that Schoolcraft voluntarily went to the police station in
his own car with his wife, who waited in the lobby during his inter-
view, (2) that the police did not tell him that he was under arrest
and made no allegations pre-Miranda regarding the sexual relation-
ship between him and the victim, (3) that there was no evidence
that he was threatened, handcuffed, or physically restrained during
the interview, (4) that he was offered and given drinks, cigarettes,
and restroom breaks, and (5) that he was told that he could leave.
See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 102, 112–13; Howes, 565 U.S. at 509; Yar-
borough, 541 U.S. at 664–65.
True, some factors might have supported a conclusion that
Schoolcraft was in custody—(1) that he was interviewed in a se-
cured room at the police station, and he got to that room by walk-
ing through an automatically locked door and past several officers’
cubicles, (2) that the pre-Miranda portion of the interview lasted
about four hours, and the interview continued for about three
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22-13717 Opinion of the Court 9
more hours post-Miranda, (3) that he was escorted to and from the
restroom and to and from his smoke break, and (4) that he was ar-
rested at the end of his interview. See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 102,
112–13; Howes, 565 U.S. at 509; Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664–65.
Because the competing considerations could lead reasonable
jurists to disagree over whether Schoolcraft was in custody, we
cannot say that the Georgia Court of Appeals unreasonably applied
federal law in concluding that he was not.
Moreover, even if a reasonable jurist could have concluded
that Schoolcraft was in custody for several hours, and even though
his custody would be a relevant factor in determining whether he
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights after receiv-
ing them, it did not, by itself, determine whether his waiver was
coerced. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382–84; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
226. The evidence shows that, though Schoolcraft was hungry and
unfed on the day of the interrogation, he was generally given access
to relieve himself, given drinks and cigarettes, and was never phys-
ically punished. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. There was also no
evidence that he lacked education or that he had low intelligence.
See id. After his Miranda rights were read to him, Schoolcraft con-
firmed that he understood them, he continued to talk to the officers
without asking for an attorney or asking to stop the interview, and
he subsequently gave a confession. See id. Thus, the Georgia Court
of Appeals reasonably applied federal law when it concluded that,
under the totality of the circumstances, Schoolcraft voluntarily and
knowingly waived his Miranda rights before he confessed that he
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engaged in sexual conduct with the victim. See Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 444; Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382–84; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226;
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101–03.
Finally, to the extent that Schoolcraft argues that he was en-
titled to Miranda warnings before he made statements about kiss-
ing the victim and being in love with her because he considered
them self-incriminating, the admission of these statements at trial
was harmless because his post-Miranda confession that he engaged
in sexual conduct with the victim—the acts that for which he was
charged—was properly admitted at trial. See Sears, 73 F.4th at 1280,
1292.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err by
denying Schoolcraft’s § 2254 petition.
AFFIRMED.
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