USA v. Alisbey Santillon Gata

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11514
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALISBEY SANTILLON GATA,
a.k.a. Alexs Santillon,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20368-BB-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11514
Before WILSON, L UCK , and LAGOA , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alisbey Santillon Gata appeals his conviction for possessing
a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
and argues that § 922(g) is unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause and the Tenth Amendment. Santillon Gata argues that §
922(g) is unconstitutional because it does not require that the pos-
sessed firearm substantially affect interstate commerce. Santillon
Gata also argues that § 922(g) violates the Tenth Amendment. Be-
cause both of these issues have been addressed and foreclosed by
this Court’s prior precedent, we affirm.
See United States v. Brown,
342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003) (under our prior precedent
rule, we must follow a prior binding precedent “unless and until it
is overruled by this [C]ourt en banc or by the Supreme Court”).
I.
On May 21, 2021, Santillon Gata robbed a boutique store,
during which he brandished and pointed a revolver firearm at the
cashier and demanded her to open the jewelry case. Santillon Gata
then fled the scene. Later that day, police offers identified Santillon
Gata as the robber because he left his phone number at the pawn
shop where he pawned some of the stolen items. Police officers
obtained a warrant for Santillon Gata’s residence, and upon arrival,
searched Santillon Gata’s person and found two guns.
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22-11514 Opinion of the Court 3
Santillon Gata was subsequently indicted by a grand jury for
Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (“Count 1”);
brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (“Count 2”); and possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(“Count 3”). Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Santillon Gata
agreed to plead guilty to Count 3, and the parties agreed to jointly
recommend a sentence of eight years’ imprisonment. Santillon
Gata stipulated in the factual proffer to the plea agreement that the
two firearms that he possessed were manufactured outside the
state of Florida and traveled in interstate commerce. At the
change-of-plea hearing, the government stated in summarizing the
factual basis for his guilty plea that the two firearms that Santillon
Gata possessed were manufactured outside the state of Florida and
affected interstate commerce. And Santillon Gata admitted that
the proffered facts were true and pled guilty to Count 3.
A probation officer prepared a presentence investigating re-
port (“PSI”). The PSI determined that Santillon Gata had a base
offense level of 20, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). The PSI
added four levels because Santillon Gata possessed the gun in con-
nection with another felony, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B),
raising his total offense level to 24. The PSI stated that Santillon
Gata had prior convictions for uttering a forgery, grand theft, pos-
session of MDMA, resisting an officer with violence, battery on a
law enforcement officer, disorderly intoxication, and battery, and
these convictions resulted in a criminal history score of four and a
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11514
criminal history category of III. Santillon Gata also had the follow-
ing charges against him that had been
nolle prossed: possession of
marijuana, possession of cannabis, threatening law enforcement,
driving on a suspended license, and throwing a deadly missile.
The PSI calculated Santillon Gata’s sentencing guidelines
range as 63 to 78 months of imprisonment, with the statutory max-
imum imprisonment term being 120 months.
Santillon Gata objected to the four-level enhancement, ar-
guing that he was suspected of committing the robbery but did not
commit it. He also objected to the failure to include the reduction
for acceptance of responsibility. He argued that if the reduction
was applied and his objection to the enhancement was sustained,
his total offense level would be 17 with a guidelines imprisonment
range of 27 to 33 months. And he noted that this would not alter
the 96-month recommended sentence agreed upon in the plea
agreement.
At the sentencing hearing, Santillon Gata reiterated his ob-
jection to the four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in
connection with another felony offense and argued that it was un-
clear who committed the robbery. After hearing arguments from
counsel and testimony from an officer, the district court overruled
the objection to the enhancement. At the hearing, however, the
government conceded that the three-level reduction for ac-
ceptance of responsibility applied.
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22-11514 Opinion of the Court 5
The district court then determined that Santillon Gata’s total
offense level was 21, with his guidelines range being 46 to 57
months of imprisonment. After hearing from the owner of the
robbed boutique, Santillon Gata, and the parties’ counsels, the dis-
trict court sentenced Santillon Gata to 96 months of imprisonment
and 3 years of supervised release. The court also dismissed Counts
1 and 2. This appeal ensued.
II.
Generally, we review the constitutionality of a statute
de
novo, as it is a question of law.
United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d
708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). However, if the issue is raised for the first
time on appeal, we review for plain error only.
Id. Plain error oc-
curs only if (1) there was error, (2) it was plain, (3) it affected the
defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) it seriously affected the “fair-
ness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id.
(quoting
United States v. Jones, 289 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir.
2002)).
III.
As Santillon Gata concedes, decisions by this Court “have
clearly held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause.”
United States v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 1278, 1283
(11th Cir. 2017) (citing
United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 391
(11th Cir. 1996)). We have also rejected as-applied challenges to 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), holding that the government proves a “minimal
nexus” to interstate commerce where it demonstrates that the
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11514
firearms were manufactured outside of the state where the offense
took place and, thus, necessarily traveled in interstate commerce.
Wright, 607 F.3d at 715–16. And we have specifically rejected con-
stitutional challenges to § 922(g) under
United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995), concluding that “[n]othing in
Lopez suggest[ed]
that the minimal nexus test should be changed.”
McAllister, 77
F.3d at 390 (quotation marks omitted);
see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561–62 (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was unconsti-
tutional because it did not “substantially affect” interstate com-
merce and lacked a jurisdictional element to ensure each “firearm
possession in question affects interstate commerce”).
We have also held that Congress does not violate the Tenth
Amendment when it enacts legislation through the constitutionally
permissible exercise of its Commerce Clause power.
See Cheffer
v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995). Further, we have held
that § 922(g) does not violate the Tenth Amendment.
See Hiley v.
Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998),
aff’g,
Nat’l Ass’n of
Gov’t Emps. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564. 1577–78 (N.D. Ga. 1998)
(noting that because § 922(g) is a valid exercise of Congress’s com-
merce authority, it cannot violate the Tenth Amendment).
Here, Santillon Gata did not object to the constitutionality
of § 922(g) under either the Commerce Clause or the Tenth
Amendment in the district court. Therefore, we review his argu-
ments only for plain error. And, as Santillon Gata concedes, his
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22-11514 Opinion of the Court 7
arguments that § 922(g) is unconstitutional1 are barred by our prior
panel precedents holding that § 922(g) is constitutional under the
Commerce Clause, even when the gun was only manufactured
outside the state of conviction, and under the Tenth Amendment
because it does not invade the province of the states. Indeed, San-
tillon Gata admitted that the guns that he possessed were manufac-
tured outside of Florida.
We therefore affirm his conviction.
AFFIRMED.
1 When a defendant makes only passing references to an issue in his brief, it
constitutes a failure to devote a discrete section of his argument in his appel-
late brief to an issue, and that issue is deemed abandoned on appeal.
United
States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003),
abrogated on other
grounds by Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). Here, while
Santillon Gata mentioned an as-applied challenge to § 922(g) in an issue state-
ment and in the opening sentence of his Tenth Amendment argument of his
brief, he does not otherwise make an as-applied argument about the facts in
his case and only addresses the facial constitutionality of the statute. But, as
explained above, even if Santillon Gata did not abandon an as-applied chal-
lenge to § 922(g), it is foreclosed by our precedent.
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