Chanda Alane Hardin v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11026
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CHANDA ALANE HARDIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00879-CLM
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11026
Before N EWSOM , G RANT, and B LACK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Chanda Hardin appeals the district court’s order affirming
the Commissioner’s denial of her claim for a period of disability,
disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income.
She contends the Appeals Council (AC) erred in holding that her
medical submissions, which included evidence of a herniated disc,
did not show a reasonable probability of changing the outcome of
the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision. She also asserts the
ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial evidence when it relied
on the Vocational Expert’s (VE) testimony regarding a question
that was not based on a correct or full statement of Hardin’s limi-
tations and impairments. After review,1 we affirm the district
court.
1 We review
de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner’s de-
cision is based, and the Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence.
Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253,
1260 (11th Cir. 2007). The Commissioner’s decision will not be disturbed if,
in light of the record as a whole, it appears to be supported by substantial evi-
dence, which is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reason-
able person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion.
Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). When a claimant
properly presents new evidence to the AC, we consider whether that new ev-
idence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.
Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262.
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22-11026 Opinion of the Court 3
I. AC DECISION
Generally, claimants are permitted to present new evidence
at each stage of the administrative process, including before the
AC.
Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir.
2007). The AC will review a case if it “receives additional evidence
that is new, material, and relates to the period on or before the date
of the hearing decision, and there is a reasonable probability that
the additional evidence would change the outcome of the deci-
sion.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470(a)(5). If a claimant presents evidence
after the ALJ’s decision, the AC must consider it if it is new, mate-
rial, and chronologically relevant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5), (b);
Pupo v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 17 F.4th 1054, 1063 (11th Cir.
2021). Evidence is material if it creates a reasonable probability of
changing the ALJ’s decision.
Hyde v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 456,
459 (11th Cir. 1987).
However, we have held the AC, in denying a request for re-
view, is not required to “give a detailed rationale for why each
piece of new evidence submitted to it does not change the ALJ’s
decision.”
Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 784
(11th Cir. 2014). In
Mitchell, we concluded the AC adequately eval-
uated new evidence submitted where it accepted the evidence but
denied review because the additional evidence failed to establish
error in the ALJ’s decision.
Id.
The record does not support Hardin’s claim the AC failed to
adequately consider her new evidence. The AC explicitly noted
each of the medial records Hardin submitted, including the MRI
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11026
report from June 29, 2017, that showed right-sided disc extru-
sion/herniation at L5-S1, and it stated it found the new evidence
did not show a reasonable probability of a different result. Thus,
the AC considered the evidence, specifically incorporating descrip-
tions of the medical records into the record, and concluded the new
evidence was insufficient to alter the ALJ’s decision.
See id. Be-
cause the AC is not required to give a detailed rationale for why
each piece of new evidence submitted to it does not change the
ALJ’s decision, its consideration of Hardin’s newly submitted evi-
dence was not erroneous.
See id.
Likewise, the AC did not err in determining the MRI evi-
dence showing a right-sided disc extrusion/herniation at L5-S1
would not affect the outcome of the ALJ’s decision. Hardin con-
tends the MRI is material because the ALJ found her back pain was
not substantiated by medical evidence and this finding was contra-
dicted by the MRI evidence showing the back pain was caused by
a herniated disc. This argument mischaracterizes the ALJ’s hearing
decision because the ALJ did not find Hardin’s back pain was not
caused by a medically determinable impairment. Instead, the ALJ
found Hardin’s lumbar degenerative disc disease was a severe im-
pairment. Further, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (RFC) as-
sessment accounted for Hardin’s back impairments, which is con-
sistent with the MRI, and the MRI does not show any different or
more severe disability as to render a reasonable probability it
would change the administrative result.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b);
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22-11026 Opinion of the Court 5
Pupo, 17 F.4th at 1063. Accordingly, the AC did not err in evaluat-
ing Hardin’s newly submitted evidence.
II. ALJ HYPOTHETICAL
At the fifth step of the disability inquiry, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant can perform other work in light of the claim-
ant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Wilson v. Barn-
hart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002). For a VE’s testimony to
constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical
question that comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.
Win-
schel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011).
The hypothetical need only include the claimant’s impairments,
not each and every symptom of the claimant.
Ingram, 496 F.3d at
1270.
While Hardin alleges the ALJ erred in relying on the VE’s
testimony because the hypothetical question did not accurately
state her pain level or her RFC, she does not state what impair-
ments or limitations the ALJ failed to include in the hypothetical
question. While she contends the ALJ erred in relying on the VE’s
testimony regarding a hypothetical individual who could work at a
“light exertion level,” the ALJ did not rely on the VE’s answer to
this hypothetical question, but instead the ALJ relied on the VE’s
answer to his question limiting the hypothetical individual to a
range of “sedentary” work.
Hardin’s argument fails because the ALJ’s hypothetical
needed only include Hardin’s impairments, which it did when the
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11026
ALJ asked the VE about a hypothetical individual limited to a range
of sedentary work.
See Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1270. The ALJ was not
required to include each and every symptom of Hardin’s in the hy-
pothetical question.
See id. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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