Christopher Michael Richardson v. David Davis, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12644
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF DAVID DAVIS,
Individually and in his official capacity as
Sheriff of Macon-Bibb County,
MACON-BIBB COUNTY,
A Government entity of the State of Georgia,
MAYOR ROBERT REICHERT,
Mayor and Chairman of Macon Bibb County
Board of Commissioners,
DEPUTY DERRICK STOKES,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12644
DEPUTY LAWRENCE PRICHARD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00320-MTT
____________________
Before R OSENBAUM , BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Richardson appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of several Defendants from the Bibb
County Sheriff’s Office1 (collectively, “BCSO Defendants”).2
Richardson argues that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment on the merits of his deliberate indifference
claims despite the BCSO Defendants only moving for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. Richardson also argues
1 While the county is “Macon-Bibb County,” the sheriff’s office is simply
referred to as the “Bibb County Sheriff’s Office.”
2 The “BCSO Defendants” include Macon-Bibb County Sheriff David Davis as
well as Macon-Bibb County Deputy Sheriffs Derrick Stokes, Lawrence
Prichard, Anthony Sims, Devin Keith, Robert Perry, Adam Butcher, Elson
Odle, Richard McClendon, Gregory Mays, and Derick Vickery.
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22-12644 Opinion of the Court 3
that the BCSO Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment
on the merits of his deliberate indifference claims. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
I . Background
A. Facts
The Bibb County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”) operates the
Bibb County Law Enforcement Center (“LEC”), which serves as
the county jail and houses more than 900 individuals charged or
convicted of misdemeanor or felony offenses. CorrectHealth Bibb
(“CorrectHealth”) is a private corporation that is contracted to
provide inmate healthcare services at the LEC. As such, BCSO
employees do not treat inmates, operate the infirmary at the LEC,
nor make medical decisions. However, BCSO employees do
transport inmates to off-site medical appointments scheduled by
CorrectHealth. BCSO employees can postpone these
appointments when a staffing shortage prevents off-site
transportation. If an off-site appointment needs to be cancelled,
BSCO employees notify CorrectHealth, who reschedules the
appointment.
On July 18, 2019, Richardson was arrested by the BCSO for
making terroristic threats and was booked into the LEC, where he
remained until March 10, 2020. A few weeks before he was
arrested, Richardson injured his pinky finger in an altercation. He
arrived to the LEC with this injury, and it was identified by a
CorrectHealth nurse during Richardson’s initial medical screening.
While the injury was identified during Richardson’s medical
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12644
screening, there is no evidence that he complained of ongoing pain
from his injury at that time.
Richardson first complained about his finger on August 5,
2019, when he informed CorrectHealth employees that his finger
was “aching and throbbing [in] pain.” Two days later, an x-ray
revealed “displaced chip fractures” in his finger. On August 13,
Richardson’s CorrectHealth doctor referred Richardson to an
orthopedic surgeon. On August 21, a CorrectHealth
representative scheduled an appointment for Richardson to be
evaluated on August 27 at OrthoGeorgia, an offsite orthopedic
provider. However, Richardson was not seen at OrthoGeorgia
until September 9. This delay in his appointment is the basis of this
appeal.
On September 23 OrthoGeorgia scheduled Richardson for
surgery. On October 21, Richardson underwent surgery on his left
pinkie finger; he returned to the LEC with a cast on his arm and no
complaints of pain.
B. Procedural History
Richardson initiated suit on August 14, 2020. On October 7,
2020, Richardson amended his complaint and alleged various
violations of his constitutional and civil rights, as well as tort claims
under Georgia law against numerous entities and individuals,
including the BCSO Defendants.3 As relevant to this appeal,
3 Richardson also alleged various claims against Macon-Bibb County and
Robert Reichert, the Mayor and Chairman of the Macon-Bibb County Board
of Commissioners. Macon-Bibb County and Mayor Reichert filed a motion
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22-12644 Opinion of the Court 5
Richardson claimed that the BCSO Defendants violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs.4 He sought damages against the BCSO
Defendants in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On February 4, 2022, the BCSO Defendants moved for
summary judgment. As for Richardson’s deliberate indifference
claims, the BCSO Defendants moved for summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that Richardson failed to
present evidence that satisfied the first prong of the qualified
immunity analysis—whether there was a constitutional violation.
On July 7, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for
the BCSO Defendants on all claims. As for the deliberate
indifference claims, the district court declined to grant summary
judgment on the BCSO Defendants’ requested grounds of qualified
immunity, instead granting summary judgment in favor of the
BCSO Defendants on the merits of Richardson’s underlying
constitutional claims. Richardson timely appealed.
for summary judgment, arguing that they were not the proper parties and
would otherwise be entitled to immunity. Richardson did not challenge this
motion and “concede[d] his claims against [these] Defendants.” The claims
against Macon-Bibb County and Mayor Reichert are not part of this appeal.
4 As a pretrial detainee, deliberate indifference claims are brought under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth
Amendment. Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 985–86 (11th Cir. 2003).
However, such claims are analyzed under the same standard. Marsh v. Butler
Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12644
II. Discussion
We review de novo an appeal of a district court’s grant of
summary judgment. Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308,
1310 (11th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We must view all evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw “all justifiable
inferences” in that party’s favor, but “inferences based upon
speculation are not reasonable.” Kernel Recs. Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d
1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).
Richardson presents two primary arguments on appeal.
First, he argues that the district court procedurally erred when it
sua sponte granted summary judgment for the BCSO Defendants
on the merits of their § 1983 deliberate indifference claims.
Richardson also argues that he presented sufficient evidence of a
Fourteenth Amendment violation to survive summary judgment.
We address each argument in turn.
A. Procedural Argument
Richardson first argues that it was error for the district court
to grant summary judgment for the BCSO Defendants on the
merits of his deliberate indifference claims, as the BCSO
Defendants only moved for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds. We disagree.
“A district court possesses the power to enter summary
judgment sua sponte provided the losing party ‘was on notice that
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22-12644 Opinion of the Court 7
she had to come forward with all of her evidence.’” Burton v. City
of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1203 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)). Importantly, however,
formal notice is not required as long as “a legal issue has been fully
developed, and the evidentiary record is complete.” Artistic Ent.,
Inc. v. City of Warner Robins, 331 F.3d 1196, 1201–02 (11th Cir. 2003).
In Burton, a voting rights case, we considered whether it was
error for the district court to sua sponte grant summary judgment
on a plaintiff’s § 1983 constitutional claims even though the
defendant only moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
Title VI claims. 178 F.3d at 1186. While we acknowledged that the
claims were technically different, we noted that, because both
claims required the plaintiffs to establish the requisite
discriminatory intent to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiffs
had “more than the reasonable opportunity to marshal the same
evidence of intent [that they did for their § 1983 claims] in support
of their Title VI claim as well.” Id. at 1204.
Here, the district court did not err in sua sponte granting
summary judgment in favor of the BCSO Defendants. While the
BCSO Defendants only moved for summary judgment on the
grounds of qualified immunity, their argument focused entirely on
the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis5—whether or not
5 A plaintiff can demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply by
showing (1) that a defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) that the
constitutional “right at issue was clearly established at the time” of the alleged
violation. Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 2018).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12644
a constitutional violation occurred. In other words, the BCSO
Defendants argued that they had not been deliberately indifferent
to Richardson’s serious medical needs. And while the first prong
of the qualified immunity analysis is technically different than the
underlying merits determination, it requires the same thing—for
the plaintiff to prove that a constitutional violation occurred.
Thus, like in Burton, because Richardson was “on notice” that he
had to come forward with all of his evidence to combat the
constitutional prong of the qualified immunity argument—which,
again, is the very same evidence required to prove the merits of his
deliberate indifference claims—the district court did not err in sua
sponte granting summary judgment for the BCSO Defendants. 178
F.3d at 1186, 1204.
B. Substantive Argument
Richardson also argues that it was error for the district court
to grant summary judgment on the merits of his deliberate
indifference claims. We disagree.
A detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right against cruel and
unusual punishment includes the right to be free from “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs” by jail officials. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “To show that a prison official
acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a
plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.”
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Under the
objective inquiry, a detainee must show an “objectively serious
medical need” that “poses a substantial risk of serious harm.”
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22-12644 Opinion of the Court 9
Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotations
omitted and alterations adopted). And, under the subjective
inquiry, a detainee can only survive summary judgment if he
produces evidence of, among other things, “(1) subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm” and “(2) disregard of that
risk.” McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).
Here, Richardson argues that the BCSO Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, he argues that the BCSO
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs when they allegedly ignored the injury to his pinky finger
and then delayed providing him with transportation to his original
OrthoGeorgia appointment, thereby causing his medical treatment
to be delayed even further.
Even assuming that Richardson has satisfied the objective
prong and established that the injury to his pinkie finger was an
“objectively serious medical need” that “pose[d] a substantial risk
of serious harm” to him, Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258, he has not
presented the requisite evidence to avoid summary judgment on
the subjective prong. First, Richardson presents no evidence that
the BCSO Defendants were subjectively aware of his serious
medical needs. While Richardson points to the medical records
which documented the pain he incurred during his medical
appointments, the existence of these records is not evidence that
the BCSO Defendants, the individuals subjected to his § 1983 suit,
had any personal knowledge of Richardson’s injury, as the BCSO
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-12644
Defendants were not the same individuals who diagnosed,
evaluated, and eventually treated his injury. In fact, Richardson
does not argue and does not present any evidence that any of the
BCSO Defendants had knowledge of his finger injury, as the
subjective prong requires.
Further, Richardson also presents no evidence that the
BCSO Defendants even engaged in the conduct he is now accusing
them of—cancelling Richardson’s August 27 OrthoGeorgia
appointment. While two BCSO representatives testified that the
BCSO would have the ability to reschedule an inmate’s medical
appointment in the instance of a staffing shortage or safety issue,
Richardson presents no evidence that the BCSO Defendants did so
in this case. Instead, he simply points to the medical records
indicating that “CorrectHealth scheduled an appointment for
Richardson with OrthoGeorgia for August 27, 2019” before noting
that “Richardson’s appointment was then rescheduled for
September 9, 2019.” In order to complete his argument, it would
be logical for Richardson to bring forward some evidence that the
BCSO Defendants rescheduled his August 27 appointment for
September 9. Richardson does not do so, and instead chooses to
simply point to the fact that the appointment was rescheduled. We
note that while we must draw justifiable inferences in Richardson’s
favor at this stage, we need not draw unreasonable inferences based
on pure speculation. Kernel Recs. Oy, 694 F.3d at 1301.
To the extent that Richardson is alleging that the district
court mischaracterized certain pieces of evidence, his arguments
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22-12644 Opinion of the Court 11
are unsupported by the record evidence. First, Richardson takes
issue with the district court’s finding that he “raised no complaints
[during initial medical screening at the LEC] about his finger.” But
the medical records showed that while Richardson identified his
finger injury during his LEC intake screening, he did not complain
about any ongoing pain until his August 5 appointment. Next,
Richardson asserts that, “[w]hile the underlying reasons may [be]
unclear, it was evident that Richardson missed his appointment
because Defendants failed to transport him there.” As explained
above, this is pure speculation. Richardson does not point to any
evidence that backs up this naked assertion. Finally, Richardson
asserts that the district court was incorrect in asserting that the
delay in medical treatment was only thirteen days. It appears that
Richardson is basing this assertion on his initial intake screening,
which occurred on July 18, 2019. Again, however, there is no
evidence that Richardson complained about any pain in his finger
during this screening. Once Richardson did alert CorrectHealth
officials to his ongoing pain, he was able to schedule a consultation
for August 27 at OrthoGeorgia, which was then delayed to
September 9, thirteen days later.
Ultimately, Richardson’s entire deliberate indifference claim
is based on the naked assertion that: “by failing to ensure that
Richardson got the medical attention that he needed . . . ,
Defendants should be liable for their deliberate indifference to Mr.
Richardson’s medi[c]al needs.” Unfortunately for Richardson,
without any evidence that the BCSO Defendants (1) had subjective
knowledge of his serious medical need, and (2) actually engaged in
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-12644
conduct that disregarded his serious medical need, his deliberate
indifference claims cannot survive summary judgment.6
III. Conclusion
Because the BCSO Defendants moved for summary
judgment and presented arguments on the constitutional prong of
the qualified immunity analysis, and because that prong requires
Richardson to present the same evidence as he would be required
to present to avoid summary judgment on the merits, the district
court did not err in sua sponte granting summary judgment on the
merits of Richardson’s deliberate indifference claims. And because
Richardson does not present the requisite evidence necessary to
avoid summary judgment on the merits of his deliberate
indifference claims, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
6 Richardson also spends part of his initial brief appearing to argue that Sheriff
Davis, one of the BCSO Defendants, had supervisory liability over the alleged
constitutional violations of other BCSO employees due to his “failure to
supervise, and his failure to train with regard to[] Richardson’s claim for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” We need not evaluate
this claim, as Richardson is unable to present any evidence to avoid summary
judgment on the merits of his underlying Fourteenth Amendment claim. See
Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1264 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We need not
address the Appellant’s claims of . . . supervisory liability since we conclude no
constitutional violation occurred.)
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