USA v. Joshua Hunter

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11960
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSHUA HUNTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cr-00053-TFM-M-2
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11960 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 09/21/2023 Page: 1 of 7

-- 1 of 7 --

2 Opinion of the Court 22-11960
Before J ORDAN, BRANCH , and E DMONDSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joshua Hunter appeals the above-guidelines 48-month sen-
tence imposed -- pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) -- upon the sec-
ond revocation of his supervised release.1 Hunter challenges the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence. No reversible error has
been shown; we affirm.
In 2008, Hunter pleaded guilty to carjacking and to pos-
sessing a firearm during a crime of violence: violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2119 and 924(c). Hunter was sentenced to a total of 161 months’
imprisonment followed by 5 years’ supervised release.
Hunter completed his custodial sentence and began his 5-
year term of supervised release in August 2019. In October 2020,
the district court revoked Hunter’s supervised release and sen-
tenced Hunter to 13 months in prison followed by 47 months of
supervised release.
Hunter began his second term of supervised release in Sep-
tember 2021. In May 2022, a probation officer petitioned the dis-
trict court to revoke Hunter’s supervised release for a second time.
The probation officer alleged that Hunter had violated the condi-
tions of his supervised release in two ways: (1) by committing new
state crimes (trespass and attempt to introduce contraband into a
1 Hunter does not challenge the revocation of his supervised release.
USCA11 Case: 22-11960 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 09/21/2023 Page: 2 of 7

-- 2 of 7 --

22-11960 Opinion of the Court 3
prison facility); and (2) by failing to notify his probation officer
within 72 hours of being arrested.
The petition set forth the circumstances underlying
Hunter’s newly-charged state offenses.2 In the early morning
hours on 8 April 2022, officers responded to a call about a trespasser
on state property near an Alabama prison facility. Officers discov-
ered a black duffel bag containing a drone battery and several sealed
packages containing “37 touchscreen cell phones, 44 (USB) charg-
ing cords, 28 charging blocks, 71 sim cards, 29 push pins, 20 sticky
notes containing phone numbers, pin numbers and account num-
bers, two (2) gold necklaces, one (1) pair of eyeglasses, 214 grams
of white pills and 60 grams of brown pills (believed to be supple-
ment pills).” The packages had zip ties taped to them in a way that
led officers to believe that the trespasser intended to deliver the
packages by drone into the prison yard.
After discovering the duffel bag, officers used police dogs to
track the trespasser. Officers located Hunter and arrested him
without incident. Officers later located a drone near the area where
Hunter had been found.
At the final revocation hearing, the district court revoked
Hunter’s supervised release. The district court then considered the
parties’ submissions, the advisory guidelines range (18 to 24
months), and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The district court
2 Never has Hunter disputed the factual allegations underlying his state
charges.
USCA11 Case: 22-11960 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 09/21/2023 Page: 3 of 7

-- 3 of 7 --

4 Opinion of the Court 22-11960
acknowledged -- but noted that it was not bound by -- the parties’
joint recommended sentence of 24 months. At the end of the hear-
ing, the district court concluded that an above-guidelines sentence
of 48 months’ imprisonment with no additional term of supervised
release was appropriate.
We review a sentence imposed upon revocation of super-
vised release for reasonableness in the light of the totality of the
circumstances and the section 3553(a) factors. See United States v.
Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935-36 (11th Cir 2016). We evaluate the sub-
stantive reasonableness of a sentence -- whether one inside or out-
side the guidelines range -- under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “The party
challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is un-
reasonable.” Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936.
In imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised re-
lease, the district court must consider (1) the nature and circum-
stances of the offense, (2) the defendant’s history and characteris-
tics, (3) the need for the sentence to deter criminal conduct and to
protect the public, (4) the need to provide the defendant with edu-
cation training or medical care, (5) the advisory guidelines range,
(6) the policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, (7) the
need to avoid sentencing disparities, and (8) the need to provide
restitution to victims. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e). We will
disturb a sentence only “if we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judg-
ment in weighing the [sentencing] factors by arriving at a sentence
USCA11 Case: 22-11960 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 09/21/2023 Page: 4 of 7

-- 4 of 7 --

22-11960 Opinion of the Court 5
that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” See Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936 (quotation omitted).
Hunter has failed to demonstrate that his above-guidelines
sentence substantively was unreasonable. The record reflects that
Hunter has a lengthy criminal history. Hunter also committed the
instant supervised-release violations less than 7 months after his
most recent release from custody and after already serving an ad-
ditional 13-month sentence upon the revocation of his first term of
supervised release in this case. At the revocation hearing, the dis-
trict court described Hunter’s criminal history as demonstrating a
willful disregard for the law and a “disregard for any sense of au-
thority and any sense of compliance” with societal rules.
The district court gave little weight to Hunter’s arguments
about whether his charged state crimes constituted felonies or mis-
demeanors under Alabama law. The district court, instead, stressed
the “flat-out dangerous” nature of the conduct underlying
Hunter’s violations. The district court recognized the already-dan-
gerous conditions inside Alabama’s prisons and explained that -- by
attempting to smuggle contraband into a prison -- Hunter acted to
further endanger the safety of inmates and correctional officers.
The district court observed that allowing inmates access to cell
phones would facilitate ongoing criminal activity both inside and
outside of the prison and could lead to possible prison violence.
The district court observed that Hunter showed disdain for the law
not only by violating the law himself while under the court’s
USCA11 Case: 22-11960 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 09/21/2023 Page: 5 of 7

-- 5 of 7 --

6 Opinion of the Court 22-11960
supervision but also by assisting others in violating the law and
prison rules.
The district court observed that the circumstances sur-
rounding Hunter’s conduct indicated that Hunter had conspired
with inmates to smuggle the contraband. The district court noted
that -- had Hunter been successful -- Hunter was likely to repeat the
behavior.
In the light of the nature and circumstances of Hunter’s su-
pervised-release violations and of Hunter’s history and character-
istics, we accept that an above-guidelines sentence of 48 months’
imprisonment could be reasonably thought to be necessary to pro-
vide adequate deterrence and to protect the public from future
crimes.
Contrary to Hunter’s assertion on appeal, the district court
considered expressly evidence that Hunter had earned his OSHA
certification and that Hunter was close to obtaining his commercial
driver’s license. The district court recognized that Hunter had “the
ability to do differently” but “willfully ch[o]se not to.” That the
district court afforded more weight to Hunter’s criminal history
and underlying conduct than the court did to other mitigating fac-
tors is no abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d
823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The weight to be accorded any given §
3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the
district court, and we will not substitute our judgment in weighing
the relevant factors.” (quotation and alteration omitted)).
USCA11 Case: 22-11960 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 09/21/2023 Page: 6 of 7

-- 6 of 7 --

22-11960 Opinion of the Court 7
Viewing the record as a whole, we are not “left with the def-
inite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at
a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dic-
tated by the facts of the case.” See Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936. The
district court abused no discretion; we affirm Hunter’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 22-11960 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 09/21/2023 Page: 7 of 7

-- 7 of 7 --