Joan P. Davis v. David Erich Nahmias, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-14424
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JOAN P. DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DAVID ERICH NAHMIAS,
of the Georgia Supreme Court,
in his individual capacity,
HEIDI M. FAENZA,
Director of Admissions ofthe Office of Bar Admissions,
in her individual capacity,
JOHN C. SAMMON,
Chairman of the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants,
in his individual capacity,
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14424
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-02413-MHC
____________________
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joan P. Davis, a formerly-licensed attorney proceeding
pro
se, appeals following the dismissal of her amended complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, Davis argues that the district court
erred in dismissing her challenges to certain Bar readmission rules
and procedures based on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 She also
contends that the court erred in finding that she failed to state a
claim for relief as to one defendant, and in concluding that any
claims for monetary damages were barred by judicial immunity.
We address these arguments in turn.
I.
1
Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);
D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983).
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21-14424 Opinion of the Court 3
Court filings2 show that Davis had been licensed to practice
law in the State of Georgia.
See In re Davis (“
Davis I”), 725 S.E.2d
216 (2012). At some point, however, the State Bar of Georgia
(“State Bar”) charged her with violating certain provisions of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in two disciplinary actions.
Id. at 217. A special master later concluded that she had violated
the rules as alleged and that disbarment was the only appropriate
punishment under the circumstances.
Id. at 218. She ultimately
sought judicial review of the preceding, but the Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed and ordered her disbarred in 2012.
Id. at 220.
In 2017, Davis applied to the Georgia Office of Bar Admis-
sions for reinstatement.
See In re Davis (“
Davis II”), 834 S.E.2d 93
(2019). The Office’s Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants
(the “Board”), however, denied her application.
Id. at 94. She
sought judicial review of that decision, but the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld the Board’s decision and denied her application for
reinstatement in 2019.
Id. at 96.
In 2021, Davis filed the present
pro se suit in the Northern
District of Georgia. In an amended complaint, she identified three
officials⸺“David E. Nahmias, Chief Justice of the Georgia Su-
preme Court, [i]n his individual capacity; Heidi M. Faenza, Direc-
tor of Admissions of the Office of Bar Admissions, [i]n her individ-
ual capacity; [and] John C. Sammon, Chairman of the Board to
2 We note that Davis cited to the following cases in her amended complaint,
and the district court took notice of them without objection.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-14424
Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants (“the Board”), in his individual
capacity”⸺as defendants. Citing to both
Davis I and
Davis II, Da-
vis alleged nine counts against the defendants, claiming various fed-
eral and state constitutional violations. In her prayer for relief, she
did not expressly request an award of damages, but she did seek
“such further legal and equitable relief as is equitable and just.”
The defendants moved to dismiss Davis’s amended com-
plaint. And the district court dismissed Davis’s complaint because,
after citing to both
Davis I and
Davis II, it concluded that she was,
in fact, seeking review of the 2019 judicial decision in her case. The
court explained:
Davis has crafted the language of her Amended Com-
plaint to give the appearance of a general challenge to
the constitutionality of the Bar rules, but a careful re-
view of her allegations reveal that
she is, in reality,
seeking the reversal of the denial of her Application
for Reinstatement.
(Emphasis added). Thus, the court dismissed her suit for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, based on the
Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine, as her claims were inextricably intertwined with the state
court’s adjudication of her application. It alternatively found that
Davis failed to state a claim for relief as to Faenza, as none of the
purported wrongdoing on the part of Faenza was alleged in her
amended complaint, and that any claims for monetary damages by
Davis were barred by judicial immunity, as defendants were acting
in their capacities as a judicial officer and agents of the court.
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21-14424 Opinion of the Court 5
This appeal ensued. On appeal, Davis challenges the preced-
ing determinations.3 For ease of reference, we will address each
point in turn.
II.
We review
de novo a district court’s determination that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206,
1209 (11th Cir. 2021).
Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over cases
which involve questions of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. They
may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
under certain circumstances.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, bars federal dis-
trict courts from reviewing state-court decisions, because lower
federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over final state-court
judgments.
Behr, 8 F.4th at 1208. It applies to “cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings com-
menced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
3 Davis also argues that the district court failed to construe her amended com-
plaint liberally. Although we ordinarily construe
pro se pleadings liberally,
Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1386 (11th Cir. 1998), there is no need
for a liberal construction where the
pro se litigant is an attorney,
see Olivares
v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977).
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-14424
U.S. 280, 284 (2005). These injuries must be caused by the judg-
ment itself.
Behr, 8 F.4th at 1212.
The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies not only to federal
claims actually raised in the state court, but also to those that are
“inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment.
Casale v.
Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). But a federal claim
is only “inextricably intertwined” with a state-court claim when, in
substance, it amounts to a direct appeal of, or a direct attack on, the
state-court judgment, even if the appellant does not refer to their
proceeding as a direct appeal.
Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211.
For example, in
Behr, we noted that the Supreme Court had
held that a request for a declaration that the state court’s judgment
was arbitrary and capricious was, in effect, an attempt to directly
appeal the state court’s judgment and was thus inextricably inter-
twined with the state-court claims.
Id. But a federal law claim is
not “inextricably intertwined” with a state law one simply because
it “require[s] some reconsideration of a decision of a state court,”
provided that the plaintiff presents “some independent claim, albeit
one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in
a case to which he was a party.”
Id. at 1212 (quoting
Nicholson v.
Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1288 (11th Cir. 2009)). We have explained
that application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a narrow, claim
specific inquiry:
Unlike many doctrines, [
Rooker-Feldman] is not pru-
dential—it is based explicitly on the statutory limita-
tions of federal district courts’ jurisdiction. Only
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21-14424 Opinion of the Court 7
when a losing state court litigant calls on a district
court to modify or ‘overturn an injurious state-court
judgment’ should a claim be dismissed under
Rooker-
Feldman; district courts do not lose subject matter ju-
risdiction over a claim ‘simply because a party at-
tempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously
litigated in state court.’ Nor is
Rooker-Feldman
‘simply preclusion by another name.’ To be sure,
other doctrines of preclusion, abstention, or comity
may still bar a plaintiff's claims—but they are separate
and distinct from
Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional
prohibition on appellate review of state court deci-
sions in federal district courts.
Id. at 1210 (citations omitted) (first quoting
Exxon Mobile, 544 U.S.
at 292–93; then quoting
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006)).
And we have emphasized that a “claim-by-claim approach is the
right one.”
Id. at 1213.
In
Behr, we analyzed “a 30-count
pro se complaint” that pre-
sented “a wide variety of constitutional, statutory, and tort claims
against 18 named defendants.”
Id. at 1208. The district court dis-
missed all 30 claims under
Rooker-Feldman because “the claims
were related to the Behrs’ earlier state court litigation.”
Id. In re-
versing the district court’s judgment of dismissal, we explained that
the Supreme Court’s decision in
Exxon Mobil had “exposed the
flaws in our significant expansion of
Rooker-Feldman.”
Id. at 1210.
We then concluded that
Exxon Mobil showed that “considering
whether a claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-14424
judgment is not a second prong of the analysis”; rather, “it is merely
a way of ensuring that courts do not exercise jurisdiction over the
appeal of a state court judgment simply because the claimant does
not call it an appeal of a state court judgment.”
Id. at 1212. We
further stated that “the district court m[ight] ultimately have rea-
son to dismiss” the remaining claims, “but not on
Rooker-Feldman
grounds.”
Id. at 1208.
In
Berman v. Florida Board of Bar Examiners, 794 F.2d 1529,
1530 (11th Cir. 1986), a case relied on by the district court, we ad-
dressed an attorney’s challenge to “a state court judicial proceeding
resulting in the denial of a particular application (Berman’s) for ad-
mission to the Florida Bar.” Berman had specifically asked, in his
prayer for relief, that the district court grant him admission to the
Florida Bar.
Id. We upheld the applicability of the
Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine and held that a decision by a state supreme court in
a particular case denying the admission of a particular bar applicant
qualified as a final decision for
Rooker-Feldman purposes.
Id. We
also explained that federal district courts lack jurisdiction over
claims “that a state court’s judicial decision in a particular case has
resulted in the
unlawful denial of admission to a particular bar ap-
plicant.”
Id. (emphasis added). But we noted that “[f]ederal district
courts have jurisdiction over” challenges “to a state’s general rules
and procedures governing admission.”
Id.
Here, we conclude that the following of Davis’s claims were
a direct appeal of, or a
de facto appeal of, harmful state court judg-
ments: (1) the equal protection claims; and (2) Counts Two, Three,
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21-14424 Opinion of the Court 9
Four, Five, and Eight of Davis’s amended complaint, which alleged
that the defendants acted improperly in deciding her application for
reinstatement. Because the district court could not reject the Geor-
gia Supreme Court’s ruling on her particular application, her claims
were tantamount to an appeal of the 2019 state court judgment,
which was barred by
Rooker-Feldman.
Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211. Ac-
cordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing these claims
under
Rooker-Feldman, as each of these claims amounted to an
impermissible appeal of a final state court judgment.
Exxon Mobil,
544 U.S. at 284.
We note that the remaining claims in Davis’s amended com-
plaint—Counts One, Six, Seven, and Nine, except for the equal pro-
tection aspect of Counts Seven and Nine—discussed and refer-
enced the prior state court litigation. Nevertheless, we conclude
that they did not make the claims a direct appeal of, or a
de facto
appeal of, the state court judgment, as success in any of these claims
would not invalidate or undermine the state court judgment.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284;
Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211. Further,
Davis, unlike the plaintiffs in
Feldman and
Berman, did not request
admission to the bar in her prayer for relief.
See Berman, 794 F.2d
at 1530;
see also Behr, 8 F.4th at 1210 n.1 (describing
Feldman).
And because “considering whether a claim is ‘inextricably inter-
twined’ with a state court judgment is . . . merely a way of ensuring
that courts do not exercise jurisdiction over the appeal of a state
court judgment simply because the claimant does not call it an ap-
peal of a state court judgment,” we conclude that the district court
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-14424
erred in concluding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied to
these claims, which were not appeals or de facto appeals of the
Georgia Supreme Court’s rulings.
Behr, 8 F.4th at 1212.
While we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing
some of Davis’s claims under
Rooker-Feldman, we express no po-
sition on the potential merit of these remaining claims.
III.
We review
de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim.
Evanto v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 814
F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2016). In doing so, we accept the allega-
tions in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
World Holdings, LLC v. Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 701 F.3d 641, 649 (11th Cir. 2012). To survive a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a com-
plaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on
its face.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that al-
lows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. When considering a mo-
tion to dismiss, the district court generally must limit its consider-
ation to the pleadings and any exhibits attached.
Grossman v. Na-
tionsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).
We also review
de novo whether an official is entitled to ju-
dicial immunity.
Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir.
2001). Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from
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21-14424 Opinion of the Court 11
damages for their acts taken while acting in their judicial capacity
unless they acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Bolin v.
Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Stump v. Spark-
man, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978)). Whether a judge’s actions were
made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: “(1)
the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the
events occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the
controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the
confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his
judicial capacity.”
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir.
2005). A judge enjoys immunity for judicial acts even if he made a
mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded his authority.
McCullough
v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018).
We may affirm the district court’s decision for reasons dif-
ferent than those stated by the district court.
Turlington v. Atlanta
Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1433 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998). If a district
court does not consider alternative grounds for dismissal, however,
we can also remand for the district court to do so in the first in-
stance.
See Behr, 8 F.4th at 1214. An appellant can abandon a claim
by: (1) making only passing reference to it, (2) raising it in a per-
functory manner without supporting arguments and authority, (3)
referring to it only in the “statement of the case” or “summary of
the argument,” or (4) referring to the issue as mere background to
the appellant’s main arguments.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014).
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-14424
Here, the district court correctly found that, if it had juris-
diction, it would dismiss Davis’s amended complaint for failure to
state a claim against Faenza. This was proper because, while Davis
mentioned the role Faenza played in the application process in her
amended complaint, she failed to plead any “factual content that
[would] allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that [Fa-
enza was] liable for [any] misconduct” by failing altogether to as-
sert which violations of her rights Faenza played a role in.
Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. In other words, the amended complaint did not tie
any of Faenza’s acts to any violation of Davis’s rights, thus failing
to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6).
Id. And the district
court was correct to limit its consideration to the amended com-
plaint.
Grossman, 225 F.3d at 1231.
In addition, the district court properly dismissed, on judicial
immunity grounds, any claims by Davis for monetary damages.
She requested damages only to the extent that her prayer for relief
asked for costs, expenses of litigation, and unspecified other legal
and equitable as is equitable and just under the circumstances. As
much as this portion of the amended complaint constituted a re-
quest for monetary damages, however, the district court correctly
concluded that judicial immunity barred the claim. Davis does not,
and could not, argue that the defendants here acted in the clear ab-
sence of jurisdiction.
Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239. In addition, her
amended complaint establishes that the actions of the defendants
were part of a normal judicial function.
See Sibley, 437 F.3d at
1070. Davis also does not challenge the district court’s conclusion
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21-14424 Opinion of the Court 13
that judicial immunity applied to all three defendants, rather than
just Justice Nahmias, so any potential argument in this respect is
abandoned.
Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681-82. Thus, the district court
correctly determined that any request for monetary damages was
barred by judicial immunity.
IV.
In sum, we affirm, in part, as to the dismissal of: (i) the equal
protection claims in Davis’s amended complaint, as well as Counts
Two, Three, Four, Five, and Eight, for lack of subject-matter juris-
diction; and (ii) any claims against Faenza, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted; and (iii) any claims again
the defendants for monetary damages, as barred by judicial im-
munity. However, we vacate in part, as to the dismissal of Davis’s
remaining claims underlying Counts One, Six, Seven, and Nine,
and remand the case for further proceedings in that respect.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
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