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22-11416•USA v. Ashley Nicole Haydt
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11416
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ASHLEY NICOLE HAYDT,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00469-RAH-SMD-2
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11416
Before J ILL PRYOR , L UCK , and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ashley Haydt appeals her total sentence of 220 months’ im-
prisonment, imposed after she was convicted of conspiracy to use
an explosive device, malicious use of an explosive, and misprision
of a felony. On appeal, Haydt argues that the district court erred
in using U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1 to calculate her base offense level because
she did not knowingly engage in conduct that created a risk of mur-
der. After careful review, we affirm.
When reviewing a challenge to the applicability of the
Guidelines, we consider legal issues
de novo, review factual find-
ings for clear error, and apply the Guidelines to the facts with due
deference, which is akin to clear error review.
United States v.
Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010). A defendant may
not be sentenced based on “groundless inferences.”
United States
v. Lopez, 898 F.2d 1505, 1512 (11th Cir. 1990). But a district court
may make reasonable inferences “based on common sense and or-
dinary human experience.”
United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883,
885 (11th Cir. 2013). “The district court’s determination that the
appellant [intended to cause] death or serious bodily injury is a find-
ing of fact that will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.”
United States v. Honeycutt, 8 F.3d 785, 787–88 (11th Cir. 1993).
Additionally, the issue turns on the defendant’s “state of mind at
the time [of the offense], and not the actual results of [her] actions.”
Id.
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22-11416 Opinion of the Court 3
Under the 2018 Guidelines Manual, the guideline provision
applicable to a defendant convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
ordinarily is U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4 and provides for a base offense level
of 24 if the offense created
a substantial risk of death or serious bod-
ily injury to any person other than a participant in the offense.
U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(a)(1) (2018). However, when the offense was
in-
tended to cause death or serious bodily injury, the court should ap-
ply “the most analogous guideline from Chapter Two, Part A (Of-
fenses Against the Person),” if the resulting base offense level is
greater than that under § 2K1.4.
Id. § 2K1.4(c)(1).
Section 2A2.1 of the Guidelines applies to assault with intent
to commit murder and attempted murder. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1 (2018).
Under this section, the base offense level is 33 if the object of the
offense would have constituted first degree murder, and an addi-
tional 2 points are added if the victim sustained serious bodily in-
jury.
Id. § 2A2.1(a)(1), (b)(1). In relevant part, for the purposes of
§ 2A2.1(a)(1), first degree murder is defined as “the unlawful killing
of a human being with malice aforethought,” including any “kind
of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing.” 18
U.S.C. § 1111(a); U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1, comment. (n.1).
Section 2A2.2 applies to aggravated assault and provides for
a base offense level of 14. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(a) (2018). Another five
points are added if the victim sustained serious bodily injury.
Id.
§ 2A2.2(b)(3)(B).
Here, the district court did not clearly err in imposing
Haydt’s sentence. As the record reflects, Haydt’s convictions
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11416
stemmed from her scheme to bomb the vehicle of the father of one
of her children, Terry Brooks. The plan was fleshed out at trial by
Haydt’s coconspirator, Sylvio Joseph King, the man who placed
and detonated the bomb. According to King, he had met Haydt at
work and they had become friends as Haydt’s relationship with
Brooks was breaking down. Eventually, Haydt began to discuss
her custody battle with King, and King told her that he had some
friends who could “straighten the matter out.” About a month af-
ter King made this suggestion, Haydt asked King if he could get in
touch with those friends.
From that point forward, Haydt and King started talking reg-
ularly about getting rid of Brooks altogether. Haydt texted King
that she was “ready to only have to worry about me and my chil-
dren.” She asked King, “So you got this right? So it’s just me raising
my kids from then forward.” She told King she was worried “that
you don’t have this,” but she was trusting King to take care of her
problem. At one point, King sent a picture of a pipe bomb to
Haydt, to let her know he was serious. Haydt asked why he didn’t
“just take [a] rifle and shoot him.”
As their plans progressed, Haydt told King where Brooks
lived, and the day before the bombing, King sent Haydt a snapchat
message that he’d placed the bomb. On the day of the bombing,
Haydt told King what time Brooks left for work. Around that time,
King drove down the road he knew Brooks would take to work and
each time he approached a vehicle that looked like Brooks’ truck,
he would hit the detonator. Eventually, King approached the truck
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22-11416 Opinion of the Court 5
Brooks was driving, and the bomb went off. King sent Haydt a
snapchat message that said, “Boom, I felt that from 150 feet away.”
When investigators arrived, they discovered that the rear
passenger compartment behind and below the driver’s seat of
Brooks’ truck was heavily damaged. Brooks testified that after the
blast, he was taken to the emergency room, “in excruciating pain”
with damage to his lower back, burns on his arms, and his ears ring-
ing. Brooks had surgery to remove shrapnel and stayed in the hos-
pital for four days.
At Haydt’s sentencing hearing, the district court was tasked
with determining whether “the offense was intended to cause
death or serious bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(c)(1). If so, it was
to apply “the most analogous guideline from Chapter Two, Part A
(Offenses Against the Person).”
Id. Upon finding that Haydt had
“intended to cause death or serious bodily injury,” the court ap-
plied U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1 -- assault with intent to commit murder; at-
tempted murder -- as the most analogous guideline to the facts of
this case. Using § 2A2.1 to establish the base offense level, the court
ultimately sentenced Haydt to 220 months’ imprisonment.
The district court did not clearly err in concluding that §
2A2.1 was the most analogous guideline to this case, as provided
for in § 2K1.4(c)(1).
See Rothenberg, 610 F.3d at 624. Indeed, there
is ample evidence in the record for the district court to have con-
cluded that Haydt’s objective -- for Brooks to die, so that she could
be the sole parent of their son -- constituted first degree murder.
As we’ve detailed, King and Haydt had frequent conversations
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11416
about Brooks “disappearing” that increased after he filed for cus-
tody; Haydt expressly asked King to confirm that it would be “just
[Haydt] raising [her] kids from then forward.” Further, after seeing
the picture of a bomb, Haydt asked King why he did not just shoot
Brooks with a rifle. She told him that, despite her worries that he
“[didn’t] have this,” she hoped to have his word that King would
“take care” of her problem. And, as King admitted on cross-exam-
ination, merely scaring Brooks would not have helped Haydt in her
custody dispute. On this record, the district court reasonably in-
ferred that the attack on Brooks was “premeditated” and that
Haydt had made “a calculated effort to kill” him, and, thus, that the
object of the offense constituted first degree murder.
Philidor, 717
F.3d at 885.
As for Haydt’s claim that King’s decision to use a less deadly
bomb than he’d originally planned undermines this conclusion, we
disagree. King’s mental state does not determine what Haydt in-
tended, and in any event, King testified that he wanted to kill
Brooks.
See Honeycutt, F.3d at 787. Likewise, to the extent Haydt
argues that King’s testimony that she had been shocked about the
bomb suggests that she did not knowingly create a risk of murder,
we also are unpersuaded. King specifically testified that he lied to
police about her involvement in the offense to protect her from
criminal liability.
In short, the district court did not clearly err in concluding
that § 2A2.1 was the most analogous guideline under § 2K1.4(c)(1).
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22-11416 Opinion of the Court 7
See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Accordingly, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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